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
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THE PASSING
OF THE GREAT FLEET

THE PASSING OF THE GREAT FLEET

(Sub-title on Covering paper:-
*A Record of the Betrayal of the Navy
by the so-called Liberal Party*)

BY

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To the Colonies*

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JOINT FOUNDERS
AND JOINT HONORARY SECRETARIES OF
THE
IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE

LONDON
SAMPSON LOW, MARSTON & CO., LD.

1909

WALTON
H. Naval

13577

RICHARD CLAY AND SONS, LIMITED,
BREAD STREET HILL, E.C., AND
BUNGAY, SUFFOLK.

DEDICATED
TO
THE BRITISH PEOPLES

**THE
IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE**

**Founded to secure the Maintenance of
British Sea-Power
27 January
1908**

MOTTO

"God and my Country"

Imperial Defence.

A Reprint From
The Evening Standard and St. James's Gazette,
June 17, 1908.

Go! Sail to each marge of the Seven Seas.
Fly in on the wings of each landward breeze;
Or speed in the car of the circling sun
And mark where our Marches of Empire run.
O'er snowy peak, by sandy plain,
Forest and stream, and sounding main,
In blood, and sweat,
The stakes are set.
Do we watch and ward what our Fathers won?

Soft lulled in the lap of capricious Peace,
Full glutted with gear and unearned increase.
Rewards of the deeds that we have not done,
False heirs of the duty we basely shun.
Gold for our God, our glory Gain,
Unmanned, unarmed, and idly vain.
We slumber. Yet,
The spoiler's net
Is spreading to snatch what our Fathers won.

W.

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"Not less important would it be if the two political parties could be brought to consider the question of national defence from the point of view of efficiency both as regards our naval and military forces, free from all political controversy, and discover some means by which an agreement could be entered into for the permanent maintenance of this important object."

SIR JOHN H. BRIGGS, *Naval Administrations*
from 1827 to 1892 (pub. 1897), p. 155.

INTRODUCTION

"UNDER THE SHADOW OF THE GERMAN SWORD."

"Heave or sink it, leave or drink it, we were
masters of the sea."—*Kipling*.

WHEN a man loses the instinct of self-preservation his life, unless other men help him, is unlikely to be long. When a nation loses that instinct, its tenure of independent existence will certainly be short. For the comity of this world has not yet provided any asylum for the preservation of imbecile peoples. (This is a point which might well be considered at the next meeting of international Socialists.) In the absence of such asylum, the only provision for them which history records is conquest and subjugation by some race of men who are not imbecile. This was the fate of the ancient British who had forgotten the use of arms, when they were invaded by the Teutonic hordes who are our own national forefathers. Their experiences in the fifth and six centuries A.D. must have been somewhat painful. Whether, though, in the areas occupied, all of them were massacred, or only most, is still matter of dispute. This, also, was the fate of the civilised inhabitants of the Roman Empire, after they had ceased to take any active interest in the problem of imperial defence. In their case, likewise, the culmination of the process was, according to (for

instance) Professor Freeman, distinctly unpleasant. He points out that civilisation perished in blood and flames.

About one-half of the population of Great Britain are now unconscious imitators of their British predecessors in this island, and of the Romans in the last period of their degeneracy. They, too, take no active interest in national defence.

The proof of this statement lies in the undoubted fact that at least nine-tenths of the fighting men of this country, whether in the Navy, the Army, the Territorials, or the Militia Reserve, belong to the Unionist party, although that party, unhappily, comprises at most not much more than half the inhabitants. The remaining inhabitants, dominated by the ideas of the Radicals and the Socialists, hold aloof, denounce preparation for war, and leave to their political opponents the task of preserving them from the natural consequence of incapacity to fight, namely, slavery.

No more striking illustration of this attitude could be desired than that supplied by the composition of the territorial associations. Conceived by Radical legislation, these have been born by Unionist effort. The members of the Radical party have not had the energy, or the patriotism, or the spirit of self-sacrifice (which is another name for patriotism), to further the being of their own child. In the vast majority of cases, the members of the Associations are not Radicals, but Unionists.

But these latter are in the position of the children of Israel, when they were told to make bricks without straw. The Radical party and the Radical Secretary of State for War have been going about, like the roaring lion of Scripture, seeking what items of expenditure upon national defence they might devour. And that which they have devoured in this instance is the fighting efficiency of the land forces of Britain. "It is most extraordinary—the position we are in at this moment. We have no Army. The noble Duke" (of Bedford) "has shown that we have no Army. We have neither an Army to send abroad, nor an Army to defend the country at home." These are the words of the greatest of living British soldiers, the words of Field-Marshal Lord Roberts, spoken in the House of Lords on the 18th of May, 1909. "War is not a sham," he added, "but our Army is a sham, and you will never have a real Army

until you take the nation into your confidence, and tell them what the danger is."

Probably no faction quite so deeply despicable as our Radical and Socialist party of to-day has ever been known in the history of any country. Neglect of patriotic duty does not suffice them. They must also deride the whole edifice of empire which the spirit of patriotism has produced. "What's that?" was the cry recently raised by them in the House of Commons when the Ministers of Britain were asked to hoist the Flag of Britain over Government buildings, which are the property of Britain, on "Empire Day."

That question was a confession. For in truth they do not know the meaning of Empire. Unless those who do know it succeed, and succeed soon, in wresting power from their hands, they are likely speedily to be taught the meaning, not indeed of Empire, but of conquest and of subjugation. They are fond of talking of "parasites." What are they themselves but "parasites" of the Unionist party? For under the protection afforded by the fighting men supplied, practically, by that party alone, they enjoy the British liberties which they will not help to defend. Socialists and semi-Socialists are fond of talking about revolution. Has it ever occurred to them that revolution means shooting? When shooting begins the men who do not know how to shoot, and have had no military training, are scarcely likely to subdue the men opposed to them who do possess that knowledge and that training. Civil war is, in its nature, an event far more dreadful than war against a foreign foe, but it would be, notwithstanding, an evil preferable to the alternative of subjugation by that foe.

If the overshadowing imminence of the latter peril were fully realised by that portion of the people of the United Kingdom which still retains virility, the instinct of self-preservation might well tempt them to displace, by force, the present Government, and to impose, by force, their will on the anti-patriotic and degenerate part of the nation. The great mass of the Radicals and Socialists, who compose this part, would then be reduced to a condition analogous to a state of slavery, which is, as already said, in historic fact—that is to say, in all known human experience—the natural state of men who will not, or cannot, fight. Since the conquest of this country

by Germany, which is now a near contingency, would impose on them (and, unhappily, upon us all) a far more serious state of subjection, the forcible eviction from office of the unfit would seem a course of action merciful to themselves.

Those who, though of patriotic instincts, yet regard such upheaval as void of serious possibility, do not realise the facts. The definitive attribute of a nation is its independence, and independence rests on effective fighting force. The small nations which appear to be exceptions to this rule are exceptions in appearance only, and not in reality. Their existence is permitted only by reason of the balance of forces amongst the Great Powers, and when that balance disappears, the independence so preserved tends to disappear also. Thus at the present time all thinking men recognise that the independence of Denmark, of Holland, and of Belgium is precarious in the extreme, owing to the fact that the balance of power has been disturbed by the predominance of Germany.

In like manner, the independence of Sweden and Norway was known to be threatened by Russia, and this danger has only been temporarily removed by the eclipse of that empire owing to defeat by Japan.

The independence of England was secured in the Middle Ages through the tremendous fighting quality of its sons, who were more apt to threaten Europe with invasion than to suffer it themselves. This condition of things passed away with the rise of standing armies on the Continent, and it may be said broadly that, since Elizabethan times, our independence has been secured by our Fleet.

“Heave, or sink it,
Leave, or drink it,
We were masters of the sea.”

So does Rudyard Kipling make the mariners of England speak, and to whatever depth of ignominy the national degenerates of to-day may bring us in the future, still they cannot rob the yet undegenerate sons of Britain of that source of imperishable pride.

But there was a period when, not on sea only, but on land also, England knew no rival. When Cromwell and the Puritans ruled the land, our military forces were as terribly efficient as our naval.

Are there any words in human language capable of expressing the measureless contempt which the English Nonconformists of that day would have felt, not for the genuine, but for the political, Nonconformists of the present time? Still there are, doubtless, some of the successors of the Puritans who neither hate their country nor revile the noble and self-sacrificing profession of arms. Still there are, beyond all controversy, some English Nonconformists who are honest and patriotic, who disdain the practices of their brethren, and who never, like them, make religion a cloak for party hate. To these we can imagine Cromwell as stretching the right hand of fellowship across the centuries.

But what would he say, or think, of that mass of political charlatans, that crew of religious tricksters, whose places of so-called worship are mere temples of the Radical party (in elections the committee rooms of Radical candidates); whose pulpits are political platforms; whose animating motive is malignant hate of the Anglican church; whose god is Mr. Lloyd-George; whose voices are for ever being raised against the spirit of empire and the strong soul that inspires men to fight for their country in war?

"The sword of the Lord and of Gideon," was Cromwell's cry. To fight for the right was his conception of the duty of a man. Yet creatures such as these, whom Cromwell would have hurled into the deep of the sea, constitute now, in sober fact, the very backbone of that party which at present sways the destinies of Britain. These were the men—so-called—at whose behest the Radicals and their Socialist allies were returned to power in the General Election of 1906. And the condition of their return was that they should reduce expenditure on the two services. To that reduction the late Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman pledged himself in the great meeting in which he expounded his political programme—a meeting held prior to the election, and almost immediately after he had taken office, in December, 1905. The waste involved in preparation for war, and the expediency of cutting down armaments were prominent, and (but for the "terminological inexactitude" regarding the cheap loaf, and the other exercise in mendacity regarding alleged Chinese slavery) dominant topics throughout the electoral struggle that followed.

Therefore it was, and is, the dire position of this country to be governed by Ministers supported and returned by the votes of men in rebellion against that law of the universe which has imposed competition as the condition of life upon all living organisms on this planet, from the humblest plant to the mightiest nation.

This fact by itself sufficed to place Great Britain at once in most deadly peril, and every sequent act corresponding to that fundamental error of thought has augmented the danger.

In view, then, of the presence and the dominance of a school of thought, of which the ideas are plainly incompatible, not only with the maintenance of empire, but even with the maintenance of national existence, it was clearly vital that some articulate and co-ordinate effort should be made to counteract the effects of this poison, and to define the political creed of thinking men.

It was with such ends in view that we worked to found, and did found, the Imperial Maritime League.

We were inspired by no pale and anæmic purpose. We did not propose merely to vent platitudes about the necessity of naval strength to the British people, and then (like the committee of the old Navy League) at once shirk every issue upon which the preservation of that strength depended. Rather, the object with which the Imperial Maritime League was created, and the object which it has pursued, has been to set an example of courage before public men.

To face issues fairly; to present definite ideas, held with a living faith; to call the spawn of "little-England," whether Radicals or Socialists, or a nauseous mixture of the two, by their proper names, and to hold them up to public execration and contempt;—these were some of the aims of the League, and to those aims it has adhered. And, perhaps, because of this adherence, it has continually increased and has gained the invaluable services of a band of eager and enthusiastic volunteers, who grudge neither time nor labour in its cause. The League stands for truth—not hidden, but spoken—and it stands for faith in the God-given mission of our nation and our race. And because the League's work was vital, therefore it has grown, and therefore, in face of all abuse, it has set its mark already on current thought,

But meantime the fatal ideas of the political Nonconformist and the Socialist have been practically applied by the Cabinet which represents them. A blight has fallen on the armed strength of the British Isles. "Our Army," we know, "is a sham," but what of our Navy? The miserable and grievous truth is that, in large part, our Navy has become a sham too.

We still have "tons and guns." We still have collections of decrepit ships ranged in the Homoeaze and elsewhere. Go to Plymouth, go to Chatham, go to the Mother-Bank, go to the Kyles of Bute, and you may see them, lines of cripples waiting at anchor, cripples whence the men, who were as their soul, have mainly departed, cripples with their hatches closed over degenerating machinery, cripples which need months of labour ere they could be restored to the vigour of warlike life.

But for the purpose of a review, for the purpose, that is, of practising yet another deception upon the British public, many of them are still excellent. With a little steaming (and possibly in some cases a little towing) they can be brought to the Thames, and then be made the subject of unstinted floods of laudation by all that large portion of the Press which receives its inspiration from the Admiralty and from Sir John Fisher. Very probably the articles which are to eulogise the spectacle to be presented to Londoners in July are already written. If not, they can be turned out to order without difficulty.

Unhappily, victory in war is not won by a spectacle, and a spectacle is the principal purpose to fulfil which the Navy of Britain is now being adapted by Sir John Fisher and the "little-England" Government of which he has made himself the tool.

Given a Cabinet which was installed in office, as already shown, pledged to cut down the fighting Services; given a great body of supporters who do not recognise the fact of international competition, and who do not believe in the possibility of war; and nothing then stood between the naval strength of this country and those who aimed at its reduction—except the Board of Admiralty. Of that Board the chief, the despot, the autocrat, is Sir John Fisher. Of former Boards of Admiralty the members have been equals, speaking with equal voices, and exercising an equal authority. And amongst these equals the First Sea Lord was but the first, wielding no pre-

dominant authority, taking no overshadowing responsibility.

But the same fatal week which witnessed Sir John Fisher's accession to that office witnessed also a revolution in the system of control of the British Navy. For Admiral Sir John Fisher succeeded Admiral Lord Walter Kerr as First Sea Lord on October 21st, 1904, and on the previous day was published a new "Distribution of Business between the various Members of the Board of Admiralty." This new distribution took effect under an "Order in Council," dated the 10th of the previous August, and under that Order and that distribution, Sir John Fisher became, and remains even to this day, the dictator of the Royal Navy.

That dictatorship has been subject only to one paramount source of control, the financial exigencies of the Government in power.

It would be well for the British people, well for all honest controversialists, to grasp in its completeness this last salient and crucial fact.

For in an area of highly technical detail ignorance cannot administer. At the Board of Admiralty the representative of the Cabinet is the civilian First Lord, who is, in the nature of the case, profoundly ignorant of the subject with which he has to deal. Therefore, in all professional matters—that is, in all the business which comes before his Board—he must take, and is expected to take, the advice of his professional advisers upon that Board. For the last five years—or, to be accurate, according to the date at which this is penned (June, 1909), for the last four years and eight months—one of these advisers has dominated absolutely the others. He has dominated them partly by virtue of the exceptional powers conferred upon him and partly by virtue of the arrogance of his character and the violence of his will.

Therefore we arrive at this absolute result: that, whatever changes, for good or ill, have been effected in the Navy during the period named, are the product of two forces, and two forces only—(1) Finance; (2) Sir John Fisher.

Proceeding, then, from this established certainty, we have next to ask, What are these changes thus effected? But before we answer that question we have to point out that throughout this era of naval alteration—up to the

fateful declaration by Sir Edward Grey that this country was in danger of becoming "the conscript appanage" of a foreign Power—the claims of finance have been claims for reduction, not claims for increase.

As First Sea Lord, Sir John Fisher has served two Ministries, and each was animated by the same desire—the desire to reduce naval expenditure. We are writing now, not a mere party polemic (though on national grounds we most earnestly seek the immediate overthrow of the present Government), but the truth, as we know it, and as others know it who have studied the facts.

Two of the most prominent of these facts are: first, that between the year 1895, when Lord Salisbury formed his third administration, and the year 1904, the Unionist Government built up a great fleet; and, secondly, that in the latter year, that Government was considering the necessity of cutting down naval expenditure in the year following.

If anyone doubt the first fact, or deem the statement to be due to mere party bias, let him take the Navy List and eliminate from it all ships laid down during the years named. Having achieved that elimination, he will find that he has withdrawn the great majority of fighting vessels of the pre-Dreadnought type upon which Mr. Asquith, Mr. McKenna, "The Nation," the Radical Press, and the Radical Party rely to prove the thesis that we still possess, and shall possess in 1912, the Two-Power Standard as against Germany and Austria (for to this humiliating comparison have we descended). It is the simple and absolute truth which the "Daily News," the "Daily Chronicle," and the entire coalesced forces of Radical mendacity are incapable of controverting, that the Radical Party are living and relying on the naval capital accumulated by their predecessors.

The second fact is, unhappily, equally indisputable. The Unionist Ministry did cut down the naval estimates for 1905-6. They were £36,889,000 for 1904-5. They were reduced by three and a half millions for the succeeding year. The reason was the necessity imposed by the working of our party system. A British Government lives only on condition of retaining a majority of votes. That Radical Party which has since shown itself the most recklessly prodigal authority that ever cursed a nation with the finance of fools, was then making political capital out

of the imputation of extravagance to its opponents. The General Election was already looming on the horizon. Reduction of naval expenditure appeared to be (though it was not) a party necessity. Accordingly, the Unionist Cabinet effected it.

It is but fair to admit that, superficially at least, though most assuredly not in reality, there was a case for diminution. The main Fleet of one great Power had been annihilated, and the Power whose Fleet had destroyed it was our ally. British statesmen rarely take distant views. If they did, they would expect to incur the fatal charge of being "unpractical." A far-reaching view might have revealed then, as it reveals to many now, that to abandon the mastery of half the waters of the globe to Japan was an act carrying many implications of danger to the British Empire. In the result, the visible preservation of white hegemony in the Pacific has been thrown upon the United States.

But, wisely, or unwisely, Mr. Balfour's Government desired naval economies in 1905, and they found an instrument by which to obtain such economies in the man who has been the evil genius of the Navy from that time to this.

For their appointment of Sir John Fisher, to the office of First Sea Lord, it is not open even to their fiercest political opponents to impute to them blame, if only for the reason that those opponents have lived by his advice themselves ever since their own accession to power.

The reputation of Sir John Fisher stood so high at the time when the principal defence of these Isles and of the Empire was placed in his hands, that, in truth, no justification of the trust then placed in him by the Unionist Ministry is needed. As was written of the Emperor Galba, of old, all men would have held him capable of supreme rule, had he not exercised it. It is he himself who has demonstrated his own unfitness.

One of the first of the great changes which he introduced was the recall of many vessels which bore the British Flag in distant seas. From the North Pacific, from the China station, from the West Indies, from the Cape, ships which flew the White Ensign were withdrawn. And *pari passu* with that withdrawal, and as a part of it, came also the dismantling of naval stations which had served as the bases of the vanished, or of the weakened

squadrons, and the sale of the naval stores there kept, at the prices of rubbish.

Such was the fate, in Ceylon, of Trincomalee, in Vancouver Island of Esquimalt, in the West Indies of Kingston and St. Lucia, and, in Nova Scotia, of Halifax. Over vast areas of the oceans of the world the British merchant ship in its hour of need looks now in vain for the help, for the protection, which in former time was readily available. From Vancouver to The Horn, from The Horn northwards to the West Indies, the sons of Britain, on her territory, the sea, need never look in emergency for the help of the British Navy. Save only, once perhaps in two or three years, when a squadron sailing from England pays brief visits of ceremony, the whole mighty expanse of waters is untraversed by the keels of British fighting ships. Therefore, when trouble comes, British citizens have to seek, and to deem themselves fortunate if they find, the gracious help of the war vessels of foreign States. So it was when Kingston was ravaged by earthquake, and, not British ships, but ships of the United States were the first to bring aid and even (unsolicited) to land parties to restore an order which was not in danger. So it was when rioting occurred in St. Lucia, and so it was when mutiny threatened in a British protectorate amongst the troops of the Sultan of Zanzibar. On that occasion, the British representative had to appeal to the German Consul, who, kindly responding to the entreaty made, procured (after due reference to Berlin) the presence of a German cruiser to give the needed assistance which no British cruiser was able to supply.

For this kindly help proper thanks were rendered by Sir Edward Grey to the German Imperial Authorities.

There can be, and there is, no doubt whatever that the man who was the true cause of these several disgraces to the British Empire, the man through whose measures, suggested by himself, they were incurred, is Sir John Fisher. Against this we can set the circumstance that representatives of the Imperial Press have been recently most urbanely entertained under his auspices on the occasion of a naval review at Spithead. It is a characteristic contrast.

But we come now to the question of the object with which this immense deprivation was inflicted on British shipping and British interests throughout a large part of

the world. What was the motive with which it was presumed to be effected? It was comprised in the word "concentration." That word sufficed to take in completely, first, the majority of the Executive Committee of the old Navy League (not, perhaps, in itself a very difficult achievement); next, most, though not all, writers in the Press; and, thirdly, the British public.

As, in the fifth century, the trumpets of Alaric have been said to have sounded the recall to the Roman legions quartered in this country, even thus, in our time, did the menace from Germany summon home the floating legions of Britain.

Such was the nature of the allegation, but such was not the nature of the fact.

For if the need was the need of increasing the means of coping with the fighting ships of Germany, then the men-of-war recalled should have been capable of that work. But with the natural exception of the six battle-ships on the China station, previously assumed to have been set free by our alliance with Japan, the ships recalled were for the most part of very small fighting value. Moreover, relegation to the scrap-heap, which was the sequent fate of many, can hardly be regarded in itself as an act of "concentration."

Thus, then, the motive alleged, not by Sir John Fisher, but by some of his indiscreet friends in the Press and on the platform, was one which had no relevance to fact.

But the motive alleged by the Admiralty, though different, was equally insubstantial. That motive was the wish to recall obsolete vessels, with a view (of course) to their replacement by more efficient fighting craft. Than this reason none could have been better—had it only been true. Unhappily, while the withdrawal has been carried out, the replacement—in this year 1909—still awaits performance. What would be the sentiments of the shareholders of some manufacturing enterprise if they found a large part of their machinery scrapped, and, several years later, still unreplaced?

One hundred and fifty-five vessels of war were struck off the active list of the Navy by Sir John Fisher upwards of four years ago. For their non-replacement by the Unionist Cabinet, there is explanation in the fact that the period which intervened between that elimination and their departure from office was very brief. But their suc-

cessors have now been for three and a half years responsible for the strength of the Navy, and the great void thus created in it remains still unfilled. Is this a fact which possesses no bearing on the national safety?

It is, however, a remarkable point that not less than 30 per cent. of the 80 unarmoured cruisers and smaller craft struck off the Navy List as useless upwards of four years ago have been quietly and surreptitiously re-introduced into the service. To the hard and fast adherents of Sir John Fisher we would venture to submit the question whether he was equally infallible when, as in 1904, he declared these ships to be "a source of weakness and anxiety to the Admiral," and again when he thus restored them to use?

It is time, however, to state the real reason why huge expanses of the water surface of the world have been bereft of the British fighting flag. That reason was the wish to economise money in two ways: (*a*) by reducing the number of ships at sea, and (*b*) by reducing the number of men required for the Royal Navy.

The first effect is obvious, and requires little comment. If you inflict euthanasia on whole squadrons which formerly maintained British interests in distant regions, and if you diminish other squadrons that are still permitted to do what they can to sustain those interests, none can dispute that you effect a big saving, which would be bigger yet if you applied the same method to the entire fleet. Abolish the Navy, and there will be no Navy estimates.

The second effect, however, is not generally grasped. The real cost, the chief cost, of a fleet lies in its men, and in the expense of their training at sea. The men who manned the ships brought home and scrapped (scrapped without replacement), were by that trick set free to avert the otherwise inevitable necessity of increasing the personnel. More than that, this measure created an apparent possibility of decreasing it. And it has been decreased accordingly—by 3,100 men. If the 155 vessels, or the greater proportion of them, had been retained in the Navy, then a steady augmentation of the personnel would have been requisite to man new ships as these were added to the fleet.

And so great has been the saving thus achieved that we are now, as has been elsewhere pointed out, from

6,000 to 15,000 men and officers short of the number which should have been entered three years ago, while the service ratings have been insufficient to man the fleet assembled in the month of June, 1909, for the naval manœuvres of this year. (Thus is wisdom—the wisdom of a Sir John Fisher—justified by the event.) Naval manœuvres are supposed to be devised as training for war, but these manœuvres are designed as training for the British public and the representatives of the Imperial Press. The things that are seen are praised, and the things that are not seen are unknown.

The things that are seen, that have been seen, that will again be seen, are the ships. Beyond all controversy they do actually exist. This one great point Sir John Fisher and his friends have not only succeeded in establishing, but they have also pressed it upon the attention of their astonished countrymen.

The whole of the many columns of eulogium recently written, not in all but in most of the London newspapers, concerning the review at Spithead, resolve themselves into a parade of this solitary fact. "Behold," they say, "here are vessels which figure in the Navy List, and for which the country has paid. They can actually be produced. Be amazed; go on your knees; and thank Sir John Fisher."

Yet no one, so far as we are aware, has ever questioned the physical reality of these naval phenomena. It has never, we believe, been suggested that they were spooks. With regard to the ships of the British Navy, the question raised has never been whether they existed, but in what state. Upon that point, the review at Spithead threw practically no light at all, and the forthcoming naval manœuvres will throw very little—for the public will not be presented with the reports of engineers and captains.

What is known is that there has been a terrible and appalling neglect of repairs, a neglect the full effects of which cannot be gauged without something that we have not yet obtained, namely, a genuine and impartial naval enquiry.

The following analysis, however, taken from the *Standard*, of some of the figures under this head in the Navy Estimates for the current year, 1909-10, is sufficiently suggestive. In it, the actual process of scamping

repairs would almost seem to be displayed to the public eye.

The *London*, first-class battleship, after two years in the Mediterranean, went to the Home Fleet in April, 1907, and in great disrepair to the Channel in the following June. £10,000 were allotted to her repair last year, of which only £4,000 were spent. £69,000 are allotted for her repair during the current year.

Last year £10,000 were allotted for the *Venerable* (battleship). £19,000 were spent, and another £56,000 is allotted for the current year.

Eleven thousand pounds were allotted for the *Prince George* (battleship) last year, £1,000 spent.

Forty-two thousand pounds were allotted for the *Hogue* (armoured cruiser) last year, £5,000 spent, £43,000 allotted for the current year.

The *Highflyer* (cruiser) came home from the East Indies in November of last year, and was under repair till January, figuring, nevertheless, as an effective ship during that period. £43,000 are allotted for her during the current year.

The *Pelorus* (cruiser) was down for £21,000 worth of repairs last year. Nothing appears to have been spent. £20,000 have had to be allotted for the current year.

The *Pomone* (cruiser) has been brought back from the scrap-heap, where she had been reposing since 1904, and is to have £16,000 spent on her.

In most cases, it will be seen that the sum allotted last year for the repairs of specified ships far exceeded the sum actually spent. The former amount doubtless represented, to some extent at least, the real needs of the ship, while the latter amount represented the paramount claims of old age pensions and social reform.

There is, however, another point, more vital even than the state of the ship, and that point is the state of the men. This also is amongst the things unseen and unknown by the people of Great Britain, though it is upon this that their property, their liberty, and all the conditions which mould their lives mainly depend. The state of the men means the state of their training, and, first and foremost, of their training at sea. Has that training at sea been increased or diminished by Sir John Fisher?

This question is the dominating issue. To it all other

questions are subordinate. Construction, whether of battleships, of cruisers, or of destroyers, provision of stores, and of guns; even the provision of docks—desperately urgent and vital as these matters are, they are less urgent and less vital than the question of men. Once more: has their training been increased or lessened? Has their environment been improved or has it been deteriorated? Amongst the officers, have the noble traditions of the Navy and the sense of loyalty and comradeship been preserved in their integrity? It is the answer to these queries which constitutes at once the chief part of the present peril of this country and the terrible and damning indictment of Sir John Fisher.

Putting aside mere pageantry, unreality, and stage effects, let us see what is the main requisite of successful naval war. It is a fleet. But "a fleet" means, not a congeries of ships of war, hastily collected when the hour of battle comes, but a body of vessels carefully adapted to supplement each other's uses, and manned with crews trained by long and painful labour to act together.

The principal components of the fleet are three—the battle squadron, the cruisers, and the torpedo flotilla. Each unit in each part requires long and elaborate training in conjunction with the other units before it becomes fit to perform its task, and each one of the three parts also requires training in order to learn how to fulfil its functions towards the other parts.

To such an extent is this true that in past years it has been found that even a highly trained and efficient unit of a sea-going fleet, when transferred to another fleet (as, for instance, from the Channel to the Mediterranean), was for months a source of anxiety to the Admiral under whose command she had come, and of possible danger to the other vessels. And this difficulty would arise not through the least lack of skill or training on the part of the officers or men of the new arrival, but because Admirals and captains and ships themselves all have their idiosyncracies, and until these idiosyncracies are mutually known, and custom has smoothed the edges of difference, the efficient working of that machine which we call a fleet is impossible.

Now, Sir John Fisher—after flinging away, unreplaced, so large a portion of the Royal Navy as that previously described—proceeded, while in search of yet another

economy, to lay his deadly hands on the training of our fleets at sea.

On October 24th, 1906, appeared an Admiralty memorandum, framed undoubtedly by himself, in which, in language of extraordinary ambiguity, he adumbrated his intention to transfer about one-fourth of the armoured strength of this country from conditions of full training and full efficiency at sea to conditions of half, or quarter, or less, efficiency in port.

That this was in reality the purport of the move was demonstrated in a signed analysis, published in the *Standard* a few days later, and penned by one of the present writers. Of that analysis¹ subsequent events have proved the absolute correctness, but, as shown therein, so subtle and so grossly misleading was the wording of the memorandum that the impression generally conveyed, and, in all unbiassed judgment, intended to be conveyed, was the precise opposite. "Creation of a New Fleet" was the description on the placards of the Radical Press of a measure which destroyed, as with a sword, a large part of the fighting capacity of the Navy.

The battleships and armoured cruisers thus withdrawn from the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, and the Channel Fleets were placed in the home ports, and re-christened, with the vessels in like environment, "The Home Fleet." Of that "Fleet," so termed, one division (the Nore division) was stationed at Sheerness, under conditions less wholly unlike those that create readiness for war than were the conditions imposed on the other divisions stationed in the other home ports. Although those other divisions had a separate commander-in-chief from the Sheerness division, and though they were all, with the rarest and slightest exceptions, separately trained, yet they were all officially supposed to constitute one fleet, and—to make confusion worse confounded—they were all in war, but not in peace, to be under the command of the Admiral in charge of the Channel Fleet, who was then Lord Charles Beresford.

Thus the very first canon of naval preparation—that the fleet in peace is to be trained by the same officer who is to command it in war—was disregarded and nullified by the First Sea Lord, Sir John Fisher. The great Carnot,

¹ Vide pages 18-21 of this book.

in the days of the French Revolution, was termed "the organiser of victory."

Had Sir John Fisher wished to earn from posterity the title of "organiser of defeat" he could scarcely have taken measures better calculated to attain his end.

Moreover, he adhered to these amazing dispositions in spite of the repeated and urgent representations of their certain effect, which it is public knowledge that Lord Charles Beresford made.

But though the defence of Britain against actual invasion was thus thrown upon a force so situated as of necessity to be miserably inefficient in the hour of trial, the "economies" introduced by Sir John Fisher did not stop there.

He struck at the individual training of the units composing the divisions as well as at the collective training of the divisions as a fleet. Excluding only (and partially) the Nore division at Sheerness, the ships of the other divisions of the Home Fleet were deprived of nearly all training at sea. For three or four days only in each month, and—perhaps, or perhaps not—for two or three weeks in each year, were they suffered to incur the expense of practice on the element to which they were supposed to belong. A fraction of their nucleus crews would be undergoing gunnery or torpedo courses; the rest of those crews, as Admiral of the Fleet Sir Gerard Noel has said (himself commander-in-chief at the Nore up to December last), went aboard to draw their rations, and then (usually) retired to the nearest public house. This is the usage, this the training, which that gigantic genius, that much advertised naval quack, Sir John Fisher, has managed to impose on a large part of the Royal Navy.

Why do not some of the pious political-Nonconformist humbugs, who are for ever boasting their non-alcoholic principles, attack him and attack the present Government for creating conditions of almost irresistible temptation for British bluejackets?

So much, then, for the sea training and the efficiency of that Home Fleet, which Radical Ministers have repeatedly assured the country was always in "a state of instant readiness for war." Nothing but limitless ignorance can excuse what would be otherwise unlimited mendacity.

But when we turn from men to *matériel*, the case is, unhappily, no better.

The one subject on which, hitherto, the country has fixed its eyes is the subject of the latest type of battle-ships, known as "Dreadnoughts." Upon that subject little need be said here, since the facts relating to it have already been very frequently put before the nation. One new and astounding revelation has, however, now been made by Mr. McKenna, when he avowed in the House of Commons, on June 17th of this year, 1909, that the fact of the expansion of the Krupp works was known to the Government as far back as early in 1906. This avowal is, of course, in direct antithesis to the statement of the Prime Minister on March 16th last that the Government first knew of that extension in November, 1908.

In any other day of our national history, in any other state of the public mind than that now prevailing, this admission would have freed the land from the reign of a Government which had betrayed its trust. It may be that nothing short of the actual footstep of the invader as he marches through London will avail now to arouse the population of these isles from the sleep of fools.

But it may also be that demonstration so complete of the dominance of ideas which are, as we have already said, incompatible with national existence, may at last suffice, before it is quite too late, to stir to life the dormant sanity of the land. The instinct of national self-preservation is still a force. For the reason assigned by Mr. McKenna, in his speech of June 18th, for the failure to reply to one of the most obvious challenges to the seapower of Britain which it has ever received was the passionate desire to reduce armaments. That—in the presence of the definite evidence that Germany was seeking with her whole energy, not reduction of armaments, but increase of armaments—any men of affairs, any men who were not actually insane, should forego the urgent measures of preparation which the interests of the great country so unhappily in their care demanded, seems incredible. Yet we have it plainly stated by the First Lord of the Admiralty himself.

But the delay in building battleships, the failure to prepare the means to build them, the deadly danger to our safety which such delay and such failure involve, are unfortunately but a fragment of the Government's dereliction

of duty. In these days, torpedo-boat destroyers are of equal importance with battleships for the decision of naval war; nor can such war ever be attempted with any hope of success, unless an adequate torpedo force be provided. On April 7th, 1909, in the House of Commons, Mr. McKenna officially admitted that in the years 1905-6 to 1909-10 only forty-nine British destroyers had been provided for, as against fifty-four German, and that only FOUR of the British total had been completed, as compared with THIRTY German.

(This is the way in which the "Two-Power standard" has been maintained).

On May 4th, 1909, Mr. McKenna also admitted that of "completed destroyers on the effective lists of the British and German Navies, respectively, launched during and after the year 1899" there were only "fifty-nine British" as against "seventy-two German."

The essential figures are worse even than those which Mr. McKenna then admitted. Taking, not destroyers laid down during the last ten years, but destroyers capable now of effective work off the German coast, we have but forty against seventy-eight German.

The official admissions of Mr. McKenna are in themselves enough to crush any Government and any Admiralty. Rather than suffer this state of affairs to arise, Sir John Fisher, had he loved his country more than himself, would long ago have resigned.

For our position in regard to destroyers nullifies definitely the plan which in past generations Britain pursued in naval conflict. We were wont to make the ports of our enemy our frontiers, but should Germany force war on us to-morrow that possibility is gone. We cannot blockade a superior force of enemy's destroyers with an inferior force of our own, especially in view of the fact that there are two exits from the Baltic—the Skagerak and the Kiel Canal. Moreover, of the total number of blockading destroyers a large proportion must always be absent for coaling and other purposes. But if we cannot contain the enemy's destroyers, then neither can we blockade the enemy's cruisers and battleships, because our own vessels of that kind cannot keep their places at night and in fog off hostile ports, with a hostile torpedo flotilla able to attack them. Thus any coherent plan of naval campaign against Germany has been ren-

dered impossible, and the ravage of war must be let loose in the narrow seas.

This again is the achievement of a Sir John Fisher and of the Radical Party.

One point more on this head remains to be added. Twenty of these desperately needed destroyers were voted in this year's estimates, but not one of them is to be laid down until nearly the end of this year—if then.

In reference to small and medium cruisers, our case is also nearly as bad. Of such vessels actually available for service in home waters, we have thirty against forty possessed by Germany. Of the many figuring in the returns, some are absent on foreign stations and others are special service vessels, laid up in harbour with skeleton crews, being detailed for commerce protection in time of war. None of them can be rendered fit for service under six months. In order to man them, the Reserve would have to be called out—after outbreak of war. They have no ammunition on board for the larger guns.

Collecting these various and appalling points, we find that:—

(1) Sea training has been diminished to a degree utterly incompatible with naval efficiency and national safety.

A hundred years ago we kept the seas, and the French kept the ports.

Now the Navy which keeps the seas is the German High Sea Fleet, and the Fleet which keeps the ports is the British.

(2) We find Germany allowed to attain a facility equal with, if not, as is too probably the case, greater than our own, for turning out heavy battleships. Our Government, by the mouth of Mr. McKenna, on June 18th, has stated that it allowed this in order to secure a reduction of armaments.

(3) We find even a one-Power standard in destroyers altogether lost, and a complete pre-eminence in this respect accorded to our German rivals.

(4) We find that we have, at home, and actually available, but thirty medium and small cruisers against forty German.

(5) We find that we have no dockyard on the east coast capable of taking a damaged *Dreadnought*, while Germany already has six and, by Mr. McKenna's own admission, will soon have at least as many more. We find

that the dock at Rosyth will not be finished, at earliest, till 1916.

These are dreadful facts, but another not less truly formidable remains.

In any fighting service, by land or sea, the men on whom most depends are, of course, the officers. No service of any country or any time has ever boasted finer men than the officers of the British Navy—loyal, true, self-sacrificing, and inspired by a deep and stern devotion to duty.

Into this Service, amongst these men, has been introduced somehow an elaborate system of espionage, and a system of favouritism not less abominable because bound up with it. If anything on earth could sap and could destroy the *morale* of the British naval officer—a difficult feat indeed!—then it would be this system and this method. Even in the privacy of the ward-room mess, naval officers no longer dare to speak with freedom, lest a bird in the air, a spy somewhere, should report their private utterance, and punishment to their careers should follow.

We knew of this system, and we stated the facts many times in public, on the platform, but knowledge gained privately is not proof, and proof was wanting until Sir George Armstrong rendered the great public service of producing certain letters, addressed to Sir John Fisher, which had come into his possession. If, in a regiment, a subaltern were found privately reporting upon his brother officers to his colonel, we all know, without formulating the knowledge in words, what would be the opinion of both parties which would be entertained by the average Englishman.

Need more be said? Surely the reader can fill in the blanks.

We have now to commend to that reader the book to which this review of the present naval position serves as preface. The work is a *Work of Reference*, and it claims to be no more. But it is a work of reference which comprises within it a record, not, we think, to be found elsewhere, of naval controversy, and acts of naval administration, during the last five years. In this connection it may perhaps be held to be, to some small extent, a kind of modern supplement to the great history of naval administrations from 1827 to 1892, written by the late Sir John Briggs. For any political student of our day,

for any writer on naval topics, for any man who desires to inform himself of the sad story of the British Navy and of the betrayal by the Radical Government of British sea power in the years with which we specially deal, we think that this book will have a use. It gives a basis of fact upon which opinion can be formed. It contains at least the material of history.

Incidentally, it also conveys the grievous narrative of the gradual abandonment of bounden duty by an organisation which had been specially created to sustain the patriotic spirit of British men and women. It shows how the Committee of the old Navy League became the mere bond slaves of Sir John Fisher, and, in spite of the efforts of one or two of its members, still adheres to that abject position even to this day.

It shows also how, in resistance to this gross subjection, the Imperial Maritime League was formed so that each of its members might be able to—

“draw the Thing as he sees It for
the God of Things as They are.”

June, 1909.

A SEQUENCE

"Nations and Empires rise and fall as the God of Nations wills, but the study of history shows that their rise or fall is not a sudden or capricious event, but follows closely the rise or fall of the mercury in the barometer of national character."—The Earl of Meath, Originator of the Empire Day Movement, (*Public Letter*), April 28, 1908. Quoted below, p. 506.

"No nation can be permanently strong which is founded on the quicksands of indiscipline."—The Earl of Meath, at the Lyceum Club, May 25, 1908 (*Times*, May 26, 1908, p. 10, col. 3; see also the Earl of Meath in *Evening Standard and S.J.G.*, July 15, 1908, p. 12, col. 2).

"It is the solecism of power to think to command the end, and yet not to endure the means."—Bacon, *Essay* 20, *Of Empire*.

"The preparation of fleets and the organisation of their personnel are the work of time. When the day of battle comes, it is too late to meddle with established institutions. That is why we must unwearyingly endeavour to perfect them in peace."—Chevalier, *History of the French Navy*, iii., 431.

"Success in war depends on the accuracy and forethought of strategy in times of peace, and in these days our system of strategy should be complete before war is entered upon. That side will win which has prepared itself best in time of peace."—Admiral Lord Charles Beresford at Salters' Hall, November 20, 1907. (See *Times*, November 21, 1907, p. 5, col. 6; and below, p. 257.)

"As you sow in peace, so you must expect to reap in war."—Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge, quoted *Morning Post*, October 8, 1907, p. 6.

"Anti-militarism implies war at no distant date; war with its atrocities, its mourning, and its ruin. For it is the strong who impose peace, and the weak who are subject to war. In existing circumstances the best kind of pacifism" (*sic*) "is the one which reposes upon an efficient army and a good navy, on sound finance, and on internal peace. It is still unfortunately true that peace

"belongs to those who are always ready to repel war."—Dr. Huchard, a French savant, speaking of anti-militarism in France. (*Times*, September 4, 1907.)

"To-day the question is not so much whether a nation is strong enough to make war, as whether its Government is powerful enough to prevent war. . . . It is the sword alone that now keeps the sword in the scabbard."—Field-Marshal Count von Moltke, quoted *Morning Post*, March 4, 1908, p. 8.

"It is your business, and it is our business, to have our Navy in such a state that war is impossible. The Navy is an insurance for peace. To be prepared to fight if necessary is the way to win; but the greatest interest of this country is peace, because, although we might win when we go to war, the disturbance in trade and commercial matters, the disturbance of our securities, and credit, will be so great that it will amount to defeat although we won."—Admiral Lord Charles Beresford at Salters' Hall, November 20, 1907. (See *Daily Express*, November 21, 1907, p. 1, col. 3.)

"There is nothing to choose between sea supremacy and ruin."—Admiral Colomb, quoted *Daily Mail*, March 3, 1908. ("There is no half-way house between complete safety and absolute ruin."—Sir Edward Grey, M.P. (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs), November 19, 1908, quoted *Daily Express*, November 20, 1908).

"For us the loss of the command of the sea means, not defeat, but conquest."—Sir Edward Grey, M.P., 1907-8, as quoted by Earl Cawdor (late First Lord of the Admiralty) at the Institute of Naval Architects, April 8, 1908, who added:—"It is true, every word of it; it cannot be put more strongly, nor with more absolute freedom from exaggeration." (See *Daily Express*, April 9, 1908, p. 1, col. 5.)

"If we alone amongst the Great Powers gave up the competition (in armaments), and sank into a position of inferiority, what good could we do? None whatever. . . . We should cease to count for anything amongst the nations . . . and we should be fortunate if our liberty were left to us, and if we did not become the Conscript Appanage of some Stronger Power. That is a brutal way of stating the case, but it is the truth."—Sir Edward Grey, March 29, 1909. Referred to below, pp. 431, 460.

"Le trident de Neptune est le sceptre du monde."—Lemierre, *Le Commerce* (1756).

"To be Master of the Sea is an abridgement of a monarchy."—Bacon, *Essay* 30, *Of the True Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates*.

"We have settled our accounts with Austria-Hungary, with France, and with Russia. The last settlement, the settlement with England, will probably be the lengthiest and most difficult."—The late German Historian, Professor Heinrich von Treitschke

("the Supreme Educator of the German Nation," as he has been called: see *Standard*, April 27, 1909, p. 9, col. 2),—1884. Quoted by the writer of "*The German Peril*" in the *Quarterly Review*, September, 1908 (abstracted in the *Standard*, September 14, 1908, p. 4, col. 5, and referred to in the *Standard*, September 14, 1908, leading article, p. 6, col. 4; cp. below, p. 450), and also by the *Standard*, April 27, 1909, p. 9, col. 2.

The "Krüger Telegram";—December, 1895. (Referred to below, p. 432.)

"That Trident must be in our fist."—The German Emperor, at Cologne, April 4, 1897. Quoted by Mr. L. J. Maxse in the *National Review*, April, 1908, p. 181; Mr. Percival A. Hislam, *Daily Express*, July 14, 1908, p. 4, col. 6; Lieut. A. C. Dewar, R.N., *Is Invasion Impossible?* [Feb.], 1909, p. 5; Mr. L. J. Maxse in *National Review*, Feb., 1909, p. 870; Mr. H. F. Wyatt and Mr. L. G. H. Horton-Smith in *Standard*, Feb. 4, 1909, p. 4, col. 3; and below, p. 366.

The German Navy Act, 1898. (The First German Navy Act.)—(See below, pp. 115, etc.)

The German Navy League Founded, April 30, 1898.—(See *N.L.J.*, June, 1898, p. 82, and below, pp. 46, 67, 117, 127, 169, 208, 289, 411, 434, 443, 453, etc.)

"Unsere Zukunft liegt auf dem Wasser."—(The German Empire's Watchword for ten years past.) The German Emperor, at Stettin, September 23, 1898. (See *Times*, December 19, 1907, p. 7, and *Evening Standard and S.J.G.*, October 17, 1908, p. 12, col. 2; Lieut. A. C. Dewar, R.N., *Is Invasion Impossible?* [Feb.] 1909, p. 5.) Quoted below, p. 432.

The Hague Conference of 1899. (See below, pp. 4, etc.)

"We" (Germans) "are in bitter need of a strong navy. If the "increases demanded during the first years of my reign had not been "continually refused to me in spite of my continued entreaties and "warnings, how differently should we now be able to further our "flourishing commerce and our interests oversea."—The German Emperor, October, 1899 (*within a week after the outbreak of the British South African War*). Quoted by Mr. Percival A. Hislam, *Admiralty of the Atlantic*, February, 1908, p. 19, and *Daily Express*, July 14, 1908, p. 4, col. 6 (and cp. also *Observer*, November 1, 1908). See also below, pp. 432, 463, 505.

"Germany must have a fleet of such strength that a war, even "against the mightiest Naval Power, would involve risks threatening "the supremacy of that Power."—*Preamble of the German Navy Act of 1900*. (See *Journal of the R.U.S.I.*, February, 1907, p. 153. Compare also the German Naval Minister, Admiral von Tirpitz, in the Reichstag, 1899;—Quoted *N.L.J.*, March, 1903, p. 62.)

The German Navy Act, 1900.—(See below, pp. 4, 115, 117, 453, etc.)

"The national energy of Germany has need of space, and the "soil of our country has become insufficient. The dream of a

"Greater Germany has become a law for the present generation, under the iron hand of necessity. . . . War with England has nothing improbable about it . . . and our chances of success against England improve day by day."—General von der Goltz, in the *Deutsche Rundschau*, at the close of 1900. Quoted by Mr. L. J. Maxse in the *National Review*, Oct., 1907, p. 175, referred to below, p. 250.

"When the projected increase of our fleet has been effected the outlook for us will be bright. The British Fleet will no longer be an irresistible opponent to us. Numbers decide as little on the sea as they do on land. Numerical inferiority can be compensated for by greater efficiency. Besides, as places are not wanting where England's defences are weak, it is a mistake to consider a landing in England a chimera. The material basis of our power is large enough to destroy the present superiority of Great Britain, but Germany must prepare beforehand for the coming struggle, and must arm in time without losing a day, for victories on the sea cannot be improvised."—General von der Goltz, 'writing not many years ago' (apparently at the close of 1900). Quoted below, pp. 431, 435; and cp. also Mr. L. J. Maxse, in *National Review*, Oct., 1907, p. 175 (referred to below, p. 435).

"The Admiral of the Atlantic greets the Admiral of the Pacific."—The German Emperor's signal to the Czar of Russia, in the Harbour of Reval, August, 1902. Quoted by P. A. Hislam, *Admiralty of the Atlantic*, Feb., 1908, pp. i, v; and by Mr. H. F. Wyatt and Mr. L. G. H. Horton-Smith in *Standard*, Feb. 4, 1909, p. 4, col. 3; and see below, pp. 67, 366.

The German Navy Act (1900) Amendment Act, 1906. Commonly known as "The German 'Novelle.'"—(See below, pp. 4, 5, 35, 115, 117, 287, 439, 453, etc.)

The Hague Conference of 1907. (See below, pp. 4, 6, 10, 47, 49, 50, 110, 117, 212, 230, 248, 249, 252, 254, 373, 427, 512, etc.)

The German Navy Bill, 1907, introduced in the Reichstag November, 1907. Adopted (German Navy Act, 1908: see below), March 31, 1908—(signed by the Kaiser, April 20, 1908)—and Admiral von Tirpitz (Imperial Secretary of the German Navy) summoned by the Kaiser to the Upper House of the Prussian Diet "as a mark of special confidence," March 31, 1908.—(See below, pp. 266 *sqq.*, 282, 359.)

"England may experience a terrible *débâcle* in a naval war."—Herr Bebel, the German Socialist Leader, and erstwhile opponent of German Naval Expansion—(who had previously, on December 9, 1907, on behalf of the German Socialist Party, "delivered a severe indictment of Germany's policy of naval expansion"; see *Standard*, December 10, 1907, p. 7)—after hearing Admiral von Tirpitz's secret and confidential communications to the Budget Committee; December, 1907. Quoted by Lieut. Carlyon Bellairs, M.P., December 31, 1907 (see below, p. 279).

The German Navy Acts (1900 and 1906) Amendment Act, 1908. Commonly known as "The German Navy Act, 1908."—(See above on the preceding page, and below, pp. 81, 266 *sqq.*, 273, 279, 282, 286 *sq.*, 353, 355, 359, 439, 453, etc.)

"To the Great Day!"—The now prevailing Anti-British toast in German Naval Circles. (See Mr. Rowland Hunt, M.P., *Standard*, June 12, 1908, p. 10, col. 1. Cp. also Mr. H. M. Hyndman in the *Clarion*, 1908, quoted in the *Standard*, August 10, 1908, p. 9, col. 4; Mr. L. J. Maxse in *National Review*, Feb., 1909, p. 874; and Mr. H. F. Wyatt in *The Imperialist*, January, 1909, s.v. "The Shadow of the German Sword," pp. 114 *sq.*)—See below, pp. 450, 517.

"Germany will be a great naval power, in spite of her geographical position and history. Her claim to rule the waves will, earlier or later, bring on a war with Great Britain. That war will be one of the most terrible conflicts of the twentieth century. What its result can be no one can foretell, but so much is sure—that Germany does everything that human forethought and the patience and energy of a nation can suggest."—M. Lockroy, formerly French Naval Minister, in his *Lettres sur la Marine Allemande*, as quoted in the *Standard*, Aug. 3, 1908, p. 4, col. 4.

"One Life, One Flag, One Fleet, One Throne,
Britons!—

Hold your Own!"

—LORD TENNYSON.

THE PASSING OF THE GREAT FLEET

THE NAVY LEAGUE AND ITS NEGLECTED DUTY

October 21,¹ 1904. Admiral Sir John Fisher succeeds Admiral Lord Walter Kerr as First Sea Lord.²

October 20, 1904. The supremacy of the First Sea Lord over his colleagues established under and by virtue of an "Order in Council" (dated August 10, 1904),³ and the alterations made thereunder in the "Distribution of Business between the various Members of the Board of Admiralty,"⁴ October 20, 1904.⁵

November 30, 1905. The Cawdor Memorandum; a minimum Programme on the face of it. See below pp. 5, 72, 77, 203-4, etc.

¹ October 21 (Trafalgar Day) according to *N.L.J.*, 1904, p. 256, *N.L. Annual Report* for 1907, p. 5, and "A Critic" (s.v. "The Case against the Admiralty,") in *Times*, April 24, 1909;—Oct. 20, to cite the *Royal Navy List and Naval Recorder*, No. 120, Oct. 1907, p. 669.

² "There is no time limit to his office; but to my mind the Naval Lords should be elected for a definite period";—Admiral Sir E. R. Fremantle (May 20, 1908) in *Standard*, May 21, 1908, p. 9, col. 2. (Cp. also the statement made by Mr. McKenna, M.P., as First Lord of the Admiralty, in the House of Commons, on March 29, 1909, quoted *Standard*, March 30, 1909, p. 4, col. 1).

³ Issued as a Parliamentary Paper [Cd. 2416], and reprinted *N.L.J.*, April, 1905, p. 39.

⁴ Issued as a Parliamentary Paper [Cd. 2417], and reprinted *N.L.J.*, Apr., 1905, pp. 93 sq.

⁵ For the effect of the change see:—*Standard* (leading articles), June 11, 1907, p. 6, col. 7; June 21, 1907, p. 6, cols. 5-6; Nov. 15, 1907, p. 6, cols. 6-7; Jan. 27, 1908 (reprinted below, p. 303); Feb. 24, 1908, p. 6, col. 5; Feb. 25, 1908, p. 6, col. 6, and the *Standard*, Jan. 2, 1908, p. 8, col. 4 (s.v. "Year of Naval Unrest"), April 10, 1908, p. 7, col. 7, quoted below, pp. 370 sq., March 29, 1909, p. 4, col. 1;—"Barfleur," *Naval Policy: A Plea for the Study of War* (Jan., 1907), quoted in *Standard*, Jan. 19, 1907;—*Morning Post*, July 2, 1907 (leading article), p. 6, col. 6, quoted below, pp. 149 sq.;—"Civis," in *Spectator*, 1907 (on "The State of the Navy" in 1907;—quoted in *Standard*, April 23, 1909, p. 9, col. 2), and again in *Spectator*, July 18, 1908, p. 88;—Lieut. Carlyon Bellairs, M.P. (s.v. "The Impending Naval Crisis"), in *National Review*, Oct., 1907, p. 310. See now, also, *Standard*, March 18, 1909 (leading article), p. 8, col. 6;—*Daily Express*, March 20, 1909, p. 1, col. 2, and (leading article), p. 4, col. 4;—*Morning Post*, March 20, 1909 (s.v. "Naval Autocracy"), p. 7, col. 3;—Sir George E. Armstrong, in *Standard*, April 21, 1909, p. 5, cols. 1 sq., and in *Times*, April 23, 1909, p. 7, col. 4, May 3, 1909, p. 4, cols. 5 sq.;—"An Observer," in *John Bull*, April 24, 1909, p. 470;—Mr. L. J. Maxse, in *National Review*, May, 1909, p. 343.

December, 1905. Unionists' Resignation. Accession of Liberals to Office. Prime Minister :—Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman.

December 21, 1905. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's Speech at the Albert Hall. (Commented on below, pp. 2 sq., 25, 34, etc.)

THE LIBERALS AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

IRISH TIMES, Jan. 2, 1906; MORNING POST, Jan. 4, 1906; *N.L.J.*, Jan., 1906; SCOTSMAN, Jan. 3, 1906; STANDARD, Jan. 5, 1906.

To the Editor.

Athenæum Club, S.W., Dec. 25, 1905.

SIR,—“Remember that we are spending at this moment, I think, twice as much on the Army and Navy as we spent ten years ago;”—and this observation of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, in his speech of the 21st inst.¹ at the Albert Hall, drew from his Liberal audience, as from its context he doubtless hoped it would, the cry of “Shame!”

Apparently, then, the country has to reckon with a Prime Minister who is for cutting down the estimates for the Navy and Army (I invert the order of the services) as one of the Liberal methods of “ensuing² peace.”³

Did one venture to hope that Sir Henry's views (if rightly so interpreted) are not shared by his Cabinet, one is unfortunately reminded of a similar utterance which fell from the lips of another and very prominent member of the present Cabinet, Mr. Morley, as late as the 4th June last, when, in his speech at Birmingham in connection with the Cobden Centenary, he asked his hearers: “What would Mr. Cobden have said of Army and Navy Estimates rising between 1895 and 1904 from £38,000,000 to £77,000,000?”—as if the question of the adequacy of our Imperial preparations for defence could properly be considered from the point of view of this country's expenditure alone, and independently of the policy and doings of other Powers!⁴

With regard, indeed, to the question actually put by Mr. Morley: it were perhaps idle, in passing, to speculate upon what would or might have been Mr. Cobden's *ipse dixit* had he lived to see our day;—though it may well be doubted whether that *ipse dixit* would in fact have been of a character to support Mr. Morley's expectations; for, if there is one thing which Mr. Cobden stated with no

¹ December 21, 1905 (see text of this page).

² See below, p. 26.

³ Be it never forgotten that Sir Henry was the War Minister in the late Liberal Government, and that it was due to his dangerously insufficient provision of cordite in 1895 that his Government was defeated (cp. Mr. H. Chaplin, *Globe*, Apr. 29, 1907):—and he it was to whom, as Premier, the British people of the United Kingdom in January, 1906, ventured to entrust the preservation of their liberties and their Empire (see below, p. 4).

⁴ “A small fleet would be adequate for the command of the ocean if other countries had no fleets. Among the blind the one-eyed man is king. It is useless to compare our present power with our power in the past; we must set it beside other powers of the present.”—Mr. H. J. Mackinder, *Money Power and Man Power*, 1906, p. 8.

indecisive sound, it is his emphatic statement in the course of his well-known Rochdale speech of June 25, 1861:—"I would vote A HUNDRED MILLIONS rather than allow the French Navy to be increased to a level with ours, because I should say that any attempt of that sort, without any legitimate grounds, would argue some sinister design upon this country;" £100,000,000, that is, upon the Navy alone, to say nothing of the additional expenditure requisite for the Army; and Mr. Cobden, again, had France alone to think of, while France is not the sole great Naval Power of to-day.

But Mr. Morley has been known at times to express himself as Imperialistically as the best of us. "*Everybody knows, Liberals as well as Tories, that it is indispensable that we should have not only a powerful Navy, but I may say an all-powerful Navy.*" Thus Mr. Morley himself at Manchester as long ago as the 8th November, 1893—and the keenest naval enthusiast could not have desired more. Is Mr. Morley, are the Liberal party, prepared to take stand to-day upon this statesmanlike ground—or do they propose, now they are once more in office, to abandon it?

Assuming the Liberal party to endorse Mr. Morley's views of 1893, will it be seriously contended (in face of the facts and figures available and open to all) that we have at the present time—what Mr. Morley states that in the view of Liberals as well as Tories it is "indispensable that we should have"—"an all-powerful Navy," or, indeed, anything approaching it? If not, the duty of the Liberal party is clear. The British Empire cannot afford even to risk disaster; and Sir Henry and Mr. Morley will themselves be the first to acknowledge that the greatest possible extravagance for Great Britain is a Navy which, powerful as you will, may yet be inadequate to the duties which it is or may be called upon to perform; and for the reason, as so concisely put by a recent naval writer,¹ that:—"A fleet which cannot do the work required of it is useless, and worse than useless, since its cost must be nearly as great as that of a sufficient fleet."²

"*Si vis pacem, para bellum*," therefore—a trite expression it may seem nowadays, but one which is none the less essentially true. The only safe method of seeking peace and ensuing it is to prepare for war; and, to be of any effective service to the Empire, such preparation for war—which can perforce be only made in time of peace—must be preparation adequate to the Empire's needs. Anything short of that will only invite a war of aggression against ourselves and court disaster for the Empire. So far from "ensuing peace," it will only ensure war—and therewith, it may be, the downfall of the whole fabric of that Empire, which is ours so long only as we are able to hold it.

I am, Sir, Yours faithfully,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH,

*Member of the Executive Committee of the Navy League.*³

¹ Mr. H. W. Wilson, *N.L.J.*, June, 1904, p. 151.

² Cf. also below, p. 9, and (*s.v.* "The Outlook: Mr. Asquith and the Peace 'Conies,'"") *Daily Mail* (leading article), March 3, 1908.

³ Compare also the same writer's letter of June 8, 1904, entitled "Mr. Morley, Mr. Cobden, and the Navy," published in the *Glasgow Herald*, June 11, 1904, the *Irish Times*, June 14, 1904, p. 6, the *N.L.J.*, July, 1904, p. 212, and the *Scotsman*, June 11, 1904.

GENERAL ELECTION.

January, 1906. General Election. Result :—Ministerial majority, over Unionists, of no less than 356.

House 670 ;—Ministerialists [Liberals 379, Labour Party 51, and Nationalists 83 =] 513 ;—Unionists 157.

Clear Liberal majority (88) over all other Parties together :—Liberals 379 ;—All other Parties [Unionists 157, Labour Party 51, and Nationalists 83 =] 291.¹

Spring, 1906. German Navy Act 1900² Amendment Act 1906—(commonly called “The German Novelle”)—passed.^{3 4}

May 30, 1906. H.M.S. *Montagu* (first-class battleship) runs ashore (see *N.L.J.*, July, 1906, p. 177).—Hopes⁵ of salving her.

APPEAL FOR NAVAL REDUCTIONS.

June 21, 1906. Deputation of Liberal Members to the Prime Minister with the object of inducing the Government to take steps to reduce the Admiralty Programme of naval construction.⁶ (Memorial signed by about 120 Ministerialists.)—See the *Times*, June 22, 1906 (and below, Index, s.v. “*Appeals for Naval Reductions*”).

June 30, 1906. “The Liberal Party and the Navy”;—by a Liberal M.P.⁷

July 10, 1906. “Naval Reductions”;—and the Liberal Reductionists ;—by Mr. F. T. Jane.—*N.L.J.*, August, 1906, p. 201.⁸

July, 1906. “Our Shipbuilding Programme.” Severe criticisms by Admiral Fremantle (Vice-Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Navy League).—*N.L.J.*, August, 1906, pp. 200 sq., from which the following is an extract :—

“We are now told that the meagre shipbuilding of four armoured “ships for the present year is to be cut down, by one battleship of

¹ The state of parties to-day (May 10, 1909) is :—Liberals, 366 ; Unionists, 168 ; Nationalists, 82, and one vacancy ; Labour, 52 ; Socialists, 1 ; Total, 670.

² Just as the German Navy Act, 1900, followed on the Hague Conference of 1899, so too the German Navy Act 1903 (below, pp. 81, 266 sqq., 279, 286 sq., 353, 453) followed immediately on the Hague Conference of 1907.

³ The Bill had been “accepted by the Federal Council on Nov. 16,” 1905 (see *N.L.J.*, Dec., 1905, p. 322).

⁴ For its significance see Admiral Fremantle (quoting “Excubitor”), December 6, 1906, *Jol. of R.U.S.I.*, February, 1907, pp. 154 sq. Cp. further, *N.L.J.*, December, 1905, pp. 322 sq. See also Mr. H. Tero in *N.L.J.*, Aug., 1906, p. 201 ; and Mr. H. W. Wilson, “To the Sea Lords,” *Daily Mail*, Jan. 8, 1908 (referred to below, pp. 286 sq.).

⁵ Unfounded ; see below, p. 6.

⁶ Imploing reduction simply for reduction's sake.—*N.L.'s* Official Lecturer, *N.L.J.*, March, 1907, p. 78. (For comment, see e.g. Mr. A. Lee, M.P., quoted below, p. 5).

⁷ (Presumably Lieut. Carlyon Bellairs, M.P.) Issued with *N.L.J.*, Aug., 1906.

⁸ Ending :—“We are at the parting of the ways, when all must declare themselves for a suitable navy or against it.”

"the *Dreadnought* class being omitted, in spite of the increased efforts being made by foreign Powers and the probable loss of the *Montagu*.

"How far even the present programme is from maintaining our "Two-Power standard in the future is evident."

July 20, 1906. Admiral Fremantle—at the Meeting of the Naval and Military Defence Standing Committees of the London Chamber of Commerce—seconding resolution against reduction.¹—(See *N.L.J.*, August, 1906, p. 202.)

July, 1906. "A Plea for Maintaining our Battleship Programme"; —by Mr. Arthur Lee, M.P. (late Civil Lord of the Admiralty), in *National Review*, Aug., 1906, from which the following is extracted:—

"That document" (the Cawdor Memorandum), "issued in November, 1905, contained the first clear scientific statement of our ship-building necessities that had been issued for many years, and it must not be forgotten that it was drawn up after the conclusion of the war in the Far East and the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and at a time when the Anglo-French *entente* was an already accomplished fact. This disposes of the main arguments of the 120 Liberal M.P.'s who recently petitioned the Prime Minister to curtail the shipbuilding programme.² . . .

"The four 'Sea Lords' who were the technical advisers of the late Board of Admiralty are unchanged, and are the technical advisers of the present Board as well.³ There has been no change, at any rate for the better, in our international relationships, or in the strategic problems which the Empire has to face. There has been no reduction foreshadowed in the naval programmes of the Great Powers; on the contrary, there has been a marked increase in foreign programmes since the beginning of the present year.^{4 5} . . .

"The situation is one not only of gravity but of considerable urgency."

REDUCTION OF CAWDOR PROGRAMME.

July 27, 1906. Reduction of the Programme enunciated in the Cawdor Memorandum of Nov. 30, 1905⁶—namely, a minimum of four *Dreadnoughts* in each of the two years 1906-7 and 1907-8—to three

1 "Deprecating any proposal which will tend to curtail the Naval Programme by reducing the number of new ships, the provision of which has been considered necessary by the highest naval authorities"; see *N.L.J.*, Aug., 1906, p. 202. See Admiral Fremantle, again, in *N.L.J.*, Nov., 1906, p. 276 (quoted below, p. 73).

2 See above, p. 4.

3 See below, pp. 9, 40, 240.

4 And yet Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman excused his reductions of July 27, 1906 (next referred to pp. 5 *sq.*), by the statement (on July 31, 1906) that they had been made after careful consideration of the programmes of foreign Powers and changes in them!

5 See Mr. Lee, further, quoted by Lieut. Carlyon Bellairs, M.P., in *Journal of R.U.S.I.*, Feb., 1907, p. 152, to the effect that in framing the Cawdor Memorandum no account was taken of the new German Programme). Cp. also *N.L.J.*, Jan., 1906, p. 2.

6 See above, p. 1.

and two in the two years respectively; a net reduction of eight to five (and this notwithstanding the then almost certain loss of the *Montagu*).¹ The Hague Conference² held out as a reason for the extra reduction in 1907.—³ ⁴ ⁵

TWO-POWER STANDARD THROWN OVER BY LIBERALS.

July 28, 1906.

"When we have elaborate calculations made as to what France and Germany are building, is it really a very likely contingency that France and Germany should be allied and go to war with us? I do not object to the Two-Power standard as a rough guide, but this is a Two-Power standard of almost a preposterous kind."⁶—Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, Prime Minister, in the debate on the Naval Estimates, July 28, 1906. (See the *Times*, July 29, 1906.)⁷

August, 1906. The *Montagu* (see above, p. 4, *s.v.* May 30, 1906) given up for a total loss.⁸ ⁹ Not replaced.¹⁰

August, 1906. "Destroying Britain's Naval Supremacy";—by Mr. H. W. Wilson, *National Review*, September, 1906.

¹ Cp. the comment of the then vital Navy League, referred to below, pp. 72, 204.

² Not inappropriately, during its course styled the "Vague" Conference, *E.S. & S.J.G.*, July 18, 1907. Concerning the Conference itself see above, p. 4, and below, pp. 10, 47, 49, 50, 110, 117, 212, 230, 248, 249, 252 (text and nn.), 373, 427, 512, etc.

³ Cf. *Journal of R.U.S.I.*, Feb., 1907, p. 152.

⁴ For another excuse offered, see above, p. 5, n. 4; and for its lack of foundation, p. 5, n. 5.

⁵ Concerning the third ship of 1907-8 (the *Vanguard*) see below, pp. 50, 249 (text and n. 5), 436.

⁶ Compare with this, Sir Henry's statements of earlier date;—

"I accept in the fullest and most complete form the doctrine that it is necessary for this country to hold the supremacy of the seas; and, further, I accept the doctrine that the test and standard of this supremacy is that our fleet should be as strong as the combined strength of *any other two fleets in the world*. That supremacy I believe to be the traditional possession of this country. I believe it is necessary, on account of our insular position and the extent of our Colonial empire, and I further believe that that necessity has not been impaired, but rather increased, by the development of our trade, by the multiplication of our interests in all parts of the globe, and by the increased facility of communication all over the world."—(Sir H. C.-B. in debate April 1, 1889, quoted by Lieut. Carlyon Bellairs, M.P., in the *National Review*, June, 1907, p. 619; see also below, pp. 34, 309.)

"I accept in fullest and most complete form the doctrine that it is necessary for this country to hold the supremacy of the seas. I accept the doctrine of standard of supremacy that our fleet should equal *any two other fleets in the world*. . . I yield to no reasonable person in a desire to maintain the Navy in all the strength and efficiency that are necessary."—(Sir H. C.-B., March 15, 1906, quoted in *Standard*, Oct. 15, 1906, p. 6, col. 5.)

⁷ Upon Sir Henry's "disquieting" statement of July 28, 1906, see Admiral Fremantle, *N.L.J.*, Nov., 1906, pp. 276-7.

⁸ The announcement was made *the day after Parliament adjourned*. See Lieut. Carlyon Bellairs, M.P., *Journal of R.U.S.I.*, Feb., 1907, p. 131. (Cp. the Government's similar tactics in regard to the Dilke Return, 1908; below, *s.v.* Aug. 2, 1908, p. 440.)

⁹ In passing, it may be of interest to mention that the total loss to the country through the wrecking of the *Montagu* was £1,069,290. (For details, see Report of Committee of Public Accounts, *Daily Express*, July 29, 1908, p. 5, col. 1.)

¹⁰ See further below, pp. 9, 35, 77, 204, etc.

THE NAVY AND THE NAVY LEAGUE.

Extracts from

An Address at Dunvegan, Isle of Skye, N.B.

 September 3, 1906.¹

At the request of MacLeod of MacLeod, C.M.G., Captain 74th Highlanders (retired), an address was given in the Hall, Dunvegan, Isle of Skye, N.B., on Monday, the 3rd September last, by Mr. L. Graham H. Horton-Smith, F.S.A.Scot., of the London Scottish R.V., and of the Executive Committee of the Navy League,—“*Relative to Naval Supremacy as the Sole Basis of our National Security and to the Work of the NAVY LEAGUE in connection therewith.*”

The speaker commenced by pointing to the non-political nature of the League's work. Politics, he said, in the ordinary acceptance of the term, were the curse of this country, and it was only in the sense of ensuing the good of the *πολιτεία* or “body politic” as a whole that the Navy League was political; and in that sense it was political to the core. . . .

Turning to the question of the Navy regarded as a matter of insurance, he demonstrated the incompatibility of cheap food with a cheap Navy; reminded his hearers of our dependence on others for the great bulk of our food and raw materials, pointing to the ascertained value of the food imports into the United Kingdom, at the rate, namely, of £435 per minute, and of our total imports into the United Kingdom at the rate of £1,000 per minute^{2 3 4}, and recalling to their minds the fact that at the outbreak of the Spanish-American war (when we were not ourselves at war, nor likely to become involved therein) the mere rumour, a rumour which, by the way, turned out to be unfounded, a rumour that one single three-master from the Argentine (the *Shenandoah*), laden with wheat for this country, had been captured, was actually sufficient to send up the price of wheat in the London market! “If that can be done in the green tree, what,” he asked, “shall be done in the dry?” With an actual war in which we were engaged, or with a chance of such a war (and the chance would always exist while the Navy was weak), the cost of even such food and raw material as could come in would be largely increased, there would be danger of employers having no, or insufficient, raw material for continued work—danger, in consequence, of the wage-earners being unable to earn wages, and that, too, at the very time when food prices would be rapidly rising, with the consequent risk of our being starved into submission by the outcry of the poor. With 12,000,000 “on the verge of starvation” in peace-time, what, he asked, would be the condition of the country at large in time of war? “*The Invasion of 1910*”⁵ by Germany had been admirably written, and was, he thought, by no means an improbability; but the foreigner might perchance prefer to administer the slower and easier form of death by starvation; and if we allowed his navy to grow at its present pace while we looked

¹ See *Aberdeen Free Press*, Nov. 12, 1906, p. 3, col. 2; *Inverness Courier*, Nov. 2, 1906, p. 6, cols. 3-4; *London Scottish Regimental Gazette*, Nov., 1906, pp. 238-241; and *N.L.J.*, Nov., 1906, pp. 289-291.

² See “Facts,” published by the N.L., January, 1906 (*N.L.J.*, Jan., 1906, p. 25).

³ For facts relative to the later year, 1907, see “*Numericus*,” in *Standard*, Sept. 16, 1908 (*s.v.* “Navy as an Insurance”), p. 7, cols. 2 *sq.*

⁴ Interesting articles on “The British Navy and Food Imports,” by Mr. F. T. Haggard, F.S.S., will be found in the *Outlook*, February 29, 1908, and March 21, 1908.

⁵ By Mr. Le Queux and Mr. H. W. Wilson.

all too idly on, the day would come when our great inheritance would pass from us.

Again: he reminded them that no longer are we only an island Power. To-day we are a "*Continent*"; we march with Russia, France, Germany, the United States, and others in different parts of the world; and unless we can keep open the waterways of the world, and so relieve our troops by sea, our Empire cannot stand. How could we have kept South Africa and the Cape, had we not been strong enough to keep the seas open for the transference of our troops?¹ Perchance his audience might be inclined to put their trust in alliances—he spoke with reference to the Japanese alliance, the *entente cordiale* with France, and that with our cousins beyond the Atlantic Main²; but let them remember that we should find allies only so long as we were strong (for with weakness none would wish himself allied); and after referring to Lord Dufferin's words that "No nation's independence or possessions are safe for a moment unless she can guard them with her own right hand," he drew enthusiastic cheers from his audience in quoting the patriotic lines of Burns:—

"Be Britain still to Britain true
Amang oorsels united:
For never but by British hands
Maun British wrangs be richted."

But perhaps they might say, "Oh, the Government always looks after the Navy, and we needn't bother." That was a wrong view; and, outlining the history of the various Governments from 1850 onwards relative to the Navy, he showed that, generally speaking, nothing adequate had ever been done for the Navy, by either party in the State (and he said 'by either party' advisedly), except as the direct result of an outburst of public opinion.³ Had not Lord

¹ Cp. above, p. R.F., and below, pp. 370, 432, 463, 505.

² With regard to alliances, *ententes cordiales*, and the like, it is well to bear in mind the sound dictum of Bismarck (quoted, *Standard*, December 12, 1906) that "The friend of to-day must be guarded against as the enemy of to-morrow":—re-affirmed, as it has recently been, by Admiral von Tirpitz (Imperial Secretary of the German Navy) in the Reichstag, December 9, 1907 (quoted, *Standard*, December 10, 1907, p. 7) in the phrase:—"Present friends may be future enemies."

To give a salient instance:—"During the Crimean War France proved herself in every way a faithful ally of Great Britain. During that momentous period the friendship existing between the two nations seemed indissoluble, and up to the spring of 1856, France could do nothing wrong; she was our ally. In 1857 she could do nothing right. Then we remembered that during the Crimean War Napoleon's interests were more developed than ours. We suspected every step taken by him, and believed he was animated by a steadfast desire to humiliate us. We called to mind the swamps of Cayenne, the manufactured Plebiscitum. We spoke of Judas' kisses at Buckingham Palace and the Tuileries. The new year came. Orsini's attempt on the life of the Emperor, matured in England, was made in Paris. Lord Palmerston, willing to do the Emperor a pleasure, and shocked at the use which had been made of the right of asylum, introduced the Conspiracy to Murder Bill, a most righteous measure in principle but not carefully framed. The English people felt outraged by the insults of the French Colonels, and would not have it at any price. The 'most English of Ministers' was hurled from power, and when the Derby-Disraeli Ministry was formed, the leader of the House of Commons said war with France was a question, not of days, but of hours. Then an Old Bailey jury acquitted Dr. Simeon Bernard on the charge of conspiracy against the life of Napoleon the Third. The feeling on both sides of the Channel grew more and more intense, and it is not easy to say what might have happened, when the eleven bolt fell, not towards this side of the Channel, but over the Alps. The electricity was drawn off in another direction, but the lesson had sunk deeply into the hearts of the people."—*Ludgate Monthly*, reprinted in the *London Scottish Regimental Gazette*, January, 1907, pp. 7 sqq. (The lesson would seem to have been entirely forgotten since.)

³ Cf. *The British Navy for 100 Years*, by the late Mr. C. McL. McHardy (1896), pp. 31 sq.; *N.L. Report for 1895*, pp. 1-2; *Report of Proceedings at N.L. First Annual Meeting*, January 26, 1896, p. 6; *N.L.'s "Need for Effort,"* October, 1902, p. 3.

Wolseley said, and rightly said: "We are never ready for war, and yet we never have a Cabinet that would dare to tell the people this truth"? Let them bear in mind the late Laureate's considered lines:—

"The Fleet of Britain is her All-in-All:
Her Fleet is in *your* hands,
And in her Fleet her Fate."

Yes, it is the people of Britain who must see to it that the fleet of Britain is adequate. . . . Once the British people goes to sleep, the British Government sleeps also—and sleep accordingly must have no place among the British people. . . . Parochial things, the lesser things of the kingdom, were, no doubt, interesting and important things in their way; even the proverbial "parish pump" need not be neglected. But let them, he urged, look ever to the foundations of the Empire, before they began to tinker with the pictures on its walls!

And were matters any better to-day than in times gone by? What, he asked, except the exigencies of the political game, had led to the recent extraordinary *volte-face* on the part of the Lords of the Admiralty?¹ Why, again, did the Admiralty, in announcing that the attempt to save the first-class battleship *Montagu* had failed and was to be abandoned²—the *Montagu*, whose efficiency as a fighting unit was one of the elements upon which the present Government's estimates of but a few weeks earlier were admittedly based—why, he asked, did not they at the same time announce that another battleship, a *Dreadnought* for preference, should be immediately laid down to take her place? Did it need to be emphasised that an inadequate Navy was the greatest possible waste of money?—for, as was said by a recent naval writer:³ "A fleet which cannot do the work required of it is useless; and worse than useless, since its cost must be nearly as great as that of a sufficient fleet." The Navy was an insurance, and unless it fulfilled its purpose properly as such (and it could only do so if invincible) the money spent on it was practically thrown away, and our great Empire would fall, like the ripe plum which undeniably it is, to the nation which, with greater profit from the lessons of the past, had girded itself adequately to pluck it. People talked of the expense!—but what, he asked, are the estimates for the Navy, what have they ever been, compared with the sum of £100,000,000 which Mr. Cobden himself was willing to spend upon it in certain eventualities, with reference to the navy of France alone? And Cobden was speaking only of the Navy (independent of the due and proper additional expenditure on the Army), and Cobden had but France to think of, while France is not the sole great naval Power of to-day.

He had spoken, for the moment, of *battleships*; but what of our *cruisers*? Had we enough of them? He would recall to their minds how much the lack of frigates hampered Nelson in the great wars, and his constant (though too fruitless) calls for more. Reminding them that things had not been standing still since Nelson's day, he spoke of the enormous increase of our commerce, as also of the Empire itself, gave details showing how far less self-supporting

¹ See above, p. 5.

² See above, p. 6.

³ See above, p. 3.

was the United Kingdom now than in Nelsonian times, and dwelt upon the immensely increased responsibilities imposed upon the Navy of the present day. He referred them to Admiral Sir Geoffrey Hornby's cry of nearly twenty years ago for more cruisers;¹ and coming to times more recent, he cited Admiral Sir Harry Rawson's² statement of May, 1900, that "We have not enough battleships and cruisers to meet any great emergency that might arise." In February, 1902, we found the Rear-Admiral of the United Kingdom (Admiral the Hon. Sir Edmund Fremantle) taking up the cry, and giving it as his deliberate opinion that—apart from battleships, in which he considered we were deficient to the large number of thirty—in the number of cruisers required (in part for service with the battle-fleet, in part for the no less essential purpose of the protection of our vast commerce and food supply) we were short by no less a figure than 167!—and calling for that number accordingly.³ In January, 1903, the Admiral was still calling for them.⁴ In a letter to the *Times* of March 6, 1905,⁵ we find him again upon the subject: "It is more especially the lack of cruisers to which I am anxious to direct attention as an urgent question if our maritime position is to be maintained"; while, only so lately as June of the present year,⁶ he was to be found writing in the public Press⁷—and no doubt after taking into due consideration the international situation of to-day (including the destruction of the Russian fleet and the renewal of the alliance with Japan) as also the fact that of recent years we have, to a certain extent, built more large destroyers to do in part the work of cruisers—that even to-day we require, beyond what we in fact possess, "at least fifty fast protected cruisers of not less than 24 knots speed," to be "built without delay." "As matters stand," he wrote, "our protected cruisers are getting obsolete, and they are not being replaced"; adding regretfully:—"This is a most important question, and I wish I could succeed in compelling adequate attention to it." Did the point need further stress?⁸ . . .

Let them remember that we have no imprescriptible right to rule the seas; and let them take to heart the great warning of the "Recessional"—"*Lest we forget!*" And yet the Government—the British Government—would wish us to go to the Hague Conference with a fleet inadequate at our backs!—as if, forsooth, the British Empire should be the first to disarm! "When a strong man armed keepeth his palace, his goods are in peace; but when a stronger than he shall come upon him and overcome him, he taketh from him all his armour wherein he trusted, and divideth his

¹ See *N.L. Report* for 1899, p. 8; *N.L.'s "Need for Effort,"* October, 1902, pp. 6, 7; *N.L.J.*, December, 1905, p. 307.

² Now Governor of N.S.W.

³ *N.L.J.*, Feb., 1902, p. 25. (Referred to in *N.L.'s "Need for Effort,"* October, 1902, p. 2.)

⁴ See *N.L.J.*, Jan., 1903, p. 7.

⁵ Reprinted in part, *s.v.* "Our Lack of Cruisers," *N.L.J.*, April, 1905, p. 104.

⁶ June, 1906.

⁷ See *e.g.*, *N.L.J.*, June, 1906, p. 147 (and see also *ibid.*, p. 148).

⁸ On this question of cruisers, see further, Lieut. Carlyon Bellairs, M.P., Dec. 6, 1906 (*Journal of R.U.S.I.*, Feb., 1907, pp. 146-7), and Admiral Fremantle in *Standard*, Dec. 21, 1906 (and below p. 78, n. 6).

"spoils."¹ "Put your trust in God," said pious Cromwell; but—he added, "*and keep your powder dry!*" And human nature is still human nature. It's a very far cry, as yet, to the Millennium.

After a cordial reference to the admirable work done by Mr. H. F. Wyatt as the League's Volunteer Envoy to the Colonies, and to the success which had attended his two years' mission over-seas, the speaker made closing reference to the question of foreigners in the mercantile marine and to the grave danger to the Empire arising therefrom;—and, with respect to the suggestion, sometimes made by unthinking persons, that in war we could to some extent obviate this danger by laying up our ships, replied that we could not possibly afford to allow of this, as it would mean the cessation of, or interference with, the importation of food and raw materials into this country, which would of itself be tantamount to the starvation, either wholly or in part, to which he had already alluded. Explaining carefully how that by the abrogation of the Navigation Acts we had arrived at our present condition; how that thereby there was now, in fact, an actual dearth or insufficiency of British sailors (with the result that, as Sir Alfred Jones said at Liverpool last year,² when asked why the shipowners so often took foreign sailors, "We have to, because there literally are not enough British sailors"), he made reference, in connection therewith, to the Merchant Sailor (or "Mercantile Jack") Petition of seven years since (which, originating with the University of Durham, drew its support also from quarters far beyond the University walls); to the Navy League's carefully elaborated scheme for the establishment of training ships at suitable points round the coast of the British Isles for the training of British boy-sailors; to the Deputation of the Navy League and others in 1899 to Mr. Goschen and Mr. Ritchie (as they then were), First Lord of the Admiralty and President of the Board of Trade respectively, in relation thereto, and to the admitted danger of the then existing state of affairs as evidenced by the Merchant Shipping (Mercantile Marine Fund) Act of 1898, followed by Mr. Ritchie's well-known utterance in the House of Commons on February 28, 1899.³ That danger, he shewed, was still with us, and it was one which urgently awaited remedy. . . .

In conclusion, he called upon them, one and all, as scions of the Norsemen, sons of the sea, to come forward and help the cause of Britain, ere it were too late.

October, 1906. "Naval Reductions";—Severe Criticism by Admiral Fremantle (*N.L.J.*, November, 1906, pp. 276-8):—"The reductions are political and undoubtedly suspect."

¹ Luke, xi, 21-22.

² May, 1905.

³ Upon this matter generally, see the speaker's letters of June 23, 1899, in the *London Scottish Regimental Gazette*, July, 1899, pp. 111 *sq.*, and of June 5, 1905, in the *N.L.J.*, July, 1905, pp. 193-4.

GOVERNMENT AND THE NAVY.

PERILOUS CHANGES.

October 15, 1906. Intended "Reduction of the Fighting Power of the British Fleet by One-fourth."¹ The Government's Scheme—whereby "the efficiency of the Fleet has been insidiously sacrificed to a false system of economy"¹; a scheme "deliberately sacrificing the security of the Empire to the exigencies of party politics"¹—announced and detailed by the *Standard*, October 15, 1906.

See—*s.v.* "Government and the Navy: Perilous Changes: Twenty Capital Ships Removed: Supremacy Risked: Reduction of Sixteen Battleships"—*Standard*, October 15, 1906, p. 7, col. 1; and, for luminous comment upon the scheme, the *Standard's* leading article, October 15, 1906, p. 6, cols. 5-6. See, further, *Standard*, October 25, 1906, p. 7, col. 1, and November 17, 1906, etc.²³

October 19, 1906. Navy League letter to Press, signed by Chairman, Vice-Chairman (Admiral Sir E. R. Fremantle), and Secretary.—(*N.L.J.*, November, 1906, p. 275.) Extract:—

"11. It is currently stated in the Press that it is proposed in the near future materially to reduce the number of battleships in commission, which will necessarily place officers on half-pay and men on shore, thus reacting on the efficiency of the fleet and its thorough preparation for war. In the absence of any official confirmation of this rumoured new departure, the NAVY LEAGUE withholds comment on what would be a reversal of our accepted naval policy, likely to prove disastrous to the service and the country."⁴

October 24, 1906. Admiralty Memorandum published, intimating proposed changes in the composition of the Channel, Mediterranean, and Atlantic Fleets, and the relegation of units withdrawn from those Fleets to a new force to be called the "Home Fleet":—

REDISTRIBUTION OF NAVAL STRENGTH.

CONSTITUTION OF A HOME FLEET.

October 23, 1906.

The following communication⁵⁶ was made to the Fleet on October 23:—

The Board of Admiralty have decided on the following alterations in the distribution of naval strength:—

¹ *Standard*, Oct. 15, 1906 (leading article), p. 6, col. 5.

² Cp. also *Standard*, July, 25, 1907, "Record of Events" (below, p. 219), etc., etc.

³ See also, *s.v.* "Other Navies Compared," *Standard*, Oct. 15, 1906, p. 7, cols. 1-2.

⁴ Admirable criticism—but most unhappily not followed up by appropriate action when the Committee were faced with the actual state of things thus deprecated. (Cp. below, p. 201, text and n. 5.)

⁵ Published on Oct. 24th, 1906, and reprinted here from *N.L.J.*, Nov., 1906, pp. 275, 276.

⁶ Described as "A Fraudulent Admiralty Memorandum" (below, p. 19); for an "Analysis" of which see (*e.g.*) Mr. H. F. Wyatt, below, pp. 19 *sqq.*; and for the gist of which see below, p. 16. And see also the *Standard's* criticisms *passim* (*e.g.* above, on this page, and below, p. 23); and other criticisms below, *e.g.*, pp. 18, etc., etc. (See Index, *s.v.* "Admiralty" and "Redistribution Schemes.")

I. A distinct fleet will be constituted from the ships in commission in reserve, to be called the "Home Fleet,"¹ under the supreme command of a flag officer with the *status* of Commander-in-Chief and headquarters at Sheerness, but his functions will not interfere with those of the existing Commander-in-Chief at the Nore. This fleet will be in every respect organised with a view to enhancing its value as a fighting force, and battle practice and other fleet exercises not at present carried out by the Reserve divisions will be introduced. The primary object aimed at will be sea-going efficiency, and for this purpose the cruises of the Home Fleet will be made as frequent as practicable.

II. A sliding scale will be adopted in the strength of nucleus crews, so that the vessels first required in war will have the largest complements; whilst the vessels in "special reserve," instead of having no crews as at present, will have adequate complements of officers and men to keep the propelling machinery and armament efficient. The vessels now in special reserve will be gradually replaced by other ships as they cease to be effective units of the Home Fleet. The Board of Admiralty will determine the nature of this sliding scale of nucleus crews from time to time.

III. The distribution of ships between the present Channel, Mediterranean, Atlantic, and Reserve Fleets will be altered, in order to permit of the strengthening of nucleus crews and the organisation of a Home Fleet as above described. No ships will be paid off, no men will be sent to the barracks or to the instructional schools, and no alteration will be made in the proportion of officers and men serving afloat.

IV. The Board of Admiralty have also decided that, where it will conduce to the fighting efficiency and convenience of the service, there will be an interchange of vessels between the Home Fleet, on the one hand, and the Channel, Atlantic, and Mediterranean Fleets on the other. For instance, any vessel in the three last-named fleets requiring an extensive refit will be replaced temporarily by a ship of the Home Fleet.

V. The cruisers of the Home Fleet will from time to time be combined for instructional and tactical exercises with the cruiser squadrons of the other fleets, and the Atlantic and Mediterranean Fleets will be combined as usual for the same purpose.

The Board of Admiralty are satisfied that the constitution of a Home Fleet will increase the immediate striking strength of the Navy, and that the more active training which the nucleus crews will receive under the new system will add to the sea experience of the Fleet as a whole.²

These changes will be gradually carried out in such a way as to obviate any dislocation of the various fleets and squadrons.

¹ "When we published, on October 15, 1906, the information that the sea-going squadrons were to be reduced by one-quarter of their strength, and that, in addition, eight battleships and four cruisers were to be laid up as a preliminary to their abolition, the orders for those reductions had already been issued. The project of calling the resultant increased Reserve 'The Home Fleet,' had not then been invented. *It was invented for the purpose of disguising the real object of the change, which was to effect an economy.*"—*Standard*, July 19, 1907, p. 7, cols 4-5. Concerning this re-christening see also the *Standard's* leading articles, July 17, 1907, p. 6, col. 5; July 27, 1907, below p. 223; July 1, 1908, p. 8, col. 5; and also *Standard*, July 25, 1907 ("Record of Events"), below, p. 219; and see further, Index, s.v. "Rechristening."

² As to this, see Mr. Strachey, below p. 398 n. 12.

A CHEAP NAVY

ORDERS TO CRUISER SQUADRONS

DANGEROUS LOSS TO THE FLEET

*From the "Standard's" Correspondent at Portsmouth,
October 24 (Evening), 1906*

STANDARD, October 25, 1906, p. 7, col. 1.

'Orders have been issued to reduce the First and Second Cruiser Squadrons, from 6 ships each to 4 ships each. . . .'

It will be remembered that the removal of 4 armoured cruisers from the sea-going force is part of the new scheme of reductions which we published ten days ago.¹ It is thus already in operation. It cannot be too plainly stated, or too clearly apprehended, that what we have called the intended reduction in the Fleet, and what the Admiralty Memorandum calls its reorganisation, is nothing more or less than a permanent weakening of the Navy. There is here no question of strategic policy. It is a question of maintaining the traditional national policy of British naval supremacy or departing from it. It is a question of maintaining the avowed policy of the present Board of Admiralty, the declared policy of the present Government, or of departing from it.

We affirm that the Two-Power standard has been deliberately abandoned;² that the sea-going Fleet, on which alone the first brunt of hostilities must fall, is to be permanently reduced by nearly a quarter of its strength; that 20 valuable ships are to be thrown away; and that the Reserve is to be swollen out of all legitimate proportion. We affirm that such a system not only dangerously weakens the Navy in point of *matériel* instantly ready for war, but that the placing of some 12,000 men in barracks, in addition to the 30,000 already there, must seriously diminish their efficiency. We affirm that these things are done simply and solely to effect a money saving, and that such saving is the falsest conceivable kind of economy.

The official Admiralty memorandum published yesterday³ controverts not one of these points. It merely calls the intended changes by different names.⁴

REDUCED NAVY.

REJOICING IN GERMANY.

STANDARD, October 25, 1906, p. 7, col. 1.⁵

The *Daily Express* in its issue of to-day (October 25, 1906) publishes the following telegram from its Hamburg correspondent:—
I have interviewed a number of highly placed German naval

¹ *Standard*, Oct. 15, 1906, see above, p. 12.

² Cf. *Standard*, Oct. 15, 1906, p. 6, col. 5, and p. 7, cols. 1-2.

³ Oct. 24, 1906.

⁴ See also the admirable letter "The True Issue," by "R.N.," in the *Standard*, Oct. 25, 1906, p. 7, cols. 1-2.

⁵ Also *Evening Standard & S.J.G.*, Oct. 25, 1906.

officials at Kiel on the subject of the proposed reduction in the British Navy, and in every instance I have noted the extreme satisfaction with which the German officers have received the latest decision of the Liberal Government.

"Every ship placed in the Reserve with a nucleus crew," said an officer who is high in the councils of the German Admiralty, "means an advance in the German naval programme, because it signifies so much depreciation in the British Navy."¹

"It is simply ludicrous to imagine that a navy can be efficient if a large number of its ships are stripped of their working crews. It is false economy, and we, as the rivals of Great Britain, are particularly glad to see that the Liberal Government has fallen into the trap."

"The German motto for the maintenance of sea power is 'Efficiency first, last, and all the time,' and the only way in which we find the efficiency can be maintained is by constant practice in sea-going ships."

"If the British Liberal Government could only be maintained in power long enough, the dearest wishes of every German naval officer would be realised. Germany's sea power would be enhanced, because we feel certain that these attempts to save money are bound to weaken Great Britain's sea power, and consequently our voice in international affairs would be received with greater authority and respect."¹

In every quarter I am assured that the German Government will leave no stone unturned to bring its fleet to the highest pitch of efficiency, not necessarily for the purpose of bringing on hostilities, but to realise the wish of every patriotic German in making the Kaiser's fleet as powerful as the resources of his Empire can accomplish.

N.L. EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING.

October 29, 1906.

AGENDA.²

5. Mr. H. F. Wyatt proposes that the Committee shall :—
 - (a) Consider suggested means of influencing public opinion.³
 - (b) Consider a proposed letter to Mayors and Chambers of Commerce :—

DRAFT OF PROPOSED LETTER TO CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE, AND MAYORS.

*Brought forward in Committee by Messrs. Wyatt and
Horton-Smith.⁴*

SIR,—The Executive Committee of the NAVY LEAGUE are anxious to draw the attention of your Chamber to the very serious changes

¹ Cp., analogically, but in another connection, below, pp. 60 *sqq.*, 78, 203, 287.

² A few extracts from the Agenda of the Executive Committee of the N.L. are given in this book (pp. 15 *sqq.*, 21, 22, 40 *sqq.*, 49 *sq.*, 50, 52 *sqq.*), as mere matters of history, much on the same principle as that upon which the late Sir John Briggs acted, in writing his classical work on "*Naval Administration from 1827 to 1892*" (publ. 1897). Most of the points referred to in the Agenda in question have already been made matters of public notoriety—and the reprint merely serves to place them in their own due order and sequence.

³ Cp., *e.g.*, below, p. 21.

⁴ See further as to the fate of this letter below, pp. 21, 22, 40 *sqq.* (esp. p. 41).

in our naval policy which have been recently announced. The object of these changes is doubtless reduction of naval expenditure, that is of the amount paid for the insurance of the Empire, of the country, and of our whole sea-borne trade.

As any tampering with the strength of the Fleet must lessen the stability of all our institutions and of the commerce of the whole Empire, and would lead towards a further fall in the price of consols, the Committee do not hesitate to appeal directly to your Chamber (or "to you") for their (your) attention and their (your) support.

The points in the naval policy of His Majesty's Government which occasion alarm are four:—

I. *ABANDONMENT* of the Two-Power Standard of naval strength, which was agreed on by the leaders of both political parties in 1889.¹

II. *REDUCTION* of the shipbuilding programme (declared by the Admiralty in November last to be necessary) from eight armoured ships of the *Dreadnought* class to five, and this in face of the fact that since November last we have lost one first-class battleship, the *Montagu*.

III. *LARGE REDUCTION* in the aggregate amount of sea training received by the Fleet.² On the 24th ult.³ the Admiralty issued a public statement,⁴ the terms of which are very confused, but the upshot of which is proved by analysis to be that a large part, it is believed nearly one-fourth, of the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the Channel Fleets will be withdrawn from full service and full training, and put on half service and half training.

IV. *SCAMPING REPAIRS*.—There is great reason to fear that one method by which reduction of naval expenditure is being secured is by depriving His Majesty's ships of vitally necessary repairs requisitioned for by their own officers. It is rumoured that in some ships, not more than one to five per cent. of such requisitions have been sanctioned since Christmas last. Such neglect would be no new feature in the history of Naval administration, for in 1874, when the Liberal Government went out of office, there were but fourteen effective ironclads, out of a nominal list of 52, fit to go to sea, the rest being laid up with holes in their boilers, or other radical defects. The Fleet, which had been wrecked by a Liberal administration, was left wrecked by the sequent Conservative Government, which did not make good the grave omissions of their predecessors.

In view of these considerations, of which the national importance will be evident, the Committee venture, with great diffidence, to suggest to your Chamber the expediency of forming a Committee of your members to deal with this and kindred questions, after the example set by the London Chamber of Commerce.

The Executive Committee of the NAVY LEAGUE also venture to appeal to you most urgently to call a public meeting, either on behalf of your Chamber, or in co-operation with the municipal authorities of your city,* to inform the public fully of what is going forward,

* Or "either on behalf of the Municipality, or in co-operation with the Chamber of Commerce."

¹ See also below, pp. 40, 41.

³ Oct. 23 (24), 1906.

² See below, pp. 18, 19 *seq.*, 141, etc.

⁴ Printed above, pp. 12—13.

and to assist in enabling the voice of the country to be heard in protest before it is too late.

In the event of such a meeting, the NAVY LEAGUE would do its best, if desired, to supply a speaker competent to explain the whole situation.

Awaiting your reply,

We are, dear Sir,

CHAIRMAN.

VICE-CHAIRMAN.

SECRETARY.¹

A CHEAP NAVY.

STRONG PROTESTS AGAINST PLANS OF REDUCTION.

STANDARD, *November 1, 1906.*

From a number of letters on the naval reductions policy we select the following² :—

Portsmouth,

October 30, 1906.

To the Editor of the STANDARD.

SIR,—I should be glad if you would allow me to add my testimony of gratitude and admiration to that which you have already received from your readers. Your excellent tenacity of purpose has not only demolished the bewildering structure of misrepresentation with which the supporters of the new Navy scheme have sought to obscure the real thing, but it has succeeded in convincing many, who—as I am fain to confess—like myself, were very reluctant to believe that the policy of the present Board of Admiralty, as we knew it hitherto, was to be completely reversed.

The layman, after all, must ultimately be guided by the professional. But the naval officer on full pay is debarred by the King's Regulations from publicly expressing his sentiments upon matters connected with the Service. Yet there is nothing in the King's Regulations, or out of them, to prevent a private expression of opinion on matters of common knowledge. Here in Portsmouth one cannot but learn a good deal. Indeed, I may say that I made it my business to discuss the whole matter of the intended reductions with naval officers of my acquaintance. Even before your statement was published³ there were sinister rumours afloat; but the tradition of the Service naturally forbade any discussion of them, outside the Service, until the thing became public property.

It was then I found to my surprise that the information which you, Sir, first gave to the country, had been known more or less accurately to five out of six naval officers for some weeks. Here is a pleasing illustration of the consistent way in which the nation, and, not less, the House of Commons, is deliberately kept in a state of

¹ As to the fate of this letter, see above, p. 15, n. 4.

² See also "Man at the Wheel," *Standard*, Nov. 1, 1906 (mentioned below, p. 24 text, and n. 1).

³ *Standard*, Oct. 15, 1906; above, p. 12.

ignorance. I will wager that but for your public-spirited action, the whole scheme would have been put into operation without a word said!

But now that the designs of the Government (save the mark!) are revealed, I find not a single naval officer, from an admiral to a sub-lieutenant, who—in his private capacity—does not absolutely condemn the whole scheme from top to bottom. And why? Because they are the people who know. They know, as no civilian can understand, the indescribable importance of keeping the Fleets in full commission at sea; they know, because they have handled the business, how long it takes to shape a crew taken from “eating their heads off” in barracks, into a right ship’s company; they know what lies behind the specious official cant of “instantly ready for war,” and the “Two-Power Standard,” and so forth. And they also know the weight and power of that tremendous and ineluctable machine, the Imperial Navy of Germany.

Sir, the naval officer, the bluejacket, and the marine, taking them for all in all, are the finest men this country needs. They are being as surely sacrificed by the present Government as if they were lined up in front of a firing party. Of the country itself I say nothing. It will get what it deserves, and will deserve what it gets.

The other night, at a public banquet given down here, a distinguished admiral returned thanks for the Navy. He said he felt peculiarly privileged in so doing, because, so far as he could see, in two or three years there would be no Navy to return thanks for.

I am, Sir, Your obedient servant,

CIVILIAN.

A CHEAP NAVY.

MR. H. F. WYATT'S VIEWS ON THE SITUATION.

BOLD CRITICISM.

MISLEADING MEMORANDUM.

STANDARD, *November 2, 1906, p. 7, col. 3.*

We print the following extremely important communication¹ from Mr. H. F. Wyatt, who, as our readers will remember, recently travelled to all the great self-governing colonies in connection with the NAVY LEAGUE, with the object of arousing Colonial interest in the Fleet as the first line of Imperial Defence. Mr. Wyatt was everywhere received with sincere enthusiasm, and was accorded the high privilege of being heard at the Bar of the House of Colonial Legislatures. His letter dealing with the present disastrous policy will be read with the keenest interest in every province of the Empire.

¹ Reprinted in the *Evening Standard and S.J.G.*, November 2, 1906, p. 12, cols. 1-2, s.v. “The Navy: Analysis of the Admiralty Memorandum: Serious Charges”;—and it is from such reprint that the sub-headings in the letter as here reprinted are taken.

A FRAUDULENT ADMIRALTY MEMORANDUM.
ANALYSIS.

United University Club,
Pall Mall, S.W.,
November 1, 1906.

To the Editor of the STANDARD.

SIR,—I venture to suggest that the best way in which to discover the real intentions of the Government with regard to the manifesto issued by the Admiralty on the 24th ult.¹ is to analyse its contents. Very remarkable results follow, as I think you will admit.

Clause No. I. states that a "distinct Fleet will be constituted from the ships in commission in Reserve." But these ships will consist of those now in that Reserve, plus the six or eight battleships (if one of those numbers be correct, as I assume here) and the four cruisers which are to be withdrawn from full training and put on half training. All the rest is pure verbal juggle, of which the upshot is that the ships previously in commission in Reserve will get rather more sea training than they had before, while the ten or twelve ships taken from full active commission and added to those in commission in Reserve will get very considerably less. "The primary object aimed at," the clause goes on, "will be sea-going efficiency," which, in the case of these ten or twelve ships, is to be attained by diminishing the training which they at present receive by about one-half.

Keeping in full view this diminution of training—and the diminution is a demonstrated fact, revealed instantly by analysis, not an opinion—let us next consider Clause II. This does not deflect by a hairsbreadth the result already attained. It merely states two things:—(1) That the Admiralty will exercise their discretion as to what ships shall have nucleus crews and as to the strength of those nucleus crews; and (2) that ships which are in their judgment of no further use ("as they cease to be effective units") will be put out of use altogether, and—naturally—replaced by better ships. Both these two stated intentions are matters of course, involving obvious and primary duties which the Admiralty could hardly be expected to neglect. Why then are they set forth by the Board as if they constituted some new and surprising departure?

"A PALPABLE TRICK."

Clause III. declares that "the distribution of ships between the present Channel, Mediterranean, Atlantic, and Reserve Fleets will be altered, in order to permit of the strengthening of nucleus crews and the organisation of a Home Fleet as above described." An intention to withdraw six or eight battleships and four cruisers from full service and place them on half service, and to withdraw the crews of these ships from full training and place them on half training, could not possibly be glossed over with more cunning or less candour than it is here. The trick—for it is a palpable trick—is performed by the wilful confusion of two totally different things; that is, by purposely confusing the movement of ships belonging to

the three first-named full service Fleets with the allotment of ships withdrawn from those full service Fleets to a half service Reserve Fleet. The movement of ships from the Atlantic Fleet to the Channel Fleet, or from the Channel Fleet to the Mediterranean Fleet, is clearly not a matter upon which the country can expect to be consulted, and it does not affect the aggregate strength of these three sea-going forces. But the withdrawal of ships from those forces, that is from full service and full training, and their allotment to the "Home Fleet," that is to half service and half training, is a matter absolutely and totally distinct, a matter upon which the two Houses of Parliament and the country have a right to be heard. Now, the Board of Admiralty, who are responsible for this sentence, must have been perfectly aware that it confused two profound dissimilarities, that it mixed up the inter-movement of the units of active Fleets with the reduction of those Fleets, and that it was eminently calculated to mislead the man in the street. Why, then, did they sanction it?

But we have not yet done with Clause III., which continues:—"No ships will be paid off, no men will be sent to the barracks or to the instructional schools, and no alteration will be made in the proportion of officers and men serving afloat."

DELUSIVE.

The second statement here is the only assurance having value in the whole Memorandum. The declaration that no men will be sent to the barracks is explicit, and, in face of it, I do not see that it is possible to make any attack on the Admiralty on this point. But the other two statements have the same extraordinarily delusive character which marks the whole of this Memorandum. The words "no ships will be paid off" are yet another gloss set upon the one solid fact that a certain number of ships are to be withdrawn from full training and put upon half training. They obscure that fact, and, by obscuring it, they mislead the country. An exactly similar criticism applies to the statement that "no alteration will be made in the proportion of officers and men serving afloat."

The plain man would take this to mean that the number of officers and men on full service will not be diminished. But analysis shows that it does mean nothing of the sort, for officers and crews are equally "afloat," whether they are in a ship in commission in Reserve lying in the Hamoaze or in a ship in full service in the Mediterranean, only, in the former case, they receive half training, and in the latter full training. It is difficult to realise without indignation the deliberate deception involved in this wording.

Clause IV. states that there will be "an interchange of vessels between the Home Fleet on the one hand and the Channel, Atlantic, and Mediterranean Fleets on the other." This interchange will not alter in the least the aggregate reduction in sea-going training: it only alters the units which are to experience that reduced training. Yet it somehow conveys the impression that in some mysterious way the aggregate training will be increased.

THE "INTENTION TO DECEIVE."

Clause V. merely says that "the cruisers of the Home Fleet will, from time to time, be combined for instructional and tactical exercises with the cruiser squadrons of the other Fleets." For years past

cruisers, as well as battleships, belonging to the Reserve have been so combined during naval manœuvres, and the only interest attaching to this announcement lies in that which is not revealed, namely, the *extent* to which this combination will be effected in future.

After Clause V. follows this remarkable statement :—"The Board of Admiralty are satisfied that the constitution of a Home Fleet will increase the immediate striking strength of the Navy, and that the more active training which the nucleus crews will receive under the new system will add to the sea experience of the Fleet as a whole." What this statement really amounts to is this :—"The Board of Admiralty are satisfied that to withdraw a large part (one-fourth?) of the Channel, Mediterranean, and Atlantic Fleets from full training and to put them on half-training will increase," etc.

This Admiralty communication reflects dishonour on the source whence it emanated, because it is quite obviously animated and inspired from start to finish with the intention to deceive the public; as, in fact, it has deceived it. But its real meaning will become obvious to anyone who will take the trouble to examine it in the light of this analysis.

May I add that, in my humble judgment, not only England, but the whole Empire owes a debt of gratitude to the *Standard* in this matter?

I am, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT.

November 2, 1906. Protest against NAVY LEAGUE's apathy;—by "Ten Years Navy Leaguer," *Standard*, November 2, 1906, p. 9, col. 5.

N.L. EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING.

November 5, 1906.

AGENDA.¹

5. To consider a proposal by Mr. Wyatt to ask Mr. Balfour and Lord Rosebery, and other prominent politicians of both parties, to address a great public meeting in the Royal Albert Hall, to protest against the declared intention of the Government² to cease to make equality with the next two Fleets the standard of our Naval strength.³

8. Consideration of proposed letter to Chambers of Commerce and Mayors. (Copy circulated herewith).⁴

¹ Cp. above, p. 15, n. 2.

² Cp. above, p. 6.

³ This was placed on the following week on the "Standing Agenda;"—but no action was ever taken upon it by the Committee.

The Committee throughout demurred to the calling of a public meeting on the ground that they could not ascertain the true facts as to the state of the Navy; and, although one of us (Mr. Horton-Smith) insisted, both upon this occasion (Nov. 5, 1906) and upon later occasions, that the very fact that the Government refused to give the facts was the strongest fact for a public meeting, the Committee decided to take no step in that direction. (Cp. further below, p. 200.)

⁴ Printed above on pp. 15-17. And, as to its fate, see above, p. 15, n. 4.

November 10, 1906. "A Cheap Navy: Singular Attitude of the Navy League: Question for Subscribers";—*Standard*, November 10, 1906, concluding as follows:—"In default of explanation" (of such attitude) "it will be for the subscribers to the Navy League to determine whether it is worth while to continue to support an association whose independence and impartiality are open to grave suspicion."¹

N.L. EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING.

November 12, 1906.

AGENDA.²

10. Consideration of proposed letter to Chambers of Commerce and Mayors. (Circulated with last Agenda).³

Standing Agenda:—To consider a proposal by Mr. Wyatt [see s.v. "Agenda," paragraph 5, for November 5, 1906, above p. 21⁴].

LIBERALS AND THE TWO-POWER STANDARD.

November 12, 1906.

The STANDARD, November 14, 1906, and *the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL*, December, 1906, p. 322.

To the Editor.

Athenæum Club, Pall Mall, S.W.,

November 13, 1906.

SIR,—The Prime Minister has been asked a plain question in the House of Commons, on the 12th November,⁵ namely:—"Whether it was the policy of the Government to make equality with the two next strongest fleets the standard of our naval strength."

He has declined to answer that plain question, riding off on the *ipse dixit* of himself that "the present strength of the British Navy is in excess of the Two-Power standard."

Accepting Sir Henry's statement for the sake of argument only, it is yet (as I respectfully submit) immaterial to the point. The question is not: "What is the relative strength of the British Navy to-day?" but: "What is to be the relative strength of the British Navy two or three years hence?"—and the country is entitled to know in this connection whether the Government bases its programmes of new construction on the Two-Power standard in its hitherto accepted sense (of capacity to meet and beat the two next strongest fleets) or not.

It is a plain question—susceptible of an equally plain answer. That answer has been refused.

I am, Sir, yours faithfully,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH

(Of the London Scottish R.V. and of the Executive Committee of the NAVY LEAGUE).

¹ See also "Only an Englishwoman," *Standard*, Nov. 17, 1906, below, p. 24.

² Cp. above, p. 15, n. 2.

³ Printed above on pp. 15–17, and see above, p. 21, and below, pp. 40–42. As to its fate see above, p. 15, n. 4, and below, p. 41.

⁴ And see above, p. 21, n. 3.

⁵ Nov. 12, 1906.

November 15, 1906. "A Cheap Navy: Germany's Real Attitude upon Sea Supremacy";—Letter to "the Head of a London Commercial House from a business friend and correspondent in Lübeck, who has warm sympathies towards England";—*Standard*, November 15, 1906, from which we give a salient extract in the note.¹

A CHEAP NAVY.

REFUTATION OF A FALSE RUMOUR.

STANDARD, November 17, 1906.

We hold that the intended reductions in the Navy are fraught with issues so immediately perilous to the security of the nation and of the Empire that it is our plain duty to keep the main points of the question daily before our readers. Since we first published our information on the subject² it has been persistently attempted to discredit our statements by the publication of a series of official and officially-inspired announcements, which, while they have entirely failed to refute our contentions, have tended to confuse the public mind as to the real meaning of the intended changes. We therefore put forward in a concise form a list of the reductions contemplated:—

1. The sea-going squadrons are to be reduced by six first-class battleships. The Channel, Atlantic, and Mediterranean battle squadrons are each to lose two ships. Mr. Robertson, Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty, confirmed this statement in the House of Commons on October 31.
2. The sea-going squadrons are to be reduced by four armoured cruisers. The First and Second Cruiser Squadrons are each to lose two ships. Orders to this effect have already been issued.
3. Instead of 32 battleships at sea in full commission there will be only 26 (20 in Home waters, as against 18 of Germany, and six in the Mediterranean). Instead of 21 cruisers at sea in full commission, there will be 17. The first line of defence is thus reduced by one-fifth.
4. The eight first-class battleships of the "Royal Sovereign" class (eldest only 14 years old) are to be placed in "Special Reserve"—that is, they will remain in harbour, attended by skeleton crews, who will oil the machinery and clean the guns. The Special Reserve is the vestibule to the scrap-heap.³
5. Four armoured cruisers of the original County Class are also to be placed in Special Reserve under like conditions.

¹ "Consider, too, our rapid increase of population, amounting to a million of souls year by year, *without any outlet to speak of*. Can you wonder that we feel the necessity of expansion, and that that need will one day assert itself with irresistible force? . . . Our rulers are impervious to considerations of humanity in policy. . . . When the time is ripe, and our forces are about equal, be sure there will be no lack of a cause of war, be it never so frivolous. When the worst comes to the worst, and after all has been said and done, *right can only be maintained by might!* England is the bulwark of liberty; that once shattered, a fearful reaction will set in, and the Prussian 'Junker' will rule the world."—(The italics are ours.) ² *Standard*, Oct. 15, 1906, above, p. 12.

³ Or, to put the matter another way:—"The exact meaning of 'special reserve' is a ship whose repairs are let slide against the day that a Conservative Government comes into office. In this way they cost nothing (*Economy*); and they are fully available for the Dilke Return (*Efficiency*); and, finally, when the other side comes in, they can be put into a state of full repair (*Bloated Armaments*). These, I believe, are the exact facts, although it is not polite to mention exact facts."—Mr. F. T. Jane in *E. S. & S. J. G.*, Oct. 5, 1908.

These twelve ships represent a net loss to the Navy. In future the number of battleships will stand at 46. That is including the "Renown," at present a Royal yacht, and four second-class battleships (two "Centurions," two "Trafalgars"). Actual available total, 41 first-class battleships.

The Government dockyards are choked with every class of vessel in every stage of disrepair. There are neither men to do the work, nor money to pay for it. Five battleships of the Channel Fleet are awaiting repairs or refitting; so are six out of the 14 "practically ready" of the Reserve, or Home Fleet, and eight cruisers.

WHAT IS THE NAVY LEAGUE DOING?

STANDARD, November 17, 1906.

To the Editor.

SIR,—We are all, men and women, being asked to give our money to the Navy League; but what exactly does the Navy League do that we should, at this crisis, send our money to it? One sees no evidence of its activity, no sign that shows the uninitiated that it is doing anything, in its official capacity, to rouse the "man in the street" to the danger that is threatening the Navy and, through the Navy, England. There are no placards up, no notices of meetings to be held, in which the public will have the whole question explained to it by experts; no evidence, in short, that there is such a thing as a Navy League; and we feel more than doubtful whether our money would be very usefully bestowed upon it.

As a mere woman, watching what is going on around her, I am greatly struck at the contrast between the vehement agitation shown, the meetings held, the boycott established or threatened when it is a question of having 15oz. of soap for threepence instead of 16oz., and the equanimity, the tranquillity with which this serious danger that threatens our Navy and our nation is taken. No M.P.s are heckled about this; no meetings are called the country over to register the people's indignation. Why is this? Do we really care more for our pockets than our country? Is there really a sneaking satisfaction that we shall each save a few shillings by these "economies"? It looks like it.

Only from your correspondent, "The Man at the Wheel,"¹ has there come a refreshing note of energetic action, apart from verbal protest. I hope that he is not in a hopeless minority; that the nation will begin to stir itself, and show the Government actively that it is not going to have its very existence imperilled to please faddists.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,
ONLY AN ENGLISHWOMAN.²

¹ *Standard*, Nov. 1, 1906. See above, p. 17, n. 2.

² See above, p. 22.

MINISTERS' POLICY.

REDUCTION OF THE TWO SERVICES A LEADING POINT.

STANDARD, November 23, 1906.

United University Club, S.W.,

November 19, 1906.

To the Editor.

SIR,—That some should still be found who honestly doubt the intention of the present Government to reduce our naval strength is a striking proof of the resistance of the human brain cell to unacceptable ideas. To those whom the accumulation of evidence has not yet convinced, may I suggest the expediency of reviewing in orderly sequence the facts which constitute the present situation? The first of these facts is the return to power, at the last general election,¹ of a party which was, both explicitly and implicitly, pledged to achieve very large reductions in our naval as well as in our military expenditure. Now, is this pledge in dispute? I scarcely think that anyone will be found hardy enough to enter into controversy on this point, but to meet that contingency, let me recall the speech made in London, at the Albert Hall, by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, on the 21st of December last.² He spoke as the acknowledged leader of his party; he spoke in the hearing of the nation; and he put before the electors of the land an outline of the policy which, if placed in office, he purposed to pursue. And in that policy, reduction of expenditure upon the two Services took a large and prominent place. He referred, first, to the new method—the method of arbitration—by which, as he and others like him conceive, a nation can maintain its place in the midst of that secular international competition which is, sooner or later, the condition of existence for every people upon earth. And then he added:—

“Ah! but, ladies and gentlemen, it is vain, it is vain, to seek peace if you do not also ensue it (cheers). I hold that the growth of armaments is a great danger to the peace of the world. A policy of huge armaments keeps alive and stimulates and feeds the belief that force is the best, if not the only, solution of international differences. It is a policy that tends to inflame old sores, and to create new sores. And I submit to you that, as the principle of peaceful arbitration gains ground, it becomes one of the highest tasks of a statesman to adjust those armaments to the newer and happier state of things” [*e.g.*, in the case of the Navy, by cutting down the programme of armoured construction,³ reducing sea training,⁴ and scamping repairs⁵]. “What nobler rôle could this great country assume than to put itself at the head of a league of peace, through whose instrumentality this great work could be effected? . . . We want two things. We want relief from the pressure of excessive taxation, and at the same time we want money to meet our own domestic needs at home,⁶ which have been too long starved and neglected, owing to the demands on the taxpayer for military purposes abroad. How are these desirable things to be secured if, in time of peace, our armaments are maintained on a war footing?”

¹ Above, p. 4.² Dec. 21, 1905; see above, p. 2.³ Above, pp. 5, 16.⁴ Above, pp. 14, 16, 19; and *cp.* below, pp. 132, 141, 246, 253, 256, etc.⁵ Above, p. 16 (and see Index).⁶ *Cp.* Mr. Asquith, cited below, pp. 315, 450.

In view of the withdrawal of six battleships and four armoured cruisers from full service at sea and their relegation to half, quarter, or less service in port,¹ this last inquiry by the present Prime Minister seems peculiarly significant.

I am not concerned to argue here the question of arbitration *versus* war, the question, that is, whether growing nations, such as Germany and Japan, can be induced to cease their growth, to abandon all the ambitions which that growth implies, and to accept for ever the existing *status quo*. I quote the speech of the Prime Minister merely for the purpose of showing that he stands definitely committed to the policy of reducing armaments. "It is vain," he tells us, "to seek peace," that is, by arbitration, "if you do not also ensue it,"² that is, by a reduction of fighting force. In view of the context, there is no other possible construction to be placed upon his words. To labour this point is, however, probably superfluous. For in his views, his hopes, his objects, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman is a type of most of his followers, whose election addresses contained in a great number of instances some approving reference to the policy of reduction.

We have, therefore, the established fact of the return to power of a party pledged to reduce the Services,³ and we have now those further facts affecting the Navy which are the subject of public comment at the present time. Surely, then, the man who is still doubtful of the real meaning of these facts should construe them in the light of the previously declared intention of the head of the Government which is responsible for them.

But, following upon that intention, what are the next most pertinent points to which the intelligence of this doubting Thomas should be directed? Surely, to the reduction of our naval strength in the near future by the abandonment of three contemplated *Dreadnoughts*,⁴ coupled with the decrease of building expenditure by £2,000,000 for the year 1907-8, which is referred to by Admiral Fremantle in your columns to-day. While considering the meaning and effect of this decrease, our doubting friend might also ponder over the continued diminution in the number of dock-yard hands,⁵ which stood at 35,000 odd in 1904, but stands at 27,000 odd now. A fall of some 8,000 in this number within two years hardly looks like a determination on the part of this country to maintain its former standard of naval strength. Accordingly, we have the explicit statement of the Prime Minister, on which you were good enough to permit me to comment in a previous letter,⁶ that in view of the friendliness of France this former standard is now "preposterous."⁷ Yet our doubter always bears in mind that what is in question is our naval strength, not in the immediate present, prior to the coming changes, but in the swiftly approaching future, for which the present should prepare. Next let him "read, mark, learn, and inwardly digest" that wonderful Admiralty Memorandum published on the 24th of last month,⁸ in which the removal of a large part of the Fleet from full efficiency and the fighting line to a condition making anything like full efficiency impossible⁹ is actually represented as a gain to the safety of the nation.¹⁰ Let him then ask himself whether, when he

¹ Cp. above, p. 23.

² Above, p. 2

³ See above, p. 25.

⁴ Cp. above, p. 5.

⁵ Cp. below, pp. 40, 42, 61, 63, 65, 74 *sq.*, 126, etc.

⁶ In the *Standard*.

⁷ Cp. above, p. 6.

⁸ Oct., 1906. Reprinted above, pp. 12 *sq.*

⁹ See above, pp. 14, 16, 19 *sqq.*

¹⁰ See above, p. 13.

considers all the points enumerated, not singly and independently, but as a sequent whole, he can, consistently with reason, maintain his former attitude of unbelief.

I cannot refrain from offering here my humble tribute of astonishment to the hardy and cynical audacity displayed by Mr. Haldane at the Guildhall banquet on the 9th inst. On that occasion the War Secretary is reported to have said: "We are conscious of a deep responsibility, of a solemn duty, a duty which I will define in accepting it as this—to diminish by no hair's breadth, not by one whit, the fighting efficiency of the forces of the Crown."¹ In view of the facts of the case, Mr. Haldane's declaration that he accepts the duty, which the words and acts of the Cabinet alike repudiate, must be regarded as one of the most monstrous and flagrant defiances of truth in which a responsible Minister ever indulged, although, indeed, previous instances of the kind are not lacking. But what must be the degree of Mr. Haldane's contempt for the intelligence alike of the audience which he was addressing and of the wider public to whom his speech would penetrate? There remains, however, one barrier to which not only the present, but some former, Ministers have found it convenient to cling, and that barrier is the fiction of reliance on the Board of Admiralty. Now on this point we have the positive guidance of the past. If there be any one lesson which can be derived with absolute certainty from the strange history of British naval administration during the last 90 years, i.e., since Waterloo, it is that the Board of Admiralty as an instrument of defence against the Cabinet is a broken reed.

Let us take some examples. In 1835, a period in many respects analogous to this, the Navy Estimates, which had stood at £23,504,070 in 1814, had fallen to £4,434,783. As a consequence, line of battleships, going even to the Mediterranean station, went out half-manned and destitute of their principal batteries. As a result, again, of this insane parsimony, the British Empire ran the most frightful risk of destruction in the year 1840, when we were so near to war with France over the question of Mehemet Ali and Egypt, that the captains of ships were officially warned to expect collision with the French fleet. Had that collision occurred, it is humanly certain that our defeat and collapse must have followed. Admiral Sir Maurice Berkeley, then commanding H.M.S. *Thunderer* on that station, writes: "The first reinforcement of seamen, or rather persons so called, did not arrive till the month of January (six months after the warning was given), and it amounted then to 600 men only." It can scarcely be contended that on this occasion the Board of Admiralty was of much protection to the public against the "economy" of the Cabinet. Again, in 1858, the Board had permitted the strength of the Fleet to fall to a level actually lower than that of France alone. In 1874, Mr. Ward Hunt, the new First Lord of the Admiralty, had to explain in Committee of Supply that we had in reality only 14 effective sea-going ships, out of a nominal Fleet of 51 ironclads, the remaining vessels being laid up with holes in their boilers or other radical defects. One might have imagined that if ever a Board of Admiralty had reason to resign, that which had witnessed this ghastly process of neglect must have been the Board on whom the obligation lay. But the obligation was not recognised. One is not aware that, with the striking exception of Lord Charles Beresford,² there has been any example of resignation for a public cause by any member of a Board of

¹ See also below, p. 33.

² Cp. below, p. 114.

Admiralty. At any rate, there is no instance of wholesale resignation by the Sea Lords, although there have been many instances of wholesale neglect by a Cabinet. The Sea Lords were said, indeed, to have threatened resignation in 1893,¹² but that allegation has been contradicted. When, however, we remember that their careers, and, therefore, their incomes, are at the mercy of the Government of the day, and that in resigning they risk the destruction of all their prospects in life, it must be confessed that those who expect of them these sacrifices make a large demand on human nature.³ Probably also the excuse is ready to hand that the ultimate responsibility rests not with themselves, the Sea Lords, but with the Government, with Parliament, with the country. Or, again, they may indulge in the fatal argument that, since the Cabinet have made up their minds to reduce expenditure, that reduction will have to be accomplished, if not by themselves, then by their successors. Undoubtedly these excuses are profoundly fallacious; undoubtedly they contain in them the seed of national catastrophe; undoubtedly the bright star of honour shines only for the man who does his duty to his country unswervingly, even though he knows that personal ruin will be his portion. Yet such reasons, though false if used as suggested, are valid for the public at large, in that they show the need—the dire need—of public movement. Let the voice of a roused England speak.

I am, Sir, Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT.⁴

November 19, 1906. "A Cheap Navy: Admiral Fremantle's Warning: Two-Power Policy: Lord Brassey's Note 'Misleading'"; —*Standard*, November 19, 1906.⁵

PERIL OF A CHEAP NAVY

MR. WYATT'S INDICTMENT

THE NAVY AND THE EMPIRE

STRENGTH OF GERMANY.

STANDARD, November 29, 1906, p. 7, cols. 5-6.

Mr. Harold F. Wyatt, of the Navy League Executive Committee, addressed a meeting of the people of Ealing in the Victoria Hall of that town last night, the Mayor presiding. He drew attention to the unpatriotic action of the Government in decreasing the strength of the Navy, and pointing to the increasing power of Germany on the seas, warned his fellow-countrymen of impending dangers if they did not throw off their apathy on this matter.

At the outset Mr. Wyatt showed first the part which the Navy had played in building up the Empire, next the part which it played at this moment in maintaining both the Empire and the actual safety of the three kingdoms, and, thirdly, he depicted the function

¹ See below, p. 114, n. 2.

² In consequence of Sir Wm. Harcourt's well-known utterance referred to by the late Mr. C. McL. McHardy. *The British Navy for 100 Years* (1896), p. 32, and by Mr. L. G. H. Horton-Smith, *s.v.* "Patriotism and Naval Lords," in *N.L.J.*, July, 1905, p. 194 (referred to below, p. 114, n. 2).

³ Cp. also Sir John Briggs' *Naval Administrations from 1828 to 1892* (publ. 1897), pp. 324-57.

⁴ See also *Standard*, November 26, 1906.

⁵ Cp. also "A Cheap Navy under Criticism: Reversing Admiralty Policy: Whittling Down Sea-Power: An Admiral's (Admiral Fremantle's) Warning: The 'Monstrous' Action of 'Naval Experts'"; —*Standard*, November 22, 1906.

which the NAVY LEAGUE had fulfilled in informing and focussing public opinion on naval questions.¹ The foundations alike of the Empire and of its trade were laid by the Puritan mariners of Elizabethan times, especially by Sir Francis Drake. The history of the seventeenth century was largely concerned with the naval competition of England, Holland, and France, and in the eighteenth century the latter became our principal opponent, sea power being always the main factor which decided the contest, and the command of the sea being the ultimate goal. The history of this great duel terminated with the close of the Napoleonic period, and, as the result of the struggle and our victories, we emerged into the world with the mastery of the sea and the commercial hegemony of the world. For many years our pre-eminence remained unchallenged, England living on the naval prestige of the past, just as a firm of merchants, whose business once was sound, might long carry on their concern by virtue of the credit they had obtained in a previous period long after the substance had departed.

Now the question of the strength of the Navy depended on the Cabinet, and the attitude of the Cabinet depended upon that of the people, and in whatever direction the people of England exhibited keenness, in that direction it was quite certain that the principal politicians of the land would, sooner or later, have to exhibit keenness too. A democratic Government, dependent for its existence on a majority of votes, could never afford long to disregard any developed desire of the country. But as a general rule the country exhibited no keenness and no strong desire in regard to the strength of the fleet. That was because they trusted that vital matter to the Cabinet of the day, which, as he had just shown, was bound by the law of its being to neglect any duty, however serious, which had not votes behind it, or, in the current cant of the day, which was not backed by a mandate.

Here it is, then, that the function of the NAVY LEAGUE begins to be exercised to rouse, to animate, to inform, to guide public opinion. This the NAVY LEAGUE has to do, and never was there a time when there was greater need for the arousing of public sentiment in regard to the Navy than the present. Here we have in England the most unwarlike population of Europe—a people amongst whom a large school of anti-nationalist Socialists, reinforced by a large number of political, as distinguished from genuine, Nonconformist ministers, are everlastingly preaching that patriotism and preparation for war are crimes. Over against us, not 300 miles from our shores,² is a mighty nation the whole manhood of which is trained to arms,³ a nation which already exceeds ours in numbers by nearly 20 millions,⁴ and which is growing at a far greater rate than our own.⁵ Between us and them—between the unwarlike⁶ and the warlike,³ between the trained³ and untrained,⁶ there has been hitherto one barrier, and one only, and that is the fighting fleet of England. Now we have a Ministry returned to power under a pledge to cut down that single shield which stands between Britain and her foes.⁷

A leading newspaper, which had signalised itself by its patriotic

¹ Cp. the words of the N.L.'s "*Need for Effort*" (Oct. 1902), quoted below, p. 73.

² See below, pp. 432, 477.

³ Cp. below, pp. 78, 381, 431, 432, 444, 452.

⁴ Cp. below, pp. 269, 277, 381, 432, 444, 504.

⁵ Cp. above, p. 23; and below, pp. 269, 504.

⁶ Cp. below, pp. 113, 444.

⁷ See above, pp. 25, 26.

advocacy of this naval question of late—he referred to the *Standard*—had allowed him to give in its columns some account of the history of naval administration in England.¹ This history showed that not only in the old days, but from 1814 onwards, successive Cabinets had been apathetic in these matters, and had brought the country to the verge of ruin, until stirred to action by the people. Having described the reductions which had taken place in the Navy by a Government pledged to economy in the services,² and having quoted Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman's avowed abandonment of the Two-Power Standard,³ he appealed to the people at large to intervene, and prevent disaster. Germany might easily become master of the Channel for 24 hours, with her large number of torpedo boats⁴ and her ever-ready fleet, and that might prove the extinction of Great Britain, and even her annexation to the German Empire.

A vote of thanks concluded the proceedings.

November 28, 1906. "Naval View of Reductions";—by "Captain R.N.," *United Service Magazine*; abstracted in *Standard*, November 28, 1906.

December 1, 1906. "A Cheap Navy: Nine more Warships intended to be laid aside: Useful Vessels 'Scrapped'";—Mr. H. W. Wilson, *National Review*, December, 1906, abstracted in *Standard*, December 1, 1906.

"A CHEAP NAVY."

STANDARD, December 5, 1906, p. 8, col. 6.

To the Editor of the STANDARD.

Mincing Lane, E.C.,

December 4, 1906.

SIR,—With respect to the single-minded and patriotic manner in which you have exposed and laid bare the glaring and destructive methods in which the present Government are already dealing, and propose further to deal, with the Navy, may I ask if the day has not arrived when the feelings and views of all City men should find a time and place to give expression to their sentiments touching this national and urgent question? You, Sir, have placed before the public in a most concrete and detailed form the various items by which the present Government propose to weaken and diminish our naval power. You have printed as facts proposed reductions of our Fleet in being, and the contraction of our building programme, which are serious enough to create universal alarm. These statements have not been denied, and all the information that has been elicited from the Government tends to confirm the worst fears.

¹ *Standard*, November 23, 1906 (above, p. 27). ² See above, pp. 14, 16, 19-21, 23, 26.

³ See above, p. 6.

⁴ Cp. below, pp. 61, 66, 76 sq., 202 sq., etc., etc.

Now, Sir, this question of tampering with the Navy is no light matter. It cannot be ranked in the same category as the Education Bill, the Trade Disputes Bill, or even the Soap Combine. It is an Imperial question, far above all other matters which are engaging the attention of Parliament, and in its effect is a down-grade step towards sapping the very foundations of the Empire, both in its integrity and security. It is a sop thrown to the Socialistic sections to appease their clamant demands for economy at the expense of the nation's safety.

Knowing the deep concern and anxiety felt by many City men at this dangerous and pernicious policy with regard to our Navy, may I suggest that a City meeting be convened to take into consideration the vital question of the nation's peril which must result if the proposed reductions be consummated, and to decide what steps should be taken to arrest the carrying out of the Government's proposals by which they would jeopardise the safety of the Empire?

I feel convinced that such a movement would be most cordially and influentially supported. Our Navy is our main bulwark against foreign aggression and the protection of our mercantile marine and commerce, and without its maintenance in a state of absolute efficiency and sufficiency our extinction as a nation is merely a question of time and opportunity.

I have taken part since and including 1885 in inaugurating several meetings in the City on behalf of the Navy, but can recall no occasion for which the need of such a movement was so pressing as in the present crisis. If this appeal meets with any response I shall be glad to join in assisting in the proposed movement.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

JOHN J. JACKSON.¹

THE STANDARD OF NAVAL STRENGTH.

December 6, 1906.

A Lecture by Lieut. CARLYON BELLAIRS, R.N. (Retd.), M.P., at the Royal United Service Institution, Thursday, December 6, 1906; Admiral Sir R. H. Harris, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., in the Chair. Reported—together with the speeches following thereon (December 6 and 7)—in the *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, Vol. 51, No. 348, February, 1907, pp. 123-183.

The following is largely reprinted from pp. 160-163 :—

MR. L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH, F.S.A.Scot. :—

Like everyone else, I have listened with the utmost attention and interest to everything that has fallen from the lips of the speakers up to the present moment, and it is with some diffidence that I rise to place before you the views which I hold upon this subject.

I should like, now, in the first place, if I may, to take one particular point in Admiral Bowden-Smith's speech. Admiral Bowden-Smith, so far as I can see, is the only one who has yet spoken who has tended to throw doubt upon what appears to be in general the mind of this Meeting. He has suggested that, because the

¹ One of the original Founders of the Navy League; for many years an active member of its Executive Committee, and a former Chairman of the Defence Committee of the London Chamber of Commerce. (Cp. further below, Index, *s.v.* his name.)

Government of the day has a majority which is almost, if not entirely, unexampled, they are therefore likely to do their duty. (*Admiral Bowden-Smith*: I did not say that: I said they ought to do their duty.) *Mr. Horton-Smith*: I am much obliged to the Admiral for his correction; I do not wish to misrepresent anything he said; but would he suggest that the Government are in fact doing their duty? I do not care to trench upon politics; it matters not for the moment which political party we favour; it is not for the purpose of party politics that we are here to-day. I may perhaps, however, call attention to the fact that the present Government, with its enormous majority, recently introduced a Bill to deal with Trade Disputes, a Bill which, in the mouth of their own Attorney-General,¹ was the only reasonable arrangement to be arrived at in regard to the Law, and yet, because a small group in the House were sufficiently noisy,—or shall I say insistent?—to have their own very different wishes carried out, this greatest Government of modern times has given way, capitulating to the group against its own better judgment.² And is not that exactly what the Government would appear to be doing as regards the Navy?

A second point which Admiral Bowden-Smith made—one which at first glance seemed to be a good point—namely, that we need not build as much at the present moment as we should otherwise build, for the reason that the British nation can build more rapidly than any other. Assuming the reason relied on to be sound in fact (a suggestion the accuracy of which I am not to be taken as admitting³), that might be something in the nature of a good argument; but, if I may say so, and I say it with the utmost respect for the Admiral, he has cut from his own argument the sole basis whereon it rests, for at the close of his speech he said that he considered it very undesirable (for reasons which he gave) that we should build rapidly. Now, you cannot have it both ways. Either it is a bad thing to build rapidly or it is not; and if (as would appear to be the Admiral's opinion) it is a bad thing to build rapidly, then you must build in advance, and so, by slower building, secure the same effect as if you began later and built more rapidly. Let us take it, then, that we must build in advance. If we must build in advance, let us see what we are supposed now to be doing.

¹ The late Sir John Lawson Walton, K.C., M.P. (who died Jan. 18, 1908).

² See *Standard*, Nov. 2, 1906, p. 7, col. 4, and (leading article), p. 6, cols. 4-5.

³ It may be well, in this connection, to quote Lieut. Carlyon Bellairs, M.P., in *Morning Post*, Dec. 28, 1906, p. 3, col. 3:—"Readers of the *Morning Post* may possibly remember the unfortunate assertion of the Premier about the greater speed with which we built the ships of our programme than Germany. . . . The rate-of-building argument was submitted to the pitiless comparison of ascertained facts, and we have never heard of it since."

Cf. also *N.L.J.*, Jan. 1906, pp. 2, 3, Admiral Fremantle, *N.L.J.*, Nov. 1906, p. 276; Lieut. C. Bellairs, M.P. (Dec. 6, 1906), *Jol. R.U.S.I.*, Feb. 1907, p. 131; and Commander Caborne (Dec. 6, 1906), *Jol. R.U.S.I.*, Feb. 1907, p. 175; Dr. B. W. Ginsburg, "The *N.L.* and Some Recent Developments in regard to Navies" (publ. Nov. 1906), p. 11; *N.L.J.*, Jan. 1908 (leading article), p. 3; Lieut. C. Bellairs, M.P., in *Morning Post*, Jan. 15 (and 22), 1907; Mr. H. W. Wilson, *National Review*, April, 1907, p. 206; Lieut. C. Bellairs, M.P., *Nat. Review*, June, 1907, p. 622; B.W.G., in *N.L.J.*, April, 1908, p. 127; *Standard*, July 28, 1908, p. 6, and July 30, 1908, p. 6; Mr. H. W. Wilson, in *National Review*, May, 1909, p. 397; and see further Admiral von Tirpitz himself, cited below, pp. 273, 282.

Such alleged rapidity on the part of Britain was, it should be observed, assumed and relied on in the Cawdor Memorandum, Nov. 1905, p. 7. It was rashly reaffirmed by Mr. Lloyd George in his "amazing speech" of July 28, 1908 (*Times*, July 29, 1908, p. 10, col. 2), for which see further below, pp. 315, 430 *sqq.* In view of recent events (in 1909) it is not likely to be relied on again.

We are here to discuss the question of "The Standard of Naval Strength."

[After making reference to "the three P's," Parliament, the Platform, and the Press (which the lecturer had said the Admiralty ought always to welcome), and following it up with a rapid survey of the history of naval administration in this country from 1854 onwards to the present day,¹ leading to the conclusion which the speaker put in the form of a question: "When ever has any Government from that day onwards adequately done its duty by the Navy except as the direct result of an outburst of public opinion?" he proceeded:—]

Mr. Haldane, the present Minister for War, has stated that this country needs "an invincible Navy." Does Mr. Haldane suggest that we have at present, or that his Government is setting about the production of, "an invincible Navy"? True that, so far as words go, the Minister for War speaks as we should all wish to see the Government act. Responding (in the unfortunate absence of the First Lord of the Admiralty²) to the toast of the "Imperial Forces" at the Guildhall Banquet of the 9th November last, Mr. Haldane, speaking in that impressive spirit of responsibility so familiar to those who knew him in the Courts, said of his Government:—"We are conscious of a deep responsibility, of a solemn duty, a duty which I will define in accepting it as this—to diminish by no hair's breadth, not by one whit, the fighting efficiency of the forces of the Crown." I do not know what Mr. Haldane could have meant, because if he meant to say that his Government was not going to diminish the strength of the Navy, and the Government then immediately proceeded to knock out about half a dozen or more battleships, and to reduce the programme of new construction already decided upon, I should have thought it was quite clear that they were going the very best way to work, to diminish considerably the fighting efficiency of the British Navy both actually and, as regards other Powers, relatively.

And now, coming to the great principle known as the "Two-Power standard," we have at the outset of this discussion, as it seems to me (for reasons which I will mention in a moment), the presumable fact, or what I should call a *prima facie* case, that the Two-Power standard is being thrown overboard. If we complain, we are asked why—if we are right—does not the Opposition dare to move the adjournment of the House of Commons? Is not this, perhaps, because the late Government is itself not free from blame in regard to its naval administration, and fears the obvious retort which such a motion would invite? I am not one of those who think so highly of what Unionist administrations of the past ten years have done in regard to the Navy. But "let the dead past bury its dead." It is now more material to ask: "What has the present Government said and done, what is it doing, with regard to the Navy?" Before coming into office the present Prime Minister stated that he accepted the doctrine that the test and standard of our supremacy of the seas was that our fleet should be as strong as the com-

¹ As to which cp. *e.g.* above, pp. 8 (text and n. 3), 15, 16, 27, 28, 30; and below pp. 42, 56, 88, 114, 131, etc.

² Curiously enough, Lord Tweedmouth was again unfortunately unable to be present on the 9th November, 1907, the occasion of Sir John Fisher's astounding speech—as to which see below, pp. 254, 255, 258 (text and n. 1), 259, 260, 271, 316, 319, 323, 330, etc.

bined strength of *any other two fleets in the world*.¹ What, now, has been the hitherto accepted meaning of the Two-Power standard up to the present year? It means, not a mere equality with the two next strongest Powers, but the capacity to meet *and beat* the two next strongest Powers;² and that no doubt is the standard which Sir Henry meant that he accepted. You cannot be certain to beat your enemy unless you have some margin of superiority. Personally I am not prepared to accept the 10 per cent. margin alluded to by other speakers. I agree with Admiral Campbell's view. Why should the British Empire, which exists on and by sea power alone, run the risk of trusting its security to a 10 per cent. margin, especially nowadays, when there is plenty of chance of battleships being sunk from all sorts of extraneous causes, as was seen in the recent Russo-Japanese war? The British Empire can afford no risks whatever, and I seriously question whether a 10 per cent. margin of superiority is to-day sufficient. But assume it is. It is yet to be a superiority as against the next two strongest Powers. That has been and is the accepted meaning of the Two-Power standard, and that it is which, as I have said, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman accepted before he came into office; that it is, again, of which he has recently restated his acceptance in his early days of office;³ but now he has closed the book of his past statements, and argues that it is almost "preposterous"⁴ to suggest that France and Germany, for instance, will ever join together. Is it really such a preposterous thought? If Germany were to choose to "square" with France on the condition of France taking Belgium without Antwerp, and Germany taking Holland plus Antwerp, there would be all the foundation of a good square deal on the part of France and Germany⁵; and if they saw their chance of such square deal, it may well be that for its purposes the French might sink for the moment their grievance as to the Lost Provinces; and you may be sure that if Germany (by way of utilising further in her own interests such achieved community of purpose) saw any chance of getting for herself some of those fair places of the earth which the blood and treasure of our forebears, yours and mine, have bought for us, Germany would take the first available opportunity of turning that chance into a certainty. And yet we have the Prime Minister saying that he will not look at the Two-Power standard if it means a standard as against France and Germany; and all the time you have the conditions of a French and German coalition existing. Think a moment! What does the expression "*standard*" mean? If we are not going to keep to our standard of building so as to be able to meet and beat the next two strongest Powers, whichever they may be, what is the use of calling it a "*standard*" at

¹ Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, in debate, April 1, 1889. See Lieut. Carlyon Bellairs, M.P., "The Cobden Club and the Navy," in the *National Review*, June, 1907, p. 619 (referred to above, p. 6, n. 6).

² For the Cawdor definition of the Two-Power Standard, see below, pp. 308, 350, 435 *sq.*, 472, 513;—and for the only reasonable and logical interpretation of that Standard, below pp. 513, n. 6, 518 *sq.*, nn.

³ March 15, 1906. Cp. above, p. 6, n. 6.

⁴ Cp. above, p. 6. (Compare also, generally, his Albert Hall speech of Dec. 21, 1905, referred to above, pp. 2, 3, etc.)

⁵ Cp. letter of "English Patriot," *Standard*, Aug. 7, 1908, p. 7, col. 3 (referred to below, pp. 421, 443), giving details (with their Ambassadorial source of origin, 1905), concerning Germany's actual offer to France of a free hand in Belgium if France would only remain neutral as between Britain and Germany.

all? If a thing is stable, it may be called a standard; if it is not, it is no longer a standard. If the Two-Power standard is no longer to have the meaning it has always hitherto borne, a meaning which can be "understood of the people," a meaning which, clearly understood, enables the country to keep an intelligent eye upon the Admiralty, then not only is it no longer a "standard," but no longer has the country any basis upon which it can intelligently follow and intelligently (if need be) criticise the actions of those who from time to time may be responsible for the Navy. If we are not to discuss the position as against the combination of France and Germany, it would almost appear unreasonable and unnecessary at the present moment to discuss the question at all, except in so far as there may be suggested a possibility of a war between the United States and Germany in union against ourselves, which I hope is not very likely, though, of course, it cannot and must not be left out of consideration.

Taking, then, the Premier's own statements, to which I have just referred, you have, as it seems to me, a good *prima facie* case for suspecting that the Government are, in fact, throwing overboard the "Two-Power standard" in its hitherto accepted sense. But there is more than what I have already mentioned. The Premier was asked in the House on the 12th of last November¹ whether the Two-Power standard in its hitherto accepted sense was or was not the policy of his Government, and he declined to answer that very simple yet all-important question.² Admiral Bowden-Smith has told us that in his opinion we are all right at the present moment; I confess I think we are not far from being all wrong. The point, however, is, not whether we are safe or unsafe at the present moment, but whether, and upon the adoption of what policy, we shall be safe in the years to come.

Independently of Ministerial statements (important as the latter are), and coming now to facts:—Do not let it be forgotten that when the Cawdor Memorandum was issued last year it was no ordinary Memorandum; the Unionist Government were putting their heads together to see what was the absolute *minimum* that they could dare suggest—they were just going out of office—and as the result of their deliberations it was decided that it was essential that we should lay down, as a *minimum*, four large armoured vessels in 1906-7, and four in 1907-8 (eight in all), each to be built within two years,—and yet in July of 1906, with a new Government in power, when nothing had in the interval taken place on the Continent of Europe to make any variation necessary, the Admiralty, through the First Lord, come forward and say that the country, instead of needing as a *minimum* four and four (as they had said but a few months earlier) could do with only three and two; that is to say;—instead of eight, only five! And this in face of the fact that both France and Germany had during the interval brought forward increased programmes,³ and that the *Montagu*—a British first-class battleship—had in the interval run ashore and was already then a probable total loss.⁴

There are, of course, many points in relation to the latest (the

¹ Nov. 12, 1906.

² See above, p. 22.

³ Cp. above, pp. 4, 5.

⁴ She ran ashore 30 May, 1906 (see below, p. 4). She was given up for a total loss, August, 1906. See above, p. 6.

recent) Admiralty Memorandum¹ to be considered. Earlier speakers, however, have ably dealt with many of them, and I must not take up your time by going over the same ground again. I will only add one word with respect to repairs. Is it not really alarming to be told and (if it be the fact) to realise that 75 per cent.—some say 95 per cent.—of the repairs of the ships of His Majesty's Navy are left undone to such an extent that large numbers are not capable of doing the duty they ought to do? Take a single instance (I have not time for more), the *Glory*, which, for the reason indicated, could recently steam but 12 knots instead of her normal 18!

I should like, however, ere I sit down, to refer to one other matter: the question of cruisers, to which the Two-Power Standard has, of course, no application. This question is one which Admiral Fremantle has had under his continuous consideration since 1902,² and it is a matter to which we must give yet more and more attention. As late as June of the present year³ he stated in the public Press that for the purpose of commerce protection alone, to ensure our food and raw material from the hands of the enemy, we require at the present moment (beyond what we, in fact, possess) "at least 50 fast protected cruisers of not less than 24 knots speed" to be "built without delay."⁴ That is the result the Admiral has arrived at after many years of thought. It has been suggested that the result of the late manœuvres⁵ has shown it to be an impossibility for the British Empire to protect its own commerce. If that is so, it at least supplies a reason for Mr. Robertson's statement, that it is not in the public interest to give any information relative to the results of those manœuvres.⁶ Ministers to-day, when they do not wish to give an answer to a naval question, say either that the question asked is immaterial, or that it is not in the public interest to give an answer! But we are entitled to know—and we *must* know—whether it is intended in fact that we shall protect our commerce in war. If we intend to do so, then it follows that, if Admiral Fremantle is right, we must proceed at once to build for the purpose, as with our present number of cruisers we should, *ex hypothesi*, be unable to afford the necessary protection. Remember that if our commerce (which includes our food) is insufficiently protected, then, when the day of war is on us, up will go the cost of freight and insurance to such an extent—to say nothing of "corners"—that the cost of raw materials for our manufactures will be enormously enhanced, while food itself will go to famine prices. There will be both shortage and, simultaneously, enhanced prices. There will be great distress. Manufacturers will have to shut down their works; wage-earners in consequence unable to earn any wages at the very moment when food will be rising rapidly in price; and there will be grave danger of our being starved into submission by the outcry of

¹ Oct. 23, 1906. Reprinted above, pp. 12 *sq.*

² See above, p. 10.

³ June, 1906.

⁴ See above, p. 10.

⁵ The Naval (or "Trade Protection") Manœuvres, 1906 (as to which see Admiral Fremantle in *N.L.J.*, Aug., 1906, pp. 200 *sq.*)

⁶ Impelled by public opinion, the information eventually appeared. (See *sz.* "The Naval Manœuvres, 1906," *Times*, Feb. 19, 1907, and *N.L.J.*, March, 1907, p. 60.) It well repays perusal.

In the *N.L. Annual Report for 1906*, p. 4, "no scheme to protect" was the expression used. To judge from the "Admiralty Remarks" upon the "Report of the Naval Manœuvres of 1906" (*Times*, Feb. 19, 1907), one might with more correctness speak of "a scheme not to protect."

the poor. I do not think I am putting the case too high. In 1812, when we were fighting two Powers (France and America) at the same time, although we were at that date almost entirely self-supporting, and although our population then was less than half what it is to-day, the quartern loaf went up in price to 1s. 8d., and bread riots took place in many of our large towns. Bread riots are next door to submission, for no Government can keep in power and carry on a war if the whole country is in a ferment of discontent, with riots from starvation the rule on every hand. Yes, if the Admiralty means to protect our commerce in the event of war, then it follows that, if Admiral Fremantle is right, the means for that sufficient protection are at present non-existent; while, if he is to be regarded as wrong, it would almost seem to follow that he is wrong only because the Admiralty has decided that we are *not* to be prepared to protect our commerce in the day of war. If that be so, indeed, then:—

Good-bye to the British Empire!

SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS.

AN admirable summary of the proceedings appeared in the *Standard* of December 7, 1906, p. 8, col. 4, and December 8, 1906, p. 9, col. 4, from the former of which we here reprint the following abstract:—

“Mr. L. Cope Cornford¹ . . . recapitulated the facts of the case:—The reduction of the sea-going squadrons, the placing of eight or ten thousand men on half-training, the laying up of eight battleships and four cruisers, which, together with the reductions announced in the House of Commons and elsewhere, would bring the available strength in battleships to 41. He dwelt upon the evils of the short-service system,² the stopping of recruiting for the Royal Naval Reserve, the reduction of the Royal Marines by some 1,500 men, and the intended abolition of the coastguard,³ which ‘had been announced, but not confirmed—or denied.’ Mr. Cornford reminded the audience that already over 30,000 men were kept in barracks, and that the short-service system,² insidiously introduced, resulted in a permanent source of weakness to the Fleet, and the ultimate emigration of highly trained men to the United States Navy—‘and for what?’ According to the Navy Estimates, to save pensions⁴—to save the pensions of men who have given the best years of their lives to their country’s service!” (There was loud applause.)⁵

STANDARD, December 7, 1906, p. 6, cols. 5-6.

Leading Article.

THE enthusiastic assemblage, composed of distinguished representatives of both Services, together with men of various schools of political thought, which crowded the theatre of the Royal United

¹ Author of “*The Defenceless Islands*”; and also of the series of articles “In Case of War,” published in the *Standard*, June, 1906, for which see *N.L.J.*, July, 1906, p. 174.

² See below, pp. 62, 64, 66, 79, 127, etc.

³ See below, pp. 61, 63, 65 *sq.*, 75; and see Index, *s.v.* “Coastguard.”

⁴ See (*s.v.* Dec. 6, 1906) *Journal of R.U.S.I.*, Feb., 1907, p. 159, and *N.L.J.*, Jan., 1906, p. 5. See also *Standard*, Jan. 4, 1907.

⁵ For a full report of this speech see *Journal of R.U.S.I.*, Feb., 1907, pp. 157-9.

Service Institution yesterday afternoon,¹ may serve as an index of the rising tide of feeling in the country with regard to the naval policy of the Government. Lieutenant Bellairs delivered a clear and moderate statement of the present posture of affairs, which showed that, as the reduction of naval strength was regarded in the House as a permanent reduction, the shipbuilding programme could no longer be considered as maintaining the Two-Power standard. We have purposely deferred the discussion of the building programme in these columns, regarding the actual reductions in the present strength of the Fleet as of more immediate import. At the same time, the figures adduced by Lieutenant Bellairs, showing that the relative expenditure of Germany three years hence will be eleven and a half millions in excess of our own, call for the gravest consideration, and Lieutenant Bellairs has performed a public service in presenting them. But what the country desires to know is not only if the Two-Power standard is being maintained in the shipbuilding programme, but if it is being maintained in the number of battleships actually available for service. Lieutenant Bellairs sufficiently answered what is really the half of one question, and he is confirmed in his conclusions by no less an authority than Admiral Sir E. R. Fremantle. In the course of the discussion which followed Lieutenant Bellairs' address, the facts regarding the reductions in the Fleet which we have been at some pains to lay before the country were vigorously dealt with by other speakers who were members of the Navy League (Mr. Cope Cornford² and Mr. Horton-Smith³). It is for the House of Commons to insist upon a definite declaration of naval policy, and it is for the constituencies to see that the demand is enforced. In default of that explanation, we are, it appears, expected to acquiesce in the abandonment of what the Prime Minister has called the "preposterous" Two-Power Standard⁴; with the reduction of the sea-going squadrons, the placing of a large number of officers and men on half training, the reduction of the *personnel*, the laying up of serviceable ships without any prospect of replacing them, and a monstrous accumulation of repairs in the dockyards. It may well be inquired at this juncture, what has become of the Committee of Defence, which was designed to remove all questions of the national security above partisan considerations? We are, it seems, as Mr. Horton-Smith pointed out yesterday,⁵ condemned as usual to rely upon the pressure of public opinion, as the only means by which Ministers can be persuaded to do their duty. The position is unfortunate, and not without discredit. It is also, in practice, most unfair, since it lays open every impartial critic of the naval policy of the Government to the accusation of being inspired by partisan motives. The charge can only be met by a simple denial. It is more relevant to the issue, however, to deal on their merits with the criticisms adduced. We assert that the Government, in reducing the strength of the Navy, is endangering the security of the nation and of the Empire. Part of the case was explained with the utmost lucidity at the meeting held yesterday at the Royal United Service Institution, and it will be completed to-day. The country has thus another opportunity of arriving at a true estimation of the posture of affairs.

¹ Dec. 6, 1906.

² See above, p. 37.

³ See above, pp. 31 *sqq.*

⁴ Above, pp. 6, 34.

⁵ Dec. 6, 1906, above, p. 33.

Dec. 12, 1906. "A Cheap Navy: The Admiralty Apologist Again";—Criticism and Exposure of "Excubitor's" so-called "*Truth about the Navy*,"¹ *Standard*, Dec. 12, 1906, p. 11, col. 3.

A CHEAP NAVY.

MR. H. F. WYATT ON THE DANGERS IN SIGHT.

THE REDUCED FLEET.

December 14, 1906.

In the course of an address on "The Naval Policy of the Present Government," delivered at a Meeting of the Junior Conservative Club,² held last evening under the presidency of Mr. A. E. Perkins, Vice-President of the Club, Mr. Harold F. Wyatt said:—

He did not need to enlarge on the necessity of the Fleet to England, as everyone would understand that if the Channel were dried up to-morrow this country would have to choose between the full Continental system of military training and subjugation to a foreign Power. The first fact bearing on the present naval reductions was that on every Sunday doses of unpatriotic poison were being poured into the veins of the people from the political, as distinguished from the genuine, Nonconformist pulpit, and from the Socialist at the street corner and club. The high duties of national defence were being decried by those who owed the very freedom they misused to the martial deeds of their forefathers, and to the presence of our Army and Navy on land and sea.

The next point was the return to power at the last election of a political faction, pledged at any risk to the country to cut down the national defences (cheers).

Another point to which he would call attention was the declaration made last July³ by the Premier in the House of Commons that he regarded the old standard of naval strength agreed on by both parties in 1889⁴—the standard of equality with the next two fleets—as "almost preposterous so long as one of those two fleets was that of France."⁵ It was worthy of consideration whether Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman was right in that view, and whether the agreed standard of strength was really dependent upon the contingency of French hostility or friendship. He denied that it was contingent, because the friendship of France was itself wholly contingent upon the power of the British Fleet to render her effective aid in the event of German attack. If, therefore, the strength of our Navy were seriously reduced, it tended to the same extent to diminish the value of our friendship to France. The Two-Power Standard expressed roughly that amount of naval strength with which we could reasonably be contented having regard to practical

¹ A misleading document (extolling Admiralty policy)—"An apology for their" (the Admiralty's) "policy, supported by extremely dubious statements, and an array of quite fallacious statements" (*Standard*, Jan. 19, 1907, p. 9, col. 5)—which was actually issued by the Board of Admiralty to His Majesty's ships;—and issued to them at the public expense. See Mr. Lambert (answering Lieut. C. Bellairs, M.P.), House of Commons, Dec. 10, 1906 (*Standard*, Dec. 20, 1906, p. 9, col. 2, and see also *Standard*, Jan. 19, 1907, p. 9, col. 5). Cp., further, below, pp. 182, 504.

² See the *Standard*, December 15, 1906, p. 9, col. 3, and the *Marlborough Times* (Wilts), December 22, 1906, p. 5, col. 2.

³ July 28, 1906.

⁴ See above, p. 16.

⁵ See above, p. 6.

politics, and which gave us a fair chance of holding our own amidst the changing vicissitudes of international relations. Having thrown overboard the Two-Power standard, the Government proposed to throw overboard also the programme of naval construction which the present Board of Admiralty had a year ago represented as the minimum of national safety.¹

Next, they had the now well-established fact of the intended withdrawal of about one-fifth of our strength at sea from full efficiency and a state of instant readiness for war.² This reduction of the Fleet in commission was bad, because it meant a reduction of our strength at sea on the outbreak of war (cheers). That was at the moment when our danger was greatest.²

Then there was the immense reduction in the number of dockyard hands, which involved a diminution not only in the power of constructing ships, but also of repairing existing ones.³

It was, of course, the cue of Germany to represent the British Navy as omnipotent, and the German as contemptibly small, and that was also the cue of the official and unofficial apologists of the Admiralty. No one denied the great strength of the British Navy at the present time, but the danger against which the country had to be warned lay not in the immediate present, but in the swiftly coming future. In naval matters the present had ever to be utilised in preparation for the future (cheers). The fleets of our rivals were growing fast, while in England, not only were the Government calling a halt, but they were actually reducing the naval strength, which was the sole support on which the safety of the country rested. Anti-nationalism and anti-defence were raging like a plague in the country, and it was for every patriotic man and woman in the land to do what in them lay to combat this enormous evil (cheers).

Mr. Wyatt, who was warmly received, was supported by Messrs. G. W. Holtzapffel and L. Graham H. Horton-Smith.

After the addresses, it was unanimously resolved as follows :—

THE RESOLUTION.⁴

"That this meeting of members of the Junior Conservative Club records its emphatic protest against the declared intention of the Government to abandon the standard of naval strength agreed upon by the leaders of both parties in 1889,⁵ against the reduction of the country's fighting strength at sea, and against the dismissal of thousands of skilled workmen from the dockyards.⁶"⁴

N.L. EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING.

December 17, 1906.

AGENDA.⁷

6. Consideration of Mr. Wyatt's proposed letter to Chambers of Commerce. (Copy herewith.⁸)

The above-quoted Letter to Chambers of Commerce and Mayors,⁸ proposed by Mr. Wyatt, after being upon the Agenda for the

¹ Cp. above, pp. 5, 9, and below, p. 240. ² Cp. above, pp. 12, 19 *sqq.*

³ Cp. below, pp. 42, 340.

⁴ See the *Marlborough Times*, *loc. cit.*

⁵ See above, p. 16, and below, p. 40.

⁶ See above, p. 26.

⁷ Cp. above, p. 15, n. 2.

⁸ Printed above, pp. 15 *sqq.*

Executive Committee Meetings of October 29¹ and November 5² and 12, 1906, without being accepted by the Committee, was presented in a slightly altered and more detailed form by Mr. Wyatt at the Committee meeting of December 17, 1906, but with no greater success than before.

In its new form, it ran as follows:—

PROPOSED DRAFT OF LETTER TO CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE AND PRESS.

SIR,—The Executive Committee of the NAVY LEAGUE are anxious to draw the attention of your Chamber to the very serious changes in our naval policy which have been recently announced. The object of these changes is doubtless reduction of naval expenditure, that is, of the amount paid for the insurance of the Empire, of the country, and of our whole sea-borne trade.

As any tampering with the strength of the Fleet must lessen the stability of all our institutions and of the commerce of the whole Empire, and would lead towards a further fall in the price of consols, the Committee do not hesitate to appeal directly to your Chamber for your attention and your support.

The points in the naval policy of His Majesty's Government which occasion alarm are the following:—

1. Abandonment of the Two-Power standard of naval strength, which was agreed on by the leaders of both political parties in 1889.³ In the House of Commons, on the 28th of July last,⁴ the present Prime Minister declared that while one of the two Powers concerned was France, the maintenance of this standard would be "almost preposterous."

2. Reduction of the shipbuilding programme, declared by the Admiralty in November last⁵ to be necessary, from eight armoured ships of the *Dreadnought* class to five, and this in face of the fact that since November last⁵ we have lost one first-class battleship, the *Montagu*.⁶

3. Withdrawal of six battleships and four armoured cruisers, *i.e.*, about one-fifth of our fighting strength at sea, from full training, full efficiency, and instant readiness for war, to partial training, lessened efficiency, and incomplete readiness for war.⁷

This reduction of the Fleet in commission is bad because:—(a) It means that on the immediate outbreak of war we shall be made weaker than we ought to be. (b) It leaves room for unsuspected economies which would seriously impair the efficiency of the so-called "Home Fleet," which is only the previous Fleet "in commission in Reserve" under another name.⁸ (c) It specially weakens our hand for the protection of commerce at the outbreak of war, when the danger is greatest. (d) It reduces the sea training and sea experience of officers and men.⁹ This later on is sure to lead to a reduction of *personnel* which the Admiralty is already contemplating.

4. Abandonment of the construction of ships for the protection of commerce and the removal from the Navy of a number of ships which would have been effective for this purpose.¹⁰ Further removal

¹ Above, p. 15.

² Above, p. 21.

³ See above, pp. 16, 40.

⁴ July 28, 1906. See above, p. 6.

⁵ Nov. 30, 1905. See above, pp. 1, 5, and below, pp. 77, 203-4. ⁶ See above, pp. 4, 6.

⁷ Cp. above, pp. 12, 16, 19, 23, 37.

⁸ See above, p. 13.

⁹ See above, pp. 14, 16, 19, 25, 26, 40.

¹⁰ Cp. below, pp. 65, 132.

of powerful ships admirably fitted for purposes relating to the protection of commerce seems to be contemplated.

5. Immense reduction in the number of hands employed in the Government dockyards.¹ This process of reduction, begun under the last Government, has been continued under the present one, with the result up to date of the dismissal of 12,000 skilled workmen out of a total of (?) . . . There is reason to fear that many of the best of these have entered the service of the United States (which is rapidly building a great fleet), and are thus irrevocably lost to this country. Their places would be hard to supply. This reduction means a great diminution of our ability not only to construct new ships,² but also to repair existing ones.

6. While thus reducing the strength of our Fleet in commission to a dangerous extent and neglecting to build ships for the protection of commerce, the Admiralty has apparently made no arrangements for the protection of Trade by issuing directions and warnings intimating that diversion from the ordinary trade routes may be required in war. A scheme of this kind can be prepared in peace time, and while its details must necessarily be kept secret, the commercial community should know that it exists, and should understand what it would involve if put into operation.

The history of naval administration since Waterloo conclusively proves the total inability of Boards of Admiralty to stand between the Navy and a Cabinet bent on cutting the Navy down. Instances may be taken in 1835 when the naval estimates were reduced to four and a half millions and line of battle ships were sent out to the Mediterranean Station, half manned, and wanting their heaviest guns³; in 1858, when our Fleet had been reduced to a lower level than that of France alone⁴; in 1874, when out of 51 nominally effective ironclads, only 14 were fit to go to sea⁵; and in 1884, when the Fleet had again been reduced to an approximate level to that of France.⁶

In view of these considerations, of which the national importance will be evident, the Committee venture, with great diffidence, to suggest to your Chamber the expediency of forming a Committee of your members to deal with this and kindred questions, after the example set by the London Chamber of Commerce.

The Executive Committee of the NAVY LEAGUE also venture to appeal to you most urgently to call a public meeting, either on behalf of your Chamber, or in co-operation with the municipal authorities of your city, to inform the public fully of what is going forward, and to assist in enabling the voice of the country to be heard in protest, before it is too late.

In the event of such a meeting, the NAVY LEAGUE would do its best, if desired, to supply a speaker competent to explain the whole situation.

Awaiting your reply,

We are, Dear Sir, Yours faithfully,

CHAIRMAN.

VICE-CHAIRMAN.

SECRETARY.⁷

¹ See above, p. 26 and below, pp. 61, 63, 65, 74 *sq.*, 126, etc.

² Cp. above, p. 40.

³ See above, p. 27.

⁴ Above, p. 27.

⁵ Above, p. 27.

⁶ Cp., generally, above, p. 33.

⁷ For this letter and its fate, cp. above, pp. 15 *sqq.*, 21, 22, 40 *sqq.* (and esp. p. 41).

December, 1906. "Unsatisfactory Replies in the House of Commons";—Admiral Fremantle, in *N.L.J.*, January, 1907, pp. 17 sq.¹

Dec. 28, 1906. "Naval Shams"—by Lieut. C. Bellairs, M.P., *Morning Post*, Dec. 28, 1906; Jan. 2, 15, 22, 1907; and Feb. 1, 1907.

Dec. 31, 1906. "Our Naval Insecurity,"—by Dr. T. Miller Maguire, Dec. 31, 1906 (*Morning Post*, Jan. 1, 1907).

Dec., 1906. "The Navy in 1906: Complete Reversal of Policy in Operation";—*Standard*, Jan. 4, 1907. And see further *Standard's* striking leader of the same date, concluding:—

"It has, in fact, become totally impossible any longer to reconcile official and Ministerial utterances with the plain facts of the case with regard to the Services; and therefore it is, we affirm, that the time has come for those who are interested in the security of their country to make known their mind in this matter."

¹ See also below, p. 115, n. 2.

THE YEAR 1907

YEAR OF NAVAL UNREST.¹

REDUCTION OF CHANNEL FLEET.

January, 1907.² Channel Fleet reduced from 67 vessels to 21. Three battleships, two armoured cruisers, five protected cruisers and scouts, and 36 destroyers transferred to the Reserve (since called Home³) Fleet, and distributed among various separate commands.⁴

DEMAND FOR INQUIRY.

Jan. 5, 1907. "Case for Inquiry";—the concluding letter of the valuable series dealing with "The State of the Navy," from the pen of "Civis," in the then current number of the *Spectator*.⁵ See also the *Spectator's* leading article thereon—(pointing out "how strong is the *prima facie* case for an impartial investigation")—abstracted in *Standard*, Jan. 5, 1907.

Jan. 14, 1907. "A Cheap Navy: Political Methods, 1888⁶ and 1907⁷";—by "Civilian," *Standard*, Jan. 14, 1907.

JAMAICA.

January 14, 1907. Jamaica Earthquake (Kingston, Jamaica):—The *Indefatigable* more than five days' distance away.^{8,9}

(Cf. the *Globe*, February 2, 1907—"The Kingston Incident: How Jamaica is deserted by the Navy"—quoting the "long and important

¹ See, *s.v.*, "Year of Naval Unrest: Vacillating Admiralty: Need for Impartial Inquiry," *Standard*, Jan. 2, 1908 (referred to below, p. 280).

² See further below, *s.v.* March, 1907, p. 48.

³ See above, p. 13, n. 1.

⁴ See *s.v.* "The Admiralty and the Channel Fleet: Public Scandal and Danger: A Record of Events," *Standard*, July 25, 1907 (below, pp. 218 *sqq.*). See also *Standard*, July 27, 1907 (leading article), p. 6, col. 6, below, p. 224.

⁵ Reprinted as a volume, "*The State of the Navy in 1907: a Plea for Inquiry*" (Smith, Elder and Co., 1907); advocating "the appointment of a Committee of Lords and Commons to inquire into the administration of the Admiralty" (see Brassey's *Naval Annual*, 1907, p. 142).

⁶ First Lord:—Lord George Hamilton.

⁷ First Lord:—Lord Tweedmouth.

⁸ At Trinidad. See:—*The West India Committee Circular*, Jan. 29, 1907, p. 51.

⁹ Cp., further, below, p. 45.

dispatch" from the Special Correspondent of the *Times*, part of which is cited below on this page.)

Jamaica saw present, for her assistance in her hour of need, war-ships which flew, not the White Ensign of the Mother Country, but the flag of the Stars and Stripes.¹

OVERDUE.

CARTOON AND EXTRACT FROM "PUNCH," Jan. 30,
1907, p. 83.²

BRITANNIA (*on quay at Kingston*):—"Anybody seen my white ensign? I've been waiting a week for it."

MR. PUNCH:—"You've got to wait, Ma'am; that's the new system."

(*Earthquake at Kingston, January 14, 1907;—Arrival of first British Warship, January 22, 1907.*)

OUR NAVAL POLICY.

Extracted from THE WEST INDIA COMMITTEE CIRCULAR, Feb. 12, 1907,
pp. 87-88.³

The Special Correspondent to the *Times* in a message dated January 19 (1907),⁴ said: It is difficult to describe the sense of humiliation with which an Englishman surveys Kingston Harbour this evening . . . two American battleships, three German steamers, a Cuban steamer, and one British ship; she leaves to-night, and the White Ensign and the Red Ensign will be as absent from Kingston Harbour as from the military basins of Kiel and Cherbourg." We give without comment a few extracts from the Press on this same subject. They speak for themselves:—

"Both military and naval protection has been denied our West Indian possessions through a foolhardy policy initiated by the late Government on the score of economy, which the present politicians in power have been only too pleased to continue."—*Broad Arrow*.

"The pity is that the recent denuding of the Jamaica harbours of any British naval force should have left the greatest sea power of the world dependent on American friendship to meet an unforeseen crisis like this. It may have been necessary; but it is, none the less, somewhat humiliating."—*Bristol Times*.

¹ For further comment, see below on this page, and pp. 46, 49, 74, 100, 250, 291, 341. (Concerning St. Lucia, see below pp. 49, 50, 74, 100, 291, 341, and concerning Zanzibar, see below pp. 74, 100, 250, 273, 291, 341.)

² Reproduced in *West India Committee Circular*, Feb. 12, 1907.

³ Compare also *The West India Committee Circular*, January 29, 1907, pp. 50-51; and see the *Annual Report of the Executive Committee of the West India Committee for 1906* (publ. June, 1907), p. 9 (see below, p. 49, n. 3).

⁴ The full dispatch was reprinted in the *Globe*, February 2, 1907, *s.v.* "The Kingston Incident: How Jamaica is deserted by the Navy." (See above, p. 44.)

"It is humiliating to the last degree to reflect that, with the greatest Navy in the world at our disposal, one ship was not available at the critical moment."—*Globe*.

"It may be said we cannot keep a Navy to deal with earthquakes. But we must keep a Navy to protect our colonies and dependencies."—*Evening Standard*.

"If no British vessel was at hand, or within reach, to perform the duties of common humanity, what kind of provision had been made against the surprises of war—or the treacheries of peace?"—*Standard*.

"The real truth is, that to save a few thousands, ships have been recalled from stations where they are needed, with the result that British prestige has been endangered." 1—*Daily Mail*.

"Unless the West Indian section of the British Empire is speedily set in order, it will become the laughing stock, not merely of North America, but of the rest of the civilised world. We dare not relinquish it if we would. Strategic and other considerations may one day make these possessions among the most valuable we hold."—*The Outlook*.

February 5, 1907. Admiral Hopkins resigns from the NAVY LEAGUE. (See *N.L.J.*, March, 1907, p. 58.) And:—*Hinc illae lacrimae!* 2

THE GERMAN NAVY LEAGUE.

February 12, 1907. The significant result of the German Elections, and the Kaiser's gratitude to the German Navy League in that regard. 3 (*N.L.J.*, March, 1907, pp. 75, 82.) See also *Times*, Dec. 19, 1907, p. 7, col. 3. 4

Feb. 12, 1907. "The Vital Question Concerning the Navy"—third article—by Mr. Spenser Wilkinson, *Morning Post*, Feb. 12, 1907; the earlier articles having appeared in *Morning Post*, Jan. 24 and 25, 1907. 5

1 Compare the unabashed admission of the Executive Committee of the Navy League. See below, p. 131.

2 (Ter., *Andr.*, i, 1, 99.) The resignation of Admiral Hopkins (for the erroneous reasons mentioned below, p. 195) was the main cause of the abandonment for the time being by the Executive Committee of all further criticism of the policy of the Admiralty.

And yet:—"the Admiralty welcomes criticism; it can do nothing but good;"—Lord Tweedmouth (First Lord of the Admiralty) speaking at the Annual Dinner of the Association of Chambers of Commerce, March 6, 1907 (see the *Standard*, March 7, 1907, p. 7). A curious commentary.

3 Concerning the German Navy League see above, p. *R.F.*, and below, pp. 67, 117, 127, 169, 208, 289, 411, 434, 453, etc.

4 Cp.—*s.v.* "The Kaiser's Great Triumph: Extent of Socialist Defeats: New Naval Plans announced,"—*Daily Mail*, Jan. 28, 1907; and also (leading article), *s.v.* "Great Britain and Germany: a Contrast" (same date). See also *Standard*, March 6, 1907.

5 The second article had especial reference to "Barfleur's" *Naval Policy: a Plea for the Study of War* (W. Blackwood and Sons);—with respect to which latter see also *Standard*, Jan. 19, 1907;—"Barfleur" being (according to the *Times*, March 8, 1907) Vice-Admiral Sir Reginald Custance. See also below, pp. 262, 279.

Feb. 16, 1907. "Reducing the Navy: Channel Fleet Inadequacy under New Scheme: Peril of Unpreparedness";—*Standard*, Feb. 16, 1907.

BOLT FROM THE BLUE.

Feb. 18, 1907. The Risk of Surprise:¹ A Bolt from the Blue; State of the Home Fleet;—Debate initiated by Lord Lovat in the House of Lords, in the course of which was delivered Lord Roberts' significant warning on the question of Invasion.²³ (See report in *Times*, Feb. 19, 1907; and cp. also *N.L.J.*, March, 1907, p. 58.)

THE GOVERNMENT AND THE NAVY.

PUBLIC MEETING AT HAMPSTEAD.

February 26, 1907.

On February 26, 1907, a Public Meeting⁴ was held under the auspices of the 93rd Branch of the Navy League,⁵ Councillor Charles Hendrick, J.P., in the chair.

The following Resolution, moved by Mr. J. S. Fletcher, M.P., seconded by Mr. Harold F. Wyatt, and supported by Mr. L. Graham H. Horton-Smith, was carried unanimously:—

"That this meeting of electors convened in the Town Hall, Hampstead, urges upon the Government the necessity of maintaining the Navy in respect to the number, the strength and swiftness of ships, weight of armaments, and efficiency of officers and men, and otherwise, up to the Two-Power (of any nations) Standard, and with a reserve in addition."

March 2, 1907. "The Hague Conference and the Limitation of Armaments";—"by the Prime Minister," in the *Nation*, March 2, 1907, p. 4:—"Let me in conclusion say a word as to the part of Great Britain. We have already given earnest of our sincerity by the considerable reductions that have been" [already] "effected in our naval and military expenditure,"⁶ as well as by the undertaking that we are prepared to go further, if we find a similar disposition in other quarters."⁷

¹ Cp. below, pp. 112, 156 *sq.* 254, 434, etc.

² Concerning Invasion, see also pp. 254, 260 *sq.*, and Index, *s.v.* "Aggression," "Invasion," and "Raid."

³ It was in the course of this debate that Lord Roberts spoke of his feeling of "absolute despair, when I think of the blindness displayed by the British public which enables them to rest satisfied with our present state of unpreparedness." See *Times*, Feb. 19, 1907, p. 6, col. 1. Cp. also "Lord Roberts' famous words" quoted in *Standard*, Nov. 20, 1908, p. 9, col. 2.

⁴ See the *Hampstead and Highgate Express*, March 2, 1907, and the *Hampstead Record*, March 2, 1907, p. 5, col. 6. (Compare also the *Standard*, February 27, 1907, p. 10, col. 6.) See, further, below, p. 233.

⁵ Concerning this Branch, see below, p. 233. ⁶ Cp. Index *s.v.* "Campbell-Bannerman."

⁷ "Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman . . . has declined to lay down a battleship" (the third *Dreadnought* of 1907-8) "until the result of the Hague Conference is known" [cp. above, p. 6]. "If that battleship is necessary to the naval supremacy of this country, he has no right to delay its construction, unless there is at the same time a corresponding reduction in other navies. It should be remembered that the ship in question was considered necessary under Lord Cawdor's administration" [cp. above, p. 1], "and that nothing has occurred since to alter that necessity. If the necessity existed then, it is made doubly urgent by the loss of the *Montagu*" [above, pp. 4, 6];—*Standard* (leading article), March 15, 1907. See further below, pp. 50, 249, etc.

March 4, 1907. "Government and the Navy: Memorandum's Facts Tested: The True Situation" as regards "the Fleet at Home";—especially in reference to the Nucleus Crew system (*personnel*) and the arrears of repairs (*matériel*)—from the *Standard's* Special Correspondent at Portsmouth, *Standard*, March 4, 1907.

March, 1907. "The Admiral commanding all torpedo craft placed under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet" (see *Royal Navy List and Naval Recorder*, October, 1907, p. 674).¹

March 4, 1907. Lord Charles Beresford, Commander-in-Chief, Channel Fleet.^{2 3}

March [26], 1907. "Five Admirals appointed to Home Fleet, thus disorganising the whole of the commands and destroying the effect of two years' squadron training."—*Standard*, July 25, 1907 (quoted below p. 220).

March 5, 1907. Navy Estimates for 1907-8, outlined by Mr. Robertson, House of Commons, March 5, 1907,⁴ *Standard*, March 6, 1907;—and see *Standard*, same date (leading article), for exceedingly pregnant criticism upon them, ending:—

"The fact is that . . . the strength of the Navy, both moral and material, is being so gravely impaired that an immense increase of expenditure in the future is assured, *even if disaster be avoided in the meantime.*"⁵

March 13, 1907. "A Cheap Navy: Question of the Manning of Home Fleet: Ministerial Reticence" (Questions in the House)—*Standard*, March 14, 1907.

¹ Cp., *Standard*, July 27, 1907 (leading article), p. 6, col. 6, to the effect that the Channel Fleet was reduced from 67 vessels to 21 in January, 1907—the 21 being 14 battleships, 4 armoured cruisers and 3 unarmoured cruisers. See also above, p. 44.

² "When Lord Charles Beresford took over the Channel Fleet, it had been reduced from 67 vessels to 21. Three battleships, 2 armoured cruisers, 5 protected cruisers and scouts, and 36 destroyers were taken away and distributed among the squadrons of the Reserve (or Home) Fleet."—*Daily Express*, July 7, 1908, p. 1, col. 2. (Cp. also above, p. 44, and below, s.v. July 13, 1908, p. 423.)

The command was only accepted subject to certain modifications, if the statement in the *New York Herald* (as quoted in the *Globe*, Feb. 16, 1907) is to be taken as correct. (Cp. also below, s.v. July 13, 1908, p. 423; and cp., further, *Standard*, April 24, 1909, p. 7, col. 7.)

³ "It is, however, alleged that the Board of Admiralty have not completely observed their part of the understanding, which is believed to be the origin of the existing friction" (July, 1908).—*Western Morning News*, July 10, 1908.

See further, generally, below, s.v. July 13, 1908, pp. 422-425.

⁴ "Lord Charles Beresford . . . received his present appointment" (as Commander-in-Chief of the Channel Fleet) "on March 4, 1907, but did not hoist his flag till six weeks later."—*Standard*, Dec. 9, 1908, p. 7, col. 3.

⁵ The First Lord's "Statement Explanatory of the Navy Estimates, 1907-8," was issued Feb. 28, 1907, and printed in the *Times*, March 1, 1907.

For discussion of these Estimates, see reports in *Standard*, March 14 and 15, 1907, and (both article and leader), March 15, 1907; and see below, *passim*.

⁶ The italics are ours.

ST. LUCIA.

April, 1907. The Rioting in St. Lucia :—The *Indefatigable* 1,500 miles away.¹

(Cp. the *Daily Express*, April 30, 1907—"The Unready Navy: no help for British Colonies in time of emergency: St. Lucia's Peril";—and the *Globe*, May 15, 1907, s.v. "St. Lucia Disturbances: The Absence of a Warship²: Serious Situation."³

April, 1907. Two-Power Standard;—Debate in the House of Lords. Liberal "Lip-Service" to the Standard.

April 15 to May 14, 1907. The Imperial Conference sitting in London.⁴

April 30, 1907. Prince Bülow's Speech in the Reichstag with Reference to the Hague Conference and the Question of Disarmament—and to Germany's predetermined intentions in that regard, namely :—

"We cannot take part in such a discussion, which, momentous as it is, is yet unpractical."⁵

May 1, 1907. Naval Affairs: Debate in House of Lords: Concerning :—(1) The Present State of the Home Fleet; (2) the State of Repairs of the Fleet as a whole; (3) East Coast Dock; (4) Recent "Casualties."

N.L. EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING.

May 6, 1907.

AGENDA.⁶

6. "Mr. Horton-Smith to call attention to an article headed 'An Unready Navy: no help for British Colonies in times of emergency;

¹ See *Globe*, May 15, 1907.

² Eight days, or thereabouts.

³ Compare above, pp. 44-46, concerning Jamaica, and see the *Annual Report of the Executive Committee of the West India Committee for 1906* (publ. June, 1907), s.v. "The Defences of the West Indies," p. 9 :—"The grave danger to life and property and the loss of prestige of British rule, resulting from the policy . . . of withdrawing His Majesty's troops and ships from the West Indies has been demonstrated by the disturbances in British Guiana, in Nov., 1905" [below, p. 100], "the events subsequent to the earthquake in Jamaica, on Jan. 14, 1907" [above, pp. 44-46], "and the rioting in St. Lucia in April, 1907." [Above, on this page].

See also, concerning the Zanzibar Incident of Aug., 1907, below, p. 250.

⁴ Blue-Book Report issued June, 1907.

⁵ See the whole speech reported in the *Morning Post*, May 1, 1907 (and see also *Morning Post* leading article, same date).

⁶ Cp. above, p. 15, n. 2.

St. Lucia's Peril':—published in the *Daily Express* of April 30, 1907,¹ and ask what action, if any, the Executive Committee of the NAVY LEAGUE propose to take thereon."

7. "Mr. Horton-Smith to call attention to the speech of the German Chancellor (Prince Bülow), delivered in the Reichstag on April 30, 1907, with reference to the discussion on the Disarmament Question at the forthcoming Hague Conference and to the intended action of Germany in relation thereto,² and to ask what, if any, action the Executive Committee of the NAVY LEAGUE propose to take thereon."³

The Executive Committee of the NAVY LEAGUE proposed to take no action on either point.

Mr. Wyatt then gave notice that at the forthcoming Annual Meeting of the NAVY LEAGUE to be held on the 15th May, 1907, he should bring forward a motion, which would be seconded by Mr. L. Graham H. Horton-Smith, and would be supported by Mr. L. J. Maxse and Mr. H. W. Wilson (Editor of the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL), all being members of the Executive Committee of the NAVY LEAGUE.

The motion, which Mr. Wyatt then handed in—and which subsequently took the form of an Amendment to the Annual Report—was in the terms printed *infra* pp. 60-62.

EMERGENCY

N.L. EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING.

May 9, 1907.

AGENDA.⁴

"In view of the controversy which is promised for the Annual Meeting on May 15,⁵ to give authority to the Committee to spend the requisite amount for the issue of proxies."

The Committee decided to issue a Circular⁶ to the members of the NAVY LEAGUE asking them to place their votes at the disposal of the dominant majority of the Executive Committee, but (despite the protest of the minority⁷) refusing therein to state to the members of the LEAGUE the terms of the Amendment against which their votes were asked to be given, and indeed misrepresenting the effect of that Amendment.⁸

Comment were superfluous.⁹

¹ See above, p. 49.

² See above, p. 49, and below, on this page, n. 3.

³ This—in view of the fact that the Hague Conference had been held out as a reason for not laying down or, at least, for postponing a third British *Dreadnought* in the year 1907-8. (See above, p. 6, and below, *supra*, Aug. 21, 1907, p. 249.) And here had Prince Bülow already killed the British Disarmament proposal before the Conference had even begun!

⁴ Cp. above, p. 15, n. 2.

⁵ May 15, 1907.

⁶ Already then printed, and, allegedly, therefore not easily open to alteration. As to this, see below, p. 56.

⁷ See below, p. 68.

⁸ See further below, pp. 53, 54, 56, 68, 82, 129 *sq.*

⁹ See further generally, (concerning their action at a later date), below, p. 142, n. 11.

THE NAVY LEAGUE AND ITS DUTY.

SPECTATOR, May 11, 1907, p. 753, col. 2.

*To the Editor.*United University Club,
Pall Mall, S.W.,

May 8, 1907.

SIR,—Amongst your readers very many assuredly sympathise deeply with the views which you have powerfully expressed during the last few months regarding the reduction of our naval strength. And amongst these must be included, as I venture to hope and to believe, a considerable number of members of the NAVY LEAGUE. To such members I ask, with much deference, your permission to address an appeal, and this appeal is that if by any means they can make attendance possible, they will be present at the League's Annual Meeting, which is to be held on Wednesday next, the 15th inst., at 3 p.m., in the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall. This is, in England, an age of mandates. Without a mandate no Government nowadays appears to dare to take any important legislative decision; and it must be clear to all that without some indication at least of the views of the general body of their members, the authorities of the NAVY LEAGUE would experience great difficulty in taking any forward step, for upon the question of the effect of recent naval changes experts differ and opinions clash. Both inside and outside the League, men to whom an equal degree of solicitude for the safety of the country must be attributed are diametrically opposed on this point, though perhaps amongst those in any degree in touch with the prevailing feeling in the Navy itself conviction of a lessening national security is widely diffused. In presence, however, of this divergence, the need for a reference by the League to its members is plain, and on Wednesday that reference is to be made. An Amendment to the Resolution proposing the adoption of the Annual Report will be moved by myself, seconded by Mr. L. G. H. Horton-Smith, and have the immense advantage of the support of Mr. L. J. Maxse and of Mr. H. W. Wilson. The views expressed in the amendment are based on specific facts, and our case is cumulative. One circumstance, at any rate, stands out with a glaring force that only the blind can refuse to perceive,¹ and that is the reduction of the Naval Estimates by £6,400,000 within three years—indeed, the real reduction is greater still. Let him believe who can that this great withdrawal of the substance of the nation from the support of its Fleet has been accomplished without diminution of fighting strength.² To those less credulous I appeal, with all the earnestness that can be put into words, to attend the meeting next week. All members and associates of the League are invited to be present, though the former alone have the right to vote.

I am, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT.

¹ See also below, p. 203.² Cp. above, p. 78, and below, p. 203.

N.L. EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING.

May 13, 1907.¹

REJECTION OF PROPOSED COMPROMISE.

At the urgent solicitation of certain members of the Committee, Mr. Horton-Smith proposed a Compromise, which Mr. Wyatt indicated to the Committee his willingness to accept.

The Compromise proposed was to the effect that the President of the League should, in his speech at the Annual Meeting, read *seriatim* from the Chair the several points raised in the Amendment; state that they had been raised by certain members of the Executive Committee—a minority, if he wished to say so, and wrongly in his view, if that were in fact his view—and that having been raised he left them to the Committee for consideration and discussion during the ensuing year²;—the only other point put forward by Mr. Horton-Smith being that either Mr. Wyatt or he was to be at liberty (though with reference solely to the future and not to the past) to address the audience upon the matters in question.

He stated that, if such Compromise were accepted by the Committee as a whole, he should not accord his support to the proposed Amendment.

This Compromise, however, though eminently reasonable, was yet rejected by the majority of the Executive Committee present,³ mainly at the instance of the Chairman, Mr. H. Seymour Trower, on whose head the responsibility for the subsequent schism in the NAVY LEAGUE (thereby—and thereby alone—occasioned) must chiefly rest.⁴

This fact, being common knowledge, can be freely stated.⁴

RESIGNATION OF MR. WYATT AND
MR. HORTON-SMITH FROM THE COMMITTEE.

Compromise having been rejected, Mr. Wyatt and Mr. Horton-Smith thereupon handed in their joint Resignation from the Committee, which was in the following terms:—

(JOINT RESIGNATION)

LONDON,

May 13, 1907.

DEAR MR. SEYMOUR TROWER,⁵—

We hereby resign our respective seats on the Executive Committee of the NAVY LEAGUE, and, in so

¹ Cp. above, p. 15, n. 2.² *I.e.*, May 1907 to May 1908.³ Cp. below, pp. 179, 190.⁴ See below, p. 191.

⁵ "Premier" type is used in the earlier part of this book mainly for the *Circular Letters* addressed by us to the members of the Navy League in Britain (as also for our *Resignations*, and for the terms of our *Amendment* of May 15, 1907, and of our *Resolution* of July 19, 1907, &c.). It is used again, in the later part of the Book, mainly for the *Circular Letters* addressed by us to all who had in any way indicated their agreement with our views and their aspiration (after the Extraordinary General Meeting of July 19, 1907), for the formation of a new and vital Navy League,—and for other *Circular Letters*, etc., of date subsequent to the foundation (on Jan. 27, 1908) of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE. See Index, *s.v.* "Premier Type."

doing, we would venture to place on record our protest against the apathy of the Executive Committee in presence of the facts enumerated in our proposed Amendment to the Report of the League for 1906, and actually based on the authority of the NAVY LEAGUE'S OFFICIAL ORGAN, the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL.¹

We venture further to record our protest against the action of the Committee in the distribution of circulars to the members of the League, asking for their votes against an Amendment the terms of which were withheld from them.

We request that this letter may not only be entered upon the Minutes of the Executive Committee, but also (if only in justice to us) be published in the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL,² and we reserve to ourselves the right to publish the same as and where we may think fit.³

We are,

Yours very faithfully

HAROLD FRAZER WYATT

(*United University Club*),

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH

(*Athenæum Club*).

RESIGNATION OF MR. HORTON-SMITH
FROM THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF
THE UNIVERSITIES SUB-COMMITTEE

Mr. Horton-Smith then handed in a further letter in the following terms :—

ATHENÆUM CLUB,

LONDON, S.W.,

May 13, 1907.

DEAR MR. SEYMOUR TROWER,—

Having resigned my seat upon the Executive Committee of the NAVY LEAGUE by letter of even date herewith, addressed to yourself, I hereby resign also my Chairmanship of the Universities Sub-Committee of the NAVY LEAGUE.⁴

¹ See below, pp. 60-62, 64, 71, etc.

² Such publication was refused; and from this date onwards the Committee, while glad enough to publish attacks upon, have always refused to publish in the *Journal* any written communication from, those who had just resigned (cp. below, pp. 229, 318, 327, 394). Is this fair play?—Was it even fair to their own members? Were and are the Committee so afraid of members learning the real state of the case in regard to the country's naval defences?

³ Published in *Standard*, May 14, 1907, p. 7, col. 4. See below, p. 54.

⁴ Mr. Horton-Smith had been Chairman of this Sub-Committee since its inception in 1903. (See *N.L. Annual Report for 1903*—dated May 11, 1904—p. 9.)

I request that this letter may not only be entered upon the Minutes of the Executive Committee, but also be published in the *NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL*.¹ I reserve to myself the right to publish it as and where I may think fit.

I am, Yours very faithfully

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

RESIGNATION OF MR. MAXSE.

The Resignation of Mr. L. J. Maxse followed between the 13th and 15th May, 1907.²

A CHEAP NAVY.

GOVERNMENT'S REDUCTION PROGRAMME.

NAVY LEAGUE POLICY.

THREATENED SPLIT.

STANDARD, Tuesday, May 14, 1907, p. 7, cols. 4 and 5.

The need for the warnings which the *Standard* has been compelled from time to time to publish on the dangerous naval policy of the present Government, and the effect of those warnings, are alike illustrated by the action which is to be taken to-morrow at the Annual Meeting of the *NAVY LEAGUE* at the Royal United Service Institution. It might have been thought that in an organisation like the *NAVY LEAGUE*, the avowed object of which is to preserve the naval power of Great Britain unimpaired, there would exist no delusions as to the sophistical nature of the assurances with which the Government have endeavoured to conceal the disastrous tendencies of their naval reductions. Unfortunately, this appears not to be the case. Two members of the Executive Committee, Mr. H. F. Wyatt and Mr. L. Graham H. Horton-Smith, have felt compelled to resign their positions on the Committee in order to move the Amendment which will be found below.³ The letter which Messrs. Wyatt and Horton-Smith have addressed to Mr. Seymour Trower, the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the League, is as follows: 4—

¹ Such publication was likewise refused. (Cp. above, p. 53, n. 2). No further comment is needed.

² See below, pp. 80-81.

³ Set out below, pp. 60-62.

⁴ Above, pp. 52-53.

AN APPEAL TO MEMBERS.

STANDARD, May 14, 1907, p. 7, cols. 4-5.

To the Editor of the STANDARD.

United University Club, S.W.,

May 13, 1907.

SIR,—Within the last twelve months repeated, and, as I think, noble efforts have been made in the columns of the *Standard* to call attention to the disastrous effect of the various methods which were being employed to reduce naval expenditure.

As a part of the comment which you made and which you attracted, wonder was frequently expressed at the inaction of the NAVY LEAGUE in presence of a continued withdrawal of the substance of the nation from naval defence. Since the whole object of the League's existence is the maintenance of naval strength, and since it is the only organised body in the Empire formed for that end, astonishment and regret at its failure to attempt to resist a reduction of over £6,000,000 in the Navy Estimates, within a period of three years, were not unnatural. It has not been altogether dumb, seeing that in the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL nearly all the steps by which the present Government has effected its naval economies have been made the subject of stricture. But the action which might naturally have been expected to follow this stricture has been conspicuous only by its absence. No effort has been made by the League as a whole to rouse public opinion, as by appeal to the various Chambers of Commerce, to the great shipping bodies, and the great mercantile interests, whose national premium of insurance has been cut down by one-sixth.¹ And no endeavour has been made by the League as a whole to call public meetings to discuss this great and vital question.

This inertness on the part of the League becomes the more strange when we remember its past. In the days when a Unionist Government was in power, the League never shrank from public criticism and public agitation, as when the Committee sent long strings of sandwichmen up and down Whitehall, bearing placards with the names of the sixteen battleships ("Deathtraps") armed with muzzle-loading guns which then figured upon the effective list. But with the advent of a Liberal Government a species of paralysis seems to have fallen upon our organisation, and the successive measures by which reduction of expenditure has been and is being attained, though examined and condemned in its *Journal*, have yet been allowed to pass without any attempt towards effective protest. I am concerned here, not with causes, but with effects, and what I submit is that the effect of the League's failure boldly to resist measures by a Liberal Government, which in its official organ it has blamed, contrasts ill with its readiness to oppose the acts of Unionist Administrations in former days. This contrast must inevitably bring upon the League in an acute shape the very reproach which it has previously striven most carefully to avoid, namely, that of being influenced by "party." For this reason, as well as, for many others,

¹ Cp. above pp. 15-17, 21, 22, 40 *seq.* (esp. 41).

I deem it most expedient, in the best interests of the League itself, that it should take action vigorously, and take it soon.

But when there exists within the governing body of the League a deep divergence of view on a fundamental question of policy and duty, reference obviously becomes necessary to the only court of appeal which the League itself can furnish, viz., a general meeting of its members, usually held once a year.

This meeting is to take place on Wednesday next,¹ at 3 p.m., in the Royal United Service Institution, and the following Amendment² will be moved by myself, seconded by Mr. L. G. H. Horton-Smith, one of the foremost of NAVY LEAGUE workers, who bears a name well known, not only in the field of literature, but also at the Bar, and supported by Mr. L. J. Maxse, whose name must be familiar to everyone.

I venture, Sir, to beg you to publish this Amendment in full, for a reason which will, I think, commend itself to your sense of justice. For a circular, accompanied by a form of proxy, has been issued from the office of the League to all its members, asking them to place their votes at the disposal of the dominant majority of the committee, but withholding from them the terms of the Amendment against which those votes are to be given.³ The unfairness of this course needs no comment, and shall have none. But, as a matter of fact, the circular was only submitted for authorisation by the committee after it had been printed,⁴ and when it was alleged to be too late to print also the Amendment.⁵ The fact that this circular was being printed was not revealed to the mover and seconder, although, at that time, we were still members of the committee. The circular also declares that the "Amendment practically amounts to a censure on Sir John Fisher and the Admiralty Administration generally, which the Executive Committee as a whole [by which is meant the dominant majority] absolutely declines [by such circular] to endorse."

This is a purely *ex parte* statement, made in flagrant contradiction of the actual position known to be taken by those in favour of the Amendment.⁶ Our case⁷ is that the authority really responsible for the measures which the League's journal has condemned is not the Board of Admiralty, but the Cabinet, and we say that the entire history of naval administration since Waterloo proves to the hilt the inevitable subservience of successive Boards to successive Cabinets. We say that the *causa causans* of the reductions is finance, and finance alone, and that, as often before, the Navy Estimates have been sacrificed to a party Budget.⁷

Thus every vote won by this circular will be a vote given not merely in complete ignorance of the nature of the amendment, but upon a glaring misrepresentation of the case of those who support it. The document concludes with a bludgeon threat of resignation, if the amendment should be carried, signed by about half of the committee.

Now, Sir, I desire to appeal to all members of the NAVY LEAGUE who may be among your readers to attend, if attendance is possible,

¹ May 15, 1907; see below, pp. 60 *sqq.*

² Set forth below, pp. 60-62, and printed in the *Standard*, May 14, 1907, p. 7, col. 4.

³ See above, p. 50.

⁴ See above, p. 50.

⁵ The allegation was unfounded. See below, p. 68, n. 4.

⁶ See above, p. 50.

⁷ See below, p. 60.

the meeting at the United Service Institution on Wednesday next, and at least hear both sides before they give their votes.

I may add that all the specific points in the amendment have the full endorsement of Mr. H. W. Wilson, the editor of the *NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL*.

Finally, let me say, descending to myself, that having been intimately associated with the League during twelve years past, and having during two of those years devoted myself, mind and soul and substance, to its service, while I went round the world as its representative, I hope I may be credited with acting now only out of duty and loyalty to what I conceive to be its highest aims, as are with equal certainty the seconder and supporters of the amendment.

I am, Sir, Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT.

A CHEAP NAVY.

TO-DAY'S MEETING OF THE NAVY LEAGUE.

STANDARD, Wednesday, May 15, 1907, p. 8, col. 2.

In the admirable letter which we published yesterday, Mr. H. F. Wyatt called the attention of members of the *NAVY LEAGUE*, and, through them, the attention of the country at large, to the inexplicable attitude recently adopted by the Executive Committee of the League.

Shortly after publishing, in October last, the details of the proposed disastrous reduction in our naval forces, we had occasion to comment upon the remarkable inaction of the *NAVY LEAGUE*, a body expressly constituted in order to present to the public the exact condition of the first line of Imperial defence in relation to the requirements of Imperial security. Chiefly owing, we believe, to the vigorous action of the two members of the committee—Mr. Wyatt and Mr. Horton-Smith—who have now resigned their positions in order to move an amendment to the adoption of the annual report, the *NAVY LEAGUE* was induced to protest against the naval policy of the present Government. Since that time every one of the allegations which we brought forward has been confirmed. Yet Mr. H. F. Wyatt, seconded by Mr. Horton-Smith, and supported by Mr. L. J. Maxse and Mr. H. W. Wilson, now finds it necessary to bring forward an amendment calling upon the League to censure the present administration upon nearly every point of our original indictment.

Mr. Wyatt proposes to condemn the Government for the reduction in the Navy Estimates, the abandonment of naval stations, the withdrawal of cruisers from all over the globe, the immense reduction in the number of men employed in the dockyards, the decrease in the *personnel* of the Navy, the gradual abolition of that unique and invaluable force, the Coastguard, the relative decline of the torpedo force, the reduction in the building programme, the introduction of the ruinous and utterly unjust short-service system, and the failure to proceed with the construction of a naval base on the east coast.

There is here no question of theory. These things are actual facts, which may be ascertained by anyone. Nor are they all that

might be cited. The dangerous accumulation of repairs, the reduction of the sea-going squadrons, the curtailment of sea-training, the laying-up of valuable ships—these matters, to name but these, are not included in Mr. Wyatt's amendment.

And yet, in the face of these indisputable facts, the secretary of the NAVY LEAGUE states in a circular in which members are asked to send in proxies for use by Mr. Yerburgh or Mr. Trower: "I am instructed to add that if the amendment is carried it will involve the resignation of the president, Mr. R. A. Yerburgh, and the following members of the committee:—Chairman—H. Seymour Trower, Vice-Chairman—Admiral the Hon. Sir E. R. Fremantle; Mr. W. L. Ainslie, Colonel Barnett, R.E., Major H. R. Beddoes, Mr. G. Beetham, Mr. A. H. Burgoyne, Mr. E. J. Caldbeck, Dr. B. W. Ginsburg, Mr. A. P. Howell, Mr. A. W. Lafone, Colonel Cecil F. Leach, Mr. G. Grinnell Milne, Sir Frederick Pollock, and Mr. H. L. Swinburne."

Some of these gentlemen have done admirable service in educating the public with regard to the needs of naval supremacy. It is the more difficult to understand why, in this matter, they should have chosen to place themselves in a position which virtually commits them to the approval of the present naval policy on all the points specified by Mr. Wyatt. They have, no doubt, excellent reasons for their action; but the point which the members of the NAVY LEAGUE have to consider to-day is whether, in the event of the amendment being lost, their subscriptions would not, in the interests of their country, be better bestowed elsewhere. It is to be hoped, however, that Mr. Wyatt and Mr. Horton-Smith will receive the support which their plucky protest deserves, for, if the NAVY LEAGUE is to continue to fulfil the purpose for which it was founded, its recent policy must be completely reconsidered.

THE NAVY LEAGUE AND ITS PROXIES.

DAILY MAIL, May 14, 1907, p. 5, col. 6, EVENING STANDARD AND S.J.G., May 15, 1907, p. 14, PALL MALL GAZETTE, May 15, 1907, p. 4, col. 2, STANDARD, May 15, 1907, p. 8, col. 2.

To the Editor.

4, Paper Buildings, Temple,
London, E.C.,

May 14, 1907.

SIR,—With reference to the proxy forms sent out by the Executive Committee of the NAVY LEAGUE last Thursday, under the unfair circumstances detailed in Mr. H. F. Wyatt's letter, printed in the *Standard* of this morning, would you allow me space to point out that those members of the League who have given proxies under a misapprehension are perfectly at liberty to withdraw the same, and to point out, further, that their presence at to-morrow's meeting will in itself be tantamount to such withdrawal.

Only this morning I have received a letter from a member, who

is a barrister, stating that he has under yesterday's date, written to the secretary of the League in the following terms:—

"Dear Sir,—In view of further and better acquaintance with the facts of the case relative to the amendment of Mr. Wyatt and Mr. Horton-Smith at the meeting of the NAVY LEAGUE on the 15th inst., I beg to withdraw my proxy to Mr. Yerburch and Mr. Trower, and, were it not now too late, I should give the same to the first-mentioned gentlemen."

Another letter which I have just received—from a solicitor whom I have met but once—will sufficiently indicate the feeling which has been engendered by the action of the committee:—

"My wife and I," he writes, "are both members of the NAVY LEAGUE, and the former has succeeded in getting a good many members to join lately. We received the circulars from the committee enclosing forms of proxy, and we at once came to the conclusion that it was not a fair way of dealing with the amendment Mr. Wyatt and yourself are undertaking, and, of course, we did not sign, but made up our minds to attend the meeting and hear what was to be said on both sides."¹

I am, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

THE NAVY LEAGUE.

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE'S SPLIT.

MORNING POST, May 15, 1907, p. 5, col. 5, PALL MALL GAZETTE,
May 15, 1907, p. 4, col. 2.

To the Editor.

4 Paper Buildings, Temple, E.C.,

May 14, 1907.

SIR,—We venture to appeal to you to be so kind as to publish the subjoined copy of an amendment to the report of the NAVY LEAGUE for the year 1906, which will be respectively moved and seconded by ourselves and supported by Mr. L. J. Maxse at the annual meeting of the League, to be held in the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, at 3 p.m. to-morrow (Wednesday), the 15th inst. The object of the amendment is to raise the question of the duty of the NAVY LEAGUE to the nation, in presence of the facts severally enumerated in it, and actually based upon the authority of the NAVY LEAGUE's official organ, the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL.

We would specially ask you to print the proposed amendment in full,² in view of the fact that the dominant majority of the Executive Committee—upon which we yesterday³ resigned our seats—took upon themselves to issue, last Thursday,⁴ a circular to all members of the League asking for their votes (by forms of proxy) against that amendment, while withholding from them its terms. The unfairness of this procedure needs, we imagine, no comment.

¹ Cp. further below, p. 68.

² This request was acceded to by both *Morning Post* (May 15, 1907, p. 5, col. 5) and *P.M.G.* (May 15, 1907, p. 4, col. 2).

³ May 13, 1907.

⁴ May 9, 1907; cp. above, p. 50.

The circular, we may add, makes an *ex parte* statement that our amendment practically amounts to a censure of Admiralty administration and of Sir John Fisher, while, in fact, our case is that the Government of the day is solely responsible, and that finance, or in other words economy, is at the root of the whole matter.¹

We would entreat any of your readers who may be members of the NAVY LEAGUE to make an effort to be present at to-morrow's meeting, and at least to hear both sides before recording their votes.

It is not unimportant to observe, in conclusion, that the points specified in the amendment have received the full endorsement of Mr. H. W. Wilson, himself the editor of the official organ of the NAVY LEAGUE.—We are, Sir, Yours faithfully,

HAROLD FRAZER WYATT,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

THE NAVY LEAGUE.

TWELFTH ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING

*Held at the Royal United Service Institution,
on Wednesday, 15th May, 1907, at 3 p.m.*²

MR. ROBERT YERBURGH
(President of the League)

IN THE CHAIR.

AGENDA.

The Secretary will read the Notice convening the Meeting.

1st Resolution.

“That the Annual Report and Balance Sheet be adopted.”

Proposed by THE PRESIDENT.

Seconded by Mr. H. SEYMOUR TROWER.

The following Amendment will be moved by Mr. H. F. WYATT, and seconded by Mr. L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH:—

“That this Meeting, while adopting the Report and Accounts, deeply deplores the diminution in our naval

¹ Cp. above, p. 56.

² Concerning the use of “Premier” type in this book, see above, p. 52, n. 5.

strength involved in the reduction of the naval estimates from £36,800,000¹ for the year 1904-5, to £30,400,000 for the year 1907-8,² and represented by³ :—

1. The abandonment of naval stations in the West Indies, the Falkland Islands,⁴ Esquimalt,⁵ and Trincomalee, and the withdrawal of cruisers from very large areas of the world's seas.⁶
2. The reduction of the number of workmen in the Royal dockyards from 35,340 in 1904 to 27,315 in 1907.⁷
3. The reduction of the personnel of the Navy from 131,000 in 1904 to 128,000 in 1907.⁸
4. The reduction—now in progress, as shown by the abolition of 41 stations, and detachments—of the coastguard, hitherto consisting of 350 highly trained officers and upwards of about 4,000 highly-trained men.⁹
5. The decline of our torpedo flotilla, relatively to that of Germany, evidenced by our small destroyer programme and by the fact that in the last ten years we have laid down but 64 destroyers to 72 laid down by that country.¹⁰
6. The fact that our programme of naval construction¹¹ for the current year is smaller than that

¹ To be strictly accurate :—£36,889,000 in 1904 (see *N.L.J.*, Jan., 1906, p. 5; and *cp.* below, p. 78, n. 7).

² For the figures see *N.L.J.*, at (*int. al.*) April, 1906, p. 79; March, 1907, p. 57 (below, p. 74); April, 1907, pp. 87 and 92 (below, p. 74) (and see now also Jan., 1908, p. 6); and see, further, No. 6 and the notes thereto.—See also above, pp. 51, 55, and below, pp. 66, 74, 78, 129, 140, 195, 203, 210, 287, etc.

³ "As evidenced (*inter alia*) by"—see below, p. 140.

⁴ See below, p. 63, n. 3.

⁵ See below, p. 384.

⁶ No. 1. See *N.L.J.* at (*int. al.*), Feb., 1907, p. 35 (below, p. 74).—See also above, pp. 44-46, 49, and below, pp. 63, 65, 74, 95, 98, 99, 100, 107, 125 *sq.*, 129, 131 *sq.*, 140, 211, 225, 250, etc.

⁷ No. 2. See *N.L.J.* at (*int. al.*), Feb., 1907, p. 34 (below, pp. 74 *sq.*); March, 1907, p. 57 (below, p. 75); April, 1907, pp. 87 (below, p. 75) and 92.—See also above, pp. 26, 40, 42, and below, pp. 63, 65, 74-75, 100, 126, 129, 140, 210, 256, etc.

⁸ No. 3. See *N.L.J.* at (*int. al.*), Dec., 1905, p. 308 (below, p. 75, n. 3); April, 1907, p. 87 (below, p. 75).—See also below, pp. 63, 65, 75, 92, 113, 126 *sq.*, 129, 140, 210, 225, 256, etc.

⁹ No. 4. See *N.L.J.* at (*int. al.*), Feb., 1907, p. 34 (below, p. 75).—See also above, p. 37, and below, pp. 63, 65 *sq.*, 75, 100, 129, 140, 210, etc.

¹⁰ No. 5. See *N.L.J.* at (*int. al.*), Dec., 1905, p. 308; Nov., 1906, pp. 307-8; Dec., 1906, p. 317; March, 1907, p. 57 (below, p. 76); April, 1907, pp. 87 (below, p. 75) and 91 (below, pp. 75 *sq.*); and see also later, Oct., 1907, pp. 289, 296.—See also below, pp. 63, 66, 76 *sq.*, 91, n. 9, 115 *sq.*, 115, n. 1, 118, 119 *sq.*, 127, 129, 140, 202 *sq.*, 210, 294, 448, etc.

¹¹ Exclusive of submarines, for which see below, p. 62, n. 1, 140.

of a single European power, viz. : 67,000¹ tons to be laid down by us,² as against 71,000¹ to be laid down by Germany.³

7. The commencement of the application of the principle of short service to the men of the fleet, to the certain diminution of its efficiency.⁴

And that this Meeting also regrets the failure to proceed at once with the construction of a naval base on the East Coast.⁵

"And that this Meeting further expresses its keen desire that the Navy League throughout the United Kingdom should do its utmost by every kind of legitimate agitation to rouse British citizens to a sense of the danger involved in these economies." ⁶

THE TWELFTH ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING OF THE NAVY LEAGUE.

May 15, 1907.

The Annual Meeting⁷ was held at the Royal United Service Institution on Wednesday, May 15, 1907, Mr. ROBERT YERBURGH (President), in the chair.

The President moved and Mr. Seymour Trower seconded the first resolution.

¹ To quote Mr. H. W. Wilson's figures :—67,100 tons of sea-going units to be laid down by Britain as against 71,100 to be laid down by Germany.—*N.L.J.*, April, 1907, p. 87 (below, p. 77).

² Exclusive of submarines, for which see above, p. 61, n. 10, and below, p. 140. The exact figures (both with and without submarines) will be found below, p. 140 (and cp. also p. 116).

³ No. 6. In connection with this see *N.L.J.* at (*int. al.*), Dec., 1905, pp. 306-8 (cruisers); Jan., 1906, pp. 2, 3 (below, p. 78, n. 6), and 5; Aug., 1906, p. 200 (below, pp. 72, 204, 230) (Two-Power Standard); Nov., 1906, pp. 275 (below, pp. 72, 78, 204 *sq.*, 230), 305, 306 (below, p. 208), (Two-Power Standard); Dec., 1906, pp. 316-318 (below, p. 77) (Two-Power Standard; and cruisers), 321 (Two-Power Standard), 322 (below, p. 78, n. 6) (cruisers); Feb., 1907, p. 34 (below, p. 78) (cruisers); March, 1907, p. 57 (below, pp. 77, 78) (Two-Power Standard); *N.L. Annual Report* (March 18, 1907) for 1906, p. 2 (Two-Power Standard) and p. 3 (below, p. 78) (cruisers); *N.L.J.*, April, 1907, pp. 87 (below, pp. 77, 78) and 92; *N.L.'s "Our Naval Supremacy: Is it Assured?"* (Nov., 1906, printed in *N.L.J.*, Nov., 1906, p. 306, and reprinted unaltered as part of *N.L. Monthly Pamphlet* of), May, 1907, p. 14 (below, pp. 207, 208, 230 *sq.*, 231, n. 5 (Two-Power Standard); and see later, also *N.L.J.*, Oct., 1907, p. 289).—See also below, pp. 63 *sq.*, 66, 72, 73, n. 1, 77 *sq.*, 129, 140, 203 *sq.*, 207, 208, 210, 230 *sq.*, 231, n. 5, 253.

⁴ No. 7. See *N.L.J.* at (*int. al.*), Jan., 1906, p. 3 (below, p. 79); Feb., 1907, p. 34 (below, p. 79).—See also above, p. 37, and below, pp. 64, 66, 79, 99, 101, 129, 141, 210, 253, 256, etc.

⁵ See *N.L.J.* at (*int. al.*), March, 1903, p. 69 (relative to the Conference of Feb. 16, 1903, at the Westminster Palace Hotel, below, p. 199); April, 1903 pp. 90, 109; *N.L. Annual Report* (May 13, 1903) for 1902, p. 5; *N.L.J.*, June, 1903, pp. 135-6; *N.L.J.*, April, 1904, p. 116; *N.L. Annual Report* (May 7, 1904) for 1903, p. 4; *N.L.J.*, Aug., 1904, p. 230; April, 1906, p. 86; Aug., 1906, p. 86; Jan., 1907, p. 17 (and see also later, *N.L.J.*, Jan., 1908, p. 4; June, 1908).—See also below, pp. 64, 79, 129, 141, etc., and Index, s.v. "East Coast" and "Rosyth".

⁶ Cp. below, p. 73.

⁷ For Summary, see *Standard*, quoted below, pp. 82 *sq.*

Mr. H. F. WYATT :—Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, I rise to discharge one of the most painful and difficult duties that has ever fallen to my lot. It is a painful thing, after having served on the Executive Committee of the NAVY LEAGUE for over twelve years, and after having for two years devoted myself, body, soul, and substance to the service of the League, to find myself at divergence with some of my colleagues, or rather those who were my colleagues. It is a painful thing to be charged, as I think I shall be this afternoon, with action calculated to damage the League, in whose interests and for the sake of whose duty I am bringing forward this amendment. (Hear, hear.) This meeting has listened already to two powerful speeches directed against the amendment, which amendment those speakers have neither seen nor heard. (Hear, hear.) That is in itself a little peculiar. I should imagine that the majority of those to whom I address myself must be possessed with the idea that the amendment is of an inflammatory nature, that it is violent in its terms, that it moves the rejection of the annual report, and that it throws blame and censure upon a majority on the Executive Council. That is the natural construction which would be placed by anyone upon the violently hostile attitude of the majority of the Committee. But, ladies and gentlemen, you will be surprised to hear that this amendment does none of these things. It does not propose the rejection, but it proposes the adoption of the annual report and accounts. It does not make any reflection at all upon the past conduct of the affairs of the League by the Committee. (Hear, hear.) It refers wholly and solely to the future conduct of those affairs, and it proceeds to recite certain points and then to urge a certain course of action. Now let me read to you this extraordinary amendment, as it appears to be thought, on this question. It is as follows :¹

“That this meeting, while adopting the report and accounts, deeply deploras the diminution in our naval strength involved in the reduction of the naval estimates from £36,800,000 for the year 1904-5 to £30,400,000 for the year 1907-8,² and represented by—

“1. The abandonment of naval stations in the West Indies, the Falkland Islands,³ Esquimalt,⁴ and Trincomalee, and the withdrawal of cruisers from very large areas of the world's seas.⁵

“2. The reduction of the number of workmen in the Royal dockyards from 35,340 in 1904 to 27,315 in 1907.⁶

“3. The reduction of the *personnel* of the Navy from 131,000 in 1904 to 128,000 in 1907.⁷

“4. The reduction, now in progress—as shown by the abolition of forty-one stations and detachments—of the coastguard, hitherto consisting of 350 highly-trained officers and upwards of about 4,000 highly-trained men.⁸

“5. The decline of our torpedo flotilla relatively to that of Germany, evidenced by our small destroyer programme and by the fact that in the last ten years we have laid down but 64 destroyers to 72 laid down by that country.⁹

“6. The fact that our programme of naval construction for the current year is smaller than that of a single European Power—viz.,

¹ See above, pp. 60-62.

² Above, p. 61, text and nn. 1, 2, and below, p. 203.

³ A naval station in the wider sense of the term; and we notice that Mr. Arnold White has also so termed it. (Cp. also, in that sense, *Standard*, May 20, 1907, below, p. 97.)

⁴ Above, p. 61, n. 5.

⁵ Above, p. 61, text and n. 6.

⁶ Above, p. 61, text and n. 7.

⁷ Above, p. 61, text and n. 8.

⁸ Above, pp. 37, 61, text, and n. 9, and below, pp. 75, 401.

⁹ Above, p. 61, text and n. 10.

67,000 tons to be laid down by us, as against 71,000 to be laid down by Germany.¹

"7. The commencement of the application of the principle of short service to the men of the fleet, to the certain diminution of its efficiency."²

"And that this meeting also regrets the failure to proceed at once with the construction of a naval base on the east coast."³

"And that this meeting further expresses its keen desire that the NAVY LEAGUE throughout the United Kingdom should do its utmost by every kind of legitimate agitation to rouse British citizens to a sense of the danger involved in these economies."⁴

Now, ladies and gentlemen, I ask you, as NAVY LEAGUERS, whether you consider there is anything in this amendment which is really in conflict with the principles and the objects of the NAVY LEAGUE—(cries of "Yes" and "No")—or whether you consider that these terms of the amendment are in exact accordance with its principles and its aims? I say this with regard to the first seven points enumerated in the amendment, that whatever else is open to my opponents on this matter, the members, at any rate those of them who are members of the Executive Committee of the League, are not at liberty to denounce these seven points in the Amendment as trash. They are not at liberty to deride them unless they are prepared at the same time to throw overboard their own official organ, the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL—(hear, hear)—because all these points are based upon articles which have appeared during the last two years in the "Official Organ" of the League. Those points have been written upon, and the policy pursued by the Admiralty has been discussed in that JOURNAL. These points are, also, most fully endorsed by its Official Editor, Mr. H. W. Wilson. Although Mr. Wilson has withdrawn his former support of this Amendment—(laughter)—well, I hear some members laughing at that remark; I suppose they know exactly the pressure by which the Committee have secured Mr. Wilson's withdrawal—but, although Mr. Wilson has withdrawn his former support, because he fears to excite a rupture in the Committee, he is full of complete endorsement of every point in the amendment.⁵ (Hear, hear.) In fact, the Amendment I have drawn up was submitted by myself to Mr. Wilson, and we went through it together. All these points in the Amendment I derived from the articles which have appeared in the JOURNAL,⁶ under Mr. Wilson's editorship, and in many cases signed by his pen and accepted by the LEAGUE. You have got these seven points, therefore, all fixed.⁷ They cannot be thrown over by the Executive Committee of the LEAGUE, unless they are prepared to say that for two years past they have allowed trash and nonsense to appear in their official JOURNAL.⁸ If that is the line they take, then, as they are responsible for the JOURNAL, I think the sooner the Committee were to resign the

¹ Above, pp. 61 *sq.*, text, and 61, n. 11, 62, nn. 1, 2, 3.

² Above, p. 62, text and n. 4 (see also above, p. 37).

³ Above, p. 62, text, and n. 5.

⁴ Cp. above, p. 29, text and n. 6.

⁵ Mr. H. W. Wilson has now felt compelled by his duty to the country to resign his connection with the Navy League and to join the Council and Committee of the Imperial Maritime League. See below, pp. 368-9, 376, 393, 396.

⁶ Cp. above, pp. 53, 56 *sq.*, 60 *sqq.* (text and nn.), and below, pp. 70-80, 129 *sq.*, 139.

⁷ See preceding note.

⁸ And elsewhere also, officially. See below, p. 71.

better. As a matter of fact, we all know very well that these points are not trash; they are sound, and they cannot be controverted.

In the short time at my disposal I cannot speak to these points in the manner I should like; I cannot expatiate upon them, but I must take them very briefly indeed. The first is "the abandonment of naval stations in the West Indies, the Falkland Isles,¹ Esquimalt,² and Trincomalee, and the withdrawal of cruisers from very large areas of the world's seas."³ The answer to that on the part of the Committee, I believe, is that this is a purely strategical disposition. You are asked to believe that, and not to presume to criticise it. Our answer to it is that, had this six million pounds sterling which had been cut off the Navy Estimates not been cut off within the last three years, you could have had the concentration in home waters which it is said the withdrawal was made to effect. You could have had that, and you could have kept cruisers upon these distant stations. (Hear, hear.) I defy anybody to traverse that point. It is a mere question of expenditure; it is a question of finance. Had the Government chosen to spend that extra six millions we might have still shown the White Ensign in seas from which it is now withdrawn. (Applause.)⁴

Then "The reduction of the number of workmen in the Royal dockyards from 35,340 in 1904 to 27,315 in 1907."⁵ Is that a measure which commends itself to NAVY LEAGUERS generally? ("No" and "Yes.") Do they think it was a step that should pass without protest on the part of the LEAGUE? The Committee have passed it without protest. (Hear, hear.) I cannot conceive of any point on which the NAVY LEAGUE might more legitimately raise agitation than upon this point. (Hear, hear.) The consequent reduction of workmen, of course, accompanies the reduction in our shipbuilding programme. When you cut down the number of workmen you cannot get those men back again. Many of them are captured by the United States⁶; others have been captured by Germany.^{6 7} You cannot get back the services of the men you are dispensing with.^{8 9}

Then "The reduction of the *personnel* of the Navy from 131,000 in 1904 to 128,000 in 1907."¹⁰ "Oh! only a small reduction! Not worth the attention of the NAVY LEAGUE; it is only 3,000 men gone!" That is the attitude taken up by the majority of the Committee. The NAVY LEAGUE is only a small body, we all know, but it is intended to interest itself in such an action as the reduction of the number of men who defend the flag. The Committee take up the attitude that this is an unimportant point, not worthy of the attention of the NAVY LEAGUE, not worthy of action.¹¹

Then we have "The reduction of the coastguard."¹² That means really a blow at the system of long service in the Navy, because the coastguard billets are billets for long-service men, and the reduction

¹ See above, p. 63, n. 3.

² Cp. Mr. Rudyard Kipling's pregnant statement, quoted below (April 30, 1908), p. 384.

³ Above, p. 61.

⁴ See further below, pp. 74, 131.

⁵ Above, p. 61.

⁶ See also Mr. H. W. Wilson, cited below, p. 75.

⁷ Cp. also Mr. Beauchamp, M.P. (Dec. 5-7, 1906), *Jol. R.U.S.I.*, Feb., 1907, p. 166.

⁸ See further below, p. 75.

⁹ See also, as to "Arsenal Discharges," below, p. 108.

¹⁰ Above, p. 61.

¹¹ It is to be observed that "The net increase in the active service numbers in the German Navy during the same period was 8,747"—as admitted by Mr. Robertson, House of Commons, June 20, 1907 (*Standard*, June 21, 1907, p. 8, col. 5). Cp. further, below, pp. 267, n. 2, 287, text, and nn. 3, 4.

¹² Above, p. 61.

of coastguard service militates against the inducement to men to enter the Fleet.^{1 2} (Applause.)

Then we have "The decline of our torpedo flotilla relatively to that of Germany."³ Of course our torpedo flotilla is still enormously more powerful than that of Germany. (Hear, hear.) I do not say anything to the contrary, but I do refer to the fact that within the last ten years we have laid down only sixty-four destroyers to seventy-two laid down by Germany. ("Question.")⁴ Let me say this to avoid misconception. Our case is a case referring not to the maintenance or strength of the Fleet at this particular moment, but it refers to the strength of the Fleet in the future. (Hear, hear.) The danger which we put before you is the danger which confronts the country in the near future. It is a present danger only in the sense that the future depends upon the present. (Applause.)

Then we have "The fact"—which I have not time to argue—"that our programme of naval construction for the current year is smaller than that of a single European Power—namely, 67,000 tons to be laid down by us, as against 71,000 tons to be laid down by Germany."⁵ I have not time to go into that point, but is it not by itself a portentous point? ("No.")⁶

Then we have "The commencement of the application of the principle of short service to the men of the Fleet, to the certain diminution of its efficiency."⁷ We have always exalted and rejoiced in the superior efficiency of our men—undoubtedly, as any officer will admit, closely connected with our system of long service. It does not require a naval expert to see that a man who serves for twelve years is much more efficient than a man who serves for three or four years. I say that the principle of short service is being gradually and insidiously applied to the Fleet, and it is the duty of the LEAGUE to protest against it before it proceeds too far.

If the Committee cannot argue, as they cannot really, against the seven points enumerated, what is it in the amendment to which they object so fiercely that they have threatened the members of the League with their resignation should the amendment be carried? What remains in the amendment besides the seven points? First, that we say "The NAVY LEAGUE deplores the diminution of our naval strength involved in the reduction of the naval estimates." Do not we deplore it—"No," and Hear, hear)—the reduction of the naval estimates by six millions sterling? (Hear, hear.) Well, gentlemen, I am glad you deplore that, but the dominant majority of the Executive Committee did not deplore it. They desire that the NAVY LEAGUE, as a LEAGUE, should not express its disapproval of the cutting down of the estimates by six millions. When I look back upon the past, and upon the ideas and hopes with which I joined the NAVY LEAGUE and which have animated me ever since, and when I find myself actually asked to be silent, and to submit in silence while the estimates are cut down by one-sixth, I am amazed, and I cannot understand the attitude to which the dominant majority of the Committee have gradually grown. (Hear, hear.) You see we are not to deplore that. Supposing we were the German Navy

¹ Cp. *Standard*, Dec. 14, 1907 (leading article), p. 6, col. 7.

² See further below, pp. 75, and Index *s.v.* "Coastguard."

³ Above, p. 61.

⁴ See further below, pp. 76 *sq.*, 202 *sq.*

⁵ Above, pp. 61 *sq.*

⁶ See further below, p. 77.

⁷ Above, p. 62.

LEAGUE, and we were told the estimates for the German Fleet were to be cut down by one-sixth of the German total: do you think that the German NAVY LEAGUE would consider it in accordance with their duty to acquiesce in silence over that? ("Yes" and "No.") They would most fiercely protest against it. And are we to go away altogether from the guns which we serve, and are we to be silent in the face of this reduction when we know very well that that vast German NAVY LEAGUE, so enormously more powerful than ours, would never be silent?¹ I say it is our duty not to be silent. (Hear, hear.) And lastly I come to this, I ask for action on the part of the NAVY LEAGUE. And if I am told that the NAVY LEAGUE cannot take effective action, then I say, do take what action you can. If you put a plain duty before a man and he says he cannot do anything effective, if he is a true man he will do what he can. I am not able to do much to-day, but at least—speaking for those who are patriotic enough, and those who have given me their support—we shall have relieved our conscience of a great load. (Applause.) What was the action of the dominant majority of the Committee when they received this amendment? Why—they issued, or, at any rate, it went out in their name—I cannot believe that they were all of them cognisant of what was going to be done—they issued a circular to all members. This circular asked for the members' votes against an amendment which the Committee declared to be aimed against the administration generally. It concluded with what I have called the

¹ It may be of interest, here, to give some facts concerning the history and enormous effect of the German Navy League, (as to which cp., initially, above, p. R.F. :-)

The German Navy League—"the largest and most influential patriotic association in the world . . . with over 4,000 branches in Germany alone" and "an income of over £50,000 per annum, which is nearly all available for purposes of agitation, chiefly, as I have pointed out, virulently anti-British," with "a Journal *Die Flotte*," which "possesses a larger circulation than all the other German monthly periodicals combined, and may be seen in almost every café, inn, barber's shop, and private house"—"was started on April 30, 1898, after the First Naval Bill had been passed in the Reichstag."

For the highly interesting account of it, from which we quote, see "R. N." in *Pall Mall Gazette*, June 3, 1908, who adds, further, that "in addition to the home branches, there are about 100 in various foreign countries excepting the United States and Russia, the German Consuls being very generally the Presidents. . . . A curious" [and highly significant] "fact is that . . . within the last two years there have been large Boer contributions, actually amounting in 1905 to nearly £700."

"The Germans," he concludes, "under the influence of this persistent and skilfully-directed agitation, have actually gone navy-mad, and are ready to back without demur the vast sums continually asked for by the prospective '*Admiral of the Atlantic*'" [see above, p. R.F., and below, p. 366] "to remove the reproach of inferiority from a proud and ambitious people."

Cp. also *The Broad Arrow*, May 18, 1907, p. 552 :- "The German Navy League is constant in its endeavours to persuade the nation that the world-position of Germany demands greater sacrifices, and it must be allowed that both in the Reichstag and the country the intensity of the Colonial sentiment and the feverish desire to acquire naval bases is increasing."

The total membership of the German Navy League was given on May 11, 1907, as "906,706, shewing an increase of more than 40,000 members during the past twelve months" (and this apart, apparently, from the membership of the sister organisation, "The Navy League of German Women");—see *Standard*, May 13, 1907.

On April 29, 1908, the membership had gone up from 906,706 for last year (1907) to 1,018,590—an increase of well over 100,000 in twelve months. See the Tenth Annual Report of the German N. L., quoted *Daily Express*, April 30, 1908, p. 5, col. 2; *Standard*, April 30, 1908, p. 7, col. 3.

² For the strength (and semi-official nature) of the position now occupied by the German Navy League (under the leadership of its new President, Admiral von Koester), in its untiring efforts to second the aims of an Admiralty already only too anxious to increase the naval strength of the German Empire, see *Daily Express*, Sept. 29, 1908, p. 1, col. 8, *Standard*, Sept. 29, 1908, p. 5, col. 2, Sept. 30, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 5, 6. (See also below, pp. 434, nn. 5, 6, 453.)

"bludgeon" threat of resignation signed by fifteen members of the Committee. There is this peculiarity about this document, that while it demanded their votes against an Amendment, which it characterised by a purely *ex parte* statement¹—it absolutely omitted to state the terms of that Amendment.¹ ("Shame.") They did not give the amendment at all. I say it is a strange and almost unparalleled thing to take action of that kind. I doubt if you can easily rival it in any similar organisation to this. There may be some commercial bodies where things of that sort have been done—I do not know, but I doubt if, in an organisation of this kind, action like this has ever before been taken. Yet it was taken, and although Mr. Horton-Smith and myself when we discovered what was being done—it was only on the 9th May²—protested most strongly,³ we were told it was then too late to send out the Amendment.⁴ I am very doubtful that there would not have been time,⁵ but if there was not, then the course that ought to have been taken was perfectly plain. That circular should not have gone. (Hear, hear.) The result is that proxies have been—I do not know what word to use—obtained in the dark, in blindness, upon a glaring misrepresentation of our case. ("No, no," and "Yes.") I do not know, but I must say that that is how it appears to me, and I would submit that. As I was just coming down to this meeting I received three or four letters and a telegram. The telegram says, "Voted against Amendment under imperfect knowledge. Kindly withdraw my vote to-day," I do not know the gentleman, I have never heard of him before, but he signs it, "Clarke, 356 Camden Road." Perhaps the Secretary will make a note of that. Then there are some letters I have received. Here is one (reads letter which stated that the writer had signed his proxy against the Amendment under a misapprehension and had since withdrawn it). Then there is another one, from Broadstairs: "As a member of the NAVY LEAGUE I give my entire support to the Amendment. I hope that many others who value the patriotic motives which induced you to resign in order to move the Amendment will vote for the Amendment, and that it will be carried. I am one of those to whom a circular was sent a few days ago asking for the support of my vote for the rest of the Executive Committee against the Amendment without specifying in any way what the Amendment was. It must be obvious to all who read it at various points, that such an Amendment is only the logical result of the inertia displayed by the Committee of the NAVY LEAGUE," &c. (continues reading letter). Then there is another one signed by Osbourne, M.A. (Oxon) (reads letter). Then there are other letters which have been published⁶—one says (reads letter which was to the effect that the writer had given his proxy under a misapprehension, and wished to withdraw it). Then there is another letter from a gentleman and his wife, both members of the NAVY LEAGUE (reads letter). I put it to the meeting, is the course of action taken by the Committee fair,

¹ Cp. above, pp. 50, 53.

² May 9, 1907.

³ See above, p. 50.

⁴ It was *not* even then too late. There would have been time. Subsequent inquiries at Messrs. Eyre and Spottiswoode's sufficed to prove this. But apart from that, the Amendment had been in the hands of the Committee on and from the 6th May, 1907 (see above, p. 50). Were the Committee of the League minded to give the absent Members of the League no chance of appreciating and considering the real facts?

⁵ There would have been time;—See preceding note.

⁶ See above, p. 59.

is it English? ("No.") I ask you to give effect to that opinion when it comes to a question of voting—as I hope it will—I mean that it shall—by an overwhelming show of hands in favour.

Although we may be snowed under by proxies—and I do not doubt we shall be, hundreds of proxies are probably now in the hands of the Secretary, hundreds of votes blindly given without the knowledge of the case or of the nature of the action which we are voting against¹—I appeal to you to give us the moral support of your vote to-day on a show of hands. (Hear, hear.) That is my case on this point. There are one or two other things which I should like to speak on. One is, we are told that this action of ours tends to disrupt the NAVY LEAGUE. I cannot believe that that is really the view taken by the Executive Committee, for the reason that if they did take that view they would surely have accepted a compromise which was offered to them as late as May 13²—and that is the reason why we did not resign earlier than that date. That compromise was that the points which we desired to have discussed and which we have mentioned in the amendment should be read from the chair by the Chairman, that he should say that these points have been raised by members of the League, and that he left them for consideration by the Committee in the ensuing year, and then an opportunity was to be given to me to speak upon these points without making any attack upon the Committee and without any reference to the past. I ask you whether that was not a perfectly fair and reasonable suggestion. ("No," and Hear, hear.) Surely if the Executive Committee thought that to move this Amendment was to threaten the future of the LEAGUE, they ought to have accepted that compromise. But they would not do so. I cannot understand the attitude of the Executive in not accepting that compromise. The only reason was that they could not tolerate any longer the constant advocacy of a forward policy in the Committee by Mr. Horton-Smith and myself. As I have said, I have been a member of the Executive Committee for twelve years, and Mr. Horton-Smith has been a member for four years. I was selected by the NAVY LEAGUE as its envoy to the Colonies—(loud applause)—and it is only since I have been thus constantly urging during the last year a forward policy by the League, instead of a policy of silence and inertia, that it has been found out that it is impossible to welcome me. Does the real position justify the measures that have been taken by the majority? ("No.") Is it not clear that they have been inspired by an extraordinary animus? I think that the fifteen gentlemen threatening resignation if this amendment is carried is a surprising thing. There is nothing I regret so much in that circular as to see on it the high and honoured name, honoured by me, honoured by all, of Admiral Fremantle. (Hear, hear.) Of course, I am quite certain that the Admiral and most of those other gentlemen were not cognisant of the point I raised. That goes without saying. But I ask you to discriminate between the naval question as a whole and the question of the policy to be pursued by the League. With regard to naval matters, the authority of Admiral Fremantle can be rivalled only by those few naval officers who may be of equal eminence with himself. But upon the question whether it is expedient to take a certain course of action or not, then Admiral

¹ See above, pp. 50, 53, etc.

² May 13, 1907; see above, p. 52.

Fremantle, with all respect, does not necessarily rank higher than any layman.

We are threatened, to my great regret, with the resignation of members of Committee. I regret it, if on this ground alone, that it brings a personal element into what ought to be only a high and national question. The question is one of the duty of the NAVY LEAGUE towards the nation, and in that is involved to some extent perhaps the safety of the country itself, because there never was a time when the need of the NAVY LEAGUE, of a real, living, fighting NAVY LEAGUE, was more imperative than it is at the present time. 125 members of the House of Commons signed a demand to the Government to cut down the expenditure on the services¹ and refused to have their names published afterwards. ("Shame.") The NAVY LEAGUE is an accomplice of those gentlemen at present, because it, also, refuses to protest against that cutting down of the Estimates. The NAVY LEAGUE is positively a supporter of those 125 members.

I say this, in passing, about the Committee:—No one could know better than I do the services of gentlemen on the Committee; I have been on the Committee myself, and I do think that it would be a good thing for the League, it would be a good thing now if some rule were passed, such as is prevalent in many other organisations—namely, that one-third of the Committee should retire every three years. (Applause.)² You want new blood. The Committee has got into a sort of rut and groove.

I end with appealing to this audience. The essential points I have brought before you, and I appeal to you to intimate by a show of hands this afternoon that you desire the League to be lifted from this morass of inertia into which it seems to have fallen and become again active throughout the country. For my part I, at any rate, have now freed my heart from the weight that was upon it, and for my part I decline to be any longer an accomplice in what seems to me an abnegation of duty and a betrayal of trust on the part of the LEAGUE. (Applause.)

Mr. L. G. H. HORTON-SMITH:—Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen,—I, like Mr. Wyatt, am glad to have the opportunity at last of coming out into the light of day and of facing you all. I have resigned for the same reason as Mr. Wyatt, and the reason is because we consider that the Executive Committee to-day are making not only a blunder of the first magnitude in their own interest, but, further, they are committing a crime against the best interests of the nation. ("Oh.")

Mr. Trower, when he was speaking, referred to our not resigning earlier. The reason I did not resign earlier was a very legitimate and honourable reason—namely, that I wished to keep open the compromise up to the last moment. On their shoulders lies the rejection of that compromise. ("No, no.") It is because of that rejection that we are here to-day.

Mr. Trower also spoke of spadework. I, too, am capable of doing some spadework, and I have done it. I do not mind telling you that I have spent days going through the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL, and, I can assure you, I am able to verify every single point raised in this Amendment from the LEAGUE's own

¹ See above, p. 4.

² Cp. below, p. 139.

official utterances,¹ the articles which it accepts responsibility for,² and the articles of its own Editor³; and, if that is not sufficient to prove that they are the official utterances of the Executive Committee of the NAVY LEAGUE,⁴ I do not know what are. If they were not their official views, they ought to have been refuted or refused; they ought not to have been issued. They issued those utterances, they remained in power, and now they come here and ask you to throw all those utterances overboard. No wonder, ladies and gentlemen, during the last month they have changed the official title of their JOURNAL! They have scratched out "The Official Organ of the NAVY LEAGUE" and have inserted instead "A Record of Naval Progress at Home and Abroad." If they had said "Abroad" alone, it would, I think, have better met the case. Again: I think that the mover and seconder of the Resolution ought not to have brought the name of Sir John Fisher into the discussion. To do so, is, in my judgment, and for obvious reasons, a most unfair use of the admiral's name.^{5 6} Sir John Fisher bears a well-known name. The Executive Committee know, or ought to know, perfectly well that our attack has not been on Sir John Fisher. Had they come to the meeting at Hampstead⁷ when Mr. Wyatt and I made £20 for them in an hour and a half, they would have heard me say, in so many words, that our attack was not upon him, but upon the Cabinet.

Let me, now, draw your attention to something which Mr. Seymour Trower forgot—of course, you cannot remember everything. He has referred to one letter which the NAVY LEAGUE wrote in January of the present year.⁸ I will refer you to another. Mr. Trower has suggested—and, on consideration, I hope he will withdraw the suggestion—that an effort was being made to capture the NAVY LEAGUE by us in the interests of some great paper.⁹ I say that observation ought never to have been made, and I deny it entirely. I am not a Conservative so-called, and I do not lend myself in any way to any papers in any respect whatever. I am a Liberal Unionist, and, I hope, Sir, an Imperialist. (Applause.) It is untrue to suggest that the Executive Committee of the NAVY LEAGUE was led astray, or led at all, by the *Standard*. I will read to you the letter of October 19, 1906, which the Executive Committee itself issued officially to the public on Trafalgar Day last year¹⁰—a letter which followed upon a similar, if anticipatory letter (entitled "Rumoured Reduction of Shipbuilding Programme") officially addressed by the Executive Committee of the NAVY LEAGUE to the Prime Minister on July 11,

¹ The League's Official Letters to the Press (all of which have been and are reprinted in the *N.L.J.*), the League's Annual Reports, &c.—to say nothing of the official utterances of the League's official lecturer. (See further, below, pp. 129, 139, and Index, s.v. "Old N.L.")

² Cp. below, pp. 139 (text, and nn. 1, 2), 161.

³ Cp. above, pp. 60-62, and the notes thereto, etc.

⁴ And in any case, as a member of the N. L. wrote to us in May, 1907 (after the Meeting):—"If the fact that N. L. articles, letters to press, etc., are signed by the officials of the League does not bind the League, it at least, one would have thought, lays some obligation on the signatories as individuals."

⁵ Cp. also, below, pp. 84, 87.

⁶ "In my view, under present conditions, it is most irregular" [even for the First Lord of the Admiralty] "to mention the Naval Lords at all, as they have no platform on which so explain their conduct."—Admiral Fremantle in *N.L.J.*, Nov., 1906, p. 277.

⁷ Feb. 26, 1907. See above, p. 47, and below, p. 233.

⁸ Jan., 1907.

⁹ Cp. below, p. 84.

¹⁰ October 21, 1906.

1906, and sent also officially to the Press¹—I read from the reprint of the later letter in the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL, November, 1906, p. 275:—

"(5) In November last year² a document entitled 'A Statement of Admiralty Policy,' commonly known as 'the Cawdor Memorandum,' summarising the principles intended to guide "naval policy, was issued by the Admiralty. It stated:—

'At the present time strategic requirements necessitate the output of four large armoured ships annually; and unless unforeseen contingencies arise, this number will not be exceeded.'

"But, as showing that this was only considered as the minimum³ programme, there followed the words:—

'And while they anticipate at present that the output of four large armoured ships a year should suffice to meet our requirements, there will be no difficulty whatever in increasing this output to whatever extent may be necessary in consequence of any increase of naval power abroad.'⁴

"(6) In the House of Commons on July 27th last,⁵ Mr. Robertson, Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty, announced the intention to depart from the above programme, and to lay down only three armoured vessels in the current year.

"(7) The question thus arises, How is it possible that the same advisers⁶ who last November considered the output of eight armoured vessels for the two years necessary, have now acquiesced in an output of five only, when foreign naval Powers are showing an increased activity and our own Navy is weakened by the loss of the *Montagu*?⁷ The answer was given by Lord Tweedmouth in the House of Lords on July 30th last,⁸ when, explaining the acquiescence by the Naval Lords in the reduction, he stated: 'Undoubtedly I⁹ brought forward the desirability of making reductions. All the circumstances were surveyed, and all came to the conclusion "announced.'

"(8) It is noteworthy that in this statement no reference was made by Lord Tweedmouth to the suggestion put forward in the House of Commons by the Prime Minister¹¹ that the "Two-Power standard, as it is commonly understood, might with safety be abandoned.

"(9) Here, then, is the case in a nutshell. Political considerations, implying subservience to the outcry for retrenchment, have brought about a serious reduction in our first line of

¹ Reprinted in *N.L.J.*, Aug., 1906, p. 200, and referred to below, pp. 204, 230.

² November, 1905.

³ See above, p. 1.

⁴ See also, as showing it to be a *minimum* programme, Lord Cawdor's warning as to the future, quoted in *N.L.J.*, Jan., 1906, p. 5.

⁵ July 27, 1906, above, pp. 5 *sq.*

⁶ See above, pp. 5, 9, 40, 72, 204.

⁷ See above, pp. 4, 6, 9, 35, 41, 47.

⁸ See also *N.L. Annual Report* (March 18, 1907) for 1906, p. 2.

⁹ July 30, 1906.

¹⁰ Cp. below, pp. 122, 204, etc.

¹¹ Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman, July 28, 1906. See above, p. 6.

"defence, a direct incentive to our possible adversaries to push forward their naval preparations."¹

The words which I have read to you form a deliberate attack on the Admiralty. (Hear, hear.) I do not suggest for one moment I am endeavouring to attack the Admiralty, but, if I am, I have at least got the authority of my own Executive Committee; but I am not attacking the Admiralty. I am doing exactly, Sir, what the NAVY LEAGUE from its outset has tried to do, and I will refer to an article which appeared under the signature of Mr. Seymour Trower himself, together with that of the Secretary, in October, 1902. It was a NAVY LEAGUE publication, and was called "The Need for Effort." I read from pp. 2 and 3:—

"Why the Navy is weak:—

"The First Lord of the Admiralty must, under our present political system, be a party man, and, as such, subservient to party interest and Treasury control.

"Lord Salisbury (in the House of Lords, January 30th, 1900) has himself expressed the opinion that the undue influence of the Treasury is dangerous to national welfare.

"What you should do:—

"Public opinion, and public opinion alone, can force the Government of either party to provide an efficient and sufficient Navy, which is for the Nation only the ordinary insurance which no sane person grudges in private affairs, applied to risks appalling in their nature and extent. Your wealth, your comfort, your very existence are at stake.

"The NAVY LEAGUE, a strictly non-party body, is the only organisation which exists to focus public opinion on our danger and its remedy."

Is not that exactly what our Amendment calls upon the NAVY LEAGUE to do—namely, to "*focus public opinion on our danger and its remedy*" :—"That the NAVY LEAGUE throughout the United Kingdom should do its utmost by every kind of legitimate agitation to rouse British citizens to a sense of the danger involved in" the "economies" to which the Amendment refers?

I say no more on that matter—I think I have made my point sufficiently clear.

Let us look, now, at the Amendment in detail. There is

¹ In the very same issue of the *N. L. J.*, Nov., 1906, p. 276, Admiral Fremantle clinches and crystallises the matter in the words:—"The reductions, then, are political and undoubtedly 'suspect.'" (Cp. below, p. 230).

Again, on page 277, the Admiral writes:—"Now let us come to the concrete. We know that, according to the Cawdor Memorandum, it was stated that we must build four large armoured ships yearly, and that this programme has now been reduced to three Dreadnoughts this year and two towards the end of the next financial year (1907-1908). It is then correct to say that no large ironclad will be laid down in the calendar year 1907. In addition to this there is to be a reduction in the number of destroyers to be built this year, though in these useful vessels Germany is making great efforts. Personally, I have insisted that we urgently require medium-sized fast cruisers, and we are building none. This is not the place for details, but I have, I think, shown that our building programme as thought necessary by the Naval Lords less than a year ago has now been reduced by one-half; and it has to be proved that what was then proposed was excessive, which will be difficult in view of the increased exertions being made by Germany and France."

no question whatever as to the Reduction¹²—that cannot be denied. It has been admitted by the official organ of the NAVY LEAGUE (see, for instance, your Editor's leading article in the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL, March, 1907, p. 57; and "The Navy Estimates: Facts and Figures," NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL, April 1907, pp. 90-92, at p. 92), and, what is more, if you will look at the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL for March, 1907, p. 57. you will find that during the ten-years period from 1897 to 1906 Germany and the United States of America have exceeded by an annual average of three-quarters of a million our annual expenditure on new construction. If you look at 1907, then, taken over a period of eleven years they have exceeded us by an annual average of a million. (See NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL, April, 1907, pp. 87 and 91.) The figures of the expenditure on new construction in Britain, Germany, and the United States for the eleven years in question, given on the page last mentioned—NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL, p. 91—are as illuminating as they are disquieting.³

(1) "The abandonment of naval stations in the West Indies, the Falkland Islands,⁴ Esquimalt,⁵ and Trincomalee, and the withdrawal of cruisers from very large areas of the world's seas."⁶ I do not think I need do more than refer you to the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL of February, 1907, where, at p. 35, your own Editor says:—

"Experience at Kingston" (Jamaica)⁷ "has shown how *"deplorable"* has been the result of denuding the seas of vessels "showing the white ensign."^{8 9 10}

(2) "The reduction of the number of workmen in the Royal dockyards from 35,340 in 1904 to 27,315 in 1907."¹¹ I refer you to the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL of February, 1907, where you will find the NAVY LEAGUE's official letter to the Press, dated January 23, 1907, in which the Executive Committee calls upon the Government, intimating its grave doubt as to whether the latter are right in having so many workmen going:—

¹ Above, p. 61.

² It has always to be remembered that in the British figures are included matters which hardly count at all in the German figures; such as pay of men (Germany having conscription) and pensions (of which Germany has, as yet, practically none to pay). Even the cost of widening and deepening the Kiel Canal does not figure in the German Navy Estimates (see below, p. 267).

³ See further above, p. 61, text, and nn. 1, 2.

⁴ See above, p. 63, n. 3.

⁵ See above, p. 63, n. 6.

⁶ Above, p. 61.

⁷ See above, pp. 44 *seq.*

⁸ Compare also the prophetic utterance of Admiral Fremantle, *s.v.* "Naval Bases and Naval Stores," in the *N.L.J.*, April, 1905, p. 85:—

"Economy having been determined upon, we have, like ancient Rome, withdrawn our legions from distant parts and reduced our foreign establishments . . . It has been done hastily and uneconomically, in disregard of the maritime requirements of the Empire . . . Our maritime position in distant parts of the world has been unduly weakened, while the requirements of commerce-protection have practically been ignored."

See Admiral Fremantle again in *N.L.J.*, June, 1906, p. 147:—"How have the economies been effected? The reply is, largely by a sacrifice of our world-wide seapower. We have closed coaling stations abroad—Halifax, Esquimalt, Jamaica, Trincomalee—and reduced others, selling off stores at an alarming sacrifice. Circumstances may have made this necessary in order to strengthen the heart of the Empire, but it has an unpleasant resemblance to the withdrawal of the Roman Legions from Britain in the decadence of the Empire."

See the Admiral, further, in *N.L.J.*, Nov., 1906, p. 276.

⁹ See further above, p. 49 (St. Lucia), and below, p. 250 (Zanzibar).

¹⁰ The correctness of our views in this respect was manifested by the belated decision of the Government to restore some show of naval force to West Indian waters. See Mr. Robertson, in House of Commons, July 15, 1907 (*Standard*, July 16, 1907). And *cp.*, further, below, p. 211.

¹¹ Above, p. 61.

"How many capital ships are under repair to-day? How many more indubitably require it? Are the Royal Dockyards now able to keep pace with repairs which Lord Selborne acknowledged in 1905 they could not do unless construction were subordinated to repairs? Since that date the dockyard employés have been reduced by one-third. Is it proposed to scrap battleships as well as cruisers to save upkeep!"

I would also refer you to what the Editor of the *NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL* says in his leading articles of March, 1907, at p. 57, and April, 1907, at p. 87 (cf. also at p. 92). On p. 57 he writes:—

"Recent estimates show the following reductions in important elements of Naval force:—Workmen in Home Dockyards, 1904 to 1906, reduction of over 8,000.¹ In the same period the number of workmen in the German Admiralty yards was considerably increased."

And on p. 87:—

"Dockyard staffs have been reduced; is the Admiralty certain of obtaining the skilled artisans who have gone to Germany² and the United States³ when it again requires them? . . . We have to face such reductions as these in recent years:—Workmen in the dockyards:—22 per cent."⁴

(3) "The reduction of the *personnel* of the Navy from 131,000 in 1904 to 128,000 in 1907."⁵ There again the Editor of the *JOURNAL*, April, 1907, p. 87, points out in his leader, with that directness that characterises all his writings:—

"The trained *personnel* has been reduced; can we be certain of obtaining skilled men when we again want them to man the ships which sooner or later we shall have to build?"⁶

(4) And now, Sir, taking the coastguard⁷—that again is a matter which your Committee have put forward in their official letter of January 23, 1907, published on p. 34 of the February *JOURNAL* of this year, expressing doubt as to the Government's wisdom in reducing the coastguard.^{8,9}

¹ From 35,340 in 1904 to 27,055 in 1906 (see Mr. H. W. Wilson, in *N.L.J.*, March, 1907, p. 57.)

² Cp. above, p. 65.

³ See further above, p. 61, n. 7 (and cp. also Admiral Fremantle, *N.L.J.*, June, 1906, p. 147).

⁴ Above, p. 61 (text, and n. 8).

⁵ Compare also the Navy League's pamphlet, "Our Naval Supremacy: is it Assured?" *N.L.J.*, Dec., 1905 (s.v. "Manning"), p. 308.

⁶ See further above, p. 65, n. 11, and cp. below, p. 267 (n. 2), 287.

⁷ Above, p. 61.

⁸ For the figures see the admission made by Mr. Edmund Robertson (Parl. Sec. to the Admiralty) in the House of Commons (in reply to a question dated April 17, 1907), printed in the *N.L.J.*, May, 1907, p. 144:—"In the last twelve months 10 stations and 14 detachments in Great Britain have been closed; and 14 stations and 3 detachments in Ireland."

Replying to Major (now Col.) Seely, M.P., at a later date (June 26, 1907), Mr. Lambert (Civil Lord) said that 70 coastguard stations and detachments had been abolished since April 1, 1905. (See the *Standard*, June 27, 1907, p. 8, col. 6, s.v. "Government and the Services: Abolished Coastguards," and (leading article) June 28, 1907, p. 6, col. 6.)

On the same date (June 26, 1907) the Civil Lord gave a pledge that no further reductions would be made without giving Parliament an opportunity of discussing the matter (see *Standard*, Dec. 14, 1907, leading article, "The Reduction in the Coastguards," p. 6, cols. 6-7; and see, later, especially, *Standard*, June 1, 1908, leading article, "The Future of the Coastguards," p. 6, col. 7).

See also the *Standard* (leading article), July 20, 1907; and, further, see the *Standard*, Aug. 14, 1907, p. 5, col. 7, quoting Mr. Lambert to the effect that 68 stations had been closed involving a *personnel* of 316, and 13 stations had been reduced. Cp. also *Standard*, Aug. 17, 1907 (leading article), p. 4, cols. 5-6.

⁹ See further above, p. 37;—and see now, further, below, s.v. May 29, 1908, p. 404.

(5) Then, with regard to the decline of our torpedo flotilla relatively to that of Germany.¹ Let me, if I may, give you one instance with regard to this. In the recent April number of the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL² Mr. Wilson has pointed out with the utmost clearness that the Two-Power standard has not been maintained in destroyers.

"On the contrary, England has for years fallen below a One-Power standard, and her torpedo-boats are not fit for high sea work against large foreign destroyers."

And if you refer to the preceding number (March, 1907), the thing is laid down by him with greater clearness still:—

"The following," he writes,³ "are the units laid down or to be laid down for the five calendar years 1903-7 by England, Germany, U.S.A., and France: . . .

"In destroyers the figures are as follows for the same period:—

"England (does not include programme of 1907, which is not known)	23
"Germany (includes 1907 programme)	42
"U.S.A.	3
"France	34

"England is enormously below the Two-Power standard, owing to the small programmes of the last four years, which have produced a serious effect upon her position. Twenty-four torpedo-boats have been laid down by her in the last three years. These were at one time classed as 'coastal destroyers,' but, owing to their total unfitness to meet the German destroyers at sea,⁴ the name has now been changed.⁵ Germany has wisely and resolutely declined to build torpedo-boats, and has concentrated all her efforts upon powerful destroyers, capable of long-distance work at sea. A programme of 20 genuine destroyers is the *minimum* which would meet British wants; as to work up to the Two-Power standard *fifty or more are required.*"

The actual figures given in our Amendment will hardly be controverted by your Committee. They are given under the heading:—"The Navy Estimates—Facts and Figures," in the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL, April, 1907, p. 91, as follows:—

"DESTROYERS LAID DOWN.

	'98.	'99.	1900.	'01.	'02.	'03.	'04.	'05.	'06.	'07.	Total.
England	12	0	5	10	9	15	0	6	2	5	64
Germany	0	12	6	6	6	6	6	6	12	12	72
France ..	0	4	13	14	2	6	6	10	6	6	67
Russia...	2	5	6	20	20	20	20	10	7	7	116
U. States	16	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	3	0	21

"In addition, England laid down twelve 1st class torpedo-boats of 230 tons in 1905, and twelve more both in 1906 and 1907."⁴ 5

¹ For the figures see above, p. 61.

² *N.L.J.*, April, 1907, p. 87.

³ *N.L.J.*, March, 1907, p. 57.

⁴ Cp. Mr. H. W. Wilson in *N.L.J.*, Dec., 1906, p. 317.

⁵ Cp. below, pp. 76, 115, 116, 127, 202, 203.

"In the German Navy ten years is regarded as the efficient "life of a destroyer.¹ The above figures show all the destroyers "that can be considered effective in 1909.^{2,3}

(6) Here, again, the figures given in our Amendment⁴ will hardly be disputed by the Committee. To be strictly accurate, an extra 100 tons should be added both to Britain and to Germany, thus:—67,100 tons of sea-going units to be laid down by Britain as against 71,100 to be laid down by Germany (see Mr. H. W. Wilson's Editorial in the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL, April, 1907, p. 87⁵). But round figures are taken.⁶

Taking the question of the Two-Power Standard itself. We never got the Two-Power Standard admitted by the Radical Party in the House of Lords⁷ until we had been "at" them for months, and when we know in the meantime that the Radicals had practically decided to throw it overboard. I could give you the facts. The mere fact that in the House of Lords the Radicals now say they are prepared to keep up the Two-Power Standard cannot alter existing facts. "Words" and "works" are two quite different things.⁸ We know that the last Government went out⁹—(the speaker was on the point of referring to the programme of armoured construction detailed in the Cawdor Memorandum of November, 1905—admittedly and on the face of it a *minimum* programme; and yet reduced by the new Government before it had been in office more than a few months,¹⁰ 11—and particularly to Mr. Wilson's Editorials in the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL, December, 1906, p. 316, March, 1907, p. 57, and April,

¹ See, to the same effect, Lieut. C. Bellairs, *Journ. of R.U.S.I.*, Feb. 1907, p. 148. (Cp. also below, p. 449.)

² See further above, p. 61 (text and n. 10): and see, in confirmation, *N.L.J.*, Oct., 1907, p. 296.

³ Even taking a period of eleven years, the position was still in favour of Germany. On July 23, 1907, it was officially admitted by Mr. Lambert in the House of Commons (in reply to Lieut. C. Bellairs, M.P.), that, allowing for destroyers lost, and including those projected for 1907, Britain during the eleven years in question had provided for but 71 destroyers to Germany's 72. "Under the programme of 1897-8, which was to cover a period of eleven years, Great Britain," he said, "had 73 destroyers, of which two had since been lost" (reducing the number to 71), "and Germany 72 destroyers and one divisional torpedo-boat." See *Standard*, July 24, 1907, p. 8, col. 1; and cp. *Standard*, Jan. 2, 1908 (s.v. "Year of Naval Unrest"); as also Dec. 16, 1907 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 5-6, from which we quote as follows:—

"The destroyer contingent has been permitted to become dangerously weak. In the German Navy the official life of a destroyer is 10 or 12 years. Since 1897, Great Britain has built, or projected, 73 destroyers, of which 2 have been lost, while Germany has built, or projected, 72 destroyers and one divisional torpedo-boat, which, for practical purposes, is a destroyer. Reckoned on the German basis, therefore, this country has actually fewer destroyers than Germany. We have also to bear in mind that a proportion of our torpedo flotillas is always required abroad, where there have been as many as 47 stationed at a time." (Cp., also, below, p. 435.)

Concerning our yet older destroyers, it may suffice to quote the statement made by Mr. Austen Chamberlain, M.P., in the House of Commons, May 25, 1908 (*Daily Express*, May 27, 1908, p. 1, col. 7):—"Facts that have come to my knowledge," he said, "... convince me that it will be necessary to do a great deal more than we are doing in the matter of small cruisers and torpedo-destroyers. . . . The ships on the active list are worn out and cannot be sent to sea because they are shaking themselves to pieces. I am speaking of destroyers 12 or 15 years old" (he was speaking in May, 1908) "which could not stand the severe test of cruising under warlike conditions."

See further below, pp. 115 sq., 140, 339 sq., 437, 449, and Index s.v. "Destroyers."

⁴ Above, pp. 61 sq.

⁵ See further above, pp. 61 sq., and concerning submarines see below, p. 140.

⁶ April, 1907, above, p. 49.

⁷ Cp., below, pp. 203, 436, and Index, s.v. "Lip-Service," "Words," "Works."

⁸ Cp., above, pp. 1 sq., 35.

⁹ July, 27, 1906, above, pp. 5 sq.

¹⁰ Notwithstanding the then practically certain loss of the *Montagu* (see above, pp. 4, 6, 35), and the fact that during the interval both France and Germany had brought forward increased programmes (see above, pp. 4, 5, 35).

1907, p. 87, with reference to the Two-Power Standard, when he was interrupted by—)

The President: You have exceeded your time, but I will give you another five minutes.

Mr. Horton-Smith: You will appreciate, Sir, the critical nature of this matter. The very strong divergence of opinion that exists is a crisis in the history of the LEAGUE, and I think the Executive Committee in their own interests will be exceedingly ill-advised if they attempt to burke discussion. (Hear, hear.)

I think, however, that I have already indicated sufficient with regard to the Two-Power Standard. All I wish to say is, do not be misled by mere statements¹ in the House of Lords² that the Liberals are prepared to keep up the Two-Power Standard. Do not be misled into thinking they are doing it, when your own JOURNAL and your own Committee have already told you that they are not.^{3 4}

As to the question of Cruisers (to which the Two-Power Standard has admittedly no application⁵), I need only refer you to the official letter of the LEAGUE itself to the Press, dated January 23, 1907, and reprinted in the February number of the JOURNAL, 1907, p. 34:—

“Concerning the paucity of cruisers, we have often and often protested, and we believe, with the writer in January *Blackwood*, that in case of war we should find ‘want of cruisers written on the hearts of British Admirals.’”⁶

Dealing only with the reduction of five millions—from £36,800,000⁷ in 1904-5 to £31,800,000 in 1906-7—before the present Navy Estimates with their yet further reduction of nearly £1,500,000 were published—your own Editor in his leading article, NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL, March, 1907, p. 57, writes as follows:—

“In the same period the German and American expenditure rose from £30,000,000 to £37,300,000—an increase of over £7,000,000. Thus the comparative loss of England over the period, adding the British reduction to the German and American increase, was £12,000,000. *No intelligent man can for a moment suppose that the British Navy has not been seriously weakened in relation to the two next strongest Powers by this change in expenditure.*⁸ Ships are to-day built cheaper in Germany than in England,⁹ and battleships in the United States cost very little more than in this country.⁹ At the same time, Germany, with compulsory service, gets her men much cheaper than does England. This is an

¹ On the contrast between “Words” and “Works,” see above, p. 77, text, and n. 8.

² April, 1907, above, p. 77, n. 7.

³ See the various utterances cited above, pp. 62 (text and n. 3), 70-78, and especially the N.L.’s Official Letter of Oct. 19, 1906 (*N.L.J.*, Nov., 1906, p. 275, referred to above, p. 72, and below, pp. 204 *sq.*, 230), and the N.L.’s Official Pamphlet of May, 1907, (referred to below, pp. 208, 230).

⁴ Cp. also Dr. B. W. Ginsburg, a member of the N.L. Committee, in his “*N.L. and some Recent Developments in regard to Navies*” (publ. Nov., 1906), p. 11:—“At the present time the N.L. has before it a heavy but important task. The Cabinet has for some reason so qualified the long-accepted Two-Power Standard of comparative naval strength as in fact to have abandoned it.”

⁵ See below, pp. 228, 309, 312, 350, 436, and cp. 519.

⁶ See also the unsigned and therefore (see below, p. 161) official Editorial, *N.L.J.*, Jan., 1906, p. 3, and the Navy League’s Official Letter to the Press, Nov. 28, 1906, reprinted *N.L.J.*, Dec., 1906, p. 322. Reference may also be made to Admiral Fremantle’s views, detailed above, p. 10, and further, in *N.L.J.*, Aug., 1906, p. 201 (article concerning the Naval, or “Trade Protection,” Manœuvres, 1906—referred to above, p. 36, text, and n. 6.—“I see no reason to modify my opinion: our great need is numerous cruisers”); and in “*N. L. Annual, 1907-8*” (dated October, 1907), pp. 80-90. (See also *Navy League Report for 1906* (March 18, 1907), p. 3; and cp., further, Lieut. Knox, *N.L.J.*, March, 1907, p. 78, and April, 1907, p. 99.) And see, generally, above, p. 62, n. 3.

⁷ For the exact figure see above, p. 61, n. 1.

⁸ Cp. also, below, pp. 203, 287.

⁹ See further, as to this, Mr. H. W. Wilson in *N.L.J.*, April, 1907, p. 87.

"enormous advantage to her which makes no showing in comparative tables."

(7) I take my last point, the question of short service.¹ Here is what the NAVY LEAGUE said in its leading article of January, 1906, p. 3:—

"As for the introduction of short service, there is scarcely a single naval officer who can be found to approve that step, and, if persisted in, it may have the most prejudicial effects upon the efficiency of the Navy. . . . The danger of the British Navy becoming the refuge of the flotsam and jetsam of humanity is serious."²

Now, and lastly, as regards Rosyth³:—I think it is agreed to now⁴ by everybody that it must be built at once. If you look at the *Globe* of two or three weeks back⁵ you will find a very strong letter from Mr. Knox, the official lecturer of the NAVY LEAGUE, in which he speaks of what the Government are doing as "a Chinese farce"! Needs it any further emphasis from me?⁶

I have said all I am going to say. The NAVY LEAGUE has shown what it ought to do by its official letter of January,⁷ in which it is suggested that there ought to be a Royal Commission or a Committee of both Houses of Parliament appointed. Since then the LEAGUE'S Committee has done nothing; it has defeated us on every possible occasion when we urged action, and we thought it only right that you, the Members of the LEAGUE, should have some opportunity of learning the facts yourselves. One of the objects of the NAVY LEAGUE is, no doubt, to educate the public. We know the boys of our country are being educated;—but you have got to keep the Navy going in the meantime, so that by the time all those boys have been educated they may have something with which to fight.^{8 9}

¹ Above, p. 62.

² Cf. also the Navy League's Official Letter of Jan. 23, 1907, reprinted in *N.L.J.*, Feb., 1907, p. 34.

³ See above, p. 62; as also Admiral Fremantle, *N.L.J.*, April, 1903, p. 90.

⁴ Especially in view of the then recent Parliamentary debate (1907).

⁵ *Globe*, May 3, 1907.

⁶ Compare above, p. 62, and, further, below, p. 97; and see also Admiral Fremantle in *N.L.J.*, June, 1906, p. 148.

Illuminating comment upon the Government's actions concerning Rosyth will be found in Lord Tweedmouth's speech of May 1, 1907, in the House of Lords, reported *Times*, May 2, 1907, p. 6, col. 3. And see further, below, *s.v.* Nov. 30, 1907, pp. 271-273.

⁷ Entitled:—"Wanted: The True 'Truth about the Navy';"—the Navy League's Official Letter to the Press, dated Jan. 23, 1907; reprinted *N.L.J.*, Feb., 1907, p. 34 (and referred to again, below, pp. 195, n. 1, 484). See also the Official Lecturer in *N.L.J.*, March, 1907, p. 80.

⁸ Cp. further, below, pp. 81, etc.

⁹ Cp. *N.L. Report for 1904* (March 17, 1905), p. 6, shewing education to be only the secondary part of the League's work.

Cp. also the following, as showing the Official acceptance of this double function of the Navy League:—

"The experience of the years prior to the foundation of the Navy League had proved to demonstration that, no matter which Party was in power, adequate measures for the proper maintenance of the British Navy were but rarely, if ever, taken, *except as the direct result of an outburst of public opinion and feeling—commonly known as a 'scare'*—and the League was therefore founded in January, 1895, with the *express aim of educating and voicing* public opinion on all matters of import connected with the Navy and our dependence thereon, with the view to . . . *keeping . . . Governments up to the mark.*"—Extract from the Navy League's Letter to *Public Schools' Magazines*, 1904, a letter which was written for and at the request of the Committee of the Navy League by Mr. L. G. H. Horton-Smith, and, being approved by the Executive Committee, was issued over the signature of its Secretary, and was reprinted in *N.L.J.*, February, 1904, pp. 56 sq.

Cp. further, above, pp. 46, 55, and below, pp. 81, 82, 83 (text, and n. 2), 89, 90, 94, 95, 96, 132 sqq., 138, 158, 195, 199, 225, 229, 241, etc.

If we are beaten this afternoon, as we may be by proxies—as to which I say nothing, except that I entirely agree with Mr. Wyatt¹—you will not have done with us. We are so convinced ourselves of the correctness of our case that we shall continue on our course, and very likely in the days to come we shall succeed in persuading you that our case is right and in reversing the present policy of the Committee. In any case, to adapt the words of “Bonnie Dundee” :—

“Unhook the West Port, and let us gang free,

But ye’ve not seen the last o’ my bonnets and me.” (Cheers.)

MR. ARNOLD WHITE then moved the rejection of the Amendment, and vainly endeavoured to controvert the correctness of the facts enumerated therein.²

THE PRESIDENT :—MR. L. J. MAXSE,³ who was to have supported the Amendment, has not been able to stay, but he has placed a letter in my hands to read to the meeting, and I will proceed to read it :—

DEAR YERBURGH,

May 15, 1907.

As it is impossible for me to stay for the debate this afternoon, I should be much obliged if you would kindly read these few lines from the chair. I have repeatedly endeavoured to retire from the Committee of the NAVY LEAGUE, being unable to spare the necessary time for such work, and I now much regret that in deference to the kindly pressure of the chairman I remained on and have become innocently involved in proceedings of which I knew nothing, of which I strongly disapprove, and which culminated in an episode which, in their cooler moments, the majority of the Committee will reprobate, namely, the despatch of a sensational circular to the members of the League demanding the return of proxies against Mr. Wyatt’s Amendment without affording the members any opportunity whatsoever of knowing the issue.⁴ In my opinion this is not “cricket.” As a distinguished NAVY LEAGUER writes to me : “It does seem to me very improper that the one side should apparently use official resources and funds to further their own side of the controversy.”

But the main issue, of course, is what really matters, though it will not be voted on this afternoon, for the simple reason I have given, namely, that votes have been collected from those who have no inkling of it. That issue is whether the NAVY LEAGUE is to remain what it used to be, a vigilant, independent, and critical association exclusively devoted to the maintenance of British sea power, or whether it shall become a semi-official echo of Whitehall, with the motto, “The Admiralty, right or wrong.”

I have no knowledge as to how the LEAGUE has drifted into its present position, but the treatment of Mr. Wyatt’s motion shows how far we have departed from our original object, because that motion, though regarded as a personal affront by the Committee, is not an attack on the policy of the LEAGUE, but a criticism of the policy of the Admiralty, and if we NAVY LEAGUERS are to be debarred from criticising the Admiralty—whose operations during the past year have become a subject of increasing public concern, because they seem to be governed by the single idea of scraping up a surplus for

¹ See above, p. 68, and especially p. 50 (and also p. 53, n. 2).

² See further, below, pp. 127, 202, and Index, s.v. Mr. A. “White.”

³ Editor of the *National Review*, for whom see above, p. 54, and below, pp. 116, 145, 166, etc.

⁴ See above, pp. 59, 53.

the Chancellor of the Exchequer—we have lost much of our usefulness.

Our educational work in schools, under the auspices of Lieutenant Knox, who has a genius for his task, is beyond all praise; but what is the use of educating the youth of the country to the vital necessity of preserving our naval supremacy if, when they grow up, they find it has been hopelessly compromised by incompetent Governments?¹ I speak without any partisan bias, because it has always been common ground among NAVY LEAGUE members that every Government, whatever its label, will "sneak" a battleship whenever they dare,² i.e., whenever the public relaxes its vigilance or the Admiralty is prepared to sacrifice efficiency to economy.

For the moment, we are assured that our sea supremacy is safe, but only for the moment, and the future is very uncertain. The facts stated in Mr. Wyatt's amendment are set forth in various numbers of the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL, and though the complacency of the Committee may remain undisturbed, the steady weakening of our sea power, which has been such a sinister feature of recent British policy, and which has been coupled with the promulgation of infantile views upon universal peace and the brotherhood of man, has caused consternation to our friends and allies throughout the world, while it supplies a dangerous incentive to our enemies.³ With a few more years of the present *régime*, we shall see German Army Corps perambulating Yorkshire.

I am heartily with Mr. Wyatt and Mr. Horton-Smith in their patriotic effort to prevent the NAVY LEAGUE from being "nobbled" ⁴ by the Admiralty. I am, Sir, Your obedient servant,

(Signed) L. J. MAXSE.

The PRESIDENT: I have also received a letter from Colonel F. I. MAXSE, C.B., withdrawing his support from the Executive Committee.

Admiral FREMANTLE,⁵ SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK,⁶ Mr. ALAN BURGOYNE,⁷ Lieut. H. T. C. KNOX, and the PRESIDENT followed, one after the other,^{8,9} against the Amendment;—Admiral Fremantle and Sir Frederick Pollock, on behalf of the Committee, throwing overboard all previous official utterances and the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL, with equal absence of qualm.^{10,11}

Mr. G. W. Holtzapffel and Mr. Hubbard, who were both desirous of speaking in support of the Amendment,¹² did not, unhappily, "catch the Speaker's eye."⁹

Even so, however, the Amendment was defeated only by 17 votes out of 71, and was declared not carried.¹³

An adjournment for further consideration was moved before the Amendment was actually voted upon; but was ruled out of order by the Chairman.¹⁴

¹ Cp. above, p. 79, text and n. 8.

² Cp. below, pp. 116, 118 *sq.*, 120, etc.

³ As witness the new German Navy Act, 1908 (for which see below, pp. 266 *sq.*, 273, 279, 282, 286 *sq.*, 253, 355, 359, 439, 453, etc.).

⁴ Cp. below, p. 116.

⁵ See below, pp. 84, 130.

⁶ On his speech, see below pp. 83, 85;—and for his unusual views on official responsibility see below, p. 161.

⁷ See below, pp. 85, 190.

⁸ As to this, see below, p. 190.

⁹ "The usual technicalities of debate is that speakers should be called in turn on each side."—Mr. Robert Yerburgh (the President) in correspondence with ourselves, July 18, 1907. (Reference should, however, be made to the preceding note).

¹⁰ Mr. Yerburgh's "novel procedure" in regard to our Amendment will be found criticised below, pp. 83 *sq.*

¹¹ Cp. below, pp. 85, 88 *sq.*, 130, 138 *sq.*, 231.

¹² For the extraordinary omission (of certain crucial words in Admiral Fremantle's speech) from the *N.L.J.*'s Report of the Meeting see below, pp. 84 n. 4, 130 n. 1.

¹³ As also a third gentleman (See below, p. 190).

¹⁴ Cp. also below, p. 117.

¹⁵ Cp. further below, p. 89.

A NAVY LEAGUE DECISION.

PERILOUS POLICY OF TRUST.

STORMY DEBATE.

FAVOURING REDUCTIONS.

STANDARD, May 16, 1907, p. 7, cols. 4 and 5.

(BY A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE.)

Yesterday afternoon the general annual meeting of the NAVY LEAGUE decided, by 44 votes to 27, to abstain from appealing to the country to protest against the present naval policy of the Government. The question was raised, it will be remembered, upon an amendment to the annual report, moved by Mr. H. F. Wyatt, and seconded by Mr. Horton-Smith, who had resigned their seats upon the committee for the purpose. The terms of the Amendment called upon the meeting to deplore the diminution in our naval strength involved in the reduction of the Naval Estimates from £36,800,000 for the year 1904-5, to £30,400,000 for the year 1907-8, and specified certain aspects of naval administration—by no means all that might be cited—in which the unfortunate results of the economy were plainly manifested. These were:—[see the terms of the Amendment, printed above, pp. 60 sqq.].

There is here no question of the facts. They were not even disputed by anyone in an extremely excited assembly, with the exception of Mr. Arnold White, who, after stating that he intended to prove their inaccuracy, merely endeavoured to prove that these serious reductions were really highly beneficial. That, of course, is the point at issue. Mr. White, having mysteriously compared an abandoned naval station to a "battleship with banked fires," had twice to sit down under calls for order for relapsing into personal observations. His speech was not otherwise remarkable.

OBSCURE POINT OF POLICY.

The question which the Navy League had to settle was really a somewhat obscure point of policy. Were they, or were they not, exercising their legitimate functions in criticising points of naval administration? As they have been criticising a succession of naval administrations ever since they began to be, the sudden diffidence on the part of the majority of the committee, who announced their intention of resigning if the amendment was carried, seems somewhat inconsistent. Moreover, as Mr. Wyatt and Mr. Horton-Smith showed in detail, every one of the points dealt with in the amendment has already been adversely criticised in the pages of the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL, for whose policy (with the exception of "signed and communicated" articles) the committee is presumably responsible.¹

The committee, however, in issuing a circular calling for proxies, avoided this difficulty by representing the amendment (which was not quoted in the circular²) as a direct attack upon the present Board of Admiralty.³ Several members, having learned the truth from Mr. Wyatt's letter in the *Standard*, immediately wrote or telegraphed to recall their vote.⁴

¹ See below, p. 161.³ See above, p. 50, text and n. 8.² See above, pp. 53, 56, 58 sq., 59, 67, 68, 30.⁴ See above, pp. 59, 68.

Here at once was a fruitful subject for an infinite variety of debate. Were the NAVY LEAGUE entitled to criticise naval administration at all? Ought they, under any circumstances, to attack the Board of Admiralty? Were not their functions purely "educative"? And, if so, were points of naval administration included in the scheme of education? Finally, supposing that they might¹ conceivably criticise naval administration,² had they any justification for so doing, upon the evidence (not disputed) presented by Mr. Wyatt? It is in this last point that the interest of the country at large is involved. The rest may be left to the members of the LEAGUE to settle at their leisure.

But, as a matter of fact, the NAVY LEAGUE Committee chose to defend their position by arguing that there was no cause for alarm or agitation in the facts of naval administration presented in Mr. Wyatt's Amendment. There the facts are; they could not be denied; the British public have already had full opportunity, in the columns of the *Standard* and in the debates in both Houses of Parliament, of forming their own judgment. It is, therefore, interesting to examine the arguments in favour of the present naval policy adduced by members of the committee of the NAVY LEAGUE, a body whose constitution is avowedly non-political, impartial, and entirely devoted to the dissemination of information concerning naval affairs, with the expressed purpose of calling "attention to the enormous demands which war would make upon the Navy, and to the fact that the Navy is not strong enough to meet them, and at all times to point out any shortcomings in this respect."

If this clause in the constitution of the League does not involve criticism of naval administration, what does it involve? However, let that pass. The committee endeavoured to prove that all was, well—never better; with the exception of two members, Admiral Sir Edmund Fremantle and Sir Frederick Pollock. These gentlemen explained that, as some of the points of the amendment might be regarded as controversial, they felt bound to vote against the amendment.

The fighting was done by the rest of the committee there present; Mr. Yerburch, the president; Mr. Seymour Trower, the chairman; Lieutenant Knox, the well-known and universally-esteemed lecturer of the League; and Mr. Alan Burgoyne, on the one side; and by Mr. H. F. Wyatt and Mr. Horton-Smith on the other.

CRITICISING THE STANDARD.

Mr. Yerburch, who occupied the chair, introduced quite a novel procedure by speaking upon an amendment which was not before the meeting.³ As there was no one to call him to order, and as his remarks chiefly consisted in welcoming the amendment as being calculated to "clear the air," he was heard with attention. Mr.

¹ Cp. below, p. 94.

² It is not undeserving of notice that in the *N.L. Annual Report* for 1904 (dated May 17, 1905), p. 6, *education* is (and, as we contend, rightly) treated as only the *secondary* part of the Navy League's work—a fact which detracts a good deal from the strenuous efforts of the President nowadays to prove that the Incorporation of the League in July, 1903, "*avait changé tout cela*"—(see *N.L.J.*, August, 1907, pp. 232 sq.).

Even in the *N.L. Annual Report* for 1906, (dated March 18, 1907), to which Mr. Wyatt's Amendment of May 15, 1907, was moved, criticism (for which see above, pp. 79, 82, and below, pp. 95, etc.) holds the only *italicised* place (see below, p. 133, n. 1.).

³ Cp. also, above, p. 81 n. 9.

Yerburgh was followed by Mr. Seymour Trower, who also spoke upon an amendment which had not been moved—nor did it seem to occur to the chairman to call him to order. Mr. Trower thought proper to make certain references to the *Standard*, which we prefer to record without comment.¹ He said that the movers of the Amendment (upon which, as we have said, he had no right to be speaking at all) had doubtless been inspired by the *Standard*, a highly respected, but a party organ. The *Standard*, remarked Mr. Trower, had looked about for an instrument wherewith to attack the Government, and had selected the Navy. "We decline," he observed, "to be made the catspaw of a party journal." Mr. Trower then proceeded to introduce the name of the First Sea Lord into the argument; and, having paid a high tribute to that distinguished officer, he suggested that all personal references should be avoided by other speakers. He then stated that the business of the NAVY LEAGUE was purely educational.

Mr. Wyatt rose to move his Amendment. After calling the attention of the meeting to the breach of order committed by the chairman and by Mr. Trower, he showed that his amendment, so far from being out of harmony with the policy of the NAVY LEAGUE, was entirely based upon that policy, as explicitly declared and reiterated in the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL. He pointed out, with reference to Mr. Trower's remarks concerning the *Standard*, that the League had already condemned the reduction in the shipbuilding programme by the present Government before any reference to the matter was made in the *Standard*. He went on to dispose of the argument that the points in the Amendment dealt with strategical matters, by affirming that, if there had been no reduction in the estimates, the redistribution of the Fleet could have been carried out without reducing its strength, abandoning naval bases, and withdrawing cruisers. He urged the committee, if they would not take decisive action, to take at least some action with regard to the serious condition of affairs, and to drag themselves from their "morass of inertia." As matters stood, the committee were actually the accomplices of the 125 Liberal members who petitioned the Prime Minister to reduce the Navy—but who were ashamed to publish their names.²

Mr. Horton-Smith seconded the amendment. He read extract after extract from the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL supporting his contentions at every point, and observed that Lieutenant Knox himself had stated in public that the attitude of the Government with regard to the failure to construct a naval base on the East coast was a "Chinese farce."

A letter from Mr. L. J. Maxse was then read by the chairman, in which the editor of the *National Review* affirmed his absolute agreement with the Amendment.³

A STORM OF PROTEST.

Admiral Sir Edmund Fremantle disclaimed the responsibility of the committee for the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL. "We must print something—we must have copy, like any other journal,"⁴ said the

¹ Cp. above, p. 71.

² Cp. above, p. 70.

³ See above pp. 80 sq.

⁴ It is curious to observe that these words were omitted from the *N.L.'s Report of the Meeting: N.L.J.*, June, 1907, pp. 157 sq. (See above, p. 81 n. 11, and below, p. 130, n. 1).

Admiral. Sir Frederick Pollock also disclaimed the responsibility of the committee for anything in the JOURNAL, except matter signed by them—a singular view of executive liabilities.

Mr. Burgoyne then made a speech of a nature so personal that he was twice compelled to withdraw his words, and, having excited a storm of protest, sat down.

Lieutenant Knox, without troubling to deal with the terms of the Amendment in detail, delivered a speech supporting the naval reductions in every particular. . . . The NAVY LEAGUE lecturer would be a quite invaluable ally of the present Administration. Because Lord Tweedmouth and Mr. Robertson had asserted that the Navy was being maintained regardless of cost, Lieutenant Knox, for his part, could not conceive that anyone should criticise these utterances.

The chairman wound up the debate, amid angry interruptions, by first deprecating personalities—a somewhat belated admonition—and then by committing himself to the astonishing statement that the First Sea Lord was wholly and personally responsible for the efficiency of the Navy and its readiness for war. This, of course, is not so. The First Sea Lord is *primus inter pares*; the Board of Admiralty, as a body, is responsible to the First Lord (Lord Tweedmouth), and he to the Cabinet, and the Cabinet to the Sovereign. He also quoted Lord Tweedmouth's assurance¹ as absolute and irrefragable proof that the Navy was ready for war. More remarks, interesting as they were, had, of course, very little reference to the Amendment. That was put to the vote, and lost by 27 votes to 44.

The net result, so far as the NAVY LEAGUE is concerned, is that the committee are pledged to support the present naval policy. As regards the real question at issue, the actual effect of the grave reductions in naval strength, as set forth in the Amendment, the only argument adduced by the NAVY LEAGUE is in the nature of an exhortation blindly to put entire faith in the Government and in their professional advisers. We have heard that exhortation before. It has been metaphorically described as the "confidence trick"; and, like the ingenuous invention from which the metaphor is drawn, it is amazingly successful.

But,—*What is the Navy League for?*²

THE NAVY LEAGUE.

DAILY EXPRESS, May 16, 1907, p. 4, col. 5.

(*Leading Article.*)

The stormy meeting of the NAVY LEAGUE yesterday was the natural consequence of the naval policy of the present Government. The desire of members of the NAVY LEAGUE to stand aloof from party politics is admirable in theory, but the work of the world must perforce be done through the world's ordinary political means, and when a Government comes into being which is committed to a strong anti-military policy in all directions, organisations like the NAVY LEAGUE cannot expect to maintain a sublimely non-partisan

¹ Cp. below, pp. 104 sq.

² Our italics.

attitude. Presumably the one object of the NAVY LEAGUE's existence is to secure the absolute supremacy of the Navy, and, this being so, we find some difficulty in understanding the views of members who see without alarm substantial reductions in the Government's naval expenditure. Under the last Government the NAVY LEAGUE was perpetually and rightly calling out for greater strength and efficiency. How can the League rest content when appropriations are reduced by millions, and ships are manned by nucleus crews?

We are surprised that a single member of the LEAGUE should put any faith in the Government's professions—there is considerable discrepancy, in passing, between those of the Prime Minister and the First Lord of the Admiralty—and, in view of the fate which dogs the steps of the Army Council, which always seems to find good military reasons for the most drastic political acts of parsimony, we cannot see that even the Admiralty is to be regarded as beyond the sphere of legitimate criticism. Sir John Fisher is a public servant for whom we have a great respect, but the supremacy of the Navy is something which cannot be taken on trust, and when it is in question no considerations should impede free discussion, or, if necessary, a fresh campaign. As it would be perfectly idle to contend that the Navy is safe under the present administration, we fear that the NAVY LEAGUE must look forward to more acute crises in its career, unless it is prepared as a body to take an active and uncompromising course.

“CHEAP NAVY” DANGERS.

THE TIMOROUS POLICY OF THE NAVY LEAGUE.

STANDARD, *May 17, 1907, p. 9, col. 2.*

The remarkable meeting held by the NAVY LEAGUE on Wednesday at the United Service Institution, with its display of highly embittered differences of opinion, may at least serve the useful purpose of diverting public attention once more to the reductions in naval strength which are being steadily carried out by the present administration. Regarded as a question of regulating the internal policy of the NAVY LEAGUE, the objection of the majority of the committee to Mr. Wyatt's amendment might conceivably have been justified, although it is difficult to perceive how they could have reconciled their position with the written constitution of the League.

But the committee chose to attack Mr. Wyatt's demand for a protest against seven specified points of naval administration, none of which was of a technical or strategical nature, on the ground that these matters might either be justified by “expert” opinion, or were actually conducive to the welfare of the Navy. The arguments presented in favour of these propositions we recorded yesterday. They all avoided the main issue, and dealt in irrelevant general propositions.

Mr. Seymour Trower did indeed cite “expert” opinion—that is, naval opinion—but in a manner which aroused indignation at the

meeting, and against which we feel compelled to enter a protest. Mr. Trower asserted that the fact of such distinguished officers as Lord Charles Beresford and Admiral Custance¹ holding commands under the present administration proved that they approved of its policy. Mr. Trower must know perfectly well that an officer upon active service is precluded by the King's Regulations from expressing his opinions in public or from replying to any statement made concerning them. Mr. Trower, therefore, has taken upon himself publicly to attribute opinions to two Admirals which they are debarred from either affirming or denying.² We have to point out that, in so doing, while Mr. Trower has, of course, added nothing to the strength of his case, he has violated the unwritten rules usually held binding upon gentlemen in his position.²

Mr. Wyatt and Mr. Horton-Smith are to be congratulated upon having taken a course which, extremely unpleasant to themselves, was inspired by the sole motive of inducing the NAVY LEAGUE to perform what (rightly or wrongly) they believed to be its duty to its members and to the country. It is, we believe, the duty of every citizen who regards the security of his country as worth a thought, to protest against the present naval policy of the Government. That duty, for our part, we shall continue to perform. In addition to the facts of the case which are already known, there are considerations even more serious, to which we shall call public attention. We reproduce a letter from Mr. L. J. Maxse,³ read by Mr. Yerburch at the meeting on Wednesday, in which the editor of the *National Review* expressed his complete agreement with the position taken up by Mr. Wyatt and Mr. Horton-Smith.

PITT, PEACE AND PRICE.

STANDARD, May 17, 1907, p. 9, col. 2.

To the Editor of the STANDARD.

May 16, 1907.

SIR,—It may be of interest to know what Pitt's views were in 1787. He said, "No person can be more anxious on the subject of expense than I am, but I contend that any moderate expense by which the continuance of peace could be more fully ensured is true economy, and the best economy this country can adopt." This stood him in good stead in 1790, when this country was on the verge of war with Spain, with France as her probable ally. Lord Auckland, writing to Pitt from The Hague, said: "I am convinced that if less firmness had been shown on our part, or even that if our Fleet had not been found in the readiest and most perfect state that has been known in the annals of Great Britain, the reparation made to us would have been incomplete."

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

E. LUCAS.

¹ For whom see above, p. 46, and below, p. 279.

² Cp. also above, p. 71, text and nn. 5, 6.

³ Printed *supra*, pp. 80 sq.

"A CHEAP NAVY."

THE SPLIT IN THE NAVY LEAGUE.

MATTER TO BE REOPENED.

STANDARD, May 18, 1907, p. 5, col. 3; MORNING POST, May 18, 1907, p. 5, col. 1.¹

To the Editor.

4, Paper Buildings, Temple, E.C.
May 17, 1907.

SIR,—As mover and seconder of the amendment discussed at the annual meeting of the NAVY LEAGUE on Wednesday last, of which the proceedings were reported in your issue yesterday, we venture to beg you to accord us space for some comment.

Every effort was made by our opponents to represent the amendment as amounting to a censure on the Board of Admiralty. Our case is the exact opposite to this. Our case is, to quote words previously used by the mover of the Amendment, that "the whole history of naval administration, since Waterloo, proves to the hilt the inevitable subservience of successive Boards to successive Cabinets."² No one acquainted with that history can dispute for one moment the fact of that subservience. We have said, therefore, "that the *causa causans* of the reductions is finance, and finance alone, and that, as often before, the Navy Estimates have been sacrificed to a party Budget." Our amendment, then, was aimed, not at the servant, but at the master, not at the Board of Admiralty, but at the Government itself, which controls that Board with an authority of which the limits have never yet been reached.

The case of the Executive Committee at the meeting was the extraordinary one that the reduction of the Navy Estimates by over six million pounds within the last three years was matter apparently for congratulation, and certainly not of a nature to cause the least alarm either in itself or with respect to what it has involved. Ardent speeches were delivered by various members of the Executive Committee of the NAVY LEAGUE, including Mr. Knox, its official lecturer, in eager defence of those reductions. Indeed, these speeches by the guiding spirits of the committee were adequate to convince anyone cognisant of the objects with which the NAVY LEAGUE was formed that, if the policy advocated by the dominant majority is to prevail, the sooner the definition of its aims, as laid down in its constitution, can be altered, the better. The second of those aims is there declared to be:—"To call attention to the enormous demands which war would make upon the Navy, and to the fact that the Navy is not strong enough to meet them; and at all times to point out any shortcomings in this respect"—a passage which should apparently now run:—"To find reasons for reduction of naval expenditure."

This is, in literal fact, what the committee tried to do on Wednesday afternoon, and in making that attempt they were obliged to throw overboard their own organ, the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL, styled, until recently, "THE OFFICIAL ORGAN OF THE NAVY LEAGUE," and its

¹ See also *Daily Express*, May 18, 1907, p. 1, col. 1, and p. 5, col. 3.

² Cp. above, pp. 56, etc.

official editor, Mr. H. W. Wilson. They could not do otherwise, seeing that every point in the amendment was based on matter which had appeared in that JOURNAL, either in the form of unsigned editorials, or of articles signed by that eminent and patriotic naval expert.¹ But since the JOURNAL is now disavowed, and all agitation in the country is forbidden, what is there left for the LEAGUE to do? The committee declared on Wednesday that its work should be purely "educative." We ourselves have been members of that committee, respectively for twelve years and for four; we have the League's printed constitution before us, and we dispute utterly this declaration and defy its proof, most particularly in the narrow sense adopted by our opponents. These point mainly to the admirable and interesting lantern lectures given during the last two years by Mr. Knox in boys' and girls' schools. But the affairs of Britain are directed, and will be directed for many a year to come, by men already grown up—and not by the school children of to-day. This theory of the committee, therefore, involves the abnegation by the League of its high and binding duty to seek to be a living force, making for increased naval strength in the years to be provided for by the manhood of our own time.

But we believe, Sir, that a majority of the members of the NAVY LEAGUE would repudiate with indignation this policy of inaction and of consent in face of reductions which the League was created to resist (if only they could be made fully aware of the situation). At Wednesday's meeting the proportion of votes in favour of the amendment was as three to five, and this in spite of the fact that on our side we alone had utterance.² Every succeeding speaker was the committee's nominee.^{3 4} Had either of us possessed right of reply, the result of the voting would, we are convinced, have been somewhat different.

The matter cannot rest here. The one-sided debate of last Wednesday, an adjournment of which was proposed but ruled out of order,⁵ must be renewed on fairer lines and with a fuller knowledge of the point at issue on the part of the general body of members.

Under the League's articles of association it is provided that an extraordinary general meeting shall be called upon a requisition signed by 50 of its members; therefore, we would ask all members who may chance to read this letter and who are in sympathy with our views to communicate with us at the address from which we write. The whole question is one, not of men, but of policy and duty. It matters not who are the individuals serving upon the League's committee, but it is, or should be, of national importance that the NAVY LEAGUE, which frequently and rightly criticised in days gone by the acts of Unionist Governments, should not be allowed to remain what it has now become, the humble handmaid of the present Cabinet.

We are, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

¹ Or, also, upon the Navy League's Official Letters to the Press, Annual Reports, &c.; see above, p. 71, text and n. 1.

² See above, pp. 62 *sqq.*; and cp. next note.

³ This is not the less correct because the President read to the meeting a letter from Mr. L. J. Maxse (above, pp. 80 *sq.*).

⁴ See also above, p. 81.

⁵ See above, p. 81.

"WHAT IS THE NAVY LEAGUE FOR?"

STANDARD, May 18, 1907, p. 5, col. 3.

To the Editor of the STANDARD.

SIR,—I noticed that you finished your account of the NAVY LEAGUE annual meeting, in Thursday's issue,¹ by asking: "What is the NAVY LEAGUE for?"² A most pertinent query, which was effectively and completely answered by Mr. A. White and Lieutenant Knox, the official lecturer of the League, on the now memorable occasion which will for many years be regarded as the greatest blunder committed by the executive of that body.

Mr. Arnold White, whose last appearance at an annual meeting was remarkable for one of the bitterest of his personal encounters with the executive, and which ended in his withdrawal from all active participation in the work of the League, was invited from his retirement to do battle for the League, and in a speech, at first profusely complimentary and friendly, in recognition of the abilities and good qualities of Messrs. Wyatt and Horton-Smith, suddenly degenerated into personalities.

The laboured manner of his defence of the Government and the Admiralty, supported by Mr. Knox, left an impression amongst a great number that in these best of possible conditions there was no further use for the League. With an abundance of ships, men, and guns, more than equal to the Two-Power Standard, every point of our sea girt defence made good, without let, fear, or hindrance, the only conclusion to be arrived at is that the NAVY LEAGUE no longer has reasons for existing as a body.

I am, Sir, Your obedient servant,

JUSTITIA.³

THE NAVY LEAGUE NOT TO CRITICISE—?

STANDARD, May 18, 1907, p. 5, col. 3.

Mr. Arthur C. Langham, of 29, Kingsthorpe Road, Sydenham, writes enclosing a copy of a letter in which he tenders the resignation of himself and his wife as members of the NAVY LEAGUE. In this he says:—

"According to the majority of the committee, the administration of the Navy is not to be questioned or criticised. A more fatal principle I cannot imagine. It is well known when the South African War broke out, in what a miserable condition we were in for want of proper guns, etc.; this was because the matter had been left to the War Office. The Navy is the people's very life blood; they have the right, and they must speak and urge the various points that make for its efficiency; and, if somebody does not from time to time speak out, apathy and indifference will find us as unprepared when the time of necessity comes as the Russians were in the recent war with Japan."

¹ May, 16, 1907 (above, pp. 82 *sqq.*).

² See above, p. 85.

³ We have the permission of Mr. Robert Weatherburn, M.I.Mech.E., still at that time a member of the Executive Committee of the Navy League, and now a Member of the Council and of the Executive Committee of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE, to state that he was the writer of this letter, as also of the letter (similarly signed "Justitia") reprinted below, pp. 97 *sq.* (See also below, pp. 119, 206.)

May 18, 1907. Lieut. Knox's letter (of date May 16, 1907) in the *Standard*, May 18, 1907, p. 5, col. 3.¹

May 20, 1907. Mr. Arnold White's first letter (of date May 17, 1907) in the *Standard*, May 20, 1907, p. 3, col. 2.²

May 20, 1907. Admiral Fremantle's letter (of date May 18, 1907) in the *Morning Post*, May 20, 1907, p. 2, col. 5.³

"THE NAVY LEAGUE."

STANDARD, May 20, 1907, p. 4, col. 6.

(Leading Article.)

It is only fair to the NAVY LEAGUE to say that the letter from Mr. Arnold White which we print this morning,⁴ although it deals with the points of naval policy included in the Amendment brought forward by Mr. H. F. Wyatt and Mr. Horton-Smith last week, is, we believe, merely an individual statement of opinion. It is, however, because this effusion affords a fair example of the arguments commonly urged in favour of the present administration that we desire briefly to comment upon it. There is, of course, no question as to the chief facts of the case, as cited by Mr. Wyatt.⁵ The Navy Estimates have been reduced from £36,000,000 for the year 1904-5 to £30,400,000 for the year 1907-8; naval stations have been abandoned in the West Indies, the Falkland Islands,⁶ Esquimalt,⁷ and Trinkomali; cruisers have been withdrawn from all over the world; the number of workmen in the Royal Dockyards has been reduced from 35,340 in 1904 to 27,315 in 1907; the *personnel* of the Navy has been cut down by 3,000 men⁸; and the coastguard is in process of being abolished. Mr. Wyatt's statement that our torpedo flotilla has declined relatively to that of Germany has been traversed⁹; and the reduction of the shipbuilding programme, although we believe it to be unjustifiable, if only because whole squadrons of ships have been thrown aside or laid up, is still a controversial point. We will, therefore, leave these matters aside for the moment. There remain the extensive introduction of the short service principle, avowedly instituted in order to save pensions, and the postponement of the construction of a naval base on the east coast. These, then, are some—not by any means all—of the recent effects of the present Admiralty policy which (unlike the NAVY LEAGUE) we not only regret, but which we believe constitute a serious menace to the security of this country and of the Empire, and a certain commitment to a very heavy additional expenditure in the future. Upon what grounds are they defended? The reduction of naval expenditure, according to Mr. White, is

¹ Answered below, pp. 96 *sq.*, etc.

² For the answer to Mr. White's letters see below, pp. 95, 97 (text and n.1), 97 *sq.*, 99 *sqq.*, 102 *sqq.*, 115 *sq.*, 118 *sq.*, 119 *sqq.*, 125 *sqq.*, etc. ³ Answered below, pp. 98 *sq.*

⁴ May 20, 1907 (see above on this page).

⁵ Cp. above, pp. 60-62, and 63 *sqq.*

⁶ Cp. above, p. 63, n. 3.

Cp. above, p. 61, n. 5.

⁸ "1,000" (so printed in the *Standard*) was a printer's error.

⁹ But its accuracy established: cp. above, pp. 61, 76 *sq.*, and below pp. 115, 437, 449, etc. (and see Index, s.v. "Destroyers").

justified by reason of an increased efficiency in gunnery. We confess we are totally unable to discover any connection between the two things whatsoever. It is also accounted for upon the assumption that ships are more at sea than they used to be. Here, again, the connection is obscure. Moreover, as the sea-going squadrons have been reduced by nearly one-quarter, it is difficult to understand upon what the assumption is based. The immense reduction in the number of dockyard hands is justified by the assertion that the men who are left do more work. Do they? If they do—and who shall decide?—it can only be said that their efforts are singularly unavailing; for the men of the nucleus crews in every Royal Dockyard are being employed, not in their own ships, but in doing dockyard work. Hence the late mutinous outbreak at Portsmouth¹; and hence, too, one reason for the notorious failure of the nucleus crew system. It is also stated that more repairs are done “at sea”—no proof is adduced. But repairs which can be executed at sea do not fall upon the dockyard staff to any appreciable extent. And how do the supporters of the present administration account for the large accumulation of overdue repairs? The reduction of the *personnel* is explained by the elimination of 150 ships. This remarkable feat, always described as “strengthening” the Navy, occurred some years ago; and some of the ships have since been unobtrusively brought back into service.² How, then, can the argument apply? As a matter of fact, the Fleet has been undermanned ever since 1889, when Lord George Hamilton, having been forced by public opinion to provide a new Navy under the Naval Defence Act, struck out the clause providing the men to man the ships. It is undermanned to-day. The complements of the Nore Squadron of the Home Fleet are made up with raw boys under training.

The abolition of the coastguard is defended by a similar exercise of logic. It is stated that because the service requires high technical qualifications, necessitating continuous practice, the men of the coastguard (who are highly trained, and who are mobilised every year to keep them in practice) are not required. To justify the introduction of short service, an exactly contrary proposition is maintained: that a part of the duties aboard ship may be performed by unskilled labour. What those duties are is not specified. The fact is, of course, that five years' active education is barely sufficient to train the short service man to adequacy. He is then sent ashore, where his training serves him not at all to get a living, so that he falls into the lamentable ranks of the unskilled labourers. When Mr. Arnold White states that “there are 30,000 trained men for whom in the event of war no place exists on board ship,” he is apparently confusing the purposes for which a reserve is formed—which are, chiefly, to replace casualties and to supply men for extra duties—with the purpose for which the coastguard are maintained. Apart from the invaluable services they would render in time of war, they discharge essential duties in time of peace. In the event of the abolition of the coastguard, those duties must be discharged by another body, costing quite as much, deprived of the inestimable advantage of naval control, and necessarily less efficient. But it is part of the present policy of the Admiralty to separate the functions of the Navy so far as possible from other departments of State, and to show a saving on the Navy Estimates, which is counterbalanced by extra expense elsewhere. No one has yet been found to defend

¹ November, 1906. See below, pp. 114, 278, 340.

² Cp. also, Sir Wm. White in *N.L.J.*, May, 1906, pp. 119, etc.; and *Morning Post*, March 20, 1909, p. 7, col. 3.

the failure to proceed with the construction of a naval base on the east coast. Mr. White attempts to excuse the inexcusable, by averring that too much has been spent on bricks and mortar in the past. It has—and by the present Board of Admiralty. Mr. White's reference to the new docks at Gibraltar seems irrelevant. Gibraltar is not on the east coast of Britain. It is true, of course, that the docks at Gibraltar are exposed to fire from the hills of Spain. But who is going to mount guns on those open slopes, which happen to be exposed to the guns of Gibraltar? Finally, we are told that "five strategical keys lock up the world." Here, again, we confess that the meaning of the proposition entirely escapes us. We are also informed that the Russian Fleet has ceased to exist. But Admiralty apologists always omit to mention that the fleet which destroyed it enjoys a very vigorous existence indeed; nor do they care to reflect that friendships, and even alliances, may be broken. In this way they implicitly deny the essential principle of the Two-Power standard. The Government constantly endeavour to prove their adherence to that principle—openly impugned, in a moment of indiscretion, by the Prime Minister—by reckoning the number of ships and guns, and triumphantly proclaiming the sum total. But of what use are ships laid up, ships waiting for repair, ships half-manned, or manned by half-trained men? Of what use are guns whose crews have to be improvised, and whose ammunition is exhausted? Ships, as ships, can be made to figure in the public eye. Reductions in their number cause remark. But what of the unseen, insidious weakening of the Service which is in progress in twenty different ways, and in which the strength of men and officers, the real power, is being impaired?

"A CHEAP NAVY."

A FOUNDER'S VIEWS ON THE NAVY LEAGUE SPLIT.

STANDARD, May 21, 1907, p. 3, col. 3.

To the Editor of the STANDARD.

Lowood, Shooter's Hill, Kent,

May 20, 1907.

SIR,—I had not intended to take part in the controversy respecting the split in the NAVY LEAGUE from personal feelings of friendship towards many old members, whom I did not wish to vote against, but after reading the letters which you have published, and the account of the proceedings at its meeting last Wednesday, I feel that, as one of the original founders of the League, and for some years a member of its Executive Committee, I cannot remain wholly silent in the present crisis.

Having, therefore, abstained from attending the annual meeting for the reasons stated above, I must confess that, had I been present, I am afraid my conscience would have dictated to me to vote for the Amendment. Without committing myself, however, to an approval of all the points raised by the speeches and the terms of the Amendment proposed and seconded by Mr. Wyatt and Mr. Horton-Smith, I do consider them to be fairly correct in the main, and that

those gentlemen in their Saturday's letter¹ rightly stated and gave utterance to the original aims and basis for which and upon which the NAVY LEAGUE was founded. Its traditional policy, until quite recently, has been fearlessly to criticise and expose the weak points of any Government's naval programme, and to direct public attention to its shortcomings.

If the same spirit which animated the founders of the League and which has been strenuously followed, not only by its Executive Committee ever since, until this present Government came into power, but has also been imbibed and manifested by the supporters of and subscribers to the League, is not any longer to prevail and govern its action, I fail to see its *raison d'être*. If it is to be a lukewarm and complacent association, blindly and calmly approving the curtailment and depletion of our naval forces, and avoiding criticism when revolutionary measures are adopted of a most drastic character, then I, for one, could not support its policy. I repeat, therefore, that I quite agree with the letter in your Saturday's issue from Mr. Wyatt and Mr. Horton-Smith in its chief points, but I cannot concur in the reasons contained in Lieutenant Knox's letter for the recent reduction in naval expenditure. He speaks of the removal of the Russian Fleet, but he makes no allusion to the rapid growth of the German Fleet, the annual expansion of their building programme, and the determined spirit of the nation to provide a Navy as nearly equal to our own as they can possibly accomplish.

The allusions to the Japanese Alliance and the *entente cordiale* with France are also unsound as reasons for permanent confidence, and, although most comforting at the present time, are not valid reasons for our risking in the future the absolute supremacy at sea which is the bedrock of our existence as an Empire. For reasons of State, the Government must look ahead in the moulding of their naval policy, and their provision for all contingencies. The throwing overboard of Mr. Wilson, the able editor of the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL, is also an act which I cannot concur in. He has conducted that JOURNAL since its first issue on the most sound and patriotic lines, and has done much to promote the life and influence of the League.

I could add much to what Mr. Wyatt has already written about the present unsatisfactory state and condition of the Navy, but I am reserving this for a future occasion, when, in certain eventualities, if not remedied by those whose duty it is to make our Navy absolutely efficient for immediate action, I shall not hesitate to make known to the country the facts of which I am aware. I think that some reduction in the Naval Estimates was justifiable, but the wholesale scrapping and dislocation of the Fleet, and its consequent disorganisation, by which I mean its utter absence of cohesion for purposes of war, are factors too serious to be passed over and accepted by the country, which pays taxes to insure actual security, and leave nothing to chance. Naval supremacy must stand first, and everything else as subordinate, in Imperial policy.

To you, Sir, the country is much indebted for the timely exposure of the many dangers which the present Cabinet's action touching our Navy is likely to lead to.

I am, Sir, Your obedient servant,

JOHN J. JACKSON.²

¹ Saturday, May 18, 1907, above, pp. 88 *sq.*

² For whom see above, p. 31.

ADMIRALTY POLICY.

STANDARD, *May 21, 1907, p. 3, col. 3.**To the Editor of the STANDARD.*

264, Gresham House, Old Broad Street,

May 20, 1907.

SIR,—Mr. Arnold White, in his letter to you, dated the 17th instant,¹ appears to have got somewhat beyond his depth when he states :—

“1. The ‘abandonment’ of the naval stations is a misapprehension. They are not abandoned. Seven of them are partially or completely closed down, but in no such way as to impair their efficiency for naval repairs in an emergency. Should that emergency arise, arrangements exist for starting up their machinery into activity at short notice.”

It is perfectly well known to any one experienced in workshops and machinery that it is practically impossible to close them down for any length of time without injuring their efficiency.

Workshops and machinery must be kept going in order to be efficient.

I am, Sir, Your obedient servant,
J. C. MELLISS, M.Inst.C.E.

“A CHEAP NAVY.”

THE STULTIFICATION OF THE NAVY LEAGUE.

DUTY OF MEMBERS.

The STANDARD, Thursday, May 23, 1907, p. 77, col. 2.

In the NAVY LEAGUE, up to the time of its disastrous meeting a fortnight ago, the country had a body which watchfully, persistently, and regardless of party kept before all eyes the necessity of maintaining that naval strength which placed and kept Great Britain in its position among the nations. By its action at the meeting referred to, the majority of the League stultified the body to which they belonged, and—for the time being, at all events—rendered the very existence of the League an anomaly and an absurdity. The grave question which members of the League have now to consider is whether this condition of things is to continue permanently, whether the country is to be deprived of such an invaluable organisation as the NAVY LEAGUE *was*, or whether the effort which the public-spirited members of the body are making to place it upon its old footing are to succeed. Mr. Wyatt and Mr. Horton-Smith, who made such a spirited stand for the maintenance of the old policy of the League² at the annual meeting, appeal, as will be seen by the letter which follows, for the support of their fellow members. It is to be hoped that the response will be immediate and unmistakable :—

¹ Above, p. 91.² See above, pp. 79, 82, 83 (text and n. 2).

THE OBJECT OF THE LEAGUE.¹*To the Editor of the STANDARD.*¹

4, Paper Buildings, Temple, E.C.,

May 22, 1907.

SIR,—In the letter which you were good enough to publish from us in your issue of the 18th instant,² we observed that, if the policy advocated by the majority of the committee of the NAVY LEAGUE was to prevail, the second of the aims laid down in its constitution would have to be altered, and should in future run:—"To find reasons for the reduction of naval expenditure."

As if for the express purpose of establishing that this is now the object of the League, Mr. Knox has sent you a communication, in which he does indeed make that attempt. Truly, to see the official lecturer of the BRITISH NAVY LEAGUE, as well as the principal members of the dominant majority of its committee, thus earnestly engaged in supporting the reduction of the Navy Estimates, is a spectacle calculated to excite wonder in gods and men! Was this, indeed, the end which those had in view who supported the League in its early days, when it was vital; when it sought reasons for the increase, not for the decrease, of our power at sea? We are thankful to read a negative answer to this question given with emphasis in the *Standard* yesterday³ by Mr. John J. Jackson, who has indisputably a right to speak.

Not only a founder, but one of the principal pillars of the League in the past, he declares his substantial agreement with the views expressed by ourselves. Never was it intended, never was it contemplated, that the League should be restricted to the humble rôle now imposed upon it by the committee, the rôle of an agency for supplying lectures in boys' and girls' schools, while not merely acquiescing in, but actually supporting, the reduction of expenditure upon the Fleet.

The essence of Mr. Knox's case is that, owing to our friendship with France, our alliance with Japan, and the destruction of the Russian Navy, we have less need of naval strength than formerly, and that, therefore, we can afford to reduce it. Yet the continuance of this friendship with France depends absolutely on our power to give her effective aid in the event of attack by Germany, while this power is, in its turn, manifestly dependent upon the strength of our squadrons. In our present condition of military impotence, our understanding with the French is, in actual fact, an additional reason for the increase of our naval armaments. Again, the recall of our battleships from the Far East has left the hegemony of the waters of half this globe to Japan. Her fleet represents a force supreme in the Indian and Pacific oceans; nor could we, if we would, take that mastery from her, in view of the German menace in the North Sea. However closely we may be linked, for the moment, with our friends, the Japanese, we should do well to recollect the lessons of history, to remember that treaties are neither eternal nor irrefragable, and to ask ourselves whether a great people and a great Empire can worthily entrust honour and dominion and vast interests to the good will of another race. And while Mr. Knox parades the Russian naval eclipse as one of his reasons for urging decrease in our expenditure, he fails to recall the growth of the

¹ Continuation of reprint (commenced above, p. 95) from *Standard*, May 23, 1907, p. 7.

² Above, pp. 88 sq.

³ *Standard*, May 21, 1907 (see above pp. 93 sq.).

navies of Germany and of the United States. Yet that growth is one of the portents of our time. Unless the much vaunted "Two-Power standard" is to take the strength only of European fleets as its measure—a mighty fall, indeed—we shall soon find, if our declining programmes of naval construction are allowed to continue, that that standard has become an idle phrase. And while Mr. Knox dwelt in his speech at the annual meeting on the number of guns which we could bring to bear at sea against Germany, he omitted to state how many of these guns were in ships held in reserve with nucleus crews, or in that mysterious "Home Fleet," of the complements of whose units we have the gravest reason to fear that a large part is composed of immature boys.

Considering all these points, one is tempted to believe at first that Mr. Knox's speech and letter were really intended to be spoken and written in support of some society aiming at the reduction of armaments. Possibly, however, in this we do him an injustice, for, in the last paragraph of his letter to you, he states that, as regards one point at least in the amendment against which he spoke on Wednesday last, his own private views were in complete accord with ours. For he says that, in his "private capacity," he publicly described the failure to construct a new naval base on the east coast as a "Chinese farce." It is only, then, in his official capacity as a representative of the dominant majority of the committee that he feels bound to refrain from this criticism. Perhaps this remarkable confession gives us the key to his whole position, which certainly seems calculated to excite universal pity.

Sir, we say that the attitude which the committee has forced the League to take up on these and kindred matters is manifestly monstrous and untenable, that it constitutes an outrage upon its members, and that, by stifling the voices most likely to be raised in protest against the weakening of naval defence, it tends to inflict injury upon the nation.

We would again invite all members of the NAVY LEAGUE who are in sympathy with our efforts to communicate with us, at the address from which we write; while we are glad to add that we have already received a large amount of encouraging support.

Considerations of space make us reserve the letter of Mr. Arnold White for a later analysis.¹

We are, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

H. F. WYATT,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

MR. A. WHITE'S REASONING.

STANDARD, May 23, 1907, p. 7, col: 2.

To the Editor of the STANDARD.

May 21, 1907.

SIR,—May I crave your permission, not to traverse the whole grounds of Mr. Arnold White's letter of the 20th inst.,² but simply to point out from a reasonable standpoint some of the several inconsistencies which are to be found therein?

¹ Cp. below, pp. 102 *sqq.*, 119 *sqq.*, 125 *sqq.*, etc.

² May 20, 1907 (see above, p. 91).

In the first place, he justifies the reduction in the estimates on the ground of "doubled efficiency in gunnery" and the readiness for instant war as shown by the average ship being at sea 100 per cent. more than was the case five years ago. Does Mr. A. White honestly believe that this improvement in shooting is solely confined to the English Fleet? His further assertion that the average English man-of-war is now more at sea by 100 per cent. than formerly is again on the same lines, and ignores the fact that the battle practice of the Germans in the Greater and Lesser Belts, &c., has been more or less continuous for the last two years, and the waters in which they operate are considered to be the most severe test in endurance and skill in seamanship that can be found, owing to their intricate and varying nature.

Mr. White's reasoning is somewhat difficult to follow, and would be amusing were it not dangerous and misleading. What, for instance, are we to infer from the following statement:—"The abandonment of the naval stations is a misapprehension. They are not abandoned, seven being partially or completely closed down, but in no such way as to impair their efficiency for naval repairs in an emergency"?

Now, closing down means the withdrawal of the men, and such withdrawal is an abandonment, temporary or permanent, as the case may be. Now, if Mr. White will consult anyone who is familiar with works management, as to the trouble involved in re-starting machinery of large works after lying idle, or even partial closing down, he will, I am sure, be more careful before committing himself to the statement that such "in no way impairs their efficiency."

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

JUSTITIA.¹

THE NAVY LEAGUE.

MORNING POST, May 23, 1907, p. 4, col. 3.

To the Editor of the MORNING POST.

4, Paper Buildings, Temple, E.C.,

May 22, 1907.

SIR,—It would perhaps be not quite courteous on our part to allow a letter from so distinguished and respected a NAVY LEAGUER as Admiral Fremantle to pass without reply from ourselves.

In his letter published in your issue of the 20th inst.² we rejoice to see that the gallant Admiral wholly disclaims the position taken up by the majority of the Committee, namely, that "the present state of the Navy offered no proper ground for apprehension or agitation," and that he states that, so far as he was himself concerned, he could not "endorse all that has been done or is being done by the Admiralty." "So far as I was concerned," he writes, "certainly this was not the case."

Admiral Fremantle in his letter bases his opposition to our Amendment moved at the annual meeting of the NAVY LEAGUE on the 15th

¹ Mr. Robert Weatherburn, M.I.Mech.E., for whom see above, p. 90.

² May 20, 1907 (above, p. 91).

inst. solely upon the ground of expediency, and cites "as an instance" of what he means "the withdrawal of our ships from distant seas," and yet, seeing that he states in his very next sentence that upon this point he entirely concurs with our Amendment, it is not altogether easy to appreciate his position and his argument. The Admiral adds that "it is certainly not the business of the NAVY LEAGUE to urge that the number of battleships in commission should be reduced to show the flag or afford protection to our merchants and Colonies in peace time."

May we say, Sir, that as to this we are the last persons on earth who would make such a suggestion. Our whole case is that if the Navy Estimates had not been cut down by over six millions within the last three years it would be entirely possible to continue to afford that protection without the smallest reduction in the number of battleships in commission. In fact, this point, as made by Sir Edmund Fremantle, appears strongly to reinforce our contention, that the real cause of all these naval reductions is not strategy but finance—finance and finance alone.

We are, Sir, unfeignedly glad that Admiral Fremantle should have written the letter to which we have referred, and we are grateful to him for his kind and courteous reference to ourselves; and we would only add the expression of our hope that all members of the NAVY LEAGUE who are in sympathy with our views and who are willing to sign a requisition calling upon the Executive Committee of the League to convene an extraordinary general meeting for the purpose of considering further the duty of the NAVY LEAGUE will communicate with either of us at the address from which we write.

We are, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

H. F. WYATT,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

A CHEAP NAVY.

NAVAL OFFICER'S VIEWS ON ADMIRALTY POLICY.

The STANDARD, May 24, 1907, p. 13, col. 1.

To the Editor of the STANDARD.

SIR,—Mr. White, in his defence of the Board of Admiralty, has, as appears inevitable with every defender of Sir John Fisher and his colleagues, strayed away from the paths of rectitude, and, at the same time, become involved, mixed, and contradictory in his arguments (?).¹

(1.) If removal and disablement of machinery and tools of the naval stations is not abandonment, what is it? The machinery has been, in a great measure, removed, and tools, machines, stores, and gear have either been sold locally or removed to England, where a vast quan-

¹ "Arguments (?)"—*sic*.

tity suffered the usual fate—sale at auction in his Majesty's dockyards for the proverbial song.¹

(2.) The reductions of the number of people in dockyards has caused a great outcry, because the men are not available to carry out repairs necessary for the efficiency of the ships. Ships have been neglected and repairs delayed, only a few of the ships being "tackled" as number of men permitted. It required neither Sir John Fisher nor any of his claue to reorganise dockyard work; the reorganisation had been well started while he was—well, in the Mediterranean.

"The dockyard 'mateys' have been required to put in a good day's work for a good day's pay, and repairs which formerly were executed as a matter of course in the dockyards are now carried out at sea"—i.e., the dockyards have not so much work to do, yet they do more—then, indeed, is "Jackie" a *deus ex machina*, and the best thing we can do for the Navy and the country is to put him on a pedestal in the capitol, and keep him there.

Further, "National safety requires that private yards shall have their share of work"—so the national safety is ensured by reducing new work in private yards to a minimum, and taking away all repairs. *Q.E.D.*

(3.) The 150 ships of little or no fighting value had had vast sums expended upon them quite recently—e.g., the *Inflexible* had been but just reired throughout; the *Colossus* had had some £60,000 expended upon her less than two years before she was scrapped, and many others were in similar case. These ships were useful as a second line; what have we now to put in a blow after a great naval battle has wrought havoc on our first line? Nothing! And, besides, events in West Indies,² South America,³ and other places⁴ prove conclusively that these ships are absolutely necessary for the policing of our distant shores—"Our frontiers are the enemies' coasts." Sir, the Germans will not be in a hurry to scrap their own ships; they hope to scrap other people's.

(4.) The coastguard has a large amount of training, and is, therefore, a good reserve man. He has the thorough grounding in training and the essential naval discipline which will, in a short time, make him a thoroughly efficient fleet man. No other reserve system can approach the coastguard in providing these two important elements in naval training. We require not 30,000, but 100,000 men—"trained men," for whom, in the event of war, places will be easily found on board ship. The work of the coastguard upon our coasts is unique, and not to be counted in £ s. d., and most certainly could never be attained by a cheap preventive man.

(5.) Who is the "highest strategical authority in Europe"? When did he prove himself such? Certainly, in the Navy Mr. White's highest strategical authority has not that reputation.

The "highest strategical authority" has been proved to be wrong in his wholesale scrapping of ships⁵; he has been grievously wrong in many of the figures which have been supplied his parliamentary colleagues; consequently, he is the more likely to be wrong in the mere matter of numbers of the *personnel* of the Navy.

¹ Cp. below, p. 125.

² Jamaica, January, 1907: see above, pp. 44 *seq.*; St. Lucia, April, 1907: see above, p. 49.

³ British Guiana, November, 1905: see above, p. 49.

⁴ See now Zanzibar, August, 1907, below, p. 250.

⁵ Cp. below, pp. 92, 293, 395, etc.; and see Index, s.v. "Scrapping."

(6.) It is, indeed, evident that there is some confusion between paper programmes and actual construction—at least in Mr. White's mind. "The following figures are worth noting":—

BATTLESHIPS.

Germany projected a paper programme in 1906-7 of 66,818 tons; 1907-8, 70,680 tons.

The tonnage actually laid down by Germany in these years was:—1906-7, 48,858 tons, plus *Ersatz Bayern*, 17,980 tons—66,838 tons;¹ 1907-8 (to date, and one cannot get beyond that—not even the "highest strategical authority")—2,120 tons.²

Is there anything wrong with my arrangement of Mr. White's figures?

(7.) The assertion that the principle of short service will lead to the certain diminution of the efficiency of the Navy carries the matter no further—whatever that may mean—because it is an unanswerable assertion, a self-evident truth.

It is astonishing how short a time and how little experience is required for the amateur critic in naval matters to become an expert in, say, naval strategy in the newspapers.

It is the presence of the "learnt in a fortnight men" (whom I have never yet seen) that helps to make the "nine years' hard work" men—the one is the complement of the other, and not to be separated; nor do I think that the short service nonsense differentiates.

(8.) The fact that there has been a deplorable waste of money in bricks and mortar for the Navy is no defence for a possible deplorable waste of ships and men because there is no base on the east coast. Why drag Gibraltar in in this connection?

Five strategical keys are of no use if the five strategical locks are defective.

"Seeing that the Russian Fleet has ceased to exist, that France is our close friend," that Japan is our bonded ally, the United States our dear cousin and brother, that Germany is our friend and neighbour, and that we are at peace with all the world, and earthquakes and nigger riots are things of the past, it is, indeed, "difficult to comprehend the pessimism of some of your correspondents." It is evident there is no need for any Navy, not even a cheap Navy.

I am, Sir, Your obedient servant,

THIRTY YEARS R.N.

WHITTILING DOWN THE NAVY.

NAVY LEAGUE POLICY.

STATE OF THE CHANNEL FLEET.

STANDARD, May 27, 1907, p. 7., cols. 1-2.

The official action of the NAVY LEAGUE in publicly supporting the present naval policy having called forth a spirited protest from Mr. H. F. Wyatt and Mr. L. Graham H. Horton-Smith, is to be again submitted to the consideration of its members, in a special general

¹ Cp. below, p. 116.

² Cp. below, p. 116.

meeting convened for the purpose. The further information which we publish to-day,¹ concerning the latest results of the policy of reduction, should serve to convince every impartial person of the real nature of that policy. It is to be hoped that all those who are not in accord with the position taken up by the NAVY LEAGUE Committee will defer their resignation until after the general meeting, in order that they may give their support to Messrs. Wyatt and Horton-Smith.

*To the Editor of the STANDARD.*²

4, Paper Buildings, Temple,
London, E.C.,
May 25, 1907.

SIR,—After reading the arguments used by the NAVY LEAGUE advocates of reduction of naval expenditure, some effort is needed to recall the fact that, after all, human reason still has some power in human affairs. To reason lies the appeal in this matter, and we, therefore, ask your permission to state the successive grounds for the belief that the naval strength of this country is being sacrificed to a false and bastard economy. We have first the prevalence before the last general election of an immense outcry against the increase in the expenditure upon the Services, and, following upon this outcry, we have that enormous act of destruction known as the "scrapping" of 150 vessels of the British Navy.³ This has afforded opportunity for noble economies indeed, for if one Government effaces suddenly 150 units of the fleet, and the next Government fails to replace them, there can be no doubt at all about the possibility of a reduction in the Navy Estimates.

Now, to which cause is this huge obliteration of the white ensign due—strategy or finance? By strategy we understand the dispositions of forces made prior to battles, and these dispositions take place in peace as well as in war. To get rid of 150 obsolete craft, and then to build better and faster ships in their stead, may be, undoubtedly, to do something which is related to strategy. But simply to abolish, and not to replace, these obsolete or obsolescent vessels⁴—what is that? Is it "strategy" or is it the evidence of a fixed resolve to cut down expenditure? As a matter of fact, in view of the extraordinary failure to make good the gaping void thus caused, general opinion in the Navy utterly condemns this wholesale "scrapping." The almost universal view now is that, since other units were not to be built as substitutes for those destroyed, nothing could exceed the folly of the sacrifice made, since in the event of war with Germany the enormous amount of work which would have to be done by small craft would be at once apparent. As things stand, much of this work would now have to be done by armoured cruisers,⁵ which naval opinion regards as singularly unfitted for it. The loss of one

¹ See *s.v.* :—"Whittling down the Navy: Still further Reductions: Blow to Gunnery Training: Engine-Room Economy;"—*Standard*, May 27, 1907, p. 7, cols. 1-2 (and see further, below, p. 105, n. 2).

² The first half of this letter—down to the word "abolished" (below, p. 103)—was reprinted in the *Evening Standard and S.J.G.*, May 27, 1907, p. 9, col. 4.

³ By Mr. Balfour's so-called "courageous stroke of the pen" (as to which see below, p. 105, and *Morning Post*, March 31, 1909, p. 5, col. 1).

⁴ Cp. below, p. 105.

⁵ Cp. below, p. 268.

of these monsters might mean the removal from life of eight hundred men and the disappearance of upwards of a million's worth of money. It is held in the Navy to be simply inconceivable that the gigantic and criminal foolishness of having to employ armoured cruisers to do work which could be far better carried out by vessels of a tithe of their cost can really be due to reasons of strategy. But if such employment be not due to strategy, what can it be due to, save a frantic and unbridled spirit of economy? That this is in fact the operating cause is absolutely clear, when we consider the further "economies" which this great elimination has made attainable. To these one of the advocates of the Government, Mr. Arnold White, lovingly refers, when he writes to you that the reduction of the *personnel* of the Navy has thus been rendered possible, together with the saving of one and a half millions sterling in the repairs and upkeep of these scrapped and unreplaced men-of-war, while seven dockyards (thus made useless) and their attendant establishments have also, as a consequence, been abolished.¹ Quite so! The argument is perfectly sound. Scrap the ships of the Navy, omit to build others in their room, and then you will need fewer men and fewer dockyards. No one can possibly dispute this proposition, and the resulting economies are undeniable. But why not carry these further? Why not scrap all the remaining components of our fleets? Then we should require no men at all, and no dockyards, so that the saving effected would be immense. Clearly, Mr. Arnold White is on this point at least a logical bankrupt.

But economy is not now confined to the abolition of ships and the reduction of the *personnel*. It is an open secret in the Navy that out of our nominal list of destroyers not more than two-thirds are now actually available in the event of war.² Economy delays their repairs. The same cause has placed out of the possibility of present action no fewer than three of the battleships of the Channel Fleet.³ The force under the command of Lord Charles Beresford is attenuated enough in any case when compared with that of which his predecessor, Admiral Wilson, disposed. The latter controlled some sixty battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, all of which were in a state of instant readiness for war.⁴ The admiral upon whom Britain now depends for defence against sudden attack is in no such happy position. The force at his immediate disposal, the force on which hangs the preservation of our boasted liberties if the sword stroke suddenly fall, is far weaker than that which protected our shores under the former leader. Instead of battleships and cruisers and destroyers, with full complements and fit immediately for war, we have the incarnations of economy. We have the "Home Fleet," half manned with immature boys, and not, in fact, available for instant action. We have ships held in commission in reserve with nucleus crews, and other ships in further reserve with crews smaller still.

Sir, does anyone dare to say that these and other economies which can be named make the country safer than it was before, or as safe? How can it be as safe, when it will now take days to get ships to sea and concentrated that previously were instantly available, and when many of those thus called out will require, in the

¹ See above, p. 102, n. 2.

² Cp. below (*s.v.* May 28, 1907) p. 109; and cp. also below, pp. 237, etc.

³ If not, in fact, four. (See below, *s.v.*, June 9, 1907, p. 123, n. 1.)

⁴ Cp. above, pp. 44-48.

opinion of naval officers, weeks, if not months, of training to render them fit to act in concert with that waning number of units of the fleet which is still kept, truly, "in instant readiness." How many of the ships that figure on the lists presented to Parliament "as fighting ships ready at an instant's notice without an hour's delay" are, in fact, so ready? Would that it were possible to have an independent inquiry into this vital point. The truth is that the desire of the Admiralty to procure efficiency is being crushed to pulp under the Nasmyth hammer of intention by the Cabinet to cut down naval expenditure. That Cabinet was returned to power pledged to reduce this expenditure, and it is reducing it accordingly—with the powerful assistance of the dominant majority of the Executive Committee of the NAVY LEAGUE. Is it not almost time for the committee to be asked to resign? We ask those members of the LEAGUE who are of this opinion to communicate with us. Letters received by us from many members expressing a determination to resign lead us to express the earnest hope that no one will take this course, but that, rather, everyone who shares our views will retain membership of the League in order to take part with us in the forthcoming conflict. Each such resignation is a direct gain to the other side.

We are, Sir,

"Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

THE BRITISH NAVY—"REGARDLESS OF COST"¹——!

STANDARD, May 27, 1907, p. 6, cols. 6-7.

(Leading Article.)

The information which we publish this morning² concerning the intended reductions at the training establishments of Whale Island and his Majesty's ship *Vernon*, together with the serious decrease in the number of men entered as engine-room artificers, is worthy of the gravest consideration. His Majesty's ship *Excellent*, better known as Whale Island, Portsmouth, is the gunnery school for seamen. Men and officers are drafted there to be taught gunnery, and three years after they have completed their course they return for further instruction, which includes subsequent developments. The *Vernon* is the torpedo school. In both establishments the training staffs of officers and instructors are already worked to their utmost capacity. These staffs the Admiralty have decided considerably to reduce, and, at the same time, the courses of instruction are to be shortened. It is stated that, owing to the recent reduction of the *personnel* by some three thousand men, smaller staffs will now suffice for training purposes. Apart from the fact that the scarcity of men is driving the drafting officers to their wits' end to find crews to man even the reduced number of ships either partly, or continually, at sea, the actual decrease, which is spread over all ratings, including stoker ratings, cannot possibly justify the removal

¹ Per Lord Tweedmouth (see next page). ² May 27, 1907. (See above, p. 102, n. 1.)

of a single member of the training establishments. Nor can there be any conceivable excuse for diminishing the number of men entered as engine-room artificers. The present establishment is barely adequate: yet, while the men are leaving the service at the rate of over twenty-four per month, others are being entered to replace them at the rate of only six per month. An exercise in simple arithmetic will demonstrate the resultant deficiency. It has been attempted to defend the reduction of the sea-going squadrons and the laying up of ships with skeleton crews, on the score of "strategical" considerations. How a wholesale diminution of strength can be regarded as a part of strategy has not at present been explained. It might, indeed, be so construed if it were accomplished at the behest of England's potential rivals in sea power; but our enemies are (as usual) of our own household. But the cheating of men out of their war training, and the deliberate removal of the skilled artisans who are responsible for repairing work, are actions of which everyone is competent to judge. It is impossible for the Admiralty to represent them as part of a mysterious scheme of national defence which they have just invented, and the execution of which happens to coincide with the return to power of a Liberal Government whose credit is mortgaged in the security of promise to economise.¹ The fact is, of course, that the reason for this decrease in men and in their training is simply to save money; just as the withdrawal of ships from the sea-going squadrons, the laying up of ships, and the other reductions in the Fleet are also due to the determination to save money.²

We are nearing a position in which we shall be able to appreciate the full beauty of Lord Tweedmouth's recent declaration that the Government were resolved to maintain the supremacy of the British Navy, regardless of cost.³ As Mr. H. F. Wyatt and Mr. Horton-Smith point out in the highly pertinent letter which we print this morning,⁴ 150 ships were sacrificed by the last Government, largely in deference to the cry for reduced expenditure on the Services. Mr. Balfour was induced to sanction this sacrifice,⁵ because it was represented to him by his professional advisers that these vessels were useless in war, and unnecessary in peace. The country—or, rather, that proportion of citizens who still retain an interest in its security—acquiesced, upon the distinctly expressed condition that the supremacy of the Fleet should not be impaired. The condition implied the replacing of the serviceable ships among those abolished, by new ships. It has not been fulfilled. We have neither cruisers enough for patrol duties in time of peace, nor small craft for subsidiary purposes in time of war. Against that deplorable deficiency, we are to set squadrons of large and powerful ships, both battle-

¹ Pledged to economy;—See Mr. Asquith's admission at Leeds, Oct. 10, 1908 (*Standard*, Oct. 12, 1908, p. 7, col. 7, and below, pp. 349, n. 4, and 450 n. 9).

² For the sequel to the *Standard's* statements, we need only refer our readers to the Leading Article in the *Standard* of May 28, 1907, p. 6, col. 5; to the *Standard* of May 29, 1907, p. 7, col. 1 (the latter, *sc.*:—"Whittling Down the Navy: Reply to Mr. Robertson: Confirmation of Reduction"); and to the *Standard* of May 30, 1907, p. 7, cols. 1-2. (Cp., further, in such connection, *Standard*, June 15, 1907, p. 7, col. 3, and June 17, 1907, p. 7, col. 3.)

It were perhaps irrelevant to note that Mr. Robertson—who so ably seconded Lord Tweedmouth and the Cabinet in their reduction of the strength of the British Navy at all and any cost (cp., in this connection, below, p. 271, n. 2) was awarded a Peerage! (see the *Times*, April 17, 1908, and below, p. 364, text and n. 5).

³ See above, p. 104, text and n. 1.

⁴ Reprinted above, pp. 102-4.

⁵ See above, p. 102, text and n. 3.

ships and cruisers. Into the highly technical controversy waging between those who advocate the building of a few big ships, and those who prefer a larger number of moderate size, we do not propose to enter. Nor, at this moment, do we dwell upon the reduction in the building programme. It may suffice to note that, of the 62 battleships in the current Navy List, only 41—including two still incomplete—can be regarded as even distantly “available for war.” For there is not the least use in building ships if there are not enough officers and men to man them. We cannot man the ships we have. That is the essential point in the present posture of affairs. We have a Navy of big ships casually distributed round the coasts of Britain—whence, in the event of war, mines, submarines, and destroyers would cause their instant and speedy removal—consisting of a few ships fully manned and at sea, and the rest half-manned and in harbour, or laid up, while their crews are being trained in barracks. And of these ships, it is notorious that a dangerously high proportion are under repair, in dockyards depleted both of workmen and stores. To take the instance of the Channel Fleet, cited by Messrs. Wyatt and Horton-Smith¹: the squadron was cut down from sixteen battleships to fourteen, of which three² are under repair. Nor have they been replaced, as under the “new scheme” it was arranged that ships refitting should be replaced, by vessels of the Home (or Reserve) Fleet. We have, therefore, at this moment, eleven battleships to meet a sudden emergency. It is of no use to pretend that the Home Fleet is ready for war. It is not. Its complement is made up of raw boys, its allowance of ammunition is less than that of the sea-going fleets, its crews are untrained. The defensive force of the Channel under the last Government consisted of some sixty vessels, battleships, cruisers, and destroyers. That represented what Admiral Wilson, whose reputation as a naval officer is second to none in the world, regarded as requisite to the situation. It is impossible to say in what Lord Charles Beresford’s force consists, save that he has nominally fourteen battleships, and actually eleven, as compared with sixteen; for the squadrons which would come under his command in war partly belong to the Home Fleet, and partly to the reserves with skeleton crews. They are split up under other commands in various places; they are not ready for war; and many vessels—notably those belonging to the torpedo flotillas—are under repair. At the same time, numbers of workmen employed at Woolwich Arsenal are being discharged daily, the vote for ammunition having been reduced by over a quarter of a million, and that for guns by nearly the same amount.

Such are some of the aspects of the condition to which a Liberal Government and a subservient Board of Admiralty have brought the first line of defence. But, because the ships of the Fleet—whether ready or unready, manned or empty—are stationed round these coasts, the people of Great Britain hug themselves upon their “security.” Let them not be deceived. Upon the outbreak of war no Admiral in his senses would keep a single battleship in the Channel or anywhere near the shores of the North Sea. The ships which were not at sea but which were only “instantly ready” in harbour would hazard some very considerable risks in leaving it. But, apart from these trifling facts, the most dangerous element in

¹ Above, p. 103.

² If not, in fact, four. (See above, p. 103 n. 3, and below, p. 123).

the present posture of affairs is the systematic tampering with the men. The country has been deluded too long by mere juggling with numbers of ships and guns. It is the officers and the men, first and last, and always the officers and the men, who are to be regarded. Five fully-manned ships, with highly-trained crews, are better than ten ships undermanned with half-trained men. If this country can no longer afford to maintain the naval dockyards abroad, to equip the dockyards at home, to build new cruisers, to keep the Fleet in repair, to support the expense of burning coal at sea, to pay the pensions of long service men, or the cost of the Coastguard, let the Government say so, and let them see to it that what ships we have are served to perfection. But the Government, while constantly assuring the country that they are ready to incur any expense to ensure naval supremacy, are saving money on *matériel* throughout the Fleet, and, at the same time, they are decreasing the numbers of the men, and, last of all, they are limiting their training. The Board of Admiralty, the naval advisers of the Government, to whom the country looks for protection against political intrigue, are carrying out this policy. It is not the first time that Boards of Admiralty have been as subservient. Nor has the country, which omits to provide adequate retiring pensions upon resignation for these distinguished public servants, any right to complain if the members of the Board do not see fit to resign their positions. For no Government have yet proved themselves superior to the temptation of subordinating the interests of the Services to political expediency. Sometimes, as at this moment, their action results in a state of insecurity, which, sooner or later, produces an acute crisis.

"STORES" IN THE NAVY.

STANDARD, May 27, 1907, p. 7, col. 2.

We have received the following from a correspondent at Portsmouth:—

"I venture to send you an answer, as I believe, to Mr. White's defence of a cheap Navy. About reduction of stores and material. One notable case here was that of a destroyer which had to wait for six weeks for the necessary plates to repair damages incurred in collision.

"In connection with the abandonment of naval stations abroad, it is a fact that they are depleted of stores, materials, tools, machines, and machinery, and none of them—unless Canada has refitted the wrecked yard at Halifax—could be utilised for a damaged fleet within anything like a 'short notice.' They might get the 'short notice,' but it would be a long preparation that would be required.

"At, I think, the time when the Japanese ships were here, or it may have been the Russians, there was a joke published in the papers to the effect that the foreigner had been shown everything in Portsmouth yard except one locked room, which the 'joker' assured them it was more than his place was worth to show; and then the joke was explained that there was nothing whatever in that locked store-room. There is at the present time more than one empty, or

half empty, store-room in each and all of his Majesty's dockyards, and they had just as well be kept locked for all the use they are. Now, to help fill some of the empty shelves, to prevent the present buying of necessary stores, Malta is being called upon to send home everything and anything in the way of stores that can by hook or by crook be regarded as not wanted there. The establishment is being reduced to the very lowest limit, and every available opportunity is being taken advantage of to return to England stores (material, ammunition, tools, machines) which in a very short time will have to be returned, or else the ships must starve. At the dockyard auctions in May the Admiralty sold as old metal some 200 tons of stuff and 60 tons of tin, either as copper or as copper alloys (brass, phosphor bronze, &c.) and white metal, 90 per cent. of which is tin. Copper costs £105 per ton, and tin £195, and yet it was sold at dockyard sale prices instead of being utilised (as it would have been by any other shipbuilder and engineer) in the usual manner for other work, the whole of these valuable metals being recoverable in the process of remanufacture. Is it not a curious proceeding? And it goes on from year to year, as the proceeds of these sales help to swell the funds at disposal of the yards selling the stuff—the buying of the new comes out of the general vote."

May 27, 1907. "Arsenal Discharges:—How Woolwich Men are Shipped off to Germany";—*Standard*, May 27, 1907, p. 9, col. 5.¹

THE NAVY LEAGUE.

MORNING POST, May 27, 1907, p. 2, col. 6.

To the Editor of the MORNING POST.

17, Elphinstone Road, Southsea,

May 25, 1907.

SIR,—With regard to the correspondence on this question, I have just become a member of the NAVY LEAGUE with the sole object of supporting Mr. Wyatt in his protest against the NAVY LEAGUE being turned into a political and Admiralty lap-dog.² The reduction of the Navy is and always has been a party question—it was one of the Little Englander election pledges. It may be the duty of the Admiralty to find excuses for this, but it is certainly not the duty of anyone who believes that the Navy should be above and beyond all party.—Yours faithfully,

FRED T. JANE,

Navy before Party Parliamentary Candidate for Portsmouth.

¹ Cp. also, as to Dockyard Workmen, above, pp. 61, 65, 75 (and see Index, s.v. "Dockyard Workmen").

² Cp. below, pp. 210 (text and n. 8), 291.

WHITTLLING DOWN THE NAVY.

THE NEED FOR LIGHT.

NAVY LEAGUE NO LONGER TO BE TRUSTED.

STANDARD, May 28, 1907, p. 7, cols. 1-2.

To the Editor of the STANDARD.

May 27, 1907.

SIR,—The striking letter of Messrs. Wyatt and Horton-Smith, in your issue of to-day, should suffice to rouse apprehension in every thoughtful man, whatever his political opinions may be. It is particularly remarkable, in view of the fact that your statements, and those of Messrs. Wyatt and Horton-Smith, although they were made the subject of official evasion, have proved to be true, that neither the Government nor the Admiralty think it worth while to publish an official return giving the precise condition of the ships of the Fleet. The mere reiterated assurance that they are all "ready at an instant's notice without an hour's delay" is really on the face of it—shall we say insufficient? The Government are perpetually refusing information, on the ground of incompatibility with the "public interest." Is it to be supposed, Sir, that the intelligence departments of foreign nations are not aware of the exact state of the Fleet, of which the British House of Commons is studiously kept in ignorance? The country does not ask much. It only asks to be told the facts. If the Navy is in the magnificent state of readiness for war of which we are told, why do not the Government publish a statement which, on their own showing, would redound to their credit? Let us have no more juggling with figures. Let us have a plain statement of the number of ships which are at sea, fully manned, of ships partially manned, of ships of all classes which are under repair on a given date, and let such a statement be issued monthly as a Parliamentary paper. We used to rely on the NAVY LEAGUE, an unofficial body, for such facts as these. But it now appears that we can no longer place confidence in that body.

I am, Sir, Your obedient servant,

TAXPAYER.

OUR DESTROYER FLOTILLAS.

STANDARD, May 28, 1907, p. 7, col. 2.

To the Editor of the STANDARD.

SIR,—Among the various counts in an indictment of naval policy, which is surely one of the most damning ever brought against a Government, there is one which, with your permission, I should like to emphasise. I refer to the statement that not more than two-thirds of our destroyer flotillas are available for war.¹ To anyone with the least knowledge of the conditions of modern naval warfare, such a state of things must appeal as a serious menace to the national security. In the event of war, as you rightly say in your admirable leading article, the English Channel and the North Sea would be immediately infested with torpedo craft, which would

¹ Above, p. 103.

render the presence of a battle fleet impossible. The defence of these shores against invasion would thus fall upon our destroyers and torpedo boats. No one, of course, even pretends to suppose that a hostile army corps, once landed, could not walk through England from one end to the other. In the case of trouble with a Power which I need not name, we should have to deal with the finest torpedo flotillas in the world, always in training, always instantly ready. How long will the country rest content with vague official assurances? What we want is to know exactly where we are. But that is just what the Government will not tell us. I may add that I have no politics.

I am, Sir, Your obedient servant,
INDEPENDENT.

"THE PEACEMAKERS."

THE VOICE OF THE FOREIGNER.

GLOBE, *May 28, 1907, p. 1, col. 4, "By the Way."*

(Just to show their anxiety for universal peace, Japan has just ordered a 20,000-ton battleship and Russia a 23,000-ton boat for the same purpose.—*News Letter*, San Francisco.)

I love to feel a day will come
When none shall think of war,
When men won't have the least desire
To tap their neighbour's gore.
When ploughshares take the place of swords,
How happy shall we be—
(We've built another battleship,
I am rejoiced to see.)

We like Great Britain's kindly thought
Of cutting down her fleet:
To see such gentle acts as this
Is really quite a treat.
The time of world-wide peace is near:
Oh, may we see it soon!—
(This new explosive we've found out
Should prove a perfect boon.)

Oh, let us end this age of strife:
Let's kiss and all be friends;
Nor brawl in our old foolish way
To gain some private ends.
Let's scrap our ships, disband our troops,
And let our guns be burst—
(But—let the other fellows go
And try the thing on first).

ARMAMENTS AND THEIR BEARING ON FOREIGN POLICY.

MORNING POST, May 28, 1907, pp. 8 sq.

(Leading Article.)

The intention at any price to reduce the available forces of Great Britain, which is the chief feature of the military policy of the present Government, appears to be not confined to the military forces. The Navy is subject to a similar tendency. The First Lord's Memorandum explanatory of the Estimates began with the statement that the *personnel* was to be reduced by a thousand men; its central statement was that a million less was to be devoted to new construction than the sum voted for that purpose last year; and its concluding tables showed reductions of the battleship squadrons at sea in European waters. All the rest was detail.¹ We do not propose to-day to enter into the discussion which is going on in some quarters on the subject of the purely naval aspect of the Admiralty policy of the present Government, nor to analyse the opinion and feeling of the Navy in reference to the tendencies of the Admiralty. But there is an aspect of the policy of reduction or of partial disarmament which ought not to escape the notice of statesmen. It is admitted that armament should logically bear some relation to policy. What, then, is the relation between the schemes of Mr. Haldane and of Lord Tweedmouth and the foreign policy of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's Government? This question admits of two different answers according to the meaning given to the word policy. Some people hold that the policy of a Government consists in what that Government would like or would wish. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman would certainly like to persuade the Powers to agree to some proposal for general disarmament, whatever that may mean. He certainly has no intention of attacking any Power or of taking any action that would or could lead to a quarrel with any Power. His conception of international relations is a paraphrase of the maxim "Be virtuous and you will be happy." Upon this theory it is a good thing to reduce the Army and the Navy, and upon this theory it would be better to carry the reductions much further, because if peace depended upon the intentions of the British Government it would be safe to disband the Army and send the whole Navy to the scrapheap. But the Government is not perfectly logical. The doctrine that so long as your own policy is inoffensive you will have no quarrels really implies a renunciation of all policy, which is a step further than Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman can go. Sir Edward Grey, for instance, takes some interest in the condition of Macedonia. He has followed the example of Lord Lansdowne in pressing upon the Powers an extension of the Mürzsteg programme, or at any rate an attempt to urge upon the Porte the necessity of giving reality to the so-called "reforms," such, for example, as the creation of a gendarmerie under the supervision of European officers. This is a comparatively mild course of action, but it is a course of action. No Government can in such a matter express a wish and yet at the same time declare that its wish is not equivalent to a will. There must be the idea that unless you get your way you will do something, perhaps not very much, but still something. For a Government to announce a wish and yet to declare

¹ See further, below, pp. 113 sq.

that its non-fulfilment will have no consequences would be for that Government to stultify itself. In the last analysis every expression of a wish to a foreign Government implies behind it the possession of force and the will to use it in case of need.

* * *

We have touched upon one of the currents that has just been perceptible in the flow of Continental diplomacy in order to show that the times are not so settled nor the relations of England with the other Great Powers so secure and well established as to make great surprises impossible.¹ That being the case, it is difficult to see that reductions in the naval and military forces of this country are opportune, or that the time is well chosen either for Mr. Haldane's crude and unnecessary experiments, which even if ultimately beneficial must for a long time unsettle the whole military organisation, or for those sudden revelations of new strategical and administrative schemes with which the Admiralty has of late dazzled its admirers and startled those whose notions of strategy and administration are derived from the lessons of the past. At the end of two or three years the Government will no doubt have reduced by several millions the amount that might have been expended upon the Army and the Navy. But if their generous hopes of avoiding all disputes with other Powers should be disappointed, and the Army and Navy should have to be employed, the apparent saving would be lost in the vast extra and hurried expenditure which, even in the most favourable conditions, would become necessary. Neither Mr. Haldane nor Lord Tweedmouth seems to have based his departmental policy upon observation of the state of the world, and it is unfortunately no part of the tradition of either office to consult the Foreign Office in regard to the policy upon which the Estimates should be based.

May 30, 1907. Mr. Arnold White's second letter (of date May 29, 1907), in the *Standard*, May 30, 1907, p. 7, col. 2.²

ALARM IN THE SERVICE.

May 30, 1907. The Navy: "Alarm in the Service";—from the *Standard's* Portsmouth Correspondent, *Standard*, May 30, 1907, p. 7, col. 2.³

¹ Cp. also, above, pp. 8, 23, 47, and below, p. 157.

² See above, p. 91 n. 2.

³ "In practically every department of the naval service," he writes, "it is not difficult to find evidence of the spirit of economy at work, and, as a naval man observed to-day, 'The Sea Lords are too easily led by the demands of the lay members of the Government to cut down expenditure. They are, I fear, trading on the high standard to which the Navy has been brought in recent years, and there is apparently a feeling that there is a credit balance that can be worked upon, but it is a mistake'."

NAVAL REDUCTIONS.

MORNING POST, May 31, 1907, p. 3, col. 3.

To the Editor.

4, Paper Buildings, Temple, E.C.,

May 30, 1907.

SIR,—In your leading article of Tuesday¹ you said, "The intention at any price to reduce the available forces of Great Britain, which is the chief feature of the military policy of the present Government, appears to be not confined to the military forces. The Navy is subject to a similar tendency. The First Lord's memorandum explanatory of the Estimates began with the statement that the *personnel* was to be reduced by a thousand men; its central statement was that a million less was to be devoted to new construction than the sum voted for that purpose last year; and its concluding tables showed reductions of the battleship squadrons at sea in European waters. All the rest was detail."

We ask your permission to point out to your readers generally, and especially to those who may be members of the NAVY LEAGUE, the sad fact that this statement of yours, which to us appears absolutely and incontrovertibly true, is in diametrical opposition to the attitude, the belief, and the resulting action of the dominant majority of the League's Executive Committee. The committee maintain that all the apparent naval reductions are not naval reductions. They champion, they support, they defend all these delusive phenomena. They range the NAVY LEAGUE by the side of the present Cabinet as its faithful friend and ally. They maintain that not finance but strategy, not economy but efficiency, is the sole aim of the naval policy of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's Government. If ardour and resolve in sustaining this position and a complete blindness to facts could entitle them to the thanks of the 125 members of the present House of Commons who last year petitioned the Prime Minister to cut down naval expenditure, assuredly the committee, and through the committee the League, now deserve them.

You remark, Sir, that the *personnel* is to be reduced by one thousand men, and we would point out that it had already been reduced by two thousand men, since the number voted for the year 1904-5 was 131,000, while the number voted for the year 1907-8 is 128,000.² This reduction is about equal to the removal of the complements of four battleships, and it is being accomplished at a time when the Home Fleet is largely "manned" with immature boys. Is this to be deplored? No—not according to the Executive Committee of the NAVY LEAGUE. Is it a dismal weakening of the only force which can be relied on to defend this untrained, unwarlike people of Britain from subjugation by a foreign foe? No, again—not according to the Executive Committee of the NAVY LEAGUE.

Sir, this elimination of men from national defence was one of the points comprised in the amendment which we respectively moved and seconded at the annual general meeting of the League on the 15th inst.,³ an amendment which the committee met with threat of resignation and with the denunciations of successive speakers.

But what, then, is the particular argument urged on behalf of the Committee in favour of this particular reduction? The argument

¹ Tuesday, May 28th, 1907 (above, pp. 111 *sq.*).² See above, p. 61.³ May 15, 1907 (above, pp. 60-62).

used at the meeting referred to by a gentleman (Mr. Arnold White) not now a member of their body, but who was called upon to speak in their defence, and since repeated by him in a letter to one of your contemporaries, is cogent, indeed! It is that 150 ships of the Navy having been "scrapped" (and not replaced) fewer men are now required to man those that are left. It will be seen at once that the position of the Committee on this point is logically impregnable. They have indeed proved their acuteness. They have discovered a royal road to reduction. "Have fewer ships and then we shall need fewer men." We suggest this as a new motto for the NAVY LEAGUE should it decide to continue under its present auspices.

But the magnificent efforts of the party now in power to fulfil the claims of strategy and of efficiency do not stop here. They merit on yet further grounds the admiration expressed by the League's Executive. Besides reducing the number of ships and the number of men, the warlike genius of Ministers has also reduced the number of destroyers available for war, to the extent of about one-third, by the simple process of neglecting requisite repairs. The truth of this assertion is well known in the Navy, and the grandeur of the strategical conception which prompts this neglect must be patent to all.

Solomon said that all things were vanity, but the Committee of the NAVY LEAGUE, wiser than Solomon, say in effect that all things are strategy. Strategy, not the desire to save money, prompts the cutting down of the coastguard, hitherto consisting, as stated in our amendment, of about 4,000 steady, trained, and seasoned men. Strategy, not economy, is to compel the use, in the event of war with Germany, of immensely valuable and life-laden armoured cruisers to do the work which the scrapped and unreplaced small craft would have done so much better. Strategy, presumably not the wish to save wages, has led to the employment of men of the Navy to perform the tasks of discharged dockyard labourers, and thus—subtler strategy of all—to the Portsmouth mutiny¹ of these Navy men, who complained that to force them to such employment was a breach of their contract with the State.

Sir, is it not nearly time to abandon the miserable farce of pretending that measures of economy instituted by the Government are measures of strategy instituted by the Admiralty? Is it not time to recognise the fact, known to every student of the history of naval administration, that under our Parliamentary system every successive Board of Admiralty is of necessity the servant and tool of every successive Cabinet?² There is but one authenticated and conspicuous case in which not a Board of Admiralty but one member of it did actually resign on a question of naval strength.³ This case is, of course, that of Lord Charles Beresford, nineteen years ago.^{4 5 6} But

¹ Cp. above, p. 92, and below, pp. 278, 340.

² Cp. above, pp. 27 *sq.*, etc. And see, further, Mr. L. G. H. Horton-Smith's letter, "Patriotism and Naval Lords," published in *N.L.J.*, July, 1905, p. 194, referring incidentally (a) to the action of Lord Charles Beresford in 1889 (next referred to in the text, and see also above, p. 27), and (b) to the threatened action of the Naval Lords in 1893 (above, p. 28): as also (c) to the late Sir John H. Briggs's significant work on *Admiralty Administrations from 1827 to 1892* (published in 1897); and concluding that:—"Because the Naval Lords do not resign, it does not of necessity follow that all is well."

³ Cp. Sir John Briggs, *op. cit.*, p. 325, editorial note by Lady Briggs.

⁴ See above, p. 27 and this page n. 2.

⁵ The resignation of one other Naval Lord is recorded as follows:—"Sir Maurice Berkeley" (created Lord Fitzhardinge) "resigned his seat because the Government would not make that addition to the number of seamen for the fleet which he considered indispensably necessary for the safety of the country, and which he had, for so many years, been urging unsuccessfully upon the Ministry" (Sir John Briggs, *op. cit.*, pp. 325, 327).

⁶ The intended action of Seymour and Hay in 1869, should further, perhaps, have received a passing reference. (Cp. Mr. Bellairs, M.P., *Nat. Rev.*, June, 1907, p. 617).

one swallow does not make a summer, and this exception only proves the rule.

Would it not be better then to face the palpable, if brutal, truth that a Ministry having come into power which does not seriously believe in the possibility of war is now taking money from the Navy, to the great decrease of its efficiency, and therefore of this country's only availing defence?

We are taking steps to secure that the members of the NAVY LEAGUE shall be accorded opportunity, at another and special general meeting, to consider further whether the policy of the Executive Committee is indeed accordant with the original aims and objects with which the League was founded, or whether it is at complete variance with these. Meantime, we would venture to beg those who are in agreement with the views which we have expressed to communicate with us, and in no case to resign, but rather to urge others in sympathy with them to join the League, in order that by their presence and their vote on the decisive occasion they may redeem it from its present ignominy as the mere auxiliary of the Government in cutting down the Fleet.

We are, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

WHITTLING DOWN THE NAVY.

DESTROYER PROGRAMMES.

STANDARD, May 31, 1907, p. 7, col. 7, and p. 8, col. 1.

To the Editor of the STANDARD.

SIR,—With regard to the British and German destroyers laid down in the ten years 1898–1907, Messrs. Horton-Smith and Wyatt are perfectly right,¹ and Mr. Arnold White is wrong. The following are the figures year by year :—

	'98	'99	1900	'01	'02	'03	'04	'05	'06	'07	Total.
England	12	0	5	10	9	15	0	6	2	5 ...	64
Germany	0	12	6	6	6	6	6	6	12	12 ...	72

The British figures can be quickly verified from the Estimates, allowance being made for the destroyers dropped in various years, with which I shall presently deal. The German figures can be similarly verified from the figures of the Navy Acts of 1898, 1900, and 1906, the programmes of which have been carried out to the hour, letter, and number of ships provided. Possibly Mr. White has counted the British torpedo boats laid down in 1905 and 1906, and projected for 1907,² but these vessels are no longer classed by the Admiralty as

¹ See above, p. 61 text and n. 10.

² In this connection cp. the answer given by Mr. E. Robertson (Parl. Sec. to the Admiralty), Nov. 13, 1906, cited by Admiral Fremantle, *s.v.* "Unsatisfactory Replies in the House of Commons," *N.L.J.*, Jan., 1907, pp. 17 *sq.*

destroyers,¹ and are four knots slower than the more recent German destroyers.

As for the "paper programme" of Germany, the German programme for 1906-7 was about 67,000 tons of warships. Of these warships 49,000 tons were laid down in 1906-7, and 18,000 tons in 1907-8.² The British programme for 1906-7 was 81,600 tons, of which 59,400 tons were begun during the financial year and 22,200 tons totally abandoned, thus bringing the British tonnage provided under the 1906-7 estimates below that provided under the German estimates. For 1907-8 the German tonnage provided is 71,000 tons; the British, 70,200 tons.³ Mr. White states that only 2,000 odd tons of the German programme have as yet been laid down.⁴ But if I am correctly informed, not a single ton of the British programme for 1907-8 is as yet in hand.⁵

Nor can the fact be overlooked that of recent years British programmes have not been carried out in their entirety, whereas all the German ships provided under the various Navy Acts have been built and completed to the appointed date. The following list of British ships, dropped after figuring in the various programmes, is highly suggestive⁶ :—

1903 programme: 3 small cruisers dropped in 1904.

1904 programme: 1 large armoured cruiser, 14 destroyers dropped in 1905.

1905 programme: 1 *Invincible* dropped in 1906.

1906 programme: 1 *Dreadnought*, 3 destroyers, 4 submarines dropped in 1906.

I am, Sir, Your obedient servant,

NAVY LEAGUER.⁷

"NOBBLING" THE NAVY LEAGUE.

Extract from the NATIONAL REVIEW [June], 1907, pp. 516-7.

*s.v. "Episodes of the Month," by the Editor,
Mr. L. J. Maxse.⁸*

Sir John Fisher, our First Sea Lord, *deus ex machina* of the Admiralty and supreme boss of two Governments, has performed as remarkable feats ashore as he ever performed afloat. He has

¹ See Lieut. C. Bellairs, M.P., *Morning Post*, Jan. 15, 1907 (and cp. the same writer again in *Jour. of R.U.S.I.*, Feb., 1907, p. 148); Mr. H. W. Wilson, in *N.L.J.*, March, 1907, p. 57 (quoted above p. 76); and cp. the latter again, in *N.L.J.*, April, 1907, p. 87; and the Navy League itself (*s.v.* "The Navy Estimates: Facts and Figures"), *N.L.J.*, April, 1907, p. 91; and the Dilke Return, 1907 (issued July 2, 1907), p. 64, where they are specifically classed as torpedo-boats. And see generally above, p. 61 (text and n. 10) and below, pp. 127, 202, 203 (text and nn. 1, 2), 449, and Index.

² Cp. above, p. 101.

³ As to this, cp. above, p. 101.

⁴ Cp. also *N.L.J.*, April, 1906, p. 77; May, 1906, p. 136; April, 1907, p. 91; May, 1907, p. 119; Mr. F. Shadwell, in *N.L.J.*, Jan., 1908, p. 6; Mr. H. W. Wilson, "To the Sea Lords," *Daily Mail*, Jan. 8, 1908; Mr. F. T. Jane, below, pp. 118 *sq.*; and further, the Index, *s.v.* "Dropping."

⁵ Cp. below, p. 118.

⁶ We have the permission of Mr. H. W. Wilson, still, at that time, Editor of the *Navy League Journal*, but now a member of the Council, as also of the Committee, of the Imperial Maritime League (for whom, see above, pp. 53, 60 *sqq.*, 64, 71, and below, pp. 368 *sq.*, 376, 393, 396; and Index, *s.v.* his name) to state that he was the writer of this letter reprinted in the text.

⁸ For whom, see above, pp. 80 *sq.*

hypnotised a series of Parliamentary politicians belonging to both political parties who usually rather resent being "run" by their experts, and he has practically reduced Parliamentary criticism to silence, save for the plucky persistence of Mr. Carlyon Bellairs, whom both the Front Benches combine to smother. Now apparently the NAVY LEAGUE has succumbed to the charmer; at least, that is the only interpretation we can place on the curious conduct of the majority of its committee in resenting the attempt of the minority to raise the question of British naval policy at its annual meeting, and in threatening to resign if a motion were carried condemning that policy, in spite of the fact that all the materials for such condemnation have appeared month by month in the pages of the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL, so admirably edited by Mr. H. W. Wilson, an acknowledged master of his subject. As the facts have been so clearly set forth in the *Standard*, which is one of the few newspapers which refuse to become a mere echo of the Admiralty, we need not enlarge upon the crisis in the NAVY LEAGUE here, save to urge those of our readers who belong to that body to place themselves immediately in communication with Mr. H. F. Wyatt and Mr. Horton-Smith (4, Paper Buildings, Temple, London, E.C.), the two "obnoxious" members of the committee who are endeavouring to prevent the BRITISH NAVY LEAGUE from relapsing into silence at one of the most critical moments of our history, and just as the GERMAN NAVY LEAGUE is starting a fresh agitation for yet another naval programme in addition to the prodigious programmes of 1900 and 1906. At the annual meeting (May 15) Mr. Wyatt moved a comprehensive resolution, which was only defeated on a show of hands by the comparatively small majority of forty-four to twenty-seven, although the whole machinery of the League was in the hands of the other side. After condemning the reduction of the Naval Estimates from £36,800,000 for the year 1904-5 to £30,400,000 for the year 1907-8, this resolution specified some of the dire consequences of this false economy and called upon the NAVY LEAGUE to embark on active agitation in order to arouse the country to the weakening of British Sea Power. Mr. Wyatt and Mr. Horton-Smith very properly insist on referring this momentous issue to a special general meeting of the League.

June, 1907. "The Hague Conference: The Question of Immunity for Belligerent Merchant Shipping";—by Captain A. T. Mahan (Author of "The Influence of Sea-Power upon History"); in the *National Review*, June, 1907, pp. 521-537.

June, 1907. "The Cobden Club and the Navy";—by Lieut. Carlyon Bellairs, M.P.; in the *National Review*, June, 1907, pp. 614-626.

STARVING THE NAVY.

A REPLY TO MR. ARNOLD WHITE.

STANDARD, June 4, 1907, p. 5, col. 5.

To the Editor of the STANDARD.

Portsmouth,

June 1, 1907.

SIR,—I have read Mr. Arnold White's letter with much interest. In the matter of his claim to be the originator of "Trafalgar Day," he is certainly reminiscent of one feature of that battle. The British Fleet was there in a numerical inferiority to a Two-Power combination. Few have worked harder than Mr. Arnold White to produce a similar inferiority of the British Fleet in the future. But it remains to be demonstrated whether numerical inferiority is the prime essential to naval victory.

Mr. Arnold White demands some figures about German destroyers. May I offer them?:

Here they are:—

	British.	German.
"River class" period.....	34	12
30kt. t.b.d. period	68	26
27kt. t.b.d. period	45	7

Boats of the 27 knot period are now getting very *passés* (especially under the economy and efficiency system of keeping in repair). However, we have an undoubted superiority in all three classes—quite enough to worry patriotic Germans or our own Little Englanders.

There is balm for them, however, in the promise of the future. Here are the figures of the last three years:—

Estimates	British.		German.		Total Ratios.	
	T.b.d.	T.b.	T.b.d.	T.b.	British.	German.
1905-1906	6	+ 12	6	+ 0	18	to 6
1906-1907	2*	+ 12	12	+ 0	14	to 12
1907-1908	5	+ 12	12	+ 12	17	to 24

(*) The 1906-7 Estimates were 5 ocean-going t.b.d., of which 3 appear to have been quietly dropped.¹

The argument advanced by Mr. Arnold White about paper programmes and unbuilt ships is a blunderbuss that has been fired a good deal of late. The German *Dreadnoughts* have been considerably delayed—according to one story, owing to turbine experiments: but, according to my information, owing to certain necessary gunnery experiments for a revolutionary change proposed in these ships. However, all the contracts were given out for 1906-1907 ships during 1906, and the vessels are in hand. Also, Krupp's Germania Yard has received the order for one of the 1907-1908 battleships, and presumably is at work upon her. Nothing whatever has yet been done with our 1907-1908 ships.² Also, I would point out that Germany has never yet projected a ship and then dropped it, while we have continually done this. It has been left to these latter days, however,

¹ Cp. above, p. 116.

² Cp. above, p. 116.

for a battleship to be dropped in order to secure the political support of Little Englanders and avowed anti-Imperialists.

As I have several times pointed out to Mr. Arnold White, this—and this alone—is the real issue. He is simply trading in red herrings in his gallant attempts to find reasons and excuses for those who are merely the instruments in this business. The thing that he has to justify is this: Is it right to cut down the Navy in order to keep a political party together?

It will be time enough to discuss "technical details" when that point is settled.

I am, Sir, Your obedient servant,

FRED T. JANE.

June 3, 1907. Mr. Arnold White's third letter, in the *Standard* June 3, 1907, p. 8, col. 5.¹

NAVY LEAGUE APOLOGIST REFUTED.

STANDARD, June 5, 1907, p. 10, col. 5.

To the Editor of the STANDARD.

4, Paper Buildings, Temple, E.C.,

June 3, 1907.

SIR,—If Mr. Arnold White suffers under any sense of neglect in that, as he supposes, two of the eight contentions in his letter to you of the 20th ult. have not been entirely and completely refuted in the manner in which the other six have been reduced to ruin, we will hasten to remove the cause of his discontent.

We confess that, in view of your admirable leading article of the same date with that of his letter, after the able communications to your columns, signed "Justitia,"² and after the absolutely crushing exposure of the erroneous nature of his arguments made in the *Standard* of the 24th of last month by "Thirty Years R.N."³ (to which Mr. White has not even attempted to reply), we thought that it would be more courteous in us, and, in fact, kinder, to leave him severely alone. One does not like to trample on the fallen, nor twice to slay the slain.

One of the two points on which Mr. White appears to think that he has still a case is represented by No. 5 of the clauses of the amendment brought forward by us at the annual meeting of the NAVY LEAGUE on May 15.⁴ In this clause we invited the meeting to deplore "the decline of our torpedo flotilla relatively to that of Germany, evidenced by our small destroyer programme, and by the fact that in the last ten years we have laid down but 64 destroyers to 72 laid down by that country." Here is a definite statement of fact,⁵ which Mr. White, unfortunately for himself, traverses. Regarding this statement, your correspondent, "Navy Leaguer," who seems to write with knowledge, has already pointed out that we are

¹ Cp. above, p. 91, n. 2.

² See above, pp. 90, 98.

³ *Standard*, May 24, 1907. See above, pp. 99-101.

⁴ May 15, 1907. Above, pp. 61, *sqq.*

⁵ See above, p. 61 (text and n. 10).

right, and that Mr. White is wrong.¹ The latter, however, declines to admit his error.² Whence, then, are derived the figures to which he takes objection? From the British and German Navy estimates of the last ten years. The figures for each year, as shown by those estimates, were given by "Navy Leaguer" in your issue of Saturday last,³ with a reference to the source of his information. It is hardly worth while to waste your valuable space by quoting them again, and, indeed, to waste time in disputes over indubitable and incontrovertible fact is absurd. Mr. White should look at these estimates and endeavour to understand them. Then he will find that our assertion is correct, and that within the period named "we have laid down but 64 destroyers to 72 laid down by" Germany. If this is not "relative decline," what is it?

Mr. White observes that his sole authority is the Dilke return. If, as appears, he found this insufficient to enlighten him, he would have done well to wait until he had adequate information before rushing into print.

The second of the points on which Mr. White still seems to rely is an alleged confusion by us of paper programmes with actual construction. Here, again, his mistake is palpable, namely, that he has ignored the very terms of the amendment which he challenges. We pointed out that "our programme of naval construction for the current year was smaller than that of a single European Power, viz., 67,000 tons to be laid down by us, as against 71,000 to be laid down by Germany." The words "to be laid down" indicate not something that has been done, but something which is intended to be done. They refer to intention, not to execution. In other words, we compared the respective programmes ("paper programmes," if Mr. White prefers the expression—programmes are usually written on that material) of the British and of the German peoples. Now, will Mr. White kindly state wherein consists the "confusion" in comparing one declaration of national intention with another? To compare actual performance for this year is impossible, for the year is yet young, and the products of it must of necessity be as yet unknown.

But if Mr. White means to convey that Germany is less likely than Britain to fulfil her plans of construction, then past experience proves that he is wrong. Since 1898, the construction of no German ship, the money for which had been voted by the German Reichstag, has been abandoned,⁴ while unhappily so much cannot be said for this country.⁵

Mr. White would have gained either much and, apparently, much-needed information, or else great opportunity for attempting to make corrections, had he been, during the last year or two, a student of the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL. For although the Executive Committee of the League, at the last annual meeting, were obliged to throw overboard and disavow this, which had hitherto been held their "official organ" (because only by that action could they resist the points of our amendment), they have not yet repudiated the figures, taken from Government returns, which their editor, Mr. H. W. Wilson, had given it. As things now stand, these figures,

¹ Above, p. 115. Cp. also below, p. 202.

² He inferentially admitted it later: see below, pp. 127, 202 (text and n. 9).

³ This should have been given as "Friday":—May 31, 1907. See above, pp. 115-57.

⁴ Cp. the N.L.'s official admission, Dec. 9, 1907 (*N.L.J.*, Jan., 1908, p. 6).

⁵ See above, pp. 81, 116, 118-57.

or many of them, must be regarded by orthodox followers of the committee's faith, not as incorrect, but merely as unwelcome. They are, however, it would seem, unknown to Mr. White. Yet our amendment, which he criticises, was purposely based upon them.

In conclusion, we would recall, both to him and to the public, that in addition to the two questions which we have dealt with here, six other points were raised in his letter to you, and that on every one of those points he has been shown in your columns to be mistaken. That he has so far accepted this demonstration in silence is perhaps sufficient proof that he feels reply to be impossible; but if this be not the case, then let us have his answers.

We are, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

HOW THE STANDARD OF STRENGTH IS BEING DISREGARDED.

STANDARD, *June 5, 1907, p. 10, col. 5.*

To the Editor of the STANDARD.

82, Bruntsfield Place, Edinburgh,

June 1, 1907.

SIR,—I shall be glad if you can find space for a few general remarks on the main points involved in the unhappy, but apparently inevitable, discord which has arisen in the NAVY LEAGUE regarding the inadequacy of the latest Government naval estimates.

(1.) The standard of British naval strength formerly advocated by the LEAGUE has gradually been discarded by the Executive, and in the latest annual report the lowest criterion is interpreted as "a fleet equal in numerical strength of battleships to the two next strongest Powers, with at least a 10 per cent. margin of reserve." Even this small advantage does not exist; and our possession of an ample reserve of battleships, also of armoured cruisers, is indispensable for the preservation of our naval supremacy.

(2.) Our alliance with Japan, our *entente* with France, good gunnery, presumably excellent strategy, improved general efficiency of *personnel*, form no factor in our minimum standard, and however valuable as subsidiary to, must never be treated as substitutes for, the requisite shipbuilding programme.

(3.) For many years the League has rightly emphasised our serious deficiency in swift cruisers for protection of our sea-borne trade; yet it is now urged that no agitation should be conducted for construction of such necessary craft.

(4.) Letters written by defenders of the executive exhibit a seemingly deliberate disregard of the recent and rapid growth of the fleet of our most formidable competitor for sea power, viz., the United States, and, of course, also of the political ambition from which this extraordinary increase springs.

(5.) So far from having "ceased to exist," the Russian Navy is still much stronger than it was twenty years ago; and in the event of

an otherwise equal naval contest, might easily turn the scale in favour of our foes.

(6.) For two successive years the output of war vessels by the United States has exceeded ours, and her annual navy estimates have risen to nearly £25,000,000. During the short period in which our naval expenditure has been positively diminished by more than £5,000,000, that of the United States and Germany combined has been enlarged by about £7,000,000! Since 1904 these two nations have launched at least nine first-class battleships, which, collectively, are more valuable than those lost by Russia in her war with Japan.

(7.) The assumption that no British battleships are needed in the Far East is based, partly, at least, on political considerations, the importance of which it does not fall within the province of the First Sea Lord of the Admiralty to determine; and the latest reduction of our naval expenses, according to his own confession, originated with Lord Tweedmouth.¹

(8.) Our squadrons on distant stations, except, perhaps, that of Australia, seem remarkably weak, and our Mediterranean Fleet has been reduced by two fine battleships.

Recording my earnest gratitude to you and Messrs. Wyatt and Horton-Smith for your and their patriotic resistance to prevalent apathy respecting the indubitable decline of our naval ascendancy,

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

HY. TERO.²

June 6, 1907. Mr. Arnold White's fourth letter (of date June 5, 1907) in the *Standard*, June 6, 1907, p. 12, col. 4.³

June 7, 1907. Mr. Arnold White's fifth letter in the *Standard*, June 7, 1907, p. 10, col. 4.³

NAVY LEAGUE.

ACTION OF LEADING LONDON BRANCH.

June 7, 1907. At a specially convened Meeting of the Executive and General Committees of the Third London Branch of the NAVY LEAGUE—Mr. R. L. Stockman and Mr. R. J. Smerdon, sen., in the Chair and Vice-Chair respectively—Mr. Wyatt and Mr. Horton-Smith unanimously elected members of the Executive Committee of the Branch, on the understanding that both such Committees were in entire agreement with them, both as to the real facts of the Naval situation and as to the proper policy to be pursued accordingly by the NAVY LEAGUE.⁴

¹ See above, p. 72; *N.L.J.*, Nov., 1906, p. 275 (quoted above, p. 72); and below, p. 204, n. 3.

² At that time Hon. Sec. Edinburgh Branch N. L., now Hon. Sec. Edinburgh Branch IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE, for whom see, further, below, pp. 227 *sq.*, etc., and Index, *s.v.* his name.

³ Cp. above, p. 91, n. 2.

⁴ Concerning this Branch, see, further, below, pp. 124 *sq.*, 128, 234, 288, 357, 386.

June 8, 1907. "Whittling Down the Navy: An Officer's Indictment."—Article by "A Naval Officer" (in the *Monthly Review*, June, 1907), abstracted in *Standard*, June 8, 1907, p. 8, col. 5.

A CHEAP NAVY.

THE POLICY OF REDUCTION.

PRESENT STRENGTH OF CHANNEL FLEET.

June 9, 1907.

CONTRAST WITH LAST YEAR.

STANDARD, June 10, 1907, p. 7, col. 7.

The assembling of the Channel Fleet at Spithead to do honour to the King and Queen of Denmark upon their arrival brings into striking prominence the immense difference between the Fleet under Admiral Sir A. K. Wilson's command last year and the force given to Lord Charles Beresford. Out of a nominal strength of 14 battleships, there are only eleven at Spithead,¹ the remaining three being unavailable. The first Cruiser Squadron has gone to America.²³ . . .

The Channel Fleet under Admiral Wilson consisted of 67 vessels. The Channel Fleet at present consists of 21 vessels, of which three battleships are out of action.¹

Of the 67 vessels of which the Channel Fleet was composed last year, there were 17 battleships, 6 armoured cruisers, 8 protected cruisers and scouts, and 36 destroyers.

Of the 21 vessels of which the Channel Fleet is composed this year, there are 14 battleships, of which 3 are out of action,¹ 4 armoured cruisers, at present on the other side of the Atlantic,²³ and 3 protected cruisers. There are no scouts and no destroyers directly under Lord Charles Beresford's command. . . .

(Cp., further, the *Standard's* able leading article, June 11, 1907, p. 6, cols. 6-7, on the present constitution of the Channel Fleet;—affirming that the condition of affairs therein described "is a real national danger; and that it is the direct result of the policy of the present Board of Admiralty.")

¹ At about the same date the case was, in fact, even worse than as here described by the *Standard*. For Mr. Lambert, in the House of Commons, June 24, 1907, was forced to admit that from at least 10 to 15 June, 1907, the Channel Fleet was no less than "four battleships short";—(see *Standard*, June 25, 1907, p. 8, col. 2).

"After repeated denials in Parliament, it was" eventually "admitted that the evidence of the signal logs showed that the Channel Fleet was for lengthy periods as many as 4 battleships short of its strength" (of 14), "owing to ships away refitting."—Lieut. Carlyon Bellairs, M.P., "The Impending Naval Crisis," *National Review*, Oct., 1907, at p. 311.

In fact:—"From May 5 to June 23 inclusive" (1907), "upon three occasions, 3 battleships were taken away, and, upon four occasions, 4 battleships. These are the facts, in support of which Mr. Bellairs referred to the evidence of the signal logs of the Fleet."—*Standard*, July 10, 1907 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 5-6.

² See text, and below, pp. 124, 192, 224.

³ And only "returned to these waters" on July 4, 1907. See Lord Tweedmouth, in the House of Lords, July 4, 1907 (*Times*, July 5, 1907, p. 6).

June 15, 1907. Mr. Arnold White's sixth letter in the *Standard*, June 15, 1907, p. 5, cols. 6-7.¹

June 18, 1907. *Standard's* Leading Article, p. 6, cols. 6-7, commencing :—

"The public uneasiness with regard to the state of the Fleet in home waters will hardly be allayed by the impotent official statements made yesterday in reply to questions in the House of Commons. The Channel Fleet at this moment consists of 11 battleships and 3 unarmoured cruisers; the 3 other battleships being in dock,² and the 4 armoured cruisers of the First Cruiser Squadron being at Quebec."³ See also the second paragraph commencing :—"But it will be argued that the Nore division of the Home Fleet must be regarded as instantly ready to combine with the Channel Fleet. We have constantly pointed out that a fleet which is under a separate command, which is not a sea-going fleet, and which is largely manned by boys under training and second-class stokers, is not, never has been, and never can be, instantly ready. . . ."

June 21, 1907. *Standard's* Leading Article, p. 6, cols. 5-6, ending :—"In one short week, despite the reluctance of the Government to yield information, the few admissions wrung from the Parliamentary representatives of the Board of Admiralty constitute in themselves a sufficiently grave indictment."

NAVY LEAGUE COMMITTEE CONDEMNED BY THE LEADING LONDON BRANCH.⁴

Extract from Resolution unanimously passed at a Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Third London Branch of the Navy League⁵ held on the 21st June, 1907 :—

The EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE of the Third London Branch of the Navy League have this day resolved unanimously that the Third London Branch of the Navy League deeply deplore the defeat of the Amendment to the Annual Report

¹ Cp. above, p. 91, n. 2.

² See above, p. 123.

³ See above, p. 123.

⁴ See *Daily Express*, June 24, 1907, p. 6, col. 7; *Daily Graphic*, June 24, 1907, p. 10, col. 4; *Evening Standard and S.J.G.*, June 22, 1907, p. 6, col. 3; *Morning Post*, June 22, 1907, p. 8, col. 3; and *Standard*, June 22, 1907, p. 7, col. 2, and June 25, 1907, p. 9, col. 4.

⁵ For this Branch, see above, pp. 122, etc.

of the Navy League for 1906,¹ moved and seconded at the Annual Meeting of the Navy League on the 15th ult.² by Mr. Wyatt and Mr. Horton-Smith respectively. . . .

And they have further this day resolved unanimously that they pledge themselves by every means in their power to secure the reversal in the near future of the lamentable decision arrived at on the 15th ult.²

A CHEAP NAVY.

NAVY LEAGUE AND THE POLICY OF REDUCTION.

GROWING DISSATISFACTION.

STANDARD, *June 25, 1907, p. 9, col. 4.*

To the Editor of the STANDARD.

4, Paper Buildings, Temple, E.C.,

June 22, 1907.

SIR,—Mr. Arnold White's case for weakening the Navy, as set forth again in his last letter to you, is—in view of the previous criticisms passed upon it—so transparently feeble that it may, perhaps, seem a waste of time once more to point out his fallacies. He stands forward as the advocate and the defender of seven naval reductions, as also of one further economy in regard to the delayed construction of the new naval base at Rosyth.

The first of the reductions in question was the abandonment of various naval stations which had hitherto served as bases for the squadrons which showed the British flag and protected British interests in the respective seas. Some of those squadrons having been withdrawn, and the British flag, as exhibited by them, having disappeared, it becomes clear at once to the economists and strategists of the Cabinet that the naval bases so affected are not wanted. Accordingly, they are "closed down" (the phrase is Mr. White's), and "Thirty Years R.N." has pointed out that "the machinery has been in a great measure removed, and tools, machines, stores, and gear have either been sold locally or removed to England, where a vast quantity suffered the usual fate—sale at auction in his Majesty's dockyards for the proverbial song."³

We drew Mr. White's attention to this crushing fact in a previous letter, but he has, naturally, chosen to ignore it, for the sufficing reason that he cannot answer it. His only attempt at reply is that "arrangements existed for starting up the seven naval stations should emergency arise," and that Halifax and Esquimalt⁴ have been taken over by Canada.

These naval stations, then, are first to be "closed down," and next to be "started up." "Jack-in-the-Box" was nothing to this

¹ Printed above, pp. 60-62.

² May 15, 1907 (above, pp. 62 *sqq.*).

³ See above, pp. 99-100.

⁴ Cp. above, p. 61. n. 5, and below, p. 384.

conception of Mr. White's, of which it is difficult to speak with seriousness. Does he really suppose that naval bases, perhaps half the world away, which have been stripped of their equipment, can be started again in full working order and in unimpaired efficiency at the very moment of the outbreak of a terrific struggle for command of the sea, in which the very existence of this country will be at stake? Is it at such a moment that stores, including ammunition, tools, machinery, and gear are to be transported over the oceans of the globe to the various points whence—with the blessing of Mr. White and of the Executive Committee of the NAVY LEAGUE—they had been carefully withdrawn? Was this withdrawal accomplished for reasons of "strategy," and, if so, will the contemplated restoration in the circumstances referred to be "strategical" also?

Sir, there are few propositions, however ridiculous, which cannot in these days find defenders, but Mr. White's reasoning on this point is so manifestly and so inherently absurd that hardly any thinking individual can for a moment accept it as rational. The truth, of course, is that the plight is so desperate of those who, like Mr. White and the NAVY LEAGUE's committee, contend that every obvious naval reduction is not reduction at all, but merely a measure of "strategy," that they are forced into the rankest absurdities in the attempt to sustain their case. Here is an instance from which there is no getting away. Here are these abandoned naval stations. They are stripped. Their stores are depleted. Does Mr. White imagine that these deficiencies can be made good on the spot? Has he ever been to Esquimalt, as one of us has, and, if so, how comes he to suppose that the colony of British Columbia, with its meagre population and its vast area, can supply out of her own resources the war-like provision required for the sustenance of a naval force? Mr. White speaks of H.M.S. *Dominion* having been recently "repaired" at Bermuda. He is again in error, at least if the word he uses is to carry its customary naval meaning. For the *Dominion* was not "repaired." She was patched, and patched with difficulty, just sufficiently to enable her to make her way home.

Another fact is the reduction of the number of workmen employed in the Royal dockyards from 35,000 men to 27,000. One might have thought that even Mr. White, or the NAVY LEAGUE's Executive Committee, would have been obliged to own that here at least was real diminution. But not at all. The loss of the labour of eight thousand workmen is more than made up, according to Mr. White, by the increased efficiency of those who are left. "Until Sir John Fisher acceded to power," he has written, "idleness, political intrigue, and 'skimp-shanking' were prevalent." This is a mere assertion by Mr. White of his own uncorroborated opinion. If he had been conversant with opinion which is more important, that is to say, with naval opinion, he would have been aware that the belief of the Navy is the precise contrary of his own, and is that the evils named did not prevail largely prior to Sir John Fisher's accession to power, but have prevailed largely since.

Mr. White, again, has argued that the reduction of the *personnel* by 3,000 men (not one thousand, as he wrote) is justified because 150 vessels have been "scrapped"—and not replaced. He now seeks to defend this immense reduction in our naval force by quoting an opinion that "Great Britain with her invincible Navy can strike deadly blows at Germany." No doubt Great Britain could strike those blows if her Navy were indeed invincible (and also if private

property at sea be not rendered immune from capture), but the whole present question is whether our Navy is invincible now, and, if invincible now, how long it will remain so in the near future. The enormous reduction in the strength of the Channel Fleet you have already demonstrated, and the immensely lowered fighting efficiency of the units composing the Home Fleet, and of other units placed in reserve with nucleus crews, can scarcely any longer be disputed.

It would be hardly fair on our part to take up much more of your valuable space by again refuting Mr. White's remaining contentions. We are glad to see that he has apparently now recognised the error into which he fell in challenging our statement—that within the last ten years Britain had laid down but 64 destroyers to 72 laid down by Germany, and in confusing vessels now only classed as torpedo boats with genuine destroyers of largely superior tonnage.¹ At any rate, he makes no attempt to substantiate his previous case on these points.² Perhaps in time he may come to understand that in his other points also he has been equally wrong.

To assist him, however, in reaching this desirable conclusion, we may observe that when he says that "the 'German naval peril' consists entirely of short service ratings," and instances the Kaiser, Admiral von Tirpitz, and Admiral von Koester,³ as favouring such ratings, he is very singularly unfortunate in his argument. For the intention to introduce long service ratings into the German Navy was made known by Admiral von Tirpitz himself (Secretary of State for the Imperial Marine) in an order issued with regard to the training of boys, 850 of whom are to be entered next October. The Berlin correspondent of one of your contemporaries⁴ in commenting upon this news remarked: "The scarcity of trained long service men has long been a source of anxiety to the authorities, and the new regulations are evidently designed to meet this want by training up a body of professional seamen and warrant officers."⁵

Thus, at the very time when the principle of short service is being introduced into the Navy of Britain, the principle of long service is being introduced into the Navy of Germany. And why do we have this contrast? Because in the case of Britain expenditure on the Navy is descending, while in that of Germany it is ascending. Because in Britain the Government desires economy, and in Germany the Government desires increase of naval strength. Because in Britain the BRITISH NAVY LEAGUE, through its committee, champions reduction and stifles criticism, being thus false to its duty and a traitor to its principles, while in Germany the GERMAN NAVY LEAGUE fires the hearts of those to whom it appeals with passionate longing for victory at sea.

We will touch on but one other point, which displays to an exceptional degree the inconsistency of this pleader for our own NAVY LEAGUE's committee. Mr. White says, "I cited the case of Gibraltar to illustrate the danger of an insular Power squandering its resources on buildings and cement when capital ships were all too few." Here at last we have the full admission of the inadequacy of our "capital

¹ Cp. above, pp. 76, 116, and below, pp. 202-3.

² Cp. above, p. 120, n. 2, and below, p. 202 (text and n. 9).

³ For whom, see above, p. 67, n. 2, and below, pp. 434, 443, 453.

⁴ *The Times*.

⁵ *Times*, June 13, 1907, p. 5, col. 3 (cp. also, *Army and Navy Gazette*, Nov. 7, 1908, p. 1070, col. 3).

ships" made by a man who is, at the same time, defending the reduction of the Navy Estimates by £6,000,000 a year!

Is it possible, Sir, for the weakness of the case of the committee of the NAVY LEAGUE to be more clearly exposed than in this instance?

We are happy to say, in conclusion, that a resolution,¹ which was unanimously passed last night² by the committee of the leading London branch of the NAVY LEAGUE,³ is proof that a perception of the true facts is beginning to spread amongst the League's members.

We are, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,
L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

NAVY LEAGUE.—URGENT.

CONCERNING THE PROPOSED REQUISITION⁴ TO THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE NAVY LEAGUE.

CIRCULAR LETTER TO MEMBERS OF THE NAVY LEAGUE.⁵

4 PAPER BUILDINGS,
TEMPLE, LONDON, E.C.

22 June, 1907.

The Navy League was intended to be and upon its official publications is still defined as:—

"A strictly non-party organisation, to urge upon GOVERNMENT and the ELECTORATE the paramount importance of an adequate Navy as the best guarantee of peace."⁶

DEAR SIR (OR MADAM),⁷

We send you herewith a form of Requisition⁴ to the Executive Committee of the Navy League⁸ to call an

¹ Printed (in extract) above, pp. 124 *sq.*

² June 21, 1907.

³ For which, see above, pp. 122, 124 *sq.*, and below, pp., 234, 288, 298;—Now the First London Branch of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE (see below, pp. 288, 298, 357, 386).

⁴ Printed below, pp. 136 *sqq.*

⁵ Reprinted in large part in *Standard*, July 1, 1907, p. 8, col. 4. See also *Daily Express*, July 1, 1907, p. 1, col. 7; *Morning Post*, July 1, 1907, p. 8, col. 5, and (leading article), p. 4, col. 4.

⁶ This definition is further referred to below, p. 225.

⁷ Concerning the use of "Premier" type in this book, see above, p. 52, n. 5.

⁸ For the indefensible attitude adopted by the Executive Committee of the N.L. in regard to the Requisition itself when received, see below, p. 136, n. 4.

Extraordinary General Meeting of the League, for the purpose mentioned in that form.

If, as we venture to hope, your views accord with those expressed in the Requisition, we would beg you to be so kind as to append your signature to it and return it to us at once.

The dominant majority of the Executive Committee, prior to the Annual General Meeting of the League on the 15th May last, sent forms of proxy accompanied by circular letters to the Members of the League, asking for their votes against the Amendment to be moved by us, misrepresenting (as we contend) its effect, and threatening resignation if it were carried—but withholding its terms.

In Clause VIII. of the proposed Resolution referred to in the accompanying Requisition¹ we give the substance of those terms.

We believe that, had these been brought to the cognisance of the Members of the League generally, they would have decisively supported our Amendment. Many letters from Members, stating that their proxies in favour of the Executive Committee had been given under a complete misapprehension, confirm us in this belief.

Every one of the seven instances of Naval Reduction, enumerated in our Amendment, and numbered (1) to (7) inclusive,² was based, purposely, upon information supplied during past months and years by the *Navy League Journal*, which was officially described up to and including April last as "The Official Organ of the Navy League." Every one, again, of these seven points, as also the unwarrantable delay in constructing the new naval base on the East Coast, had been officially made the subject of stricture, severe as it was critical, in the *Navy League Journal* (either in articles signed by its official Editor, Mr. H. W. Wilson, or in the Navy League's own unsigned Editorials) and otherwise.³

The various Members of the Executive Committee who at the General Meeting urged the rejection of our Amendment, championed, defended, and sustained each of the

¹ Below, pp. 136 *seqq.*

² Above, pp. 60 *seqq.*

³ See above, p. 71 (text and n. 1), and *cp.* below, p. 139 (text and nn. 1, 2).

Naval Reductions which their Official Organ had thus condemned. They disowned that Organ. They repudiated responsibility for its articles. They flung overboard its Editor. And the only explanation offered was :—" We must say something," . . . " We must have copy."*¹

Whatever therefore has been written, apparently on behalf of the Navy League, in the *Navy League Journal*, in condemnation of the reductions in our Naval strength referred to in our Amendment, is now recanted and withdrawn. Instead, *those reductions are now stamped with the approval of the Executive Committee of an organisation formed to secure the increase of our power at sea!*

The Committee maintain (to repeat our own description of their attitude given in the public Press²) that all these apparent Naval reductions are not Naval reductions. They range the Navy League by the side of the present Cabinet as its faithful friend and ally. They maintain that not finance, but strategy—not economy, but efficiency—is the sole aim of the Naval policy of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's Government.

If ardour and resolve in sustaining this position, and a complete blindness to facts, could entitle them to the thanks of the 122 Members of the House of Commons who last year petitioned the Prime Minister to cut down Naval expenditure,³ then assuredly the Committee, and through the Committee the League, now deserve them.

* Compare, e.g., the Leading Article, entitled "The Navy League," in *The Naval and Military Record*, May 23, 1907, p. 328, col. 3.

¹ See also the *Standard*, May 16, 1907, p. 7, cols. 4-5, quoted *supra*, pp. 84 sq.

It is the astounding fact that these words in which Admiral Sir E. R. Fremantle threw overboard the *Navy League Journal* have been *entirely omitted* from the supposed verbatim report of his speech therein given. (Cp. above, pp. 81 n. 11, 84 n. 4.)

We have the written authority of the League's president, Mr. Yerburgh (under date May 24, 1907), for the view that the *Journal* was to contain all the speeches in full (i.e., of course, *verbatim*).

We have before us, also, the written statement of the League's secretary, addressed to one of ourselves under date May 28, 1907, that "as a *verbatim* report of the speeches at the Annual Meeting was taken, no proofs will be sent out to speakers for correction."

We have before us the transcript of the snorthand note of the material passages in Admiral Fremantle's speech, made by the Press Association's representative at the Annual Meeting itself.

Why were these material passages of the Admiral's speech withheld from readers of the *N.L.J.*?

² Above, p. 113.

³ June 21, 1906. See above, p. 4.

In the circular letters despatched by the Executive Committee, as mentioned above, our Amendment was characterised as one which "practically amounts to a censure on Sir John Fisher and the Admiralty Administration generally." We utterly deny the truth of this allegation.

We aim our attack not at the servant but at the master, not at the Admiralty but at the Government, of which the Admiralty can but be the instrument.

We say that it is time to end the farce of pretending that measures of *economy* instituted by the Government are measures of *strategy* instituted by the Admiralty.

We point out the indisputable fact that the whole history of Naval administration since Waterloo proves the subservience—the inevitable subservience—of successive Boards of Admiralty to successive Cabinets.

We say that the Navy League was created to resist Naval reductions, not to advocate them, and that, in advocating and defending them at the late General Meeting, the dominant majority of the Executive Committee, in effect, reversed the purposes of the League.

To take a salient instance. We have shown, in the public Press, that when at the General Meeting the Executive Committee endorsed the diminution of the *personnel* of the Navy by 3,000 men, on the ground that 150 vessels had been "scrapped"—"scrapped" and not replaced¹—their argument is simply one for reduction:—"Have fewer ships and then we shall need fewer men"; and we have ventured to suggest² that this should be adopted as the new motto for the Navy League, if and so long as it is to continue under its present auspices.

We note, again, and we would ask you alike in turn to note, the unabashed admission on the part of the Executive Committee in the current number of the *Navy League Journal* (unless this, too, is to be disavowed) that the alteration in the distribution of our Fleet has involved:—"Some sacrifice to our Imperial prestige in distant parts of the world!"

Our case upon this is, that, had the Navy Estimates

¹ Cp. above, p. 65, and below, pp. 268, etc.; and Index, s.v. "Scrapping."

² See above, p. 114.

not been cut down by over £6,000,000 per annum, the desired concentration in home-waters might have been achieved without that sacrifice, since ships could have been built and maintained to take the place of those withdrawn from distant stations (whether withdrawn for "scrapping" or for service at home). We say, therefore, that to cover that admitted sacrifice of Imperial prestige with the much-abused name of strategy is—if we may "call a spade a spade"—obvious nonsense.

The reduction of the Channel Fleet, again, from 67 units to 21 is a matter not of opinion but of fact, and the relegation of units withdrawn therefrom to conditions of inferior efficiency is now an ascertained certainty. To decrease the fighting value of the naval force which guards these shores cannot be "strategy";—though there may be "strategy" of another kind dictating the constantly evasive replies given to questions on this subject in the House of Commons.

What has actually occurred is that the Navy has been cut down and its fighting efficiency reduced *to suit the exigencies of party politics*.

This being so, the Executive Committee of the Navy League have been false to the duty of the League in not resisting such reduction.

Further;—We submit that, in declaring at the General Meeting that the League's work should be mainly, if not solely, "educative," and in suffering its other functions to fall into abeyance, the Executive Committee have violated both the spirit and the letter of the Constitution of the League, still printed on the official pamphlets and leaflets issued by it.¹

That Constitution, there printed, is as follows:—

- "1. This Association shall be called 'THE NAVY LEAGUE.' Its purpose shall be to secure as the primary object of the National Policy, 'The Command of the Sea.'

¹ See further, below, pp. 295 *sq.*, 296 (text and n. 1).

“ 2. The general aims of The Navy League shall be—

- (a) To spread information, showing the vital importance to the British Empire of the Naval supremacy upon which depend its trade, empire, and national existence.
- (b) To call attention to the enormous demands which war would make upon the Navy, and to the fact that the Navy is not strong enough to meet them; and at all times to point out any shortcomings in this respect.¹
- (c) To call attention from time to time to such measures as may be requisite to secure adequate preparation for the maritime defence of the Empire.²
- (d) To urge these matters on public men and, in particular, upon candidates for Parliament.

“ 3. The Navy League shall be absolutely distinct from all party politics.”

The Executive Committee have violated both Clause 1 and Clause 2 of the Constitution by defending and championing naval reductions. They have violated these Clauses again, by restricting the larger part of the League's official work to lantern-lectures in boys' and girls' schools.

Of the first violation we have already spoken. On the second, we need only observe further that, though it is of high importance to train the children of Britain in patriotism and in the principles of sea-power,³ that work is entirely subsidiary to the chief purpose of the League, which

¹ Note that these words “*and at all times to point out any shortcomings in this respect*” are actually emphasised as being of the most especial importance (and are even printed *in italics* for greater prominence) in the Navy League's *Annual Report* for 1906, p. 3. See above, p. 83 n. 2, and below, p. 296 (text and n. 1).

² Admiral Fremantle would seem to have been fighting shy of this clause (c), in his speech at the Annual Meeting of May 15, 1907. See *N.L.J.*, June, 1907, p. 158, col. 1.

³ See above, pp. 79, 81.

is (as expressly in its Constitution declared) to influence National Policy.¹ The national Policy of this country in regard to the Fleet is not inspired or sustained by the school-children to whom the work of the League's sole official lecturer is mainly confined. For many years to come that Policy will be directed, or supported, not by boys now at school, but by men already arrived at maturity. In seeking, therefore, to confine the main function of the League to the education of boys and girls, and in asserting in the current number of the *Navy League Journal* the "paramount" claims of such work,² the Executive Committee abandon the undoubted aim with which the League was founded.

"Its purpose shall be to secure as the primary object of the National Policy, 'The Command of the Sea.'"

That purpose is not *fulfilled* by lantern lectures to school-children.

The considerations already recited make it clear that either the Constitution of the Navy League should be altered, to suit the ideas of those Members of the Executive Committee who are opposed to the original aims of the Navy League as laid down in its Constitution, or else that such Members should be respectfully requested to resign.

We have not suggested that the Committee have intentionally violated Clause 3 of the Constitution; yet we submit that, in attacking and criticising the naval policy of one party and in now upholding and defending naval reduction by another, the Executive Committee have in fact, and most unfortunately, laid the League open, in the eyes of the public, to the charge of meting out greater favour to the one party than to the other. With the cause of the Committee's action we are not concerned.

¹ See above, p. 132, and further, below, on the present page. Cp. also above, pp. 79 text and nn. 8, 9), 81.

² See *N.L.J.*, June, 1907, p. 149.

Whatever the cause, the undoubted effect is the reversal of the purposes of the League.

We appeal, therefore, to all those Members of the League who adhere to the original objects with which the League was formed, and who desire to see it a living force, making for increase and not for decrease of naval strength, to come forward and help us in our difficult struggle, first by signing and returning to us the Requisition, and next by attending, if attendance be in any way possible, the forthcoming Extraordinary General Meeting of the League, the exact date and place of which it does not rest with us to determine.

Should attendance at such Meeting be impossible, we would still ask you now to sign and return to us the Requisition, and also at a later date to sign and return to us the form of proxy which we shall send you in due course.

We are, dear Sir (or Madam),
Yours faithfully,

(Signed) HAROLD FRAZER WYATT,
*(Formerly Navy League Envoy to the
Colonies, and late Hon. Secretary of
the Navy League.)*

(Signed) L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.
*(Hon. Vice-President of the Cambridge
University Branch of the Navy League,
and late Chairman of the Universities
Sub-Committee of the League.)*

Late Members of the Executive Committee of
The Navy League.

NAVY LEAGUE.—URGENT.

REQUISITION^{1 2 3}
TO
THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
OF
THE NAVY LEAGUE⁴

To:—

*The President, the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Executive Committee, the Executive Committee, and the Secretary of:—*⁵

THE NAVY LEAGUE,
13 Victoria Street, Westminster,
London, S.W.

WE, the undersigned, being Members of the Navy League, do hereby in conformity with Article 9 of the Articles of Association of the Navy League (registered under the Companies Acts 1862 to 1900) require you, the Executive Committee of the Navy League, to convene an Extraordinary General Meeting of the same,

To consider and decide upon the following RESOLUTION⁶—consonant with the original aims and objects of the Navy League—which will be moved by Mr. Harold F. WYATT, late Navy League Envoy to the Colonies and late Hon. Secretary of the Navy League, seconded by Mr. L. Graham H. HORTON-SMITH, Hon. Vice-President of the Cambridge University Branch of the Navy League and late Chairman of the Universities Sub-Committee of the Navy League (both late Members of the Executive

¹ Reprinted in large part in *Standard*, July 1, 1907, p. 8, col. 4. See also *Daily Express*, July 1, 1907, p. 1, col. 7.

² Our letter concerning this Requisition is printed above, pp. 128 *sqg.*

³ This Requisition, duly signed, was sent in to the Secretary of the N.L. on June 28, 1907. See below, pp. 142 n. 1, 144, 165 n. 4.

⁴ For the indefensible attitude adopted by the dominant majority of the Executive Committee of the Navy League in regard to this Requisition, see above, p. 128 n. 8, and the pages cited below, p. 142, n. 1.

⁵ Concerning the use of "Premier" type in this book, see above, p. 52 n. 5.

⁶ Moved on July 19, 1907. (See below, pp. 190 *sqg.*)

Committee of the Navy League), and supported by Mr. L. J. MAXSE (late Member of the Executive Committee of the Navy League), as also by Mr. Sam BIRCHAM (of Beech Hill, Woking), Lieut.-General G. W. FORBES, R.M. L.I. (a Vice-President of the Navy League),¹ Mr. John J. JACKSON (an Hon. Vice-President and one of the Original Founders of the Navy League), Mr. F. T. JANE (Author of "Fighting Ships," and "Navy before Party" Parliamentary Candidate for Portsmouth), Mr. Rudyard KIPLING (a Vice-President of the Navy League and President of the Rottingdean Branch of the Navy League), Mr. J. Crosland MALLAM (Hon. Secretary of the Sydenham Branch of the Navy League), Sir Spencer MARYON-WILSON, Bart. (a Vice-President of the Navy League and a Vice-President of the Liverpool Branch of the Navy League), Capt. R. B. NICHOLETTS, R.N. (a Member of the present Executive Committee of the Navy League),² Mr. George T. SHYVERS (Hon. Secretary of the Newcastle Branch of the Navy League), Mr. R. J. SMERDON and Mr. R. L. STOCKMAN (Vice-Chairman and Chairman respectively of the Executive Committee of the Third London Branch of the Navy League), Mr. Henry TERO, of Edinburgh, and other representatives of the Navy League:—

I. That, in the opinion of this Meeting, the late Executive Committee of the Navy League (mainly identical in *personnel* with the present Executive Committee elected on the 15th ult.) declined to carry out the aims and objects of the Navy League, by their refusal to resist the several Naval economies enumerated in the Amendment moved at the Annual General Meeting of the Navy League on the 15th ult., and by their rejection of such Amendment.

II. That, in the opinion of this Meeting, the policy of such Executive Committee, in ceasing to urge increase of naval strength, and in acquiescing in and defending (as at the said General Meeting) the various naval reductions

¹ Since deceased (he died Aug. 19, 1907).

² For whom see below, pp. 165, 166, 180, 207, 281.

referred to in the said Amendment, was and is in direct opposition to the aims of the Navy League as defined in and by its Constitution.

III. That, in particular, the declaration, made at the Annual Meeting by some Members of the late Executive Committee (and emphasised by the present Executive Committee in its unsigned Editorial in the June number of the *Navy League Journal*) that the work of the Navy League should be purely, or mainly, "educative"¹ is at complete variance with Clauses 1 and 2 of the Constitution of the Navy League, namely:—

Clause 1. "This Association shall be called 'THE NAVY LEAGUE.' Its purpose shall be to secure as the primary object of the National Policy, 'The Command of the Sea.'"

Clause 2. "The general aims of The Navy League shall be—

- (a) To spread information, showing the vital importance to the British Empire of the Naval supremacy upon which depend its trade, empire, and national existence.
- (b) To call attention to the enormous demands which war would make upon the Navy, and to the fact that the Navy is not strong enough to meet them; and at all times to point out any shortcomings in this respect.²
- (c) To call attention from time to time to such measures as may be requisite to secure adequate preparation for the maritime defence of the Empire.³
- (d) To urge these matters on public men, and, in particular, upon candidates for Parliament."

IV. That this Meeting disapproves the action of the late Executive Committee at the said General Meeting in

¹ See above, pp. 132, 134.

² See above, pp. 83 n. 2, 133 n. 1.

³ See above, p. 133, text and n. 2.

disavowing the articles in the *Navy League Journal*, either signed by their Official Editor, Mr. H. W. Wilson, or appearing unsigned as Editorials,^{1 2} wherein (in accordance with the principles on which the Navy League was founded) the said naval reductions were resisted and denounced.

V. That, in the opinion of this Meeting, those Members (if any) of the present Executive Committee who still disagree with the aims and objects of the Navy League as defined in and by its Constitution, or, accepting these, still decline to act upon them, and are still unwilling to resist the said naval reductions, should resign their respective seats upon that Committee.

VI. That it be an instruction to the Executive Committee of the Navy League to carry out the aims and objects of the Navy League as defined in and by its Constitution.

VII. That this Meeting resolves that from and after the current year the members of the Executive Committee of the Navy League shall retire by rotation in the proportion of one-fourth of their number in each year,³ retiring according to seniority, provided always that any member of the Executive Committee, so retiring, shall be eligible for re-election after an interval of not less than one year.

VIII. That this Meeting now adopts, as part of this Resolution, the substance of the Amendment moved at the said Annual General Meeting,⁴ and that this Meeting deeply deplores :—

(A) The diminution in our naval strength involved in the reduction of the Navy Estimates from

¹ See above, pp. 61 *sq.* (text and nn.), 71, 78, 82, 89, 129, and cp. below, pp. 143, 158, 161, 205, 294 (and especially p. 161.)

² Etc. ;—see above, pp. 71 (text and nn. 1, 2, 3), and below, p. 161.

³ Cp. above, p. 70.

⁴ Printed above, pp. 60-62.

£36,800,000 for the year 1904-5, to £30,400,000 for the year 1907-8,¹ as evidenced (*inter alia*)² by :—

- (1) The abandonment of naval stations in the West Indies, the Falkland Islands,³ Esquimalt,⁴ and Trincomalee, and the withdrawal of cruisers from very large areas of the world's seas.⁵
- (2) The reduction of the number of workmen in the Royal Dockyards from 35,340 in 1904 to 27,315 in 1907.⁶
- (3) The reduction of the *personnel* of the Navy from 131,000 men in 1904 to 128,000 in 1907.⁷
- (4) The reduction, shown by the abolition of 41 stations and detachments, of the coast-guard,⁸ hitherto consisting of about 350 highly-trained officers and about 4,000 trained and seasoned men.⁹
- (5) The decline of our flotilla of destroyers relatively to that of Germany, evidenced by our small destroyer programme, and by the fact that in the last ten years we have laid down but 64 destroyers to 72 laid down by that country.¹⁰
- (6) The fact that our programme of naval construction for the current year is smaller than that of a single European power, viz., 66,600 tons of battleships, cruisers, and torpedo-craft (or, with the addition of some 3,600 tons for submarines, 70,200 tons) to be laid down by us, as against 71,100 tons to be laid down by Germany.¹¹

¹ See above, p. 61 (text and nn. 1, 2).

² Cp. above, p. 61 n. 3.

³ Cp. above, p. 63 n. 3.

⁴ Cp. above, p. 61 n. 5.

⁵ No. 1.—See above, p. 61 (text and n. 6).

⁶ No. 2.—See above, p. 61 (text and n. 7).

⁷ No. 3.—See above, p. 61 (text and n. 8).

⁸ These figures were subsequently and officially admitted to be even less than the fact. See above, p. 75 n. 8.

⁹ No. 4.—See above, pp. 61 (text and n. 9), 115, and especially also below, p. 404.

¹⁰ No. 5.—See above, p. 6 (text and n. 10).

¹¹ No. 6.—See above, pp. 61 (text and n. 11), 62 (text and nn. 1, 2, 3), 116.

(7) The commencement of the application of the principle of short service to the men of the Fleet, to the certain diminution of its efficiency.¹

(B) The delay in the construction of a new Naval Base on the East Coast.²

IX. That this Meeting further expresses its profound concern, in view of the reduction of the Channel Fleet from 67 units under its late Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sir A. K. Wilson, to 21 units under its present Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Lord Charles Beresford,³ and in view also of the relegation of units withdrawn from this Fleet to conditions of far inferior efficiency either in the Home Fleet (too largely manned with second-class stokers and immature boys) or in ships in reserve with nucleus crews.⁴ And that this Meeting points out the impossibility of believing that this great diminution in the strength of the Channel Fleet, thus previously comprising 67 units concentrated and ready for war, can have been due to "strategy" or to any cause except the desire for economy at all costs.

X. That this Meeting declares its opinion that the essential cause of all these several reductions and economies is not strategy, but finance.

XI. That this Meeting records its belief that the adequacy and efficiency of the British Navy have been weakened by these reductions and economies;

And that this meeting expresses, accordingly, its keen desire that the Navy League throughout the United Kingdom should do its utmost—by every kind of legitimate agitation—to secure the united action of patriotic men of all parties in urging upon Government and upon the

¹ No. 7.—See above, p. 62 (text and n. 4).

² See above, p. 62 (text and n. 5), and below, p. 199, and Index *s.v.* "Rosyth."

³ Cp. above, pp. 44, 48, etc.

⁴ Cp. above, pp. 14, 16, 18, 19 *sqq.*, etc.

Electorate the dangers thereby involved to the security of the British Empire.¹

Signature (*Name in full*) _____

Address _____

Designation _____

Date _____ 1907.

TO MEMBERS OF BOTH HOUSES OF
PARLIAMENT.

June 24, 1907.²

Letter addressed to Members of both Houses of Parliament—excluding only the Nationalist Members of the House of Commons, as the avowed enemies of Great Britain.

4 PAPER BUILDINGS,
TEMPLE, E.C.,
24 June, 1907.

DEAR SIR (OR MY LORD),

As mover and seconder respectively of the Amendment put at the Annual General Meeting of the Navy League on the 15th May, 1907, and as mover and seconder respectively of the substantive Resolution which will be put at the Extraordinary General Meeting of the League to be convened after the due signature of a Requisition for

¹ This Requisition was sent in by us to the League's Secretary on June 28, 1907 (see above, p. 136 n. 3, and below, p. 144), together with a *letter* to him from ourselves saying (*inter alia*):—"We venture to suggest the propriety of the publication of the full terms of the Requisition, or at any rate the full terms of the Resolution therein proposed, in the forthcoming issue of the *N.L.J.*."—Neither the one nor the other was ever printed in the *N.L.J.* (the Committee, presumably, not caring to leave on record in the *N.L.J.* the strength of the case against themselves). Cp. below, p. 190, n. 1. Comment is, of course, needless. We merely state a fact.

We also, in the same letter, requested to be informed, at the earliest opportunity (and we were known to be on the telephone), of the date fixed by the Executive Committee for the Extraordinary General Meeting required by the Requisition. The astonishing neglect of the first elementary principles of fair-play evinced by the dominant majority of the Executive Committee in face of and in regard to this request will be found detailed below, pp. 148 n. 2, 209 nn. 2, 8.

Cp. also, for reference to yet other tactics of the Executive Committee the effect of which (whether designed or not) was to secure victory for themselves (at the expense of national security) at the Extraordinary General Meeting of July 19, 1907:—(A) Below, pp. 162 *sqq.*, 171, 172, 173 *sq.*, 174 *sq.*, 176 *sqq.*, 181, 209 nn. 2, 8 (and, for the belated apology drawn in this regard from the President, Chairman, and Vice-Chairman of the Executive Committee, see below, pp. 183 *sq.*);—(B) Below, pp. 173 *sq.*;—(C) Below, pp. 189 (text and n. 9), 196 n. 3, 209 (text and n. 2); and see also, generally p. 214 nn. 1, 2, p. 217 n. 3.

Concerning the Committee's tactics to secure victory for themselves at the Annual Meeting (May 15, 1907), see:—Above, p. 50 (text and nn. 6, 7, 8, 9).

² Concerning the use of "Premier" type in this book, see above, p. 52 n. 5.

the same by the requisite number of Members of the League, may we respectfully venture to enclose herewith a copy of the Circular letter of the 22nd inst. which we have addressed to Members of the League,¹ as also a copy of the form of the Requisition itself² which accompanied such letter.

The Circular letter will, we think, sufficiently explain what has led up to the present position of affairs in the Navy League itself, whilst in the Requisition will be found the actual terms of the proposed Resolution.

The Navy League is generally, though erroneously, considered to represent a forward Naval Policy, and its acquiescence in, and defence of, present Naval Reductions, have had, and are having, the unfortunate effect of stifling justifiable criticism and of imparting unjustifiable confidence. The duty of the Navy League to the Nation, and the highest interests of the Nation itself—these are the issues at stake.

We earnestly trust that we may be pardoned for venturing to send you the enclosures in question, whilst we hope also that you will be both willing and able to spare time for a careful consideration of the facts therein set forth.

We are,

Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

"INSTANT READINESS FOR WAR."

June 26, 1907. First appearance of even the advance-proofs of the NAVY LEAGUE article ("Instant Readiness for War") for the July (1907) number of the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL.³—*Vide* abstract in the *Standard*, June 26, 1907, p. 9, col. 1.⁴

¹ Printed above, pp. 128 *sqq.*

³ *N.L.J.*, July, 1907, pp. 183-4.

⁴ The attitude of the Fisherite Press upon the article in question may be exemplified by the *Army and Navy Gazette*, June 29, 1907, which regards it as indicating:—"the capitulation of the organisers of the League."

Upon the method of the article's publication and its consequent liability to repudiation the same paper makes shrewd comment. (See below, p. 202 n. 4).

Concerning the article itself see also below, pp. 145 *sq.*, 146 n. 7, 151 *sqq.*, 159, 161 *sq.*, 167 *sq.*, 180, 188 *sq.*, 191 *sqq.*, 198 *sq.*, 202, 213, 215, 230 *sq.*, 234.

² Printed above, pp. 136 *sqq.*

GOVERNMENT REPLIES TO QUESTIONS.

June 28, 1907. *Standard's* Leading Article, p. 6, cols. 5-6, commencing:—"The replies of the Government to questions respecting their naval policy continue to give equal cause for grave misgivings, both in what is admitted and what is withheld . . ."—and giving an admirable *résumé* of the facts.

REQUISITION TO NAVY LEAGUE COMMITTEE

DISPATCHED.

June 28, 1907. The Requisition to the Executive Committee of the NAVY LEAGUE—printed above, pp. 136 *sqq.* (forms of it having been issued for signature, together with the letter of June 22, 1907, printed above, pp. 128 *sqq.*)—duly signed by over the requisite number of members of the League¹—sent in to the League's Secretary—(together with a letter requesting equal conditions for both sides² at the Extraordinary General Meeting³ to be held in pursuance of such Requisition).

THE NATION AND THE NAVY LEAGUE.

To Editors.

4, Paper Buildings, Temple, E.C.,

June 29, 1907.

SIR,—May we hope that you will be able to find space in your columns for the insertion of some part at least of the enclosed Circular Letter⁴ and Requisition?⁵

We ask this in the interests of free criticism, wherein the NAVY LEAGUE might naturally be expected to bear a principal part, and also in view of the great importance of the question at issue, which is, in short, the safety of the country.

We are,

Yours faithfully,

HAROLD FRAZER WYATT,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

June, 1907. "Navy League Policy";—A strong appeal to the NAVY LEAGUE by Mr. F. T. Jane, in favour of the Resolution to be put at the Extraordinary General Meeting of July 19, 1907—being a letter, printed in *N.L.J.*, July, 1907, p. 214, but *screened from observation by a page of advertisements*. See below, pp. 166, 197.

¹ Requisite number of signatures, 50;—Actual number sent in to Executive Committee, 132;—Over 270 more received after the Requisition had been sent in. Total received, Over 400 (see below, p. 165, text and n. 4).

² Cp. above, p. 81 nn. 8, 9, and below, p. 190.

³ July 19, 1907; below, pp. 189 *sqq.*

⁴ Printed above, pp. 128 *sqq.*

⁵ Printed above, pp. 136 *sqq.*

WHAT ABOUT THE NAVY LEAGUE?

MORNING POST, June 29, 1907, p. 8, cols. 5-6.

Extract from Leading Article.

After pointing out that "The German High Sea Fleet consists of 16 battleships, 4 armoured cruisers, 8 small cruisers, and over 40 destroyers, . . . the British Channel Fleet 14 battleships, 4 armoured cruisers, and 3 protected cruisers"—[while, further, to quote the *Observer*, July 7, 1907, p. 6, cols. 2-3, "no destroyers are permanently attached to it" (i.e., to the Channel Fleet), though "29" (misprint for 24)¹ "are temporarily placed at the Admiral's disposal"],^{2 3 4}—the *Morning Post*, June 29, 1907 (leading article), p. 8, cols. 5-6, continues as follows:—

¹ See Mr. L. J. Maxse, *National Review*, July, 1907, p. 686, cited below, n. 2.

² See hereon Mr. L. J. Maxse's incisive article, "What of the Navy?" *National Review*, July, 1907, pp. 685-6 (referred to below, p. 148):—

"Is this the moment to demobilise the British Navy and render it unfit, because unready, for war? At last there are signs that the patriotic persistence of the *Standard*, so splendidly seconded by the *Spectator*, is bearing fruit, and that the eyes of the purblind public, who have refused to see what they did not want to see, are being gradually opened to the danger of the present naval administration. Sir John Fisher, who has done good work in his time, for which he deserves and has received full credit, has grown altogether 'too big for his boots.' He has become dazzled and demoralised by social success, and has been so long on shore as to have forgotten the sea. He has fawned on the great, and has ingratiated himself with the politicians of both parties by anticipating their craving for cheese-paring, while he bamboozles his journalistic dupes by a judicious mixture of swagger and flattery. He is a public danger because he is playing the very devil with the Fleet, and is jeopardising the security of the State, as may be gathered from a striking article in the current number of the *Navy League Journal*, which abundantly justifies those members of the Navy League Committee who recently resigned as a protest against the apathetic acquiescence of the League in the perilous policy of the Admiralty." [Cp. above, pp. 52-54.] [The italics are ours.]

"In this article, 'Instant Readiness for War, the German High Sea Fleet, under the command of Admiralissimo Prince Henry of Prussia, who practically controls the entire naval force of Germany, is cited as a good example of 'an instantly ready fleet.' For the autumn manœuvres it will consist of 16 battleships of two types, 8 of each; 4 armoured cruisers, 8 small cruisers, and 40 or 50 destroyers, all fully manned; while its reserve, available at short notice but not fully manned, comprises several inferior battleships, together with armoured and protected cruisers, as well as 60 destroyers and torpedo-boats. 'The units of the High Sea Fleet are kept as far as possible concentrated, and are constantly manœuvring in company. The other units occasionally go to sea, and in time of peace have reduced crews.' It will be observed that Prince Henry's main fleet is complete in all particulars. It is not composed of battleships and of cruisers alone, but has with it a proportion of torpedo craft. It is thus in a condition to strike at once, and to use its force to the utmost.' As our contemporary significantly observes:

"The public will be in a position to judge whether the various British fleets, or any one of them, are in a position of instant readiness for war by reflecting how far they fulfil the postulated conditions.

"*Note*.—The main British Fleet, the Channel Fleet, consists of the following units, which are all that are permanently under the orders of its Admiral, and has at the present moment the following actual strength, owing to various causes:

	Nominal	Actual	
Battleships	14	10 to 12	Some ships away refitting
Armoured Cruisers	4	0	4 ships in America
Protected Cruisers	3	3	
Destroyers	0	0	

²⁴ Destroyers temporarily attached to Fleet."

³ Writing—s.v. "Admiral of the Atlantic": Germany's great strength in the North Sea,"—*Daily Express*, July 1, 1907, p. 4, col. 6, Mr. Percival A. Hislam thus describes (as at the date of his article) the composition and strength of the German High Sea Fleet (renamed from the "Active Battle Fleet" in order to soothe British susceptibilities):—

"Germany's Fleet in the North Sea" [apart from and in addition to its destroyers] "consists of 16 battleships divided into two homogeneous squadrons, with 3 armoured and 12 protected cruisers. . . . The Active Battle Fleet is described by those who know it as the most war-worthy naval force in the world."

⁴ Speaking in the House of Commons, July 16, 1907, Mr. Lambert stated the compara-

"What about the NAVY LEAGUE?—will exclaim the reader who imagines that body to be a watch dog set to observe the Admiralty. The NAVY LEAGUE at its recent annual meeting¹ anathematised those of its members who expressed uneasiness and proclaimed its mission to be to stand between the Admiralty and its critics. This new mission is an addition to the danger, for the NAVY LEAGUE has become nothing but a soporific to the public doubts. The NAVY LEAGUE is, however, less alert than it might be, and into its *Journal*² has found its way a plain statement of the awkward fact that the two Fleets that are ready in the North Sea stand"³ [in battleships alone³] "as sixteen to fourteen. *The article looks like a tacit apology to the recalcitrant members whose plea⁴ for criticism⁵ of the Admiralty has been silenced.*"⁶ 7

June 29, 1907. Mr. Robert Verburgh's letter (of date June 28, 1907) in the *Times*, June 29, 1907, p. 13, col. 5.⁸

THE NAVY LEAGUE.

TIMES, July 1, 1907.

To the Editor of the TIMES.

4, Paper Buildings, Temple, E.C.,

June 29, 1907.

SIR,—We appeal to your fairness and courtesy to allow us right of reply to the letter from Mr. Verburgh published in your issue of to-day.⁹

tive nominal figures [apart from destroyers, and without any reference to the actual state of readiness of the battleships of the Channel Fleet (as to which see above, pp. 145, n. 2, and cp. also above, p. 123, and below, pp. 224, 262)], to be then as follows:—British Channel Fleet: 14 battleships, 4 armoured cruisers, 3 unarmoured cruisers, 1 repair ship, 1 despatch vessel;—German High Sea Fleet: 16 battleships, 3 armoured cruisers, and 8 unarmoured cruisers. (See *Standard*, July 17, 1907; *Daily Express*, July 17, 1907, p. 1, col. 2.)

¹ May 15, 1907. See above, pp. 60 *sqq.*

² See above, p. 143, and *N.L.J.*, July, 1907, pp. 183-4.

³ Apart from other units, as to which see above, p. 145.

⁴ See above, pp. 52-54, 60 *sqq.*, etc., etc.

⁵ Cp. above, pp. 79, 81, 82, 90, and below, p. 229.

⁶ The italics are ours.

⁷ "The facts are given," continues the *Morning Post* (*ibid.*), "and the moral is gently hinted, wrapped up in a sound strategical essay. We hope it may reach the hands of the Labour Members of Parliament, who have perhaps not been long enough under the influence of the charm of St. Stephen's, which always in the long run deadens the power of perceiving the world outside, to be unable to realise a disagreeable fact. The Labour Members are there to consider the future of the working population. At present that future depends on the chapter of accidents with the odds of sixteen to fourteen against the British workman. The Labour Members, by a little pressure on Lord Tweedmouth, might turn the odds into twenty against sixteen in favour of the British side, and might give enough attention to the matter to guard against any future relapse into unfavourable odds. The great difficulty about all matters of defence is that not half a dozen of the politicians take them seriously, and that three-quarters of the public assumes that they are adequately considered by Governments guided by professional advice. But the system of professional Boards is not meant to guarantee that professional advice is taken. It guarantees nothing but the omnipotence of the Cabinet Minister. So long as it lasts there will be alternate periods of panic and of false security. Meanwhile the odds of seven to six against, for the first fight in a possible struggle for the command of the sea, hardly point to the wisdom of blind confidence in the Admiralty."

⁸ See below, pp. 146 *sqq.*, 171.

⁹ *Times*, June 29, 1907 (above, on this page).

Mr. Yerburgh intimates his opinion that the adoption of the Resolution which we propose to move at an Extraordinary General Meeting of the NAVY LEAGUE would involve the dissolution of that body. As the whole purport of the resolution is merely to force the Executive Committee of the League in future to carry out, in spirit and in letter, the objects with which the League was founded (as these are laid down in and by its Constitution)—that is, to resist, and not to defend, naval reduction, and to urge increase, instead of decrease, of naval strength—it is difficult to see why the result feared by Mr. Yerburgh should accrue. We conceive, on the contrary, that the effect would be the redemption of the NAVY LEAGUE from the state of paralysis and impotence into which it had been plunged. We do not for a moment believe that any large number of the League's members would resign because its fundamental aims were in future to be pursued, instead of being, as lately, neglected or reversed. But, in any case, a living half is better than a dead whole.¹

We, however, on our part, know as a fact, from many letters addressed to ourselves, that the rejection of our proposed Resolution would involve the resignation of no inconsiderable portion of the membership of the League.

We enclose, Sir, copies of the circular letter and of the requisition which we have sent out to the League's members. From these documents you will see that we have already received most influential support from within the League itself, including that of a man whom all lovers of Britain and of the Empire honour—Mr. Rudyard Kipling.

We are, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH

(Late Members of the Executive Committee
of the NAVY LEAGUE).

P.S.—Mr. Yerburgh asks those to whom he directs his appeal to refrain from action until they have seen the Committee's defence.² We in our turn would beg them to exercise a similar restraint until they shall have read our rejoinder to that plea.³

NOTES.

THE NAVY LEAGUE AND SIR JOHN FISHER.

THE OBSERVER, June 30, 1907, p. 6, col. 6.

"At this moment we cannot afford to surrender the smallest advantage. Our fleet is reduced below the proper standard of efficiency, with no better motive than to save money to win votes.

¹ "It is absolutely untrue to state that the carrying of our Resolution on the 19th July" (1907) "will mean the wrecking of the Navy League. What it will mean is the resignation of those members of the Executive Committee who are in sympathy with the reduction of the Navy, and the introduction of new ones who are opposed to it."

Mr. H. F. Wyatt, interview, July 9, 1907, published in *Daily Express*, July 10, 1907, and *Standard*, July 10, 1907.

² See, for it, below, p. 171.

³ See below, p. 171.

The NAVY LEAGUE, the proper guardian of our interests, is lulled to sleep by the siren, Sir John Fisher, and economy seems a weightier argument than patriotism."

July, 1907. "What of the Navy?"—Navy League Dissentients Justified;—Mr. L. J. Maxse in the *National Review*, July, 1907, pp. 685–6 (quoted above, p. 145 nn. 1, 2).

July 1, 1907. Issue of circular, dated July 1, 1907 (together with forms of proxy), from the dominant majority of the Executive Committee of the NAVY LEAGUE.¹²

July 2, 1907. "A Cheap Navy: Government and the Policy of Reduction: Striking Figures";—*Standard*, July 2, 1907, p. 7, col. 5.

LORD TWEEDMOUTH AND HIS WORD OF HONOUR AND THE NAVY LEAGUE REQUISITIONISTS.

MORNING POST, July 2, 1907, p. 6, col. 6.

(*Leading Article*.³)

Lord Tweedmouth, the First Lord of the Admiralty, in the course of a political speech delivered on Saturday made some remarks on the subject of the Navy which ought hardly to pass without a word of comment. He is reported to have said: "As to the Navy, he had to tell them not to believe all the scares that they saw in the newspapers. He could assure them that most of those scares were

¹ Cp. below, p. 162.

² It was not possible for us to issue our forms of proxy until (at the earliest) the 2nd or 3rd July, 1907, for—despite our request for the information at the earliest opportunity (see above, p. 142, n. 1)—it was not until the late afternoon or evening of Monday, July 1, 1907, that, acting under the instructions of the Executive Committee, the secretary wrote to inform us of the date which they had fixed for the Extraordinary General Meeting. They had, however, in the meantime, commenced issuing their own proxies. See below, p. 209 n. 8; and cp. above, p. 142, n. 1.

It is an extraordinary fact that although this (the Committee's first circular letter to Members of the League, asking for proxies in their own favour—a circular letter which was *both incorrect and misleading* (see below, pp. 162 *sqq.*, 171, 172, 173 *sq.*, 174 *sq.*, 177 *sq.*, 181, 185)—only bears date, Monday, July 1, 1907, and was apparently, therefore, only "passed" officially that afternoon, the secretary (acting, presumably, under instructions) had already commenced to issue it (in printed form), together with printed forms of proxy, on the previous day *Sunday*, June 30, 1907 (that to one Member of the League bearing the Sunday postmark:—June 30, 1907, midnight). Cp. also, below, p. 209 n. 8).

The Head Office would seem to have been hard at work also late into Monday night, July 1, 1907, with the resultant effect that the misleading circular must have been in the hands of Members before they could receive our circular letter and proxies (as to which see below, pp. 162 *sqq.*, 170, 209, n. 8)—the copy of the Committee's circular (and form of proxy) which reached one of ourselves bearing the postmark:—"London, Ju." (*i.e.* July) "2. 07; 1.15 a.m."!

See further, generally, above, p. 142 n. 1.

³ See hereon below, pp. 151 *sqq.*

entirely manufactured, and he would give them his word of honour that at that moment the British Fleet was as strong as it ever was, and, as he thought, stronger.¹ He could assure them that it was the view of the Government that they must keep their first line of defence in thorough good efficient order. They must do it with every regard to whatever economy was necessary. But they must not try to pinch—efficiency came first, economy came second.” The interesting passage is that in which Lord Tweedmouth gave his word of honour that at that moment the British Navy was as strong as ever it was. It seems to us that it was irrelevant for Lord Tweedmouth to give his word of honour. For what does that convey? No more than that Lord Tweedmouth sincerely believes the Navy to-day to be as strong as at any previous period. But no one doubts that that is Lord Tweedmouth’s belief. We may even for ourselves go further and express our belief that the present Government has not consciously made any attempt to reduce naval expenditure at the sacrifice of efficiency. Lord Tweedmouth is a civilian who once was a soldier, but who has for many years been a politician. He makes no claim to be a strategist or a master of naval warfare. The Committee known as the Cabinet is entirely composed of men of the same class. They are none of them strategists and none of them masters of naval warfare. Suppose the public to want some guarantee that the Navy is at this moment likely, in the event of any war that might suddenly be sprung on the country, to win its battles. What would be the value of Lord Tweedmouth’s opinion? It would be the opinion of a well-informed, educated man upon a technical question about a business outside of his profession. Suppose a lad to have some ailment requiring surgical treatment, and to have a guardian not a surgeon nor a doctor. Upon the question whether the operation would be dangerous, what would be the value of the guardian’s opinion? Very little. If he had called in the best medical and surgical advice and trusted it, his opinion would have a second-hand value due to that advice. Lord Tweedmouth’s assurance as to the state of the Navy may be taken as equivalent to an announcement that his Naval advisers are satisfied with the present strength of the Navy. In other words, the First Lord is doing what his advisers have suggested. That is the only rational interpretation of Lord Tweedmouth’s peculiarly-worded statement.

The present constitution of the Board of Admiralty² makes the First Sea Lord the adviser of the Government upon questions of strategy and of readiness for war. Accordingly it can be inferred from Lord Tweedmouth’s words that Sir John Fisher is satisfied with the state of the Navy, a conclusion which can surprise no one, for it was pretty well known. Sir John Fisher’s brilliant career has been that of an administrator rather than of a strategist.³ The constitution of the Admiralty does not provide any means by which to secure that the judgment of a trained strategist shall be brought to bear upon strategical problems. There is nothing to prevent a First Sea Lord not himself a great expert in strategy from giving to the

¹ “I will give you my word of honour that at this moment the British Fleet is as strong as ever it was, and, as I think, stronger”;—Lord Tweedmouth to the Liberal Social Club, June 29, 1907. (See *Standard*, July 2, 1907, p. 7. col. 5;—and see further below, pp. 221, 224, n. 6.)

² Cp. above, pp. 1, etc.

³ Cp., further, below, p. 266.

Government such advice as he derives from his own inner consciousness. There is nothing to compel him first to consult a trained strategist and then to embody that strategist's opinion in the advice which he gives to the First Lord. That is a defect in the Admiralty constitution, a defect that has often been pointed out in these columns. The unhappy fact of the present moment is that several of those who are known as naval strategists by no means share the satisfaction expressed by Lord Tweedmouth and apparently by Sir John Fisher with the present state of the Navy. This fact being known to some of those who discuss the state of the Navy in the Press has caused them to express a certain uneasiness. We have ourselves from time to time called attention to phenomena in the Navy which cause anxiety; for example, to the neglect of repairs in many battleships, and to the want of concentration of the fleets, whereby the strongest British Fleet actually at sea under the orders of an Admiral is not so strong in battleships¹ as the German High Sea Fleet. Lord Tweedmouth, sincerely believing the Navy to be stronger than ever, tells his hearers not to believe all the scares they see in the newspapers, and assures them that most of the scares are "entirely manufactured." What he means by manufactured we do not understand. He would not like to be told that the opinion of his own, which he backs with his word of honour, is "entirely manufactured." The question is not whether the Navy to-day is as strong as ever, but whether its strength to-day, measured by a war standard, bears as high a proportion as ever to the strength of other Navies. Measured by that standard, we are not prepared to adopt Lord Tweedmouth's opinion, because a part of the strength of a Navy is the organisation for its strategical direction in war. Now one of the points in which other Navies have made a very great advance during the last twenty years is the organisation of their strategical direction for war, a point in which the British Admiralty has remained almost stationary.

While Lord Tweedmouth has been taking the course, which seems to us never wise on the part of a political Minister, of pledging himself to the accuracy or soundness of his opinion on a professional and therefore technical subject, other students of the subject, some of them in the past certainly as keen as Lord Tweedmouth, have been promulgating a different opinion. Certain members of the NAVY LEAGUE, who think that they were muzzled at the annual meeting, have prepared a requisition calling upon the committee to convene an extraordinary general meeting. They allege some facts hardly consonant at the first blush with Lord Tweedmouth's optimism. They assert that in three years (from 1904-5 to 1907-8) the Navy Estimates have been reduced by more than six million pounds;² that during the same period the *personnel* of the dockyards has been reduced by eight thousand men³ and that of the Navy by three thousand,⁴ and that the programme of naval construction for the present year is smaller than that of another European Power—a single Power.^{5,6} They further point to the great reduction of the number of units of the Channel Fleet, which they put at a drop from sixty-

¹ In battleships alone—apart even from other units. See above, pp. 145 (text and nn. 3, 4), 146 text and n. 3.

² See above, p. 61 (text and nn. 1, 2, 3).

³ See above, p. 61 (text and n. 7).

⁴ See above, p. 61 (text and n. 8).

⁵ Germany.

⁶ See above, pp. 61 *sq.*, and notes thereto.

seven units to twenty-one units.¹ The conveners of this extraordinary general meeting are doing a public service. They are trying to bring back the NAVY LEAGUE from its recent attitude of being a sort of semi-official apologist for the Admiralty to its original position of being a critic of the Admiralty, an independent organisation for promoting free discussion of that perhaps too sacrosanct institution. The manifesto before us quotes from the Constitution of the NAVY LEAGUE a definition of that society's mission: "Its purpose shall be to secure as the primary object of the national policy the command of the sea."² We presume that these words mean that the NAVY LEAGUE is to persuade the people of Great Britain that British policy ought continuously to be directed with a view to Great Britain's obtaining in the event of a war that command of the sea which is the condition of British independence and of the maintenance of a British Empire. A society with so important an aim might with advantage attempt to act rather as a spur than as an opiate to Lord Tweedmouth and his able colleagues. The cause of British policy would perhaps gain rather than lose if the authors of the requisition should succeed in inducing the NAVY LEAGUE to adopt their more active programme.

THE NAVY LEAGUE.

MORNING POST, July 4, 1907, p. 4, col. 1.

To the Editor of the MORNING POST.

4, Paper Buildings, Temple, E.C.,
July 2, 1907.

SIR,—We have to offer you our grateful thanks for your leading article of to-day,³ in which you are good enough to intimate that we are doing a public service in forcing the Executive Committee of the NAVY LEAGUE to convene an extraordinary general meeting. We are happy to say that supported now, as at the League's general meeting on May 15,⁴ by Mr. L. J. Maxse, we have since been granted in addition the sympathy and aid of a large number of the League's members.

The article to appear in this month's number of the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL,⁵ advanced proofs of which have been sent by the League's Committee to the Press,⁶ and upon which you commented on Saturday last,⁷ does indeed afford, as you appear to think, an astonishing vindication of our own action and that of those who have given us their aid in this matter. But the Committee at the late annual meeting of the League so completely repudiated responsibility for all the articles previously published in that JOURNAL in condemnation of the various naval reductions to which our amendment, then moved, referred, that the first question now arising is whether they do accept responsibility for the article which you have made the subject of

¹ See above, p. 141.

² Cp. above, pp. 132, 134, 138.

³ July 27, 1907 (above, pp. 148-150).

⁴ May 15, 1907 (above, pp. 60 *sqq.*).

⁵ *N.L.J.*, July, 1907, pp. 183 *sq.*

⁶ See above, p. 143.

⁷ Saturday, June 29, 1907.

remark.¹ Briefly, is this article to be taken as their own utterance or not?

Assuming for the moment that the Committee do in this case acknowledge paternity,² then the publication by them of this article constitutes instantly a really terrible condemnation of their own attitude during the last eight months, and, further, a demonstration of the impotence of that attitude at the present time. For at the general meeting they rested their whole case against the points enumerated in our amendment on two main contentions: (1) that all matters having even the remotest connection with "strategy" were too sacred for pollution by the amateur breath of NAVY LEAGUE criticism, and (2) that they were on the whole thoroughly satisfied with the state of the Navy, that the safety of this country against the German menace was absolutely assured, and that they had the fullest possible confidence in the present naval administration.

These two contentions, in whole and in part, are now dashed into ruin by the, as yet, unrepudiated article in the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL.³ In that incarnation of a faint and tardy repentance truths are set forth in regard to the dispositions necessary to naval victory. Every truth is a truth of strategy. Every paragraph is a laying down of law upon strategy. The subject of the whole article is strategy. The Committee by this article (until they repudiate it) have eaten their own arguments, urged at the general meeting, and swallowed what they then thought were their own convictions. They have proved to the world that when they resisted our amendment on the ground that it trenched on strategy, and that our naval position was secure, they were wrong to the utmost extent to which it is possible for man to be in error.

But deplorable as was the manner in which, as they now virtually admit, they then misled the NAVY LEAGUE, that fallacious guidance was less lamentable than the effect of their dire mistakes in the past and at the present time. As members of the Committee up to the days immediately preceding the late general meeting we ceaselessly urged on the Board the duty and the need of action and suggested means by which the League might hope to arouse the attention of the country. It was only when we found all such representation vain and every suggestion disregarded, that we at last, and reluctantly, took the course which alone was compatible with our views of duty. But in the meantime the League had become, as you truly observe, "nothing but a soporific to the public doubts." This has been the function to which the policy of the dominant majority of the Committee has degraded the NAVY LEAGUE. And now that at length their appalling error and the danger of the country, previously denied by them, are implicitly admitted, they still resist their plain duty, and still refuse to make the NAVY LEAGUE a living force in the land.

For if the facts are as they now (in this article) allow them to be; if the principle of concentration be vital, and by Britain disregarded; if our Fleets are scattered, and the Fleet which we might have to fight gathered together; if in our case "instant readiness for war" is not a fact but a phrase, then assuredly the acquiescence of the NAVY LEAGUE in these perils, under the misguidance of the majority of the Committee, has been, and is, a betrayal of a national trust. What was needed, and what is needed, is to make determined effort, and to

¹ Cp. above, pp. 64, 71, 130, 138-9, and below, pp. 161, 191, 202, 231, 234.

² Cp. below, pp. 188, 215.

³ *N.L.J.*, July, 1907, pp. 183 *sq.*

strain every nerve, to awaken the country and to procure restoration of national safety. Yet what action does the Committee propose to take? None. They think "the public"—the poor, helpless, inchoate, indifferent "public"—"will be in a position to judge." It is difficult for abandonment of duty to go further than this.

We are, Sir, Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,
L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

DILKE RETURN, 1907. MISLEADING DOCUMENT.¹

TWO-POWER STANDARD NOT BEING MAINTAINED.

July 2, 1907.

July 2, 1907. Dilke Return, 1907, issued. See *s.v.* "Strength of the Navy: 'Dilke Return' of 1907: Figures that Mislead: Gross Inaccuracies"—*Standard*, July 3, 1907, p. 7, cols. 1-2.² Cp. also *Standard*, July 8, 1907, p. 7, col. 1, and August 3, 1908, p. 7, col. 4 (referred to below, p. 438).

"The *Standard*," wrote the *P.M.G.*, July 3, 1907, "brings certain charges against yesterday's 'Return of Fleets,' which will strike everyone by their serious character; in fact, if they are justified, the Return itself can hardly be regarded as anything but a most dangerous and reprehensible imposture. . . . They imply that as an index of our fighting strength at sea the Return of yesterday is much worse than useless—a deception, in fact, which tends to lull the nation into an utterly unwarranted confidence in its preparations for war."

It "is, in spite of its glaring and misleading inaccuracies, a document which directly contradicts the repeated statements of the Government that the Two-Power Standard is being fully maintained."—*Daily Express*, July 4, 1907, p. 1, cols. 2-3. Cp. also *Morning Post*, July 3, 1907, below, p. 154.³

¹ The untrustworthiness of earlier Dilke Returns will be found referred to in the N.L.'s *Annual Report for 1903* (dated May 11, 1904), p. 3; N.L.'s public letter to the press, October, 1904 (*N.L.J.*, November, 1904), referred to (*s.v.* "Misleading Admiralty Returns") in N.L.'s *Annual Report for 1904* (dated May 17, 1905) p. 3; N.L.'s public letter to the press, dated November 12, 1906, and reprinted in *N.L.J.*, December, 1906, p. 321. (Cp. further, below, p. 438).

And yet it was for such another Return that the Secretary of the Navy League had informed one of our supporters that the Navy League was waiting, "as the only official information" whereon that League could act! Cp. below, p. 438 n. 2.

In "Our Naval Supremacy: Is it Assured?" issued by the N.L. in October, 1907 (and printed in *N.L.J.*, October, 1907, pp. 287 *seq.*), the Dilke Return of 1907 is described (*ibid.*, p. 288) in a single and illuminating word:—"Worthless."

² Cp. (*inter alia*) the facts mentioned in the following:—"On July 2 (1907), the annual Dilke Return of Fleets (Great Britain and foreign countries) was issued as a White Paper. On the following day (July 3, 1907), we pointed out that, whereas it is expressly stated in the Return that ships for sale are not included, no fewer than 5 British battleships and 11 British cruisers, the former announced by Mr. Robertson to be for sale during the year, the latter now figured in the Navy List under the heading of 'vessels for sale,' are included;"—Extract from *Standard*, July 8, 1907, p. 7, col. 1 (mentioned in the text); and see further below, p. 438. "We also shewed," continues the *Standard* (*ibid.*), "that the number of British battleships available was not 60 as stated, but 39"—which, it will be observed, is the exact figure substituted by Lord Tweedmouth himself on July 4, 1907 (below, pp. 154, 156, 438, n. 4, and cp. also p. 448, n. 6) for the Dilke Return's figure of 60.

³ See also "A Radical," below, p. 155.

For further comment see note hereto,¹ and for the Discrediting of the Dilke Return (and the substitution thereof of another) by the First Lord himself, on July 4, 1907, see above p. 153, n. 2, below p. 156 (text and n. 4).

THE "DILKE RETURN" OF 1907.

MORNING POST, *July 3, 1907, p. 6, col. 6.*

(*Leading Article.*)

The annual Parliamentary return of the Fleets of Great Britain and foreign countries, known as the Dilke return, has just been published.² It answers with a decided negative the question whether the Admiralty is maintaining the two-Power standard.³ According to this return Great Britain has sixty-five battleships built and building, while the two next naval Powers have between them eighty-one battleships built and building. If armoured cruisers be added to battleships the total for Great Britain is a hundred and three, for the two other Powers a hundred and fourteen, to which must be added nineteen coast defence ships. We give the figures of the return without any change, as the meaning of these figures is and always has been a subject of controversy. Nor do we attach supreme importance to these statistical totals, which never were a decisive evidence of war strength, but at best a rough guide. The two-Power standard itself is only a rough guide. The figures show that it is not maintained from a statistical point of view. In our judgment there are many other matters of about equal importance with numbers. The most important are strategical power and organisation, and tactical doctrine and practice. These are matters which can hardly be rightly estimated except by men of special knowledge and training. But among those best qualified the opinion does not prevail that the British Navy has in these respects any marked advantage over its rivals. In strategical power it is weak and ill-organised, and in tactical matters there is hardly an established doctrine known to and ingrained in all the officers of all the Fleets. Then it has to be remembered that Great Britain's strategical position may require her to have a great superiority of numbers over any hostile combination. The canal from the North Sea to the Baltic gives Germany in certain possible hypotheses the choice of two entrances into the North Sea,⁴ and that would require that a Fleet watching hers should have something like double its strength. It is true that the numbers of the ships of various categories in the British list are very large, so that the statement⁵ that the Navy was never so strong may well be true. But it must be remembered that the other Fleets have also grown, and, as the totals show, more rapidly than the British. The return therefore is not by any means a reassuring document.

¹ For this "inaccurate return of the" British "Navy's fighting strength," see also *Ev. Standard and S.J.G.*, July 3, 1907, p. 12, col. 2.

² July 2, 1907 (see above, p. 153).

³ Cp. also above, p. 153.

⁴ To say nothing of the naval facilities of Germany behind (*i.e.*, to the south of) her East Frisian Islands (below, p. 358).

⁵ Lord Tweedmouth's (above, p. 149).

THE DILKE REPORT.

GERMAN *v.* BRITISH WARSHIP BUILDING.

By "A RADICAL."

STANDARD, July 15, 1907, p. 9, col. 3.

To the Editor of the STANDARD.

Queen Victoria Street, London, E.C.,

(July 8, 1907.¹)

SIR,—The remarks of Sir C. Dilke, in his interview with a *Standard* representative, which you recently published, although interesting, are not very convincing; they conclude, "we must go on steadily building," but this is exactly what the recent Government "return" shows we are not doing, even to the extent of Germany alone, as that Power is at the present time actually building more battleships than we are, viz., eight to our five, and this is the crux of the whole controversy. Even as regards armoured cruisers, we, with all our Colonies and wide-world interests, are only building eight of these vessels to the German four, and in spite of Sir Charles' assertion that "these vessels are probably better than the battleships of other nations," they are certainly not capable of tackling the most powerful battleships now afloat, on account of their armour being inferior to the latter.

Even if we take our battleships and armoured cruisers now building combined, we only get a total of thirteen for Great Britain, against twelve for Germany, which is surely out of all proportion to our relative interests, seeing that Germany has no Colonies worth mentioning and far fewer merchant ships; moreover, even the present Government profess to have accepted the "Two-Power" standard, but as regards these two classes, according to their own figures, we are barely ahead of one Power. The key to naval supremacy is new construction, both in quality and quantity, and to put promptly on the scrap heap all old and inefficient vessels, as it is outrageous that our splendid sailors, second to none, should be expected to fight for their country on antiquated warships. Although a supporter of the Government (in fact, having given them three votes at the last election), I am doubtful of the wisdom of their naval policy, unless they can persuade the other naval Powers to follow suit; although no one more admires the peace-loving qualities of our Premier than myself, I am doubtful if they are understood and appreciated on the Continent.

Our Navy is purely a defensive force, as we lack the large Army which is necessary thoroughly to follow up a naval victory, and this, happily, is our recognised national policy as a peace-loving nation; but even as a naval police force, which it practically is, it should be thoroughly efficient both in numbers and quality in order to keep out possible foreign burglars.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

A RADICAL.

¹ This letter (referred to above, p. 153 n. 2) is inserted here—out of order—for its greater convenience in reference to the Dilke Return, 1907.

July 4, 1907. "Under-Gunned Navy: Britain Inferior to France and Germany";—*Daily Express*, July 4, 1907, p. 1, cols. 2-3 (q.v.).

LORD TWEEDMOUTH DISCREDITING¹ THE DILKE RETURN.

July 4, 1907. Lord Tweedmouth's Discrediting of the Dilke Return of 1907,^{2,3} and substitution therefor of another, July 4, 1907.⁴

POTTERING WITH THE NAVY.

STRONG SPEECH BY MR. L. J. MAXSE.

MORNING POST, July 4, 1907, p. 4, col. 6.5

Speaking at a Unionist meeting at Holmwood yesterday afternoon, Mr. L. J. Maxse pointed out that our politicians were not content to run amok in the British Army, they were also playing ducks and drakes with the British Navy, which was an infinitely more serious business than the country had yet fully realised, though there were welcome signs of an awakening to the peril of our present position. Lord Tweedmouth, the First Lord of the Admiralty, one of the many "flies in amber" in the present Cabinet, had warned the public against accepting newspaper statements as to the condition of our squadrons,⁶ and had publicly pledged his word of honour that at this moment the British Fleet was as strong as, if not stronger than, it ever had been.⁷ Such an assertion from such an authority would have considerable influence but for the lamentable fact that there had never been a moment during the last twenty years at which the First Lord of the Admiralty for the time being, no matter what party he belonged to, was not prepared to pledge his honour that the British Fleet was stronger than it ever had been under any of his predecessors. And yet time after time

¹ See below, n. 3.

² For which see above, pp. 153 *sqq.*, and again below, p. 438.

³ "Lord Tweedmouth discredits and throws overboard the Admiralty Return."—*Morning Post*, July 5, 1907 (leading article), p. 6, col. 4. (Cp. above, p. 153, text and n. 2, and p. 154).

⁴ See report of his speech, *s.v.* "State of the Navy," *Times*, July 5, 1907, p. 6, cols. 1-2;—and see *Daily Express*, July 5, 1907, p. 1, col. 3, *s.v.* "Now you See it and Now you Don't: Fine Admiralty Juggling";—*Standard*, July 5, 1907, p. 7, col. 1, *s.v.*, "Peers and the Navy: Earl Cawdor's View: Charges of the *Standard*: First Lord's Reply," and col. 2, *s.v.* "Strength of the Navy: Two Ministerial Replies, (1) Mr. Robertson, (2) Lord Tweedmouth" (see also thereon *Standard*, July 5, 1907, leading article, p. 6, col. 5; July 8, 1907, p. 7, cols. 1-2; and, leading article, June 25, 1908); and see, further, *Morning Post*, July 5, 1907 (leading article), p. 6, col. 4; and July 8, 1907 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 6-7. See further below, p. 438, n. 3.

⁵ See also report in the *Standard*, July 4, 1907, p. 7, col. 3, *s.v.* "'England in Danger': Mr. L. J. Maxse on the folly of starving the Navy."

⁶ See report of Lord Tweedmouth's speech, *Times*, July 5, 1907, p. 6, and see *Standard*, July 5, 1907, p. 7, col. 1.

⁷ June 29, 1907. See above, p. 149.

these same Ministers had been subsequently compelled to confess that our Navy was so inadequate as to endanger the safety of the State, and then urgently appealed to Parliament to vote further battleships. The immediate danger did not lie so much in the lack of ships as in certain lamentable and inexplicable changes which had been recently introduced into our Navy, with the effect of reducing our sea-going squadrons and of making the Navy as a whole practically unready for war, with the sole object, so far as could be ascertained, of scraping up a surplus for the Chancellor of the Exchequer to squander among his political friends. Past experience taught them that every £ now stolen from the Navy would cost the country at least £100 during the next panic, and if the politicians wanted to engineer a panic they were certainly going the right way to work. Our Channel Fleet, under Lord Charles Beresford, which was the greatest of our sea-going squadrons and the one upon which the security of these islands depended, had been reduced during the last few months from 67 vessels to 21.¹ In other words, it was less than one-third of what it had been in numbers under Admiral Wilson. Meanwhile, if they looked across the North Sea they would see that the rival to the Channel Fleet, and the only serious menace to this country, the great German High-Sea Fleet, under the command of Prince Henry of Prussia, had been augmented to such a point that in the event of war—and war was liable to come like a thief in the night²—Lord Charles Beresford would find himself completely outclassed in every category of fighting vessel. Battles depended largely upon battleships. Prince Henry's squadron contained several more battleships, probably six or seven, than those under Lord Charles Beresford's command. Englishmen were entitled to expect much from their sailors, who had never disappointed them, but they had no right to expect miracles, and in the event of a surprise (and most disasters were due to the surprise of an unready nation by a ready nation²) our Fleet would fight at a deplorable disadvantage. Indeed, our Channel Squadron might have to fall back and await reinforcements—a fairly humiliating position for the leading Sea Power and a dangerous proceeding, because with a few days' command of the sea the Germans could assemble and land an army of 100,000 in this country. The speaker concluded: "England is in danger at the present time because she is placing a tremendous temptation before an ambitious and aggressive neighbour who has made it obvious to the whole world, except to British statesmen, that she intends to challenge our naval supremacy on the first favourable opportunity."

¹ Cp. above, pp. 44, 48 (text and nn. 1, 2).

² In "that excellent work of Lieut.-Colonel (now General) Maurice, *Hostilities Without Declaration of War*" 1700-1870 (publ. 1883)—which "has attained to an almost classical distinction"—"it is pointed out by General Maurice that in the 171 years from 1700 to 1870 inclusive, less than 10 instances have occurred where a 'declaration of war' has been issued prior to the opening of hostilities. In 41 of the cases where no declaration was made, 'the manifest motive (in several instances the actually avowed motive) has been to secure advantages by the suddenness of the movement and the consequent surprise of an unprepared enemy. . . . These surprises have in the latest' (the 19th) 'century followed one another with greater rapidity than ever before.'"—Mr. Percival A. Hislam, *The Admiralty of the Atlantic*, 1908, pp. 140, 141.

Cp. also Lord Lovat, Lord Roberts, and Lord Lansdowne, in the House of Lords, February 18, 1907 (*N.L.J.*, March, 1907, p. 58), above, p. 47.

THE NAVY LEAGUE.

SPECTATOR, July 6, 1907, pp. 16 sq.

To the Editor of the SPECTATOR.

4, Paper Buildings, Temple, E.C.

July, 1907.

SIR,—Those of your readers—and they must be many—who are not hardened optimists in their view of the present naval position of this country, will, we believe, be interested to know something of the nature of the case which is to be preferred against the majority of the Executive Committee of the NAVY LEAGUE at an extraordinary general meeting to be held on the 19th inst.¹ This case is embodied in a resolution then to be brought forward by us,² and in a circular-letter which we have despatched to the League's members.³ Briefly, our case is that the Committee of the League have violated its constitution and reversed its objects by advocating, championing, and defending naval reductions, which the League was founded to resist. We say that the Committee persist in imputing to reasons of "strategy" measures obviously prompted by reasons of finance. We maintain, further, that in restricting the main part of the League's work to lantern-lecturing in boys' and girls' schools, and in proclaiming that they regard such educational work as the "paramount" object of the League, the Committee again altogether deny and defy the League's constitution (as printed in its official publication), the first article of which runs as follows:—"This Association shall be called the NAVY LEAGUE. Its purpose shall be to secure as the primary object of the National Policy, the command of the sea."

At the annual meeting of the League on May 15 last⁴ we respectively moved and seconded an Amendment, supported by Mr. L. J. Maxse, in which we recited seven specific naval reductions,⁵ and a gross instance of neglect—namely, the delay in the construction of a new naval base on the East Coast.⁶ The members of the Executive Committee who spoke at this meeting upheld and sustained all these reductions. They constituted themselves the champions of retrenchment. They attributed every reduction to "strategy" and desire for increase in efficiency, not to economy and to the mind of a Government which does not believe seriously in the possibility of war. But the Committee were in a difficulty. For every one of our seven points had been purposely based on their own organ, the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL, and had been made the subject of severe and critical stricture in unsigned editorials, or in articles signed by its official editor, Mr. H. W. Wilson. Therefore they threw over the *Journal*, disowned the editor, and repudiated all responsibility for his articles. The position was, and is, that the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL had condemned all these seven naval reductions, and that the Committee have approved them. But at the annual meeting the Committee went beyond this point. In order to resist our amendment, they declared their full satisfaction with the present state of the Navy. They alleged by the mouth of their official spokesman that the safety of the country was absolutely assured, and they

¹ July 19, 1907.² Printed above, pp. 128 sqq.³ See above, pp. 61 sq.⁴ Printed above, pp. 137 sqq.⁵ May 15, 1907. Above, pp. 60 sqq.⁶ See above, p. 62.

intimated that their confidence in existing naval arrangements was complete.

Like a dream, or a dissolving view, all this loud affirmation has become void and vain. To the minds of the Committee appears to have penetrated some dim suspicion of their own terrible mistake. For a few days ago they sent to the Press the advance proofs of an article in the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL violating in almost every line their own precept by dealing exclusively with strategical considerations, and having appended to it a statement of our present naval dispositions, which showed that these were at complete variance with every strategical law. Thus, unless and until this article of theirs is repudiated by them, the very foundation of their case against us is shattered into dust. Questions of strategy were at all costs to be avoided, and they have dealt with them. The perfection of our naval dispositions was to be an article of faith—and their article creates the inference that those dispositions are monstrous. But the deplorable nature of their policy is shown even in the article itself. For they create, indeed, this inference, but they dare neither to draw it nor to act upon it. "The public" is to "judge"! That public which is wrapped in a sleep of indifference as in a sleep of death, that public which the NAVY LEAGUE exists to rouse, is to rouse itself, to satisfy itself, to express itself—to do everything, in short, that it never has done, and, in the nature of things, never can do without inspiration and guidance.

Sir, we have here at once confession of error and abnegation of function. The Committee confess by implication that they lamentably misled their audience at the NAVY LEAGUE'S meeting, but they refuse now to go to work to repair, so far as may be, their grievous failure. We have urged the constraining need of striving, by every kind of legitimate agitation, to unite patriotic men of both parties in an effort to redeem the country from its present peril. The Committee would rather dissolve their body than fulfil the duty which both they and the NAVY LEAGUE were appointed to discharge.

We are, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

[We have quoted elsewhere from the article in the July NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL to which allusion is made above. That article is, in effect, a most damaging indictment of present Admiralty policy. It is difficult to reconcile its publication with resistance to the demand for stronger action put forward by Mr. Wyatt and Mr. Horton-Smith.—Ed. *Spectator*.¹]

¹ See further, the *Spectator*'s own, and remarkable, article, on the unreadiness of the British Fleet, July 6, 1907, pp. 4-5, entitled "A Position of Peril" (abstracted in the *Daily Express*, July 6, 1907, and in *Standard*, July 6, 1907, p. 7, col. 2), and commencing:—"Our naval position to-day is such that if we received from Germany, or any Power equal to her in strength at sea, a sudden declaration of war, followed by immediate action, the situation would be one of grave peril";—while on p. 3 (*ibid.*) the *Spectator* wrote:—

"We are convinced that the *Standard* and *Morning Post*, and other newspapers which have of late drawn attention to the weakness of our naval force in home waters, have been actuated by nothing but a sense of public duty. For ourselves, we claim that the existing state of affairs amply justifies the demand which we made last autumn" (and *cp.* above, p. 44) "for a careful and impartial inquiry into naval policy and administration as a whole. If the Cabinet are wise, they will insist upon such an inquiry."

July 5, 1907. Letter of the secretary of the NAVY LEAGUE (of date July 4, 1907) in the *Morning Post*, July 5, 1907, p. 8, col. 7.¹

THE NAVY LEAGUE AND ITS NEGLECTED DUTY.

MORNING POST, July 9, 1907, p. 9, col. 3.

To the Editor of the MORNING POST.

4, Paper Buildings, Temple, E.C.,
July 6, 1907.

SIR,—In the letter which you publish to-day² the secretary of the NAVY LEAGUE commits himself to the assertion that at the late annual general meeting³ the Committee did not repudiate responsibility for the articles previously published in the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL, which had condemned “the various naval reductions to which our amendment, then moved, referred.”

He then immediately quotes an extract from the speech made on that occasion by Sir Frederick Pollock, which does in express terms repudiate that responsibility, as follows: “I have never understood that every member of the LEAGUE or the Executive Committee [the italics are ours] was bound by every expression of opinion by the editor, or by any expression of opinion that was not signed by the Committee as a body.”

The articles in question were not signed “by the Committee as a body,” and if these words of Sir Frederick Pollock’s do not constitute repudiation of the Committee’s responsibility for those articles,⁴ what words, in the name of wonder, could constitute it? In the history of controversy has there ever been any more extraordinary incident than this? Here is the official secretary of the NAVY LEAGUE, presumably possessed of the gift of reason, writing to you to assert that in alleging repudiation of responsibility by the Committee we were guilty of “a complete mis-statement of fact,” and then himself instantly quoting words which demonstrate our exact accuracy! Confusion of thought could no further go, and since we are bound to assume that the Committee authorised his letter, it furnishes an astonishing revelation of the nature of their mental processes. We now publicly ask them whether they stand by or repudiate their secretary’s letter?

If they stand by it, what possible value can afterwards attach to any assertion or contradiction of theirs, since their incapacity to understand the plainest use of the English language will have been demonstrated to the world. Do they still charge us, in face of Sir Frederick Pollock’s quoted words, with “a complete mis-statement of fact,” in this particular, or do they not; and if they do not, will they publicly apologise for the monstrous charge made?

Sir, we appeal to you in this matter, as one in which honour and fair play are concerned. If the Committee abstain from reply to

¹ See below, this page *sqq.*

² “To-day” should have been “Yesterday”:—July 5, 1907.

³ May 15, 1907; above, pp. 60 *sqq.*

⁴ Cp. below, p. 294.

this letter, a copy of which we shall send to the Chairman, Mr. Seymour-Trower, or if in their reply they attempt to evade the point by confusing the issue, then we ask you publicly to judge between us.

Apart from this, Sir Frederick Pollock's repudiation of the Committee's general responsibility for matter appearing in their JOURNAL was large and generous indeed. He is the author of a new theory in this regard, to which we have to thank the League's Secretary for having, unwittingly, drawn public attention. For hitherto it has been generally held that the Committee of any organisation were at least responsible for unsigned editorials appearing in a journal published by themselves and paid for out of the funds of that organisation. The statement printed in the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL that "the NAVY LEAGUE do not hold themselves responsible for opinions expressed in signed or communicated articles" hitherto appeared to convey the certain implication that the League did hold itself responsible for its own unsigned leaders.¹ But Sir Frederick Pollock lays it down that the Executive Committee, who represent the LEAGUE, are not bound by any expression of opinion "not signed by the Committee as a body." This is a new and astonishing doctrine indeed. Here go overboard at one leap all the editorials which have appeared in the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL since its inception, except those, if any, so signed by the Committee. We doubt whether one such can be found. But, according to Sir Frederick Pollock's reading, all other utterances can go into the dust-bin, so far as the Committee are concerned, for they refuse to be responsible for them. This being the case, what is the use of the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL?

We are, however, glad to learn from the secretary's letter that the article in the JOURNAL,² the advance proofs of which were sent to you,³ has some prospect of not being repudiated by its apparent sponsors.⁴ We have already pointed out that in this article the entire gist and essence of the Committee's case against ourselves have been abandoned. Their secretary declares that this article was printed before our circular letter⁵ was sent out to members of the League. Upon this we have only to observe:—(1) that the mover of the resolution to be brought forward by us on the 19th inst.⁶ published an analysis of the Admiralty memorandum which made known the proposed redistribution as long ago as November 2 last,⁷ in which analysis he pointed out the inevitable reduction in fighting strength involved in the new scheme;—(2) that from that time forward we both repeatedly urged on the Committee of the League the need of action, and suggested means of rousing the country to a sense of the danger incurred⁸;—(3) that on the 27th of last May⁹ was published a letter of ours¹⁰ drawing specific attention to the reduction of the Channel Fleet¹¹;—and (4) that the date of our above-mentioned circular letter was June 22¹²;—in other words, four days earlier than

¹ Cp. above, p. 82.

² *N.L.J.*, July, 1907, pp. 183 sq.

³ See above, p. 143.

⁴ Cp. above, p. 143 n. 4, and below, p. 202 (text and n. 4).

⁵ See below, note 12.

⁶ July 19, 1907; below, pp. 189 sqq.

⁷ Nov. 2, 1906. See above, pp. 18-21

⁸ See above, pp. 15 sqq., 21, 22, 40 sqq., 49 sq.

⁹ May 27, 1907.

¹⁰ Of date May 25, 1907 (*Standard*, May 27, 1907); above, pp. 102-4.

¹¹ See above, p. 103.

¹² June 22, 1907. See above, pp. 128 sqq.

the earliest insertion in the London Press of the advance proofs of the article, which only appeared officially in the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL on the 3rd or 4th of July.¹

We are, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

July 8, 1907. Concerning the Resolution² to be submitted by Mr. Wyatt and Mr. Horton-Smith at the Extraordinary General Meeting of the NAVY LEAGUE on July 19, 1907; and on the state of the Navy generally;—*Standard*, July 8, 1907 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 5-6, concluding:—

"So long as the Channel Fleet remains at a strength less than one-third of what Admiral Wilson believed to be necessary for the defence of the Home waters, and so long as the Home Fleet continues to be in fact a Reserve Fleet,³ we shall persist in affirming that the present administration is responsible for the deliberate imperilling of the national security. When that danger is removed there are others, hardly less serious, which must be dealt with."

NAVY LEAGUE.—URGENT.

EXTRAORDINARY GENERAL MEETING OF THE NAVY LEAGUE.

4 PAPER BUILDINGS,

TEMPLE, LONDON, E.C.,

9 July, 1907.

DEAR SIR (OR MADAM),⁴

THE NAVY LEAGUE AND ITS NEGLECTED DUTY.

The dominant majority of the Executive Committee of the Navy League have issued to the League's members a circular letter, under date the 1st inst.,⁵ in which they give a list of the members of the Committee who, as they allege, "ask for your renewed confidence and support" as against the Resolution to be brought forward by ourselves at the Extraordinary General Meeting on the 19th inst.

¹ July, 1907.

² Printed above, pp. 136 *seqq.*

³ Cp. above, pp. 13 n. 1, etc.

⁴ Concerning the use of "Premier" type in this book, see above, p. 52 n. 5.

⁵ July 1, 1907 (above, p. 148).

It is added that, should our Resolution be carried, the Committee will resign.

It is the almost incredible fact that, in the case of at least four members of the Committee whose names are thus used in this connection, this use has been made **WITHOUT THEIR KNOWLEDGE**, and **WITHOUT THEIR CONSENT** or **AUTHORITY** having been obtained, and in two cases at least in defiance of their known and avowed sympathies with the points enumerated in our Resolution.¹

The names of these four members are:—The EARL OF WILTON,² Dr. G. R. PARKIN, C.M.G., LL.D.,³ Mr. ROBERT WEATHERBURN,⁴ and Mr. H. W. WILSON (the Editor of the *Navy League Journal*).⁵

Having, therefore, appealed to the League's members for, and doubtless procured, proxies upon the strength of their incorrect and misleading statement, the dominant majority of the Committee are now bound, **by every law of honour**, to return to those members, who gave them, all proxies so obtained, and, if they still wish to ask for proxies, to ask for them upon a fresh and true statement of the actual facts.

Their incorrect list also includes the names of two paid officials of the League, the Lecturer and the Secretary. We ask business men whether it is possible for members of a Committee to commit a grosser breach of common practice, founded upon common sense, than thus to insert the names of two paid servants of that Committee (we use the term in no unkindly or offensive sense) in a manifesto, issued by the dominant majority of it, asking for votes in their favour at the meeting at which the conduct of the affairs of the League by that majority is to be called in question. (Is such insertion quite fair even to those gentlemen themselves?)

¹ See also below, pp. 171, 172, 173, 175, 181.

² Below, pp. 164, 172, 173, 175, 177, 181.

³ Below, pp. 164, 172, 173, 175, 177, 181.

⁴ Above, p. 90 (text and n. 3), 98 (text and n. 1), and below, pp. 165, 171, 172, 173, 175, 177, 181, 281, 319.

⁵ Above, pp. 60-62 (and notes thereto), 64, 70 *sqq.*, etc., and below, pp. 171, 172, 173, 175, 177, 181, 368 *sq.*, 376, 393, 396.

Be it recalled, further, that on the occasion of the Annual Meeting on May 15th last,¹ the Committee followed the astounding course of issuing circulars asking for votes against the Amendment then to be moved by us, while refusing (despite our emphatic protest) to state what the terms of our Amendment were.

To us it seems scarcely possible—and this quite apart from the merits of the Naval controversy—that the members of the Navy League can really desire to give “renewed confidence and support” to the dominant majority of a Committee **capable of making successive errors of this nature.**²

If you have not this desire, but if you yet chance to have given your proxy to the nominees of that dominant majority, then we appeal to you to **WITHDRAW THAT PROXY AT ONCE.** This you can effect by a line addressed to the Secretary of the Navy League (as their agent), at 13, Victoria Street, Westminster, S.W.; and we should be most grateful if you could at the same time inform us by postcard of your action in this respect.

The dominant majority of the Committee use, as their principal argument against our proposed Resolution, the threat of resignation.

Under the circumstances such resignation appears to us to be urgently called for in the interests of the Navy League.

In such event, we venture to think that we shall be prepared to furnish those members of the Committee who will not be resigning with a proposed list of new colleagues who, together with themselves, will command the confidence both of the League and of the public.

For it must be remembered that (including ourselves) nine³ past or present members of the Executive Committee are in substantial agreement with the views expressed in our Resolution, the seven,⁴ additional to ourselves, being:—The EARL OF WILTON, Mr. HENRY ALLHUSEN,

¹ May 15, 1907.

² Cp. above, p. 142 n. 1, para. 4.

³ The number “nine” should have been “ten,” including Mr. John J. Jackson, for whom see the *Standard*, May 21st, 1907 (*supra*, pp. 93 *sq.*). See also in the *Standard*, July 27, 1907, p. 5, col. 4.

⁴ This should have been “eight”: see preceding note.

late M.P.¹ Mr. L. J. MAXSE, Captain R. B. NICHOLETTS, R.N., Mr. ROBERT WEATHERBURN, Mr. SPENSER WILKINSON, and Mr. H. W. WILSON, the Editor of the *Navy League Journal*, while a tenth² Dr. G. R. PARKIN, writes to us on the 9th inst.³:—"I knew nothing about the statement that I was one of those who would resign if your Resolution were carried. As a matter of fact, I would have no thought of resigning on that account."

Our form of Requisition for the Extraordinary General Meeting has now been signed by **over 400 Members of the Navy League**,⁴ including two well-known Admirals and a number of other Naval Officers whose names we do not feel at liberty to give.

Amongst Members of the League, and others, who have, in fact, indicated sympathy, either by signing the Requisition, or otherwise, are:—

LORD ARMSTRONG, Viscount BARRINGTON, Lord KESTVEN, The Earl of ORFORD, Viscount SIDMOUTH, Mr. HENRY ALLHUSEN, late M.P., Mr. W. H. ALLEN, Mr. W. H. ALLHUSEN, Mr. A. BALDWIN, M.P., Mr. SAM BIRCHAM, The Hon. CHARLES BRAND, Sir T. LAUDER BRUNTON, Vice-President of the Royal Society, Mr. VALENTINE CHIROL, Rear-Admiral A. C. CLARKE, C.M.G., R.N., Mr. WILLIAM BOYD DAWKINS, D.Sc., F.R.S., Mr. R. EVAN DAY, F.R.A.S., Capt. J. BARGRAVE DEANE, Major-General W. D. DE VITRÉ, Colonel F. A. DICKINS, Sir J. WHITTAKER ELLIS, Bart., late M.P., and late Lord Mayor of London, Sir E. H. ELTON, Bart., Sir GEORGE ERRINGTON, Bart., Lieut-General G. W. FORBES, R.M.L.I.⁵ Colonel N. P. FOWELL, General Sir W. A. GIB, K.C.B., Colonel A. J. GOLDIE, Mr. HAMILTON W. GORDON (late Judge of the High Court, Calcutta), Dr. J. C. W. GRAHAM, M.A., Dr. S. C. GRIFFITH, M.D., Major J. E. GRIMBLE GROVES, Mr.

¹ Mr. J. J. Jackson's name should have been added here. See above, p. 164 n. 3.

² This should have been "eleventh": see preceding note.

³ July 9, 1907 (cp. below, p. 171).

⁴ To avoid delay it was sent in on June 28, 1907, with the first 132 signature received. Cp. above, pp. (135 n. 3), 142 n. 1, 144 (text and n. 1).

⁵ See above, p. 137 n. 1.

WM. GRIMBLE GROVES, Mrs. TRITTON GURNEY (Chairman of the Committee of the Women's Branch of the League), Mr. H. A. GWYNNE, Dr. PERCIVAL H.-S. HARTLEY, M.V.O., M.D., F.R.C.P., The Hon. CLAUDE G. D. HAY, M.P., Colonel J. M. HEATH, C.M.G., Mr. W. F. HEATH, M.D., F.R.C.S., Colonel ALFRED HEATHCOTE, R.E., Mr. PERCIVAL A. HISLAM,¹ The Lady CHARLOTTE HOBART-HAMPDEN, Mr. G. W. HOLTZAPFFEL, Lieut. LIONEL HORDERN, R.N., Mr. GEORGE HUBBARD, Mr. ROWLAND HUNT, M.P., Ex-Lord Provost Mr. WM. HUNTER, Mr. EDWARD HUTH, Mr. B. C. A. COLVILLE HYDE, Mr. JOHN J. JACKSON (one of the Original Founders of the Navy League), Mr. M. C. JAMES, M.I.N.A., Mr. F. T. JANE,² Mr. ERNEST JARDINE, J.P., Col. E. R. JOHNSON, Surg.-Major BERNARD KENDAL, Sir HENRY KIMBER, Bart., M.P., Mr. RUDYARD KIPLING, Col. H. J. LAWRENCE, Dr. T. M. MAGUIRE, LL.D., Mr. T. CROSLAND MALLAM, The Rev. C. D. B. MARSHAM, Sir SPENCER MARYON-WILSON, Bart., Col. F. I. MAXSE, C.B., Coldstream Guards, Mr. L. J. MAXSE,³ Sir J. D. MILBURN, Bart.,⁴ Sir HENRY MILES, Bart., Mr. H. F. MORLAND-SIMPSON, Sir C. W. MORRISON-BELL, Bart., Col. L. G. MORTIMER, Mr. EDWARD NETTLESHIP, F.R.C.S., Capt. R. B. NICHOLETT, R.N.,⁵ Surg.-Major-General H. F. PATERSON, Lady SEELEY, Miss FRANCES P. SEELEY, Mr. G. T. SHYVERS, Mr. R. J. SMERDON and Mr. R. L. STOCKMAN (Vice-Chairman and Chairman of the leading London Branch of the Navy League), Mr. A. D. STEEL-MAITLAND, Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford, Mr. J. ST. LOE STRACHEY, Sir TRISTRAM T. TEMPEST, Bart., Mr. H. TERO, Mr. FABIAN WARE, Mr. W. F. W. WELLS, I.C.S., Mr. CHARLES WHIBLEY, and Mr. SPENSER WILKINSON.

Admiral Sir ALGERNON DE HORSEY, K.C.B., who was not present at the Annual Meeting, writes to us under date the 28th *ult.*,⁶ that "although voting against it for

* Mr. Frederick T. Jane is the well-known Author of "*Fighting Ships*." A letter from him will be found on p. 214 of the current (July, 1907) number of the *Navy League Journal*. It is screened from observation by a page of advertisements.

¹ Author of "The Admiralty of the Atlantic."

² See also above, p. 118, and below, pp. 197 *sq.*, etc.

³ See above, pp. 80 *sq.*, and below, pp. 198 *sqq.*, etc.

⁵ See above, pp. 137, 165, and below, pp. 180, 207, 281.

⁴ Since deceased.

⁶ June 28, 1907.

“specified reasons, I nevertheless agreed with every word of the Amendment.”¹

If you will refer to p. 163 of the *Navy League Journal* for last month,² you will find that, apart from Admiral de Horsey, no less than nine of these sympathisers with our views were there paraded as supporters of the dominant majority on the occasion of the Annual Meeting—a support which we submit was a not unnatural result of the action of the dominant majority in withholding from their circular the terms of our Amendment.

Mr. SPENSER WILKINSON was the actual Originator of the *Navy League*, in that to his published articles the League owed its inception. In a letter to us dated the 7th inst.,³ wherein he dwells upon the need of a strategy department within the Admiralty, he writes:—“If there were a return to a more vigorous policy, such as I gather that you have in mind, I should hope that the League might, after all, attain its object.”

At the General Meeting, the dominant majority of the Committee (throwing overboard the *Navy League Journal* and its Editor⁴) mainly rested their case on the grounds that they were satisfied with the state of the Navy and with the Naval policy of the present Government, and that the Navy League had no right to touch questions of strategy.

That case they have themselves dashed to atoms by the publication in the current number of the *Navy League Journal* of an article (which we hope may not be repudiated by its apparent sponsors) dealing exclusively with strategy, and creating the irresistible inference that our present naval dispositions are monstrous.

They have thus demonstrated to the world their lamentable error in opposing our Amendment on the main grounds on which they urged its rejection at the Annual Meeting. Is it not probable that, wrong as they have

¹ In view of this, would it not seem (in the absence of explanation) that the extract from Admiral de Horsey's letter as printed in the *N.L.J.* must have been, and was, distinctly misleading? If so,—Why?

² *N.L.J.*, June, 1907, p. 163.

³ July 7, 1907; reprinted below, pp. 184 sq., 307 sq.

⁴ See above, pp. 129 sq., 138 sq.

thus admitted themselves to be in their fundamental contentions, they are equally wrong in regard to their defence and advocacy of the naval reductions and economies, specified in our Amendment as also in our forthcoming Resolution?

The article referred to represents a tardy adoption by the dominant majority of a policy which we have consistently advocated for eight months past. On the 2nd November last, the mover of the Resolution showed in a signed and published letter the inevitable effect of the new dispositions announced by or on behalf of the Government, and from that time until our resignation on the 13th May,¹ we both never ceased in Committee to urge the constraining need of protest, and to suggest means of rousing public opinion.² On the 27th May³ was published our joint letter to the *Standard*⁴ (which was made the subject of Editorial comment⁵) drawing attention to the dangerous reduction in the strength of the Channel Fleet.⁶ Our Circular Letter and Form of Requisition, both containing pointed reference to this urgent matter,⁷ were of date the 22nd June⁸;—whilst the very earliest appearance of the article in question was so late as June 26th.⁹

Here, at last, are the confession and the proof that during these eight months the policy of the majority of the Committee was wrong, and ours right.

The dominant majority, in their circular of the 1st inst., venture to allege that the paralysis and wreck of the League will ensue from our opposition to them. Its paralysis has long been an existing fact. It is demonstrated once again in the article above referred to. For, if the naval dispositions of this country are as dangerous as they there imply, obviously it is the League's duty to take every means to rouse the public to a sense of its peril. But the dominant majority *propose to take no action whatsoever*. They propose to leave "the public.. to

¹ May 13, 1907. See above, pp. 52-54. ² See, e.g., above, pp. 15, 21, 22, 40, 47 sq., 52 sqq., 152, 161, and below, pp. 168, 179, 181, 237, 357, 402, etc.

³ May 27, 1907.

⁴ Dated May 25, 1907 (above, pp. 102 sqq.)

⁵ *Standard*, May 27, 1907 (above, pp. 104 sqq.).

⁶ Printed above, pp. 102 sqq.

⁷ See above, pp. 132, 141.

⁸ June 22, 1907. See above, pp. 128 sqq., 136 sqq.

⁹ June 26, 1907. See above, p. 143.

judge"—and to let the matter rest there. Those who appreciate the full force of public lethargy and indifference will realise that no grosser abandonment of the Navy League's duty could be proposed.

What is needed by the Navy League is vital energy in the conduct of its affairs, and resolute effort to avert decrease, and secure increase, of naval strength.

This present controversy has had its analogy in the German Navy League, where the victory of the forward party has led to an enormous growth in the League's membership and influence.¹

We appeal to you now to give to the British Navy League new growth and new vitality by supporting our policy of action.

We appeal to you, therefore, either to attend the forthcoming Meeting, to be held at the Caxton Hall, Westminster, on Friday, the 19th inst.,² at 3 p.m., and then to vote in support of our Resolution, or, if your presence be then impossible, to sign and return to us at once the enclosed stamped proxy. Kindly note, however, that, to be of any service, the latter must reach us not later than the morning of Wednesday, the 17th inst.³

We are,

Yours faithfully,

(Signed) HAROLD FRAZER WYATT.

(Formerly Navy League Envoy to the Colonies, and late Hon. Secretary of the Navy League.)

(Signed) L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

(Hon. Vice-President of the Cambridge University Branch of the Navy League, and late Chairman of the Universities Sub-Committee of the League.)

Late Members of the Executive Committee
of the Navy League.

¹ Cp. above, p. 67 n. 1.

² July 19, 1907 (below, pp. 189 *sqq.*).

³ July 17, 1907.

FORM OF PROXY.

The following¹ is the form of Proxy issued with the preceding Circular² :—

THE NAVY LEAGUE.

July, 1907.

I..... of..... in the County of, being a Member of the Navy League, hereby appoint Mr. HAROLD F. WYATT, of the United University Club, London, S.W., or Mr. L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH, of the Athenæum Club, London, S.W., as my Proxy, to vote for me and on my behalf at the Meeting of the League to be held on the 19th day of July, 1907, and at any adjournment thereof, as witness my hand,

Signature*.....

Date.....

Here affix an ordinary *id.* stamp, and sign and date across it.

.....
...1907.

Address

Witness to such Signature* :—

Name.....

Address.....

Occupation.....

WHAT THE NAVY SHOULD BE.

July 10, 1907. "What the Navy should be";—Lord Heneage, *Morning Post*, July 10, 1907, p. 9, col. 2.

¹ Concerning the use of "Premier" type in this book, see above, p. 52 n. 5.

² Cp. above, p. 169.

THE NAVY LEAGUE.

TIMES, July 11, 1907, p. 7, col. 6.

To the Editor of the TIMES.

4, Paper Buildings, Temple, E.C.,
July 10, 1907.

SIR,—In the letter from Mr. Yerburch which you published on the 29th ult.,¹ the members of the NAVY LEAGUE were asked to refrain from taking any action pending the despatch to them of a communication from the Executive Committee. That communication, or, rather, one from the dominant majority of that committee, has now been sent, and it is of a nature which we think justifies us in asking you to accord us opportunity to make appeal to public opinion.

For, in the circular which has been issued to the League's members, together with forms of proxy, is given what purports to be a list of the committee, "who ask for your renewed confidence and support," as against the resolution to be brought forward by ourselves, at the extraordinary general meeting of the NAVY LEAGUE on the 19th inst.;² and it is added that, should our resolution be carried, the committee will resign.

Now, it is the almost incredible fact³ that, in the case of no less than four of the committee whose names have thus been used, that use has been made without their knowledge and without their authority or consent having been obtained, and in two cases, at least, in defiance of their known and avowed sympathies with the points enumerated in our resolution.

The names of these four members are the Earl of Wilton,⁴ Dr. G. R. Parkin, C.M.G., LL.D.,⁴ Mr. Robert Weatherburn,⁴ and Mr. H. W. Wilson,⁴ editor of the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL, who has authorised us to say that he neither had nor has any intention to resign should our resolution be carried.

Dr. Parkin⁴ writes to us, under yesterday's date⁵:—"I knew nothing about the statement that I was one of those who would resign if your resolution was carried. As a matter of fact, I would have no thought of resigning on that account."

Mr. Robert Weatherburn⁴ tells us that he has strongly and consistently sustained our case in committee since our resignation therefrom on May 13 last,⁶ and the fact that his views coincided with our own must have been well known to every member of the board who attended its meetings.

We appeal, then, to public opinion to judge whether the majority of the committee of the NAVY LEAGUE, having solicited and doubtless obtained proxies upon the strength of an incorrect and misleading circular, are not bound by the laws of honour to return those proxies to their givers and to inform the latter that they have been misled.

We should like to add our conviction that Mr. Yerburch, and doubtless some of the members of the committee, can have had no personal responsibility for the issue of the circular in question.

We are, Sir, Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,
L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

¹ June 29, 1907 (above, p. 146).

³ Cp. above, p. 163.

⁵ July 9, 1907. See above, p. 165.

² July 19, 1907 (below, pp. 189 sqq.).

⁴ See above, p. 163.

⁶ May 13, 1907 (above, pp. 52 sq.).

DISSENSIONS IN THE NAVY LEAGUE.

MORNING POST, July 11, 1907, p. 9, col. 3; PALL MALL GAZETTE, July 11, 1907, p. 3, col. 2; STANDARD, July 11, 1907.¹

To the Editor.

4, Paper Buildings, Temple, E.C.,
July 10, 1907.

SIR,—In the interests of honour and fair play, we ask your leave to appeal through your columns to public opinion.

The dominant majority of the Executive Committee of the NAVY LEAGUE have issued to the League's members a circular accompanied by proxy forms. In that circular they insert what is alleged to be a list of the committee "who ask for your renewed confidence and support" as against the resolution to be brought forward by ourselves at the extraordinary general meeting of the NAVY LEAGUE on the 19th instant; and it is added that, should our resolution be carried, the committee will resign.

It is the almost incredible fact² that in the case of no fewer than four of the committee whose names have thus been used, this use has been made without their knowledge, and without their authority or consent having been obtained, and in two cases at least in defiance of their known and avowed sympathies with the points enumerated in our resolution.³

The names of these four members are the Earl of Wilton,⁴ Dr. G. R. Parkin, C.M.G., LL.D.,⁴ Mr. Robert Weatherburn,⁴ and Mr. H. W. Wilson,⁴ the editor of the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL.

Mr. Wilson's⁴ views upon the points in question have been expressed by himself with perfect definiteness in that JOURNAL,⁵ and he has authorised us to say that he neither had, nor has, any intention of resigning, should our resolution be carried.⁶

Dr. Parkin⁴ writes to us, under yesterday's date⁷: "I know nothing about the statement that I was one of those who would resign if your resolution was carried. As a matter of fact, I would have no thought of resigning on that account."

Mr. Weatherburn^{4,8} tells us that he has strongly and consistently advocated our case in committee since our resignation therefrom on May 13 last,⁹ and the fact that his views coincided with ours must have been known to every member of the Board who attended its meetings.¹⁰

We ask, then, of public opinion to decide whether the majority of the committee of the NAVY LEAGUE, having solicited and doubtless obtained proxies upon the strength of an incorrect and misleading circular, are not bound by the laws of honour to return those proxies to their givers and to inform the latter that they have been misled.

We are, Sir, Yours faithfully,
HAROLD F. WYATT,
L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

¹ Cp. also *Daily Express*, July 11, 1907.

² Cp. above, p. 163.

³ Cp. above, p. 163.

⁴ See above, p. 163.

⁵ Cp. above, pp. 60-62, and notes thereto, 64, 70 *sqq.*, etc., etc.

⁶ Cp. above, p. 171.

⁷ July 9, 1907 (above, p. 171).

⁸ Cp. above, pp. 90, 97 *sq.* ⁹ May 13, 1907 (above, pp. 52 *sq.*). ¹⁰ Cp. above, p. 171.

THE DOMINANT MAJORITY OF THE N.L. COMMITTEE AND THEIR ACTIONS.

*Letter addressed by Mr. Wyatt and Mr. Horton-Smith to the
Honorary Secretaries of all Home-Branches of the Navy League.*

4, Paper Buildings, Temple, E.C.,

July 11, 1907.

DEAR SIR,—

As we have reason to believe that the majority of the Executive Committee of the NAVY LEAGUE have written¹ to the honorary secretaries of branches, asking that resolutions may be passed in their favour,^{2 3} we think it urgent to inform you that the circular letter purporting to be issued by the Committee is both incorrect and misleading.⁴

In that circular, which has been so issued to the League's members together with forms of proxy, is given what is alleged to be a list of the Committee "who ask for your renewed confidence and support" as against the Resolution⁵ to be brought forward by ourselves at the Meeting on the 19th inst.,⁶ and it is added that, should our Resolution be carried, the Committee will resign.

Now it is the almost incredible fact—as we have stated in letters published in the *Times*, the *Standard*, the *Morning Post*, and other newspapers to-day⁷—that in the case of no less than four of the Committee, whose names have thus been used, this use has been made **Without Their Knowledge, and Without Their Authority or Consent** having been obtained, and in two cases at least in defiance of their known and avowed sympathies with the points enumerated in our Resolution.

The names of these four members are the Earl of Wilton,⁸ Dr. Parkin, C.M.G., LL.D.,⁸ Mr. Robert Weatherburn,⁸ and Mr. H. W. Wilson,⁸ the editor of the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL.

Lord Wilton⁸ tells us that he is in sympathy with the spirit of our resolution, and that he has not the least intention of resigning should it be carried. We have, however, reason to think that he will resign should it be defeated.

Dr. Parkin⁸ writes to us, under date the 9th inst.⁹: "I knew nothing about the statement that I was one of those who would resign if your resolution was carried. As a matter of fact, I would have no thought of resigning on that account."⁹

Mr. Robert Weatherburn⁸ tells us that he has strongly and consistently sustained our case in Committee since our resignation on the 13th May,¹⁰ and the fact that his views coincided with ours must have been well known to every member of the Board who attended its meetings.¹¹

We conceive that the majority of the Committee, having solicited and doubtless obtained proxies upon the strength of an incorrect and

¹ Under date July 9, 1907.

² This only came to our knowledge on July 11, 1907, and induced the letter here printed.

³ No such Resolution was read at the Extraordinary General Meeting of July 19, 1907 (below, pp. 189 *sqq.*), and it may perhaps be assumed, accordingly, that there were none (or next to none) to be read.

⁴ Cp. above, pp. 162 *sqq.*, 171, 172.

⁶ July 19, 1907 (below, pp. 189 *sqq.*).

⁸ Above, p. 163.

¹⁰ May 13, 1907. See above, pp. 52 *sq.*

⁵ Printed above, pp. 136 *sqq.*

⁷ July 11, 1907. See above, pp. 171, 172.

⁹ July 9, 1907. Cp. above, pp. 165, 171.

¹¹ Cp. above, p. 171.

misleading circular, are now bound by every law of honour to return those proxies to their givers, and to inform the latter that they have been misled.

Apart from the merits of the whole controversy, we can scarcely believe it to be possible that the members of the NAVY LEAGUE can desire to give "renewed confidence and support" to the majority of the Committee who have been capable of making a mistake of this nature, or that the Branches of the League, or their Committees can wish to pass resolutions in their favour.

It will be remembered that on the occasion of the last General Meeting, on the 15th May,¹ the majority sent out circulars asking for votes against our amendment, then to be moved, while actually refusing to insert (despite our protest) the statement of its terms.²

The majority base their defence and advocacy of the various indisputable naval reductions and economies enumerated in our Resolution, upon the alleged support of unnamed naval experts. Naval experts are ranged upon both sides in this controversy, but those whose support alone the majority of the Executive Committee can claim are the champions of reduction and of the naval policy of the present Government.

The dominant portion of the Committee argue that the will of the majority must prevail. This is an elementary proposition to which, of course, we agree. It was for this very reason that we resigned our seats on the Committee. But the majority with whom rests the final control of the League's policy is not the majority of the Committee, as they appear to suppose, but the majority of the members of the NAVY LEAGUE itself. To these we appeal in a circular letter,³ which should reach them on Saturday next,⁴ and we would urge your Committee, to whom we beg you kindly to read this letter, at least to wait until they receive our communication before passing any resolution bearing on the present dispute.

We are,

Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

July 12, 1907. Letter of the secretary of the NAVY LEAGUE (of date July 11, 1907) in the *Standard*, July 12, 1907, and *Times*, July 12, 1907, p. 4, col. 1.⁵

THE NAVY LEAGUE.

MORNING POST, July 13, 1907, p. 8, col. 4; STANDARD, July 13, 1907, p. 8, col. 4; TIMES, July 13, 1907, p. 14, col. 2.

To the Editor.

4, Paper Buildings,

Temple, E.C.,

July 12, 1907.

SIR,—If anything could be more astonishing than the recent action of the majority of the committee of the NAVY LEAGUE, it would be their present defence.

We pass by their secretary, with whose personal responsibility in

¹ May 15, 1907.

² See above, p. 50.

³ Dated July 9, 1907, and printed above, pp. 162 *sqq.*

⁴ Saturday, July 13, 1907.

⁵ Cp. below, pp. 174 *sq.*, 176 *sqq.*

this matter we are not concerned. We address to Mr. Robert Yerburgh, president of the NAVY LEAGUE, for whom we entertain the highest respect; to Mr. H. Seymour-Trower, chairman of the committee; and to the vice-chairman, Admiral the Hon. Sir E. R. Fremantle, G.C.B., whom we and all men honour, the two questions following:—

1. Are they of opinion that a mere notification upon an agenda paper that the committee would meet to consider our circular and "to take such action thereon as may be considered necessary" justified the majority of that committee in issuing broadcast amongst the members of the League, whose proxies they were soliciting, the mis-statement that the Earl of Wilton,¹ Dr. G. R. Parkin, C.M.G., LL.D.,¹ Mr. Robert Weatherburn,¹ and Mr. H. W. Wilson,¹ the editor of the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL, four members of their body, would all resign if our resolution were carried, when, in fact, not one of them intended so to do; when two of them were known sympathisers with the points enumerated in the resolution; and when one of these two was the ceaseless and strenuous advocate of our cause upon their board?

2. If they do not think that action justified, are they prepared, as members of the majority, to profit by the proxies so obtained?

We ask their pardon for even appearing to imagine that their answer to either of these questions could possibly be "Yes."

But we are obliged to put both these questions to them individually and publicly; and we request a public reply.

We are, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYAT,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

THE NAVY LEAGUE.

STANDARD, *July 13, 1907, p. 8, col. 4.*

To the Editor of the STANDARD.

29, Kingsthorpe Road, Sydenham, S.E.

July 12, 1907.

SIR,—Prior to the General Meeting of the NAVY LEAGUE, the majority of the committee sent round a circular threatening resignation if Messrs. Wyatt and Horton-Smith's Amendment was carried. Now I see from the correspondence in your columns that they are adopting similar tactics.

I always think threats of resignation show a great weakness, the last straw which a discredited body grasp at in the hope that the good nature of members may prevail to keep them in office. If the majority of the committee have the courage of their opinions, why not resign and seek re-election?

I am one of those who resigned my membership in consequence of the policy of this committee, teaching one thing in their JOURNAL and

¹ See above, pp. 163, 171, 173.

then, for fear of offending the Admiralty or the Government (it does not matter which), they turn a complete *volte-face* when asked to subscribe to the policy which was good enough so long as it only served to amuse the members of the League.

I am, Sir, Your obedient servant,
ARTHUR C. LANGHAM.

July 12, 1907. Issue of Circular, dated July 12, 1907, from the dominant majority of the Navy League's Executive Committee.¹

NAVY LEAGUE.—URGENT.

THE NAVY LEAGUE.

4 PAPER BUILDINGS,
TEMPLE, LONDON, E.C.,
13 July, 1907.

DEAR SIR (OR MADAM),²

In our last Circular Letter³ we were obliged to inform you that the majority of the Committee of the Navy League had asked for your proxy against us **upon an untrue and misleading statement of fact.**

We drew emphatic attention to this astonishing circumstance in letters published in the *Times*, *Standard*, *Morning Post*, and other newspapers on Thursday last, the 11th inst.⁴

On the following day⁵ appeared in these papers a letter giving the only defence yet attempted of the circulation broadcast to all Members of the League of this untrue statement.⁶

And What a defence!—A defence that the intended resignation of four members of the Committee (if our resolution were carried) had been assumed on the ground that none of these four was present at the Committee Meeting at which this decision was reached, and that an agenda paper had been issued to them, to which they had not replied, saying that the Committee were to

¹ Cp. below, pp. 176 *sqq.*

² Concerning the use of "Premier" type in this book, see above, p. 52 n. 5.

³ Of date July 9, 1907, printed above, pp. 162 *sqq.*

⁴ See above, pp. 171, 172.

⁵ July 12, 1907.

⁶ See above, p. 174.

meet to consider our Circular Letter of June 22nd,¹ and "to take such action thereon as may be considered necessary."

They thought this justified them in announcing the contingent resignation of the EARL OF WILTON,² Dr. G. R. PARKIN, C.M.G., LL.D.,² Mr. H. W. WILSON² (Editor of the *Navy League Journal*), and Mr. ROBERT WEATHERBURN,² **without their knowledge, and without their consent, and in defiance of the known views of at least the two latter.**

MR. ROBERT WEATHERBURN tells us that, ever since our resignation from the Committee on May 13th,³ he had ceaselessly and even passionately urged our case upon the Board. He was absent through serious illness on the occasion now referred to, and on that occasion his consent was thus assumed to the parading of his name to all Members of the League throughout Britain as our opponent who would resign if our resolution were carried!

If this were all, it would be enough, BUT THERE IS MORE:—

Will it be believed that on July 12th,⁴ the day following⁵ the publication of this excuse of assumed concurrence, **another circular**⁶ was issued from the Head Office of the League, over the signature of the Secretary, and addressed apparently to all Members of the League from whom proxies had not been obtained, **still referring to the former one,⁷ still relying upon it, still asking for proxies upon it, but NOT CORRECTING THE ADMITTEDLY UNTRUE statement which it contained?**

We cannot credit that Members of the Executive Committee—some of them our personal friends—can have been cognisant of the nature of the first Circular or of the issue of the second.

¹ June 22, 1907, printed above, p. 128 *sqq.*

² See above, pp. 163, 171, 173, 175.

³ May 13, 1907. See above pp. 52 *sq.*

⁴ July 12, 1907 (above, p. 176).

⁵ Instead of the words "The day following," we should have written "*The very day of.*" See above, p. 174.

⁶ Dated July 12, 1907 (above, p. 176).

⁷ Of July 1, 1907. See above, p. 143.

We hope that one and all will have the courage to dissociate themselves at once from **ITS UTTERLY UNJUSTIFIABLE ISSUE.**

The reality of such dissociation, however, will consist in the refusal to make use of any proxies obtained upon either of these two incorrect and misleading circulars.

We cannot believe that you, whatever your views on the controversy as a whole, will wish to endorse by your vote such methods as have been pursued in the name of the Committee in this matter.

Therefore we appeal to you, if you have given your proxy to the majority of the Committee, to withdraw it at once, and if you do not choose to give it to us, then not to give your vote at all. This withdrawal you can effect, as previously stated, by a line addressed to their Secretary, at 13, Victoria Street, Westminster, London, S.W.; but we beg you, in that case, to inform us of your action by postcard. This is essential. But if you are in substantial sympathy with our views, then we beg you to sign and return to us our proxy form immediately, if you have not already done so. *To be of any service, your proxy should reach us not later than Wednesday morning, the 17th inst.*¹

We entreat your help to rescue the Navy League from its present plight.

We are,

Yours faithfully,

HAROLD FRAZER WYATT,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

A POSITION OF PERIL.

July 13, 1907. "A Position of Peril";—by "Ex-Diplomatist" in *Spectator*, July 13, 1907 (see *Standard*, July 13, 1907, p. 8, col. 4).

¹ July 17, 1907.

THE NAVY LEAGUE.

INACTION DURING A TIME OF CRISIS.

AN APPEAL TO MEMBERS.

STANDARD, July 15, 1907, p. 9, col. 3.

In view of the important meeting of the NAVY LEAGUE which is to be held on Friday next, it may be well to recount the history of the controversy which has arisen concerning the inaction of the League—or rather of the majority of its Executive Committee—at a time when the maintenance of the country's naval strength is gravely threatened.

When, in the autumn of last year,¹ we felt it our duty to call public attention to the serious effects following and bound to follow upon the naval policy of the present Administration, we failed to secure from the NAVY LEAGUE the active support which it appeared to us to be the League's duty to give. Two members of the Executive Committee, however, Mr. Wyatt and Mr. Horton-Smith, strove hard within the committee, and in public meetings which they addressed, to rouse the League to action. On November 2 last we published an analysis by Mr. Wyatt of the Admiralty memorandum making known the new scheme of distribution of fleets.² The correctness of this analysis subsequent events have fully shown. But the committee of the NAVY LEAGUE, with the exception of an occasional letter to the Press, which they never followed up,³ gave no assistance whatever to our efforts to wake the country to a sense of its peril. Those who were fighting this difficult battle received no help from the committee, and the latter even went so far as to discountenance the two members of their body named above in bringing the subject before meetings at all.

As a result, after much friction, these two members resigned their seats upon the committee,⁴ all compromise being rejected by the majority,⁵ and brought forward an Amendment,⁶ which was supported by Mr. L. J. Maxse (who also resigned⁷), at the Annual General Meeting of the League, on May 15 last.

Commenting upon this at the time, we said:—"Shortly after publishing, in October last, the details of the proposed disastrous reduction in our naval forces, we had occasion to comment on the remarkable inaction of the NAVY LEAGUE, a body expressly constituted in order to present to the public the exact condition of the first line of Imperial defence in relation to the requirements of Imperial security."

The amendment recited seven specific naval reductions, referred to the delayed construction of the new naval base on the East Coast, and affirmed "a keen desire that the NAVY LEAGUE throughout the United Kingdom should do its utmost by every kind of legitimate agitation to rouse British citizens to a sense of the danger involved in these economies."

The majority of the committee resisted this Amendment, mainly on the general grounds (1) that it trenchanted on strategy, which they alleged to be a forbidden subject to the League, and (2) that they

¹ October 15, 1906. See above, p. 12.² *Standard*, Nov. 2, 1906 (above, pp. 19-21).³ Cp., *e.g.*, above, p. 12, etc.⁴ See above, pp. 52 sq.⁵ See above, p. 52, and below, p. 190.⁶ See above, pp. 60-62.⁷ See above, p. 54.

were well satisfied with the state of the Navy and the naval policy of the present Administration.

The Amendment being rejected, its mover and seconder set to work to procure signatures to a requisition compelling the Executive Committee to convene an Extraordinary General Meeting of the League. The forms of Requisition (for which latter only 50 signatures were legally necessary) have been signed in all by over 400 of the League's members,¹ or, in other words, as we are informed, by nearly one-sixth of its entire voting membership.

The Requisition,² embodying a Resolution,³ which we published in substance on the 1st *inst.*,⁴ has been accorded very powerful backing, both within and without the League. One of its supporters is Mr. Rudyard Kipling. Amongst those—members of the League and others—who have indicated sympathy are Lords Armstrong, Barrington, Kesteven, Orford, Sidmouth, and Wilton (the latter a present member of the Executive Committee), Mr. A. Baldwin, M.P., the Hon. Claude G. D. Hay, M.P., Mr. Rowland Hunt, M.P., Sir Henry Kimber, M.P., Mr. W. H. Allen, Mr. Henry Allhusen, late M.P., Mr. Sam Bircham, the Hon. Charles Brand, Sir T. Lauder Brunton, Mr. Valentine Chirol, Rear-Admiral A. C. Clarke, C.M.G., Mr. W. Boyd Dawkins, Sir J. Whittaker Ellis, late M.P. and ex-Lord Mayor of London, Sir E. H. Elton, Bart., Sir George Errington, Bart., Lieut.-General G. W. Forbes, General Sir W. A. Gib, Dr. P. H.-S. Hartley, M.V.O., Colonel J. M. Heath, Mr. Percival A. Hislam, Lieutenant Lionel Horder, R.N., ex-Lord Provost William Hunter, Mr. Edward Huth, Mr. John J. Jackson, Mr. F. T. Jane (author of "Fighting Ships"), Mr. Ernest Jardine, the Rev. C. D. B. Marsham, Sir Spencer Maryon-Wilson, Colonel F. I. Maxse, C.B. (Coldstream Guards), Mr. L. J. Maxse, Sir J. D. Milburn, Sir Henry Miles, Bart., Sir C. W. Morrison-Bell, Colonel L. G. Mortimer, Mr. Edward Nettleship, F.R.C.S., Captain R. B. Nicholetts, R.N. (present member of the Executive Committee), Mr. A. D. Steel-Maitland, Mr. R. L. Stockman (chairman of the leading London branch), Mr. J. St. Loe Strachey, Sir Tristram T. Tempest, Mr. Fabian Ware, Mr. Robert Weatherburn (present member of the Committee), Mr. Charles Whibley, and Mr. Spenser Wilkinson.

The committee, or rather the majority of it, published an article in the July number of the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL,⁵ which their opponents point out deals exclusively with strategical considerations, and creates the inference that our present naval dispositions are erroneous, thus shattering altogether the committee's previous position that the subject of strategy must not be touched by the League, and that all was well with the Navy. In a circular letter of the 9th *inst.*,⁶ addressed by them to members of the LEAGUE,⁶ it is also pointed out that this article marks the tardy acceptance by the Committee of the views which Messrs. Wyatt and Horton-Smith have for eight months past consistently advocated. They also observe that the committee propose to take no action whatever to follow up the ideas which they have been forced at last to adopt. Messrs. Wyatt and Horton-Smith have also drawn public attention to the circumstance that a mis-statement has been issued by the committee to all the LEAGUE'S

¹ See above, p. 165.

² Printed above, pp. 136 *sqq.*

³ See above, pp. 136 *sqq.*

⁴ *Standard*, July 1, 1907 (see above, pp. 136 *sqq.*).

⁵ See above, p. 143.

⁶ July 9, 1907. Printed above, pp. 162 *sqq.*

members, to the effect that four members of their body, namely, Lord Wilton,¹ Dr. Parkin,¹ Mr. H. W. Wilson¹ (the editor of the *NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL*), and Mr. Robert Weatherburn,¹ would resign if the Resolution were carried, when the fact was that not one of them intended to do so, and two of them were avowed sympathisers with the points named in that resolution.²

Mr. Wyatt, as is well known, was the volunteer envoy of the NAVY LEAGUE to the Colonies, and in that capacity spent two years in preaching its doctrines of naval defence all round the world.^{3 4} The attitude of New Zealand, in particular, towards this subject has been visibly strengthened as a result of the activities of the numerous Branches of the NAVY LEAGUE which he founded or revived. He stood for the Rushcliffe Division of Nottinghamshire in the last General Election.⁵ Mr. Horton-Smith bears a name well known in legal circles, and was formerly a Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge, where he had a distinguished career. He is vice-president of the Cambridge University Branch of the League.⁶

THE NAVY LEAGUE. ITS POLICY SEVERELY CRITICISED.

STANDARD, July 16, 1907, p. 6, col. 7.

There are many favourable critics of the action of Mr. Horton-Smith, Mr. Wyatt, and ourselves in persistently drawing attention to the inaction of the NAVY LEAGUE in a time of crisis when, according to not a few of the thinking public, not only the metropolis but the country itself is almost at the mercy of the foreigner. When a wealthy competitor is straining every nerve to develop its naval strength, and to develop it in such a way as to render it most effective against ourselves, the fact that our own Government is reducing the strength of the British naval force, with the NAVY LEAGUE looking on apathetically, is turning many eyes in the direction of Friday's meeting of the League⁷ at which an attempt is to be made to put the house in order.

"WIDESPREAD UNREST."

The Hon. Claude Hay, M.P., a member of the League, who was seen by one of our representatives yesterday, declared that the condition of the Navy was causing a widespread feeling of unrest.

"Though I do not pretend to be an expert in naval questions," he said, "I have had an opportunity during the past year or two of laying in a good stock of general information on the subject from most reliable sources. Amongst other topics with which I have become familiar are the changes which have been effected since the

¹ See above, pp. 163, 171, 173, 175, 177. ² See above, pp. 163, 171, 172, 173, 175, 177.

³ See (a) *N.L.J.* 1902, pp. 170, 181 sq., 206 sq., 223, 243 sq., 261 sq.;—1903, pp. 19 sqq., 54 sqq., 78 sqq., 104 sqq., 147 sqq., 177 sq., 189 sqq., 208 sqq., 228 sq., 262, 272 sq., 278;—1904, pp. 13 sq., 44 sqq., 88 sqq., 102 sq., 130 sqq., 177 sq., 204 sqq., 224 sqq., 228, 246 sqq., 257 sqq., 264 sq., 277, 282 sqq., 284 sq.;—1905, pp. 24, 35, 201;—(b) *N.L. Annual Reports*:—for 1902 (dated May 13, 1903), p. 18, for 1903 (dated May 11, 1904), p. 12, and for 1904 (dated May 17, 1905), pp. 16 sq.;—and (c) "*The N.L. and Some Recent Developments in Regard to Navies*," by Dr. B. W. Ginsburg (publ. by the N.L., Nov. 1906) p. 11.

⁴ For yet earlier work by him in connection with that League, cp. (*int. al.*) *N.L.J.* March, 1897, p. 9.

⁵ Cp. further, *N.L.J.*, Dec. 1905, p. 201.

⁶ See also *Præco Latinus* (Philadelphia, Pa., U.S.A.), May, 1900, pp. 169 sqq., 185, and Nov. 1900, p. 43; *Scottish Patriot* (Glasgow), Dec., 1905, pp. 337 sq.; *London Scottish Regimental Gazette*, March, 1906, p. 43. Cp. also above, pp. 53, 69, 79, n. 9, 89, 135, 169, etc.

⁷ July 19, 1907 (below, pp. 189 sqq.)

commencement of the *régime* of Sir John Fisher at the Admiralty, and I am quite satisfied that the alarm which those changes have inspired amongst a wide section of the thinking public is well founded. There is not a shadow of doubt that the Navy is seriously weakened, that its *moral* has been tampered with, so far as the number of ships is concerned and their armaments. There is, indeed, reason for grave anxiety on the part of the public.

"The German naval authorities seem to know a great deal more than they ought to know as to the weakening of our naval strength, and they are smacking their lips over it.¹

"In business circles, and amongst that section of the public which takes intelligent interest in non-party politics, I am convinced that there is a deep-seated sense of alarm and anxiety as to the danger in the event of a sudden emergency arising; and this alarm has palpably increased during the past few months.

"Now that the outside public have discovered the existence of a system—for the first time in naval history—whereby the views of certain members of the Board of Admiralty are puffed up in the Press² and all criticism is scouted,² uneasiness has enormously developed.

"A red-covered pamphlet, entitled 'The Truth about the Navy,' was circulated some time ago, not only amongst those connected with public work throughout the country, but also on the lower decks of his Majesty's ships. This production is a barefaced attempt³ to puff the present Board of Admiralty, under Sir J. Fisher, and to decry their predecessors or any of those people who now criticise them. Methods of this kind we used to regard as confined to foreign countries, but now we find that we are not free from them at home.²

"As regards the NAVY LEAGUE, I entirely agree with the *Standard* and Messrs. Wyatt and Horton-Smith that the NAVY LEAGUE should not be subservient to the Government of the day, whether Radical or Tory, but should be an organisation to which the public can turn for accurate information as to the Navy in the pursuance of a patriotic policy. Insuring an adequate and efficient Navy is the best security for the world's peace."

THE CHANNEL FLEET'S WEAKNESS.

Mr. Rowland Hunt, M.P., another member of the NAVY LEAGUE, who was also seen by our representative, was at a loss to know what useful purpose the NAVY LEAGUE was serving if it did not endeavour to arouse the country to a sense of its danger in view of the reductions and changes which were taking place in the Navy.

"I am more directly concerned about the weakness of our Channel squadron which is to be ready for immediate service—to meet a sudden attack. If it is not strong enough to deal with the German Fleet—which would appear to be the case at the present moment—we are literally in danger of invasion on the sudden outbreak of a quarrel. That is the fact, however people may try to minimise it or dress it up. Germany, by a *grand coup*, might throw an army into London, and once in possession of our capital could dictate her own terms of peace. In the circumstances, it appears to me that the *Standard* and the members of the NAVY LEAGUE who are calling a Meeting with the primary object of arousing that organisation to a

¹ Cp., e.g. above, pp. 14 *sq.*, etc.

² Cp. below, pp. 243, 254, 256, 335, 341, 342, 401, etc.

³ At the country's expense; see above, p. 39, n. 1.

sense of its duty in the present crisis are perfectly justified in the attitude they have taken up.

"I certainly do not think that the Channel Fleet under the command of Lord Charles Beresford is anything like strong enough. More than 40 warships have been taken from the immediate command of that able and energetic officer. At the present moment there would appear to be no destroyers at all with the sea-going squadron of the Channel Fleet. It seems to me obvious that the strength of the Channel Fleet should be what it was last year.

"I always understood that the NAVY LEAGUE existed to do what it could to keep up the strength and readiness of the British Navy, and, if they are allowed to deteriorate without an effort to protect them, then the League might as well extinguish itself. I trust that at the Meeting of the League on Friday¹ the reform element will prevail."

July 16, 1907. Letter from Mr. Yerburgh, Mr. Trower, and Admiral Fremantle (of date July 15, 1907) in the *Times*, July 16, 1907, p. 10, col. 4; *Morning Post*, July 17, 1907, p. 4, col. 2; and *Standard*, July 16, 1907, p. 6, col. 7.²

THE NAVY LEAGUE.

MORNING POST, July 18, 1907, p. 5, col. 5; STANDARD, July 18, 1907, p. 7, col. 3; and TIMES, July 18, 1907, p. 5, col. 6.

To the Editor.

4, Paper Buildings, Temple, E.C.,
July 17, 1907.

SIR,—In the letter which you published yesterday³ the President of the NAVY LEAGUE and the Chairman and Vice-Chairman⁴ of the committee stated their regret "that the circular accompanying the issue of proxies for the extraordinary general meeting should have contained the names of four gentlemen who had not given express authority for the purpose."

We are glad to find that, since this letter to you, your correspondents and the majority of the committee have issued a circular-letter to the League's members, informing them of the previous misstatement, thus giving them opportunity to withdraw their proxies. This circular-letter is dated the 15th inst., but appears, though on this point we do not pretend to certainty, to have been sent out yesterday.

This is honourable action, which we had a right to expect from the President and members of the Executive Committee of the NAVY LEAGUE;—but it comes too late to deprive them

¹ July 19, 1907 (below, pp. 189 *sqq.*).

² Cp. below, pp. 183 *sq.*

³ "Yesterday," July 16, 1907, *Standard* and *Times*;—"To-day," July 17, 1907, *Morning Post*. See above, on this page.

⁴ Admiral Fremantle, for whom see below, p. 254, text and nn. 1, 2, 3.

of the advantage that they have gained by a statement the incorrectness of which they now admit, or to remedy the injury thus inflicted on our cause. For, human nature being what it is, probably but few of those who were induced to send their proxies upon the strength of the first circular will take the trouble to recall them now, or, in cases of absence, will even have the time so to do. Therefore, from the original mis-statement (however innocent in intention that mis-statement may have been) the gain is all to our opponents, and the loss is all to us.

We are, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

THE NAVY LEAGUE

MORNING POST, July 18, 1907, p. 5., col. 5.

To the Editor.

United Universities Club, S.W.

July 17, 1907.

SIR,—Mr. Spenser Wilkinson grants me permission to send you the enclosed letter, an extract from which appears in the circular letter to members of the NAVY LEAGUE issued by myself and Mr. Horton-Smith.¹

I gather from Mr. Spenser Wilkinson that his only interest in the present controversy is connected with the possible fulfilment by the NAVY LEAGUE of the sole object with which he founded it.²

I am glad to be allowed to publish the full text of this letter, which indicates the precise extent of Mr. Spenser Wilkinson's sympathies.

I am, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT.

[COPY.]

MY DEAR WYATT,—I have read the requisition for an extraordinary general meeting of the NAVY LEAGUE. As far as my recollection goes, and I was one of the original members of the League, the object of the movement was to bring about the creation at the

¹ Above, p. 167.

² In this connection, cp. the *Morning Post*, July 19, 1907 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 4-5:—

"The dispute among the members of the Navy League, which is, if possible, to be settled at a general meeting to-day, is not very intelligible to the uninitiated. . . . The constitution [of the League] can hardly be a sacred document. It has been modified before now. . . . The time is perhaps ripe for an effort to hasten a change inevitable at the Admiralty, the transformation of the First Sea Lord's office into that of a Chief of the Staff, that is to say, *the change from a strategical director guided by his private opinion to a strategical director inseparable from an organised department of strategical thought and study.* We venture to suggest that a settlement of the differences that now distract the Navy League would perhaps be possible upon the lines of some such constitutional amendment as we have described." [The italics are ours.]

Cp. also *Morning Post*, July 11, 1907 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 6-7.

Admiralty of a strategy department, with authority in matters strategical. As vice-president I was commissioned to ask the late Admiral Sir Geoffrey Hornby to accept the presidency of the League. He said to me, "What are you driving at?" and on my replying "At getting a General Staff at the Admiralty,"¹ I said at once emphatically, "To get that I will do anything," and agreed to accept the presidency. Unfortunately he died before he had had the opportunity of taking any part in the business of the League. When a few months afterwards the Executive Committee not only abandoned but repudiated this original policy,² I had no further use for the League, and resigned my membership. But if there were a return to a more vigorous policy, such as I gather that you have in mind, I should hope that the League might after all attain its object.—Yours very truly,
SPENSER WILKINSON.³

THE NAVY LEAGUE.

RESOLUTE ATTITUDE OF THE REFORM PARTY.

VIEWS OF MR. ALFRED BALDWIN, M.P.

STANDARD, July 18, 1907, p. 7, col. 3.

Mr. Alfred Baldwin, M.P.,⁴ chairman of the Great Western Railway Company, and a member of the League, seen by our representative in the House of Commons, declared himself to be in full agreement with the reform party.

THE NAVY LEAGUE

STANDARD, July 18, 1907, p. 7, col. 3.

To the Editor of the STANDARD.

Sydenham,

July 15, 1907.

SIR,—May I ask why the president, chairman, and vice-chairman of the committee of the NAVY LEAGUE, in their letter in your issue of to-day, assume that the NAVY LEAGUE must be broken up if the motion of Messrs. Wyatt and Horton-Smith is carried?

This is the second threat the Executive have used to try to prevent themselves from being turned out;—(1) resignation, and, when they find that will not suffice, (2) the extinction of the League. I only hope members of the League will not be imposed upon by threats of this sort, which only spell "weakness."

So far from the NAVY LEAGUE being broken up, it will become much stronger by the carrying of Messrs. Wyatt and Horton-Smith's Resolution. A new Executive would not advocate a weak Navy, but

¹ Cp. also below pp. 257, 263, 307 *sq.*, etc.

² Cp. below, pp. 263, 308, etc.

³ Reprinted, again, below, pp. 307 *sq.*

⁴ For whom see above, pp. 165, 180, and also Index *s.v.* his name. (Since deceased.)

a strong one, and would also, I should hope, support the principles it might teach its members in its JOURNAL.

For my part, I shall be only too pleased to join the League again if the present Executive are beaten.

I am, Sir, Your obedient servant,

ARTHUR C. LANGHAM.

THE NAVY LEAGUE.

INCREASING SYMPATHY WITH THE REFORM PARTY.

VIEWS OF A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS.

STANDARD, July 19, 1907, p. 7. col. 5.

A momentous decision is to be taken to-day at the Extraordinary General Meeting of the members of the NAVY LEAGUE at Caxton Hall, Westminster. The committee of management is on its trial, and Mr. Yerburgh, the president, and his immediate assistants claim that to give a decision against them will mean the destruction of the organisation. This the members who are for moving forward deny, holding that the assertion is in itself a sign of weakness, and a justification for the attempt which is being made to revive the militant spirit of the League. Meanwhile, opinions are still being freely given in favour of the forward policy of the reforming party.

A member of the House of Lords who takes considerable interest in the doings of the NAVY LEAGUE (but who, for reasons of his own, does not wish to have his name associated with the present controversy) informed our representative yesterday that the gagging of the League on the subject of the parsimony of the Admiralty was like telling a missionary it was not his business to preach against sin.

"I am entirely with the reform party," he said, "for my conviction that no effort should be spared to render our Navy unapproachable both as to numbers and strength was never greater than it is at this moment. I have some acquaintance with the indomitable will that is at work on the creation of a strong Navy for Germany—a Navy which may be able one day to triumph over our own at a critical juncture."

HOME FLEET.

July 19, 1907. Article entitled "The Home Fleet Review: Instantly Ready Notice: Official War Footing: *Standard's* Views Confirmed";—*Standard*, July 19, 1907, p. 7, cols. 4-5.¹

¹ "The Home Fleet," wrote the *Standard* (l.c.), "was formed by reducing the sea-going squadrons and placing them in the Reserve. Therefore it does not 'increase'"—[as stated in the Admiralty Memorandum of Oct. 23, 1906, announcing the formation of the Home Fleet, for which see above pp. 12 sq.]—"but decrease[s] 'the immediate striking strength of the Navy.' Every allegation we have made in support of the fact has been confirmed in the House of Commons by the official spokesmen of the Board of Admiralty." And the article proceeded at once to show "in parallel columns how, step by step, our" (the *Standard's*) "statements have been confirmed."

See further below, *sv.*, "The Sham Review," p. 242.

NATIONAL DANGER.

DAILY EXPRESS, July 19, 1907, p. 1, col. 2.

A remarkable situation has arisen in connection with the meeting of the NAVY LEAGUE, which is to take place to-day at Caxton Hall, Westminster, when Messrs. Wyatt and Horton-Smith are to move a resolution condemning the Executive Committee for its acquiescence in the policy of naval reductions.

The party supporting the action of the Executive Committee, influenced apparently by the energetic action of the reformers and the repeated warnings of the *Express*, issued last night the terms of an amendment to Messrs. Wyatt and Horton-Smith's resolution, to be submitted at to-day's meeting, which makes a damaging admission of Admiralty inefficiency, and concedes, perhaps, the most vital of all the reform party's contentions.

A portion of the Amendment referred to, which is to be moved by Sir John Gray Hill, chairman of the Executive Committee of the Liverpool Branch of the League, and seconded by Mr. John Gretton, M.P., is as follows:—

"That this meeting records its conviction that it is necessary
"for the national safety that our first line fleet should be main-
"tained in constant readiness for instant service, and expresses
"its serious apprehension that our present first line fleet, the
"Channel Fleet, is not so maintained."¹

The Resolution to be moved by Mr. Wyatt, and to secure the defeat of which the Executive Committee have for days past been fighting strenuously, contains, strangely enough, a paragraph to almost precisely the same effect. It reads:—

"That this Meeting further expresses its profound concern in
"view of the reduction of the Channel Fleet from sixty-seven
"units under its late Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sir A. K.
"Wilson, to twenty-one units under its present Commander-in-
"Chief, Admiral Lord Charles Beresford, and in view also of the
"relegation of units withdrawn from this fleet to conditions of far
"inferior efficiency either in the Home fleet (too largely manned
"with second-class stokers and immature boys) or in ships in
"reserve with nucleus crews.

"And that this Meeting points out the impossibility of believing
"that this great diminution in the strength of the Channel Fleet,
"thus previously comprising sixty-seven units concentrated and
"ready for war, can have been due to 'strategy' or to any cause
"except the desire for economy at all costs."²

As the other charges brought against the Admiralty in Mr. Wyatt's motion are much less serious than the inefficiency of the Channel Fleet, the only sensible course the Executive Committee can take at to-day's meeting is to acknowledge their past errors of policy and adopt the reformers' resolution.

¹ Cp. the N.L.'s belated article referred to above, *s.v.* June 26, 1907, p. 143, text and note 4.

² See above, p. 141.

THE NAVY LEAGUE CONTROVERSY.

TO-DAY'S EXTRAORDINARY MEETING.

MORNING POST, *July 19, 1907, p. 9, col. 1*, STANDARD, *July 19, 1907.*¹*To the Editor.*

4, Paper Buildings, Temple, E.C.,

July 19, 1907.

SIR,—The members of the NAVY LEAGUE will have to decide to-day (Friday), the 19th inst.,² at an Extraordinary General Meeting, whether they approve or disapprove the policy of the present majority of the Executive Committee in advocating and defending naval reduction. The Navy Estimates have been cut down within the last three years by over six million pounds sterling of annual expenditure.³ The *personnel* has been reduced by 3,000 men.⁴ The number of dockyard workmen has been reduced by over 8,000 men.⁵ The coastguard has been reduced by the abolition of about 70 stations and detachments.⁶

Our programme of naval construction for the current year is smaller than that of Germany.⁷ In the last ten years Britain has laid down but 64 destroyers to 72 laid down by that country.⁸ The fatal principle of short service has begun to be introduced into the Fleet.⁹ The white ensign has been withdrawn from the seas of half the world.¹⁰

All these reductions, all these economies, have been sustained by the majority of the committee of the LEAGUE which was created to urge increase of Naval strength.

At the Annual Meeting of that League, on May 15 last,¹¹ we specified and we condemned these lessenings of national prestige and national safety in an Amendment which that majority rejected. In rejecting it, they did more than uphold naval reduction, through the mouths of their nominated speakers. They declared, in addition, their satisfaction with the present state of the Navy. They avowed their reliance on the excellence of the present Administration. They affirmed that, not economy, but strategy, was at the bottom of every change, and that with strategy the NAVY LEAGUE must never deal.

But since that meeting they have shifted their ground. They have implied acknowledgment of prodigious error. They have destroyed the very foundations of their case. For they have published in the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL an article¹² for which their secretary states that (for once) they accept responsibility,¹³ and in which they deal with that forbidden subject, strategy, and lay down the law upon it. In this article they create the irresistible inference that those naval dispositions, in which they had previously announced their confidence, are in fact erroneous, and, therefore, that their loudly proclaimed belief in the complete present safety of this country was a gigantic error. They thus show that in this, their main previous contention, they were wrong to the utmost extent to which men can be mis-

¹ Also *Manchester Courier*, July 20, 1907.² July 19, 1907 (below, pp. 189 *sqq.*).³ See above, pp. 61, 140, etc.⁴ See above, pp. 61, 140, etc.⁵ See above, pp. 61, 140, etc.⁶ See above, pp. 61, 75 n. 8, 140, etc.⁷ See above, pp. 62, 140, etc.⁸ See above, pp. 61, 140, etc.⁹ See above, pp. 62, 141.¹⁰ See above, pp. 61, 140, etc.¹¹ May 15, 1907 (above, pp. 60 *sqq.*).¹² See above, p. 143.¹³ See also below, p. 215.

taken, and they create the further inference that they were equally mistaken in every other point.

A poll will be demanded, and in this the majority of the committee will, doubtless, carry the day through the influence which always attaches to an existing board of directors. But a large proportion of the members entitled to vote, including many of its foremost men, have signed proxies in support of our Resolution, and we know that the vital spirit of the League is with us.

We are, Sir, Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

THE EXTRAORDINARY GENERAL MEETING OF THE NAVY LEAGUE.

July 19, 1907.¹

The Extraordinary General Meeting of the NAVY LEAGUE—called upon the Requisition of over 400 Members of the LEAGUE,² where 50 would have sufficed to satisfy all legal requirements³—was held at the Caxton Hall, Westminster, on Friday, July 19, 1907, to consider the Resolution then to be moved by Mr. H. F. Wyatt, seconded by Mr. L. Graham H. Horton-Smith, and supported by Mr. L. J. Maxse and others,⁴ and set forth above on pp. 136 *sqq.*

On the morning of the day in question (and not till then⁵) was published an Amendment⁶ to be moved, on the Committee's behalf, by Sir J. Gray Hill, and seconded by Mr. J. Gretton, M.P. This will be found set out below.⁷ Suffice it here to state, and to state clearly, that:—*The terms of this Amendment—indeed, even the intention to move an Amendment—had been withheld from members of the LEAGUE by the Executive Committee when soliciting proxies in their own favour⁸ as against the proposed Resolution.⁹*

¹ An admirable summary of the entire proceedings will be found in the *Standard*, July 20, 1907, p. 7, col. 7, and p. 8, col. 1 (with but one slight inaccuracy corrected below, pp. 212 *sq.*).

² See above, p. 165.

³ See above, p. 144 n. 1.

⁴ See above, p. 137.

⁵ See *Standard*, July 19, 1907, p. 7, col. 5; *Daily Express*, July 19, 1907, p. 1, col. 2 (above, p. 187). Cp. also *Daily Express*, August 3, 1907, p. 5, col. 7.

⁶ A purely "dishing" Amendment;—see below, pp. 196, n. 3, 201, 213, n. 6.

⁷ Below, p. 196.

⁸ Above, pp. 148, 176.

⁹ We do not find any mention of an Amendment in any of the circulars addressed to members by the Executive Committee.

And yet, from a letter in our possession, under the hand of the Secretary and dated July 6, 1907 (thirteen days before the Meeting), it is clear that an Amendment (if not its exact terms) had already then been decided upon by the Committee.

A policy of keeping members in the dark, and asking for a *carte blanche*, successful as it may prove, reflects but little credit on its originators, and can hardly be regarded as fair to the Members themselves.

It will of course be remembered that somewhat similar tactics had been already pursued by the dominant majority of the Executive Committee in relation to the Annual Meeting held on May 15, 1907 (see above, p. 50, text and nn. 7, 8, and p. 53, text and n. 2).

See also, generally, above, p. 142 n. 1, and below, p. 209 nn. 2, 8.

THE MEETING.

The proceedings having been opened by the President, Mr. R. A. YERBURGH, late M.P., who occupied the chair,
Mr. HAROLD F. WYATT rose to move:—

THE RESOLUTION.

(*This has been already printed above on pp. 136 sqq., but was never allowed to appear in the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL.*¹)

Mr. WYATT:—Before I begin my speech this afternoon I ask for two or three extra minutes in which to reply to the totally different and unconnected issue raised by the Chairman in his opening remarks regarding the fairness of his conduct in the chair on the last occasion. I do not think it is fair that any prejudice against ourselves should be created in that respect. Let me say at once that neither Mr. Horton-Smith nor I have ever imputed any personal unfairness at all to Mr. Yerburch. Mr. Horton-Smith and I have always had the highest respect and honour for Mr. Yerburch. There is no doubt about that at all. We wrote to thank him for his personal courtesy to ourselves and for the efforts which he made to restrain the extraordinary personalities indulged in by one of the Committee speakers² on the previous occasion. (Hear, hear.) What we do impute is that—doubtless it was not the intention of the Committee, but in effect (Mr. Yerburch was merely the agent of the administrators)—the arrangements did work out to our disadvantage at that meeting. So they did.³ That is all we say. We had two speeches and a letter read upon our side, and they had, I think it was, eight speeches delivered against our side. There were three gentlemen in the room who were anxious to speak on our side,⁴ but the opposition speakers were put so rapidly, called upon so quickly, that these three gentlemen did not get any chance.⁵ That was unintentional, no doubt; it was merely due to the way in which the arrangement worked, and the fact that Mr. Yerburch did not know we had speakers who wanted to speak. I think I have entirely explained the point.

Now I turn to something far different: I turn to the difficult and also the lamentable controversy in which we are all engaged. I want first to say this, that for my part and on behalf of Mr. Horton-Smith, and on behalf, I think I may say, of all those who have been good enough to give us their support, we disclaim any responsibility for having generated this dispute. For we proposed a compromise while we were still members of the Committee, a fair and honorable compromise, the terms of which were recited on the last occasion,⁶ and that compromise, although supported at first by several members of the Committee, was in the end refused.⁷

Admiral Fremantle: I venture to think we must not go into all these subjects. Do Mr. Wyatt and Mr. Horton-Smith wish to have the opinion of this meeting on the subjects of great importance which

¹ Why—despite our reasonable request (above, p. 142)—did the Committee decline to print the terms of the Resolution in the *N.L.J.*? Was it because they did not dare to leave on record in the *N.L.J.* the strength of the case against them? (Cp. above, p. 142 n. 1.) What other valid explanation can there be?

² See above, pp. 81 (n. 7), 85.

³ Cp. above, pp. 81 (text and nn. 9, 12), 144.

⁴ Cp. above, p. 81, text and n. 12.

⁵ Cp. above, pp. 81 (text and nn. 9, 12), 144.

⁶ May 15, 1907. See above, pp. 52, 69.

⁷ See above, pp. 52, 179.

they have brought before us, or are we to go on arguing on subjects such as whether justice was done from the chair or not?

Mr. Wyatt: I say this. The compromise was rejected by the Chairman of the Committee, Mr. H. Seymour Trower.¹ They say harm has been done to the League, but if harm has resulted in the opinion of some, that injury rests on the head of those who refused our compromise and not on ourselves.

But let us turn to the subject itself. It is sufficiently serious, is it not? And the task which is before me is a difficult one. I have to speak to a Resolution which, after I have spoken, will not be further discussed by the meeting, and I presume I should refrain from speaking to the Amendment which will afterwards form the topic of the debate. I will say at once that I think the majority of the Committee—I am glad to observe for the first time that this afternoon they have ceased to call themselves the Committee, they have always before constituted themselves as the whole Committee, but they do not now, there are five members who are not on their side—I say that I think that the majority of the Committee have been wise in escaping the direct issue on this occasion by meeting my Resolution with an Amendment instead of a negative.² For that Resolution embodies the terms of the Amendment moved by myself on May 15, and that Amendment was rejected by them on grounds which they have themselves since that date abandoned. (Hear, hear.) Therefore, had they faced my Resolution directly they would at once have placed themselves in an almost impossible and desperate position.

Well, ladies and gentlemen, what were the contentions on which they rested their case previously? Those contentions were mainly these. First, that the subject of strategy was a subject forbidden to the NAVY LEAGUE; that it was as "The Ark of the Covenant, upon which human hand must not be placed"; that it was a subject which it did not behove us to approach at all. And then, that the points enumerated in my resolution did touch and did trench upon strategy. That was one of their main contentions. Another thing they absolutely and explicitly stated was that my Amendment was really aimed against the Admiralty and Sir John Fisher. They said that. They said also that they had the most full and complete confidence in the present naval administration and in Sir John Fisher, and expressed their conviction of the absolute safety of the country at that time. That was the position they assumed. What is their position now? It is not the same. (A Voice: It is the same.) A gentleman says it is. If that is so let him go down from this platform and let him resign his seat on the Committee, because he is at an absolute and distinct variance with the authentic utterances of the Executive Committee which have been sent to the Press and published in the JOURNAL. Since the report of the meeting on May 15³ appeared in the JOURNAL—at which they repudiated the JOURNAL⁴—there has appeared an utterance⁵ which they have declared to be authentic.⁶ They cannot get away from that utterance. That utterance is referred to in the circular they have issued to you asking for votes. What is that article? Why, from beginning to end it is a disquisition upon strategy. It lays down the law of strategy; it deals exclusively with strategical considerations—that subject which

¹ See above, p. 52.

² Cp. below, p. 232.

³ May 15, 1907 (above, pp. 60 *seq.*).

⁴ See above, pp. 64, 71, 81, 130, 138 *sq.*

⁵ The article referred to (*s.v.* June 26, 1907), above, p. 143.

⁶ Cp. above, p. 188, and below, pp. 215, 230.

they said was not to be touched by the NAVY LEAGUE, that we erred in ever having approached it at all, as, they alleged, we approached it in the points we brought forward. That subject they devoted three or four columns of the JOURNAL to, and they wrote an article which they forwarded to the Press. Where is their former position in regard to the question of strategy now? Their previous contention on that point has gone entirely.

The next contention on which they relied last time was the contention that we were criticising the policy of the Admiralty and Sir John Fisher. As a matter of fact I denied that. I aimed my attack, I said, not at the servant, but at the master. (Hear, hear.) I aimed my attack not at Sir John Fisher, but at the power behind him, by which I mean the Cabinet. (Applause.) Now, what have the Committee done? They have attacked Sir John Fisher and they have attacked the Admiralty. They have brought against the Admiralty and against Sir John Fisher a tremendous indictment; and how have they done it? By this article to which I have referred. That article proceeds to lay down the law, as I have said, upon strategy. It affirms certain strategical necessities which must be fulfilled for the safety of this country, if its victory in war is to be assured. It creates the irresistible inference that these necessities have not been fulfilled, and that therefore this country at the present moment is not in a position to win victory in war. I do not know if you have studied this article; I think you have, but I will make the point absolutely clear as to what I mean. Let us read a little of the article:—

“For the satisfactory war training of the instantly ready Fleet the “commander-in-chief must have all its units under his personal command and inspection. Only in this way can he assure himself of “the character of the various captains and the condition of the various “units. He must know exactly what speed he can get out of his “battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, so that he may be able to tell “them off to their various duties. He must know which of his “officers are bold and resolute and which are likely to show weakness.”

All those things which are so necessary are exactly the things which are known to a large extent not to obtain in regard to our existing naval dispositions. A large part of the Fleet which Lord Charles Beresford as commander-in-chief will command in war is exactly in the circumstances which are described here as being wrong. Then, to make it quite certain, they rub it in themselves. They go on to say what the German Fleet consists of, and then they say a little lower down, “The public will be in a position to judge “whether the various British fleets, or any one of them, are in a position of instant readiness for war, by reflecting how far they fulfil the “postulated conditions.” They do not fulfil them. It is perfectly clear that this article creates, and is intended to create, the perfectly irresistible inference that our naval dispositions are wrong. (Cheers.) Then they add this further note: “The main British “Fleet, the Channel Fleet, consists of the following units, which are “all that are permanently under the orders of its admiral, and has at “the present moment the following nominal strength:—Battleships, “14; armoured cruisers, 4; protected cruisers, 3. The First Cruiser “Squadron, usually attached to the Channel Fleet, is now in American “waters.”¹ It has come back since then, but it was at that time.

¹ Cp. above, p. 123.

In other words, the strategical disposition, according to what they said about it, was monstrous. "No destroyers are permanently attached to the admiral's command, but 24 are temporarily placed at his disposal." I say that no human being who reads that article can doubt the intention with which it was written. The actual fact which it most undoubtedly conveys, and which it was the intention to convey to all readers, was that such and such strategical necessities were wanting by Britain at the present time. (Cheers.) What did they say at the Meeting about Sir John Fisher? They expressed the most extraordinary degree of satisfaction with Sir John, and they piled assertion upon assertion of their complete confidence in him, and they declared, what very likely is true, that his is the sole responsibility for the strategy of the Empire. Who said this? The Chairman, Mr. Yerburgh, said: "I say the amendment is an attack upon Sir John Fisher, he being solely responsible for the efficiency of the Fleet for war." If Sir John Fisher is solely responsible for the efficiency of the Fleet for war, as they said then, and if the actual arrangements of the Fleet are not efficient, but if, on the contrary, as they have proved them to be, they are bad, what is the position of the Committee to-day? (Cheers.) What follows from all this? Why, that when the Committee, fervently, energetically, urged you to reject the terms of my Amendment, when they expressed that unbounded confidence in the complete safety of this country, they erred to an extent which it is hardly possible to describe. They plunged themselves into lamentable error. It was quite unintentional, no doubt. They misled the NAVY LEAGUE. They misled those who trusted in their wisdom, and the country, so far as their words would carry. They have shown *now* that they were wrong *then*. I shall be anxious indeed to learn from them what they have to say upon that point; how they are able to cover their own discomfiture; how it is they are right when they said one thing then, and right still when they say a totally different thing now. You see, the fact is that Sir John Fisher, by that article, has been thrown overboard by the Executive Committee. My own position in this matter is, what I have told you, that I attacked the Cabinet, the master, and not the servant. As regards Sir John Fisher—I do not care to speak of other people who take that line—I think my own opinion on that point is irrelevant to the issue. I simply say that I recognise behind Sir John Fisher and behind the Admiralty another force, and a potent force. It is the force of party spirit, the force of the whole Government, of a Government which has been returned to power not seriously believing in the possibility of war. (Cheers.) There is no getting away from this, that during the last general election there was an enormous outbreak of anti-military feeling. I know it from the personal experience I had in the constituency for which I was standing, and I know that experiences similar to mine were multiplied all over the country. I do not think it can be disputed that a large number of the present majority in the House of Commons are actuated by an intense hate of armaments. As sensible men, must not we take that enormous fact into consideration when we are dealing with and thinking over the naval policy for which the Government is responsible? Are we children, to live for ever in the land of make-believe? Are we fools, to sleep for ever in this palace of dreams, in this house of pretence? Are we to go on for ever preaching that the Cabinet has no power, no voice in regard to naval regulations, but

that the officials of the Admiralty are the sole operative force? It may be that a man like Sir John Fisher is able to exercise great influence, but it still remains the fact that the real power behind him is the Government. (Hear, hear.) But if the present Government had been returned to power pledged to effect an increase of armaments, as they were pledged to a decrease of armaments, I ask, does any sane being suppose that we should have had these naval reductions? You have that fact before you. What has been the position of the Executive Committee? It has been in a most lamentable position. (Hear, hear.) I do not think that there ever was a more strange and grievous spectacle than that which they presented on May 15 last.¹ Member after member of the Executive Committee of the NAVY LEAGUE got up to speak with power, ability, and energy in defence of naval reductions.² Who will ever forget the passion, the emphasis, and the reverberating roar with which the official speaker of the League declared and affirmed to you the absolute safety of this country? I am referring to Mr. Knox. That takes me for a moment to a separate point. One of the arguments alleged against me was that Mr. Horton-Smith and I have been belittling the work of Mr. Knox. I do not think any greater evidence of human imbecility could be given than by that allegation. What we say is that the Committee in affirming that educational work was the paramount—paramount, mind—object of the NAVY LEAGUE were acting in the most flagrant violation of its written constitution. Does that involve any belittling of the work which Mr. Knox has rendered to the Committee and the LEAGUE, and well rendered, by his work in the schools of this country? It does not involve the slightest depreciation of his work. The LEAGUE have been totally wrong in the line they have taken. I do not blame Mr. Knox; I praise him. I give him high praise; but I do not praise him for his speech on May 15.³ I find the most tremendous fault with him for that. I think it was a grievous thing to hear a man like him declare and affirm the absolute safety of this country. How did he roar out to you the superior number of guns we possessed as against Germany? But he did not tell you how many of those guns were in ships in commission, and how many in ships in reserve, and how many in the Home Fleet.⁴ The whole of his contention has been knocked to pieces by this article that I have referred to, published in the JOURNAL, and which has appeared in the Press.⁵ His contention, which he was affirming with such tremendous insistence, that the country was safe, is now shown, by that article, to be untrue, and the country to have been unsafe. Could anybody have committed a more grievous and more tremendous error than he and the Committee did in fact commit on that occasion? But what is the effect upon the world at large? The NAVY LEAGUE, it is often said, has not much influence, it has not much power. There is a good deal of cause, I think, for that. But it does stand for public opinion. The opinion of the NAVY LEAGUE is considered to be typical of public opinion in this country. (Cheers.) The NAVY LEAGUE is generally, alas! erroneously, regarded as representing the extreme forward

¹ May 15, 1907 (above, pp. 60 *sqq.*).

² See above, p. 81.

³ May 15, 1907 (above, p. 81).

⁴ Cp. also (*s.v.* July 4, 1907), above, p. 156.

⁵ See above, pp. 143, 191 (text and n. 5).

party in regard to naval policy of this country. I wish that were true. It is not. But that is the general belief throughout the land. But the NAVY LEAGUE refuses to take action, the NAVY LEAGUE defends the reductions carried out by the Administration; the NAVY LEAGUE approves of the reduction in the naval estimates of £6,000,000. It is stifling public opinion. It is stifling those who might otherwise have succeeded in airing their views. That is the message sent all over the world, that public opinion in England, represented by the NAVY LEAGUE, defends the naval reductions recited in our Amendment and recited again in our Resolution. Do I make any imputation as to the sincerity of the members of the Committee? No, not for a moment. I impute no dishonourable action. But in this world an error of intention is often less serious than an error of judgment, and I impute to the Committee deep error of judgment. I say this, that the real reason why the Committee have got into this horrible mess is that they have not had the courage of their own convictions. (Cheers.) They followed a policy of fear and of inertia. Why, if anybody wrote to say that he objected to this thing or to that, the Committee had a sort of paralysis at once and said, "We cannot do this, we cannot do that, somebody objects, somebody resigns." Why, in human life the choice of action is the sign of a strong man. All human life is a choice between difficulties. You cannot go ahead without encountering difficulties. But the Committee are afraid to encounter them. Let us have an instance. They wrote a letter to the Press on January 23,¹ making some protest against what was being then done. Then Admiral Hopkins wrote a public letter to the *Times* saying that he disapproved of it² and he was going to resign, and did resign,³ and that the object of the LEAGUE he thought ought to be educational. In the opinion of Admiral Hopkins and of many others, when the NAVY LEAGUE was formed, its objects should have been purely educational. That is their opinion. Perhaps its Constitution should have been so framed, but it was not. If the Committee think, with Admiral Hopkins, that the LEAGUE's aim should mainly be educational, then it is their duty to resign at once, and, if they like, they can start a League whose aims should be purely or mainly educational. I stand up for the original constitution of the LEAGUE. I say that the LEAGUE was founded with the aim of making and holding the command of the sea. It is to achieve that end by every possible kind of work. You were to impress your objects upon candidates for Parliament, and you were to impress upon the people that the Navy was not strong enough to meet the difficulties it had to encounter. You see that the Committee have reversed that Constitution altogether. They have thrown overboard the main aims of the LEAGUE in declaring that its principal aims should be educational. I would therefore charge them, not with any conduct unworthy of British citizens—not for an instant⁴—but with the most tremendous error, with the most lamentable weakness, with utter failure to carry out the ends for which the LEAGUE was founded as defined in its Constitution. Therefore, in effect, they have made the LEAGUE false to its duty, a false guide to public opinion; and the LEAGUE has

¹ January 23, 1907:—Entitled: "Wanted, the True 'Truth about the Navy'";—and reprinted, *N.L.J.*, February, 1907, p. 34. See above, p. 79 n. 9.

² See above, p. 46.

³ See above, p. 46.

⁴ Cp. Mr. H. F. Wyatt in the *Daily Mail*, July 22, 1907; &c.

been really, during the last few months, a national curse instead of a national blessing. (Cheers.)

Mr. HORTON-SMITH:—I beg leave formally to second this Resolution. I shall have an opportunity of addressing you after the Amendment has been moved.¹

Sir JOHN GRAY HILL then moved,² and Mr. JOHN GRETTON, M.P. (Rutlandshire County Division), then seconded the Committee's Amendment, which was in the terms following:—

THE AMENDMENT.³

"(1) That this Meeting of members of the NAVY LEAGUE, in view of "the fact that our Fleets are at the present time at the level of the "Two-Power standard with a margin,⁴ 5 6 7 endorses the action of the "Executive Committee of the League in refusing to initiate a public "agitation upon matters of controversial detail, and pledges itself, "should necessity arise, to take immediate action in favour of "securing the maintenance of the above standard, which has been "recognised by successive Governments as embodying the minimum "requirements of the country for holding command of the sea.

"(2) It further associates itself with the statement made by the "President at the last Annual General Meeting that 'You may have "battleship heaped on battleship, manned with the best crews and "officers in the world, but your Fleets are of no service to you if, "when the hour of war strikes, they are not ready for instant service.'

"(3) And that this Meeting records its conviction that it is necessary "for the national safety that our First Line Fleet should be main- "tained in constant readiness for instant service, and expresses its "serious apprehension that our present First Line Fleet, the Channel "Fleet, is not so maintained."⁸

Mr. F. T. JANE:—Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen,—I rise to oppose this Amendment, and oppose it with all my power. I do so on the grounds that the very first statement is little better than a white lie. I object to using such strong words about it, but it is absolutely rubbish that an institution like the NAVY LEAGUE, which was founded to support the British Navy and to keep it up, should play the fool with words, as is being done on this present occasion. (Hear, hear.) We all know perfectly well that at the present moment the British Navy is equal to the Two-Power standard. That is a thing which has been trotted out in the House of Commons by various official hypocrites. It is always being trotted out; but the point is not what we are now, but what we shall be. (Hear, hear.)⁹ In the year 1910—I am not going into statistics, but any of you can work it out for yourselves—the Two-Power standard will not have been kept up. The onus of keeping that up lies with the present Government. What have they done? Cut the Navy down—to please some of their Radical and Socialist supporters. They appear to be in

¹ See below, pp. 200 *sqq.*

² On his speech, see *Standard*, July 20, 1907, p. 7, col. 7, and below, p. 200, n. 4.

³ Concerning this, see above, p. 180 (text and n. 9). And, for its obvious nature and intent, see above, p. 189 n. 6, and below, pp. 201; 202, n. 5; 213, n. 6.

⁴ But see above, pp. 62 n. 3, 72, 76, 77, 78.

⁵ As to this interpretation of the Two-Power Standard, cp. Mr. H. Tero in *Standard*, July 30, 1907, p. 9, col. 2 (below, p. 228).

⁶ For the Cawdor definition of the Two-Power Standard, see below, pp. 308 *sq.*

⁷ The only logical and reasonable interpretation of a Two-Power Standard will be found below, p. 518.

⁸ Cp., concerning the Fisherite Press, above, p. 143.

⁹ Cp. above, p. 22.

some way or other hoodwinking the Committee of the LEAGUE. The Committee are afraid to act in the matter. They do not want to step on anybody's toes or hurt anybody's feelings. But that is not the duty of the NAVY LEAGUE. Their duty is to hurt people's feelings and to fight little Englanders in every possible way.

I have no politics myself; I stood for Parliament without any politics, I simply stood for the Navy. Every man—whatever he may call himself—who cuts down the Navy is to be regarded as a public enemy, and should be treated as such. We have heard a good deal about the Liverpool Branch of the NAVY LEAGUE, and that if this thing and that thing is not done the NAVY LEAGUE at Liverpool will go to pieces. But the NAVY LEAGUE was not founded to keep Committees in place; it was founded to keep up the Navy. (Hear, hear.) This is no personal matter. As for myself, I joined the NAVY LEAGUE on purpose to support the views of Mr. Wyatt and Mr. Horton-Smith;¹ and I was given a message from Portsmouth from various naval officers to deliver to the Committee. They can have it if they want it. Shall I read it?

The President: I do not think it is fair to ask a speaker to give the names of officers on active service.

Mr. Jane: I never said anything about names. I should not think of mentioning names. Shall I read the message? ("Yes.") It is, "You are going well on the way to imitate the pro-Boers." That is what you are doing; simply following their tactics. It is exactly what the pro-Boers did at the time of the South African war. ("Order," and uproar.) It is exactly the same spirit that you are copying. ("Order, order.") You have got on your NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL, and on the form of membership, the portrait of Nelson. You claim to have founded the LEAGUE to keep up the spirit of Nelson. Do you mean to tell me that the spirit of Nelson is in any way whatever to be associated with cutting down the Navy because 125 Radical M.P.'s sent in a petition to the Prime Minister?² ("Order.") Is that the spirit of Nelson? ("No.") Is this LEAGUE founded for Nelson, or is it not? Is it founded to keep up the spirit of Nelson? Because Nelson died for his country, the least we can do is to preserve the spirit he died for. The spirit he died for is, "Fight every kind of anti-Imperialism," and we must fight that spirit always. It is not a bit of good for the Committee to try half measures. I have no personal quarrel with them; I simply put it that the NAVY LEAGUE must have a forward policy. It must be the mouthpiece of those who believe in Imperialism, of those who believe in keeping up the Navy. But it is not. It has given that up. It is now nothing but a sort of adjunct of the Government. You have become political from your fear of being so. I read carefully the accounts of the least meeting, and everything was based on the fact that if the NAVY LEAGUE condemned the cutting down of the Navy because of these 125 M.P.'s it would make itself political and condemn the Government, and it must not condemn the Government. Next year we shall see the Navy cut

¹ "To support Mr. Wyatt in every possible way. I do so in the name of Navy before Party, and patriotism *versus* ———,"—Mr. F. T. Jane, *N L J.*, June, 1907, p. 163 (the writer of the "screened" letter referred to above, p. 166 n.*).

² See above, p. 4.

down by two ships; the following year by three; and then there will be no Navy at all. About that time the NAVY LEAGUE will take the matter in hand; but the time they ought to take it in hand is now. It is no good waiting till the British Navy is sunk and then pass a resolution that it ought not to have been. What we have to do is to stop it, and the only way it can be stopped is by protesting. I have one minute more. Therefore, I beg to oppose that Amendment, and also to suggest that the third paragraph in it about the Channel Fleet—which I have not time to discuss—seems a matter with which the NAVY LEAGUE should not interfere. The duty of the NAVY LEAGUE is to see that the Admiralty have plenty of money to spend for the Navy. At present, there is no hostility to Admiral Fisher; the hostility is to those who keep him short of money. It is the duty of the NAVY LEAGUE to see he has got the right amount of money. (Cheers.)

Mr. H. NIELD, M.P. (Ealing), then spoke in support of the Amendment.

Mr. LEO J. MAXSE :—Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen,—I am a strong and violent party man upon most questions, but not upon question of national defence. I thoroughly distrust all party men upon national questions, especially upon questions of national defence, because experience teaches us that your party zealot is utterly untrustworthy on such matters, and, as between the Unionist Government and the Liberal Government, there is very little to choose. (Hear, hear.) It is six of one and half a dozen of the other. (Hear, hear.) Either front Bench, when in power, whatever may be their vociferous protests in Opposition, always try to sneak a battleship or to steal a pound from the Navy whenever they think the public is not looking. The Navy has been built up by the disinterested efforts of men acting altogether outside the great party organisations, and we should only be able to maintain our sea-power on condition that we conduct our agitation upon those lines. I so thought myself, until the Annual General Meeting of the NAVY LEAGUE, that that commonplace was a common ground among NAVY LEAGUERS, and I own that I was appalled at the attitude that was then taken up by the Executive Committee, which seemed to me to amount to this—the Admiralty, right or wrong. That seems to me to be an attitude which spells dissolution and death to a body like ours. Unless the LEAGUE be a Vigilance Committee, that is to say a Committee of Public Safety, which is inspired with the utmost distrust towards all party men and official bamboozlers—who, mind you, live by feeding the public with terminological inexactitudes—we play no useful part in public life, and we may as well wind ourselves up to-morrow. Since the Annual General Meeting there has been an alteration of attitude, or, at any rate, a change of tactics, on the part of the Executive Committee, because, whereas they told us that we need not fear, they are now endeavouring to rouse the country to the fact that our naval position at the present time is not one to satisfy the citizens of this country. They are doing precisely what they blamed us for doing. (Cheers.) They are appealing from Whitehall to the country at large, they are appealing from the expert to the man in

the street, and they are endeavouring to bring sufficient pressure upon the Admiralty in order at any rate that one of our squadrons, the Channel Squadron, may be put into fighting trim. What do we say upon that? We do not fall foul of them for that. We say more power to their elbow. We will support them with the utmost enthusiasm and energy we can in trying to succeed in getting the Channel Fleet placed upon a proper fighting basis. But we do say that in doing that they are trenching upon that sacred strategical ground off which, mind you, we were so indignantly warned. We are unable to see why, if it is fair for laymen like the laymen who have spoken in support of the Amendment, in the interests of the Committee, to criticise the constitution of the squadron, it is not also equally open to us to criticise other points in naval administration. If the Admiralty cannot even be trusted to keep the Channel Squadron, upon which the safety of these Islands depends, in a proper condition, why are we called upon to place implicit trust in the Admiralty when they tell us that not only to-day, but as regards the future, our armaments will be up to the Two-Power Standard? Why are we warned off all the questions that are recited in Mr. Wyatt's Resolution, of which some may be matters of detail, but some of which are questions of broad principle, and one in particular which I think ought to appeal with peculiar force to all NAVY LEAGUERS? I remember a few years ago I was instrumental in summoning a conference in which I had most active assistance from the Executive Committee. We met at the Westminster Palace Hotel¹ for the purpose of bringing pressure to bear upon the Admiralty to institute a first-class naval base upon the eastern shores of this country, because it seemed to us, in view of the change in the possible enemies, that we would be likely to have more trouble from the other side of the North Sea than in any of our southern waters. From that day to this, although we were strong enough at the time to compel the Admiralty to climb down and to read our views, and to publicly commit the Government of the day,² nothing practically has been done,³ and if we should find ourselves at war with Germany to-morrow we should be no better off then than we were at the time this pledge was given. I will not go into the details, because I do not think it is a question of details; I think it is a question of principle and a question of confidence. In the past we have had to fight against politicians who were trying to be experts. To-day the ground of the situation lies in the fact that some of the experts are trying to be politicians; they are trying to ingratiate themselves with the politicians, and they have assured us that nothing, so far, has been done to affect the integrity of the Two-Power Standard. We cannot feel confident as regards the future unless we do know. If we for one moment relinquish our agitation and practically put up the shutters of the NAVY LEAGUE except for educational purposes in the schools, we do know that directly our back is turned there will be steps taken which will endanger the future sea-power of this country. Therefore, we would take action in this agitation. I do most earnestly appeal to you this afternoon, and would urge upon you, to

¹ February 16, 1903 (see *N.L.J.*, March, 1903, p. 69), above, p. 62, n. 5.

² See above, p. 62 n. 5, and especially *N.L.J.*, April, 1903, p. 90, and *N.L. Annual Report* for 1903 (dated May 11, 1904), p. 4.

³ See above, p. 79, and below, p. 271 *seq.*

leave no stone unturned, because never during the last twenty years has there been a more critical situation before this country than there is to-day, and it is only by agitation that we can hope to obtain our aims. (Cheers.)

Mr. HAYES FISHER, late M.P., then followed in support of the Committee.

Mr. HORTON-SMITH:—Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen,—One has listened in the course of this afternoon to many speeches, some of great interest, but, with the exception of those which have been made on our side, I venture to think have not dealt with the question of the facts at all. Certain people have made speeches in which they have given their own opinion, but they have not explained on what they base that opinion. They said that because somebody in the country does not get up and make a speech, that, therefore, we must be satisfied with what is going on. Is not there another answer to that? Is it not a fact that for months and months past the Government in power has refused to give information when information has been asked for? Was I not right when I said to the Committee of the NAVY LEAGUE in November and December¹ that the very fact that the Government would not give us the facts was the strongest fact for a public meeting?² I asked for a public meeting then, and I received no thanks for it. About six weeks later a public meeting was again suggested,³ and the Committee began to think that they must begin to move, but still the powerful clog of paralysis which is upon the NAVY LEAGUE made them decline. We have heard this afternoon a great deal about this vital organisation of the NAVY LEAGUE. From the letters—I might almost say the reams of paper—I have received from people who are NAVY LEAGUERS, writing to deplore the paralysis of the NAVY LEAGUE, I almost began to think that the NAVY LEAGUE does not vitally exist at all. We have heard talk of the Liverpool Branch resigning. You would almost think the NAVY LEAGUE existed for the Liverpool Branch.⁴ You would almost think—and mind this—that the NAVY LEAGUE existed for itself, and not for the Empire. (Hear, hear.) That is why Mr. Wyatt and I resigned. We have deeply at heart the interests of the NAVY LEAGUE. I venture to say that nobody in this room has them more deeply at heart; but we do not let our personal interests, or even our personal desires, stand in the way of what we think to be our public duty. (Hear, hear.)

Now, let us think of one or two matters with regard to this. I see that this Amendment puts as one of its clauses, "That the NAVY LEAGUE refuses to initiate a public agitation upon matters of controversial detail," and that that is why they will not accept our Resolution. From what the last speaker said in reference to the Channel Fleet, and so on, that it was a matter of great doubt as to what was right, one would have thought that he could hardly have supported the Committee's Amendment, which in itself involves this great matter of the Channel Fleet. If it is controversial—I do not say it is; I say it is perfectly obvious it is not—but if it is, then, on the

¹ Nov. and Dec., 1906. See above, p. 21 (text and n. 3).

² See above, p. 21 n. 3.

³ In consequence of Mr. J. J. Jackson's letter in *Standard*, Dec. 5, 1906 (above, pp. 30 sq.).

⁴ Cp., e.g., Sir John Gray Hill's speech (referred to above, p. 196, 30 sq.).

second paragraph of the Amendment, he ought not to have supported it. But let us think of it in this way. Why have they brought that Amendment forward? I do not know what the proper word in the English language is, but I have heard of a word to "dish," and I believe that that is a word not inappropriate to the present matter. They have brought forward this Amendment—I say it and I mean it—with the sole object of "dishing" us. (Cheers.)¹ My late colleagues take credit—and, for what credit they can get, they may have it—for having initiated this matter of the Channel Fleet. They have no right to that credit. Captain Crutchley has written I do not know how many letters to members of the LEAGUE. I have seen one in which he says that they have taken the line they are now taking in regard to the Channel Fleet entirely independent of anything that we ever said or did. (THE SECRETARY: Absolutely.) MR. HORTON-SMITH: I am obliged to you; but, Sir, it does not alter the fact that we put it before you eight months ago and have been running it the whole way through. (Captain Crutchley: Question!) I should very much like to continue the conversation with Captain Crutchley, but it would not be in order. I will merely put the point. On November 2 last year² appeared Mr. Wyatt's able analysis of the redistribution scheme³ in the *Standard*,⁴ which was laid before the Executive Committee of the NAVY LEAGUE. What did they do? Nothing.⁵ On May 6⁶ we gave notice of the Amendment which we were going to move at the Annual Meeting.⁷ We did not insert the specific question of the reduction of the Channel Fleet in it, because we wished our Amendment to be in a form in which (as we thought) it must certainly be carried, and were able, by drafting it in the form in which it was actually moved, to show, by chapter and verse, that it had officially—that is to say, by the LEAGUE's own official utterances—been in every point approved by the LEAGUE in advance.⁸ Consequently the NAVY LEAGUE could not, except by stultifying its own Official Organ by throwing it overboard, get out of our Amendment. We all know what happened. They got out of it by throwing the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL into the waste-paper basket.⁹ On May 27¹⁰ appeared our joint letter in the *Standard*, in which we did deal with this redistribution and reduction of the Channel Fleet.¹¹ Matters were then so perfectly obvious that we determined—that we were in duty bound—to lay them before the public, and from that day onward the public has been urgently discussing the subject. On June 22¹² was dated our circular letter to you,¹³ and it was only on June 26¹⁴ that even the advance proofs appeared of the article published in the NAVY

¹ Cp. above, pp. 189 n. 6, 196 n. 3, and below, p. 202 n. 5, and p. 213 n. 6.

² Nov. 2, 1906.

³ Of October 23, 1906. Printed above, pp. 12 sq.

⁴ *Standard*, Nov. 2, 1906, printed above, pp. 18-21 (and see also, yet earlier, *s.v.* Oct. 29, 1906, above, p. 16).

⁵ Nothing:—although they had themselves officially condemned the scheme in advance, intimating that the Navy League must take action if the scheme should be persisted in (see above, p. 12).

⁶ May 6, 1907 (see above, p. 50).

⁷ See above, pp. 50, 60-62. (Annual Meeting, May 15, 1907; pp. 60 sqq.)

⁸ See above, pp. 60-62, 64, 71, and below, pp. 212 sq.

⁹ See above, pp. 81, 130, 138 sq.

¹⁰ May 27, 1907.

¹¹ See above, pp. 102 sqq., and the *Standard's* leading article upon it, above, pp. 104 sqq.

¹² June 22, 1907.

¹³ Printed above, pp. 128 sqq.

¹⁴ June 26, 1907.

LEAGUE JOURNAL of July.¹ I want you to notice one thing. I am delighted to think that my old colleagues are for once going to stick to their guns, that they are not going to repudiate that article in the JOURNAL. I hope they are not, but I have little faith, because I have before me a cutting from the *Daily News* in which Mr. Alan Burgoyne has written a letter² in which he states categorically that questions of strategy are nothing for the NAVY LEAGUE. Well, if this matter of the Channel Fleet is not a question of strategy, it is indeed difficult to know what strategy is.—I ought to have told you that Mr. Burgoyne is a member of the Executive Committee, and I think any of you who were present at the Annual General Meeting will probably recollect him without my saying anything more. (Hear, hear.)³—If the Channel Fleet reduction is a question of strategy, then it appears that Mr. Burgoyne is going to repudiate, or will reserve to himself the right to repudiate, at the earliest opportunity, this article in the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL, if it be thought desirable so to do.⁴ I am not going to say anything more about that, except, in conclusion, that the NAVY LEAGUE Executive Committee is not entitled to take the credit for bringing forward this point, and that they have only brought it forward in order to put it into an amendment with the express object of “dishing” us,⁵ and of enabling them to get something upon which they will be able to go to the country and say they have won the victory, and prevent us going back on the Executive Committee. I personally have not the slightest desire to go back on that Committee, after the way in which we have been treated, but, at the same time, if I did go back, I should do my duty as before.

Let me take one other point. Going back to the Resolution, I do not intend to go through each of the facts mentioned in detail in our Amendment at the Annual Meeting,⁶ and which forms part of our Resolution to-day,⁷ but I will say a few things. On that occasion one defence raised to our case was that our facts were wrong. The answer to that I think you will all know. A long controversy between Mr. Arnold White (the Executive's Protagonist) and ourselves took place in the *Standard*,⁸ and I venture to think that even Mr. Arnold White will not now dare to suggest that our facts were wrong.⁹ I will give you just one instance—torpedo-boat destroyers. He ventured to say that we were entirely wrong in the figures we had given.¹⁰ In his assertion, as we pointed out in the Press, he had quite forgotten that the coastal destroyers of this country are not destroyers at all, and that he had added them in as destroyers.¹¹ So little, indeed, do the Admiralty consider the coastal destroyers to be destroyers, that they have even omitted them from the list of

¹ July, 1907. See above, p. 143.

² *Daily News*, July 18, 1907, p. 6, col. 5.

³ See above, pp. 81, 85, 190 (text and n. 2).

⁴ Cp. the *Army and Navy Gazette*, June 29, 1907:—“The form in which the” Navy League’s “manifesto has been issued as an advance proof” (see above, p. 143 n. 4) “of a leading article in the next issue of the *N.L.J.*, has this advantage, that from what passed at the Annual Meeting it is quite clear that it can be repudiated at any time as an official expression of the views of the Executive Committee.”

⁵ Cp. above, p. 196, n. 3, p. 201 (text and n. 1).

⁶ May 15, 1907. See above, pp. 60 *sqq.*

⁷ July 19, 1907 (printed above, pp. 136 *sqq.*). ⁸ See above, p. 91, n. 2.

⁹ Mr. Arnold White, who was present, sat silent. (Cp. also above, p. 127.)

¹⁰ Cp. above, pp. 115, 119 *sq.*

¹¹ See above, pp. 120, 127; and cp. also above, pp. 76, 116 (text and n. 1), and below p. 203 (text and n. 2).

destroyers in the recent return.^{1 2} Let me just ask you to bear in mind that these several points in our Resolution are not mere individual points; they are all symptoms; they are all integral parts of the evidence showing how it is that this country has reduced its naval expenditure by over six millions in three years! *That is the cardinal, the crucial, fact.* These other points are evidences of it. Are you going to tell me, is Sir John Fisher going to tell me, or is anybody going to tell me, that a Navy which cost six millions less than the Navy did three years ago, is as good a Navy as the Navy of three years ago? ("Yes!") I heard one gentleman say "Yes." I am very glad to hear it; and I only regret that it is impossible for anyone with knowledge of the facts to agree with him.³

Let us consider another point. The question of the Two-Power Standard has been raised, but do not forget that, whatever be our case as regards the Two-Power Standard to-day, the Fleet of the future must be capable of still maintaining that Standard. Many people—one of my late colleagues asked me, "What on earth do you want to agitate for when we have the Two-Power Standard accepted?"⁴ My answer is:—"Words, words, words."⁵ Lip-service is no service. That is exactly what has happened. The Government has not maintained the Two-Power Standard. The Government came in meaning to throw it overboard, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman threw it overboard,⁶ and it was not until the question was asked him in the House of Commons as to whether the policy of the Government was the Two-Power Standard that any answer was got. And what was it? He did *not* answer it. He went off with a rider, an *ipse dixit* of his own, that the British Navy is to-day in possession of the Two-Power Standard. That was not the question⁷; but even in the answer given there are two points to be considered. First:—Which Two-Power Standard did he mean? He had, up to that date said he would not include France, and, therefore, if he was eliminating France, his answer may have any meaning. He might have meant that the British Navy is up to the Two-Power Standard, seeing that France is not one of the Powers to be considered; but in any case, and secondly, he did not answer the question as to what the policy of the future was to be.⁸ In November, 1905, the Unionist Government were going out.⁹ They brought in what is known as the Cawdor Memorandum.¹⁰ In that Memorandum it was definitely stated, on the authority of the Board of Admiralty that the *minimum*¹¹ requirement of this country for its national safety was the laying down of four *Dreadnoughts* in each of the two successive years, each of these four *Dreadnoughts* to be completed within twenty-four months, with an intimation that even more might have to be laid

¹ Cp. above, p. 116 (text and n. 1), 202, n. 11.

² In the Dilke Return, 1908, p. 62 (issued Aug. 2, 1908, see below, p. 438), these vessels are specifically described as "torpedo-boats, formerly designated coastal destroyers." So too, in the Return (dating as of April 1, 1908), known as the "Cawdor Return" (*Standard*, Aug. 29, 1908, p. 5, col. 4), issued by the Admiralty, Aug. 28, 1908 (referred to below, p. 448).

³ See above, p. 51; and cp. also Mr. H. W. Wilson, above, p. 78, and below, p. 287; and see also Admiral Fremantle, *N.L.J.*, June, 1906, p. 147.

⁴ Cp. above, p. 78 (text and nn. 1, 2).

⁵ Compare above, p. 77, and the phrase of Admiral Fremantle, "Words, mere words," *N.L.J.*, August, 1906, p. 200.

⁶ See above, pp. 6, 22, 72.

⁷ See above, p. 22.

⁸ See above, p. 22.

⁹ See above, pp. 1, 2.

¹⁰ See above, p. 1.

¹¹ See above, pp. 1, 4, 35, 40, 77, and below, pp. 388, 436.

down, but that, at any rate, *that* was the *minimum*.¹ Within a few weeks the Radical Government were in power,² and within a few months from that date—to be exact, it was in July, 1906—they suddenly announced that instead of four and four *Dreadnoughts*, three and two were quite sufficient.³ While yet only in intention, rumour of the proposed reduction had taken wing. Even the NAVY LEAGUE had been struck. On the 11th July⁴ the NAVY LEAGUE wrote an official and public letter to the Prime Minister, giving good reasons for the view that “not three, nor four, but” as many as “five armoured ships should constitute the main ship-building programme for the” then “current year” (1906),⁵ and concluding as follows:—“That the NAVY LEAGUE deems it a national duty to make a most urgent and earnest appeal to you, sir, as “head of the Government, not to suffer any reduction in the programme of naval construction which the Admiralty has declared “to represent the minimum⁶ of national necessity.”⁷ Yet, on the 27th July,⁸ that reduction was made, and that, too, notwithstanding that in the meantime the *Montagu* had to all intents and purposes gone, being given up for a total loss the following month⁹—the *Montagu*, a first-class fighting battleship, one of those elemental factors upon which the Admiralty Memorandum, “the Cawdor Memorandum,” had been based. Yes, notwithstanding that the *Montagu* had gone for good, they still reduced from four and four to three and two, and even, so far as one can see, they do not appear to be intending to replace the *Montagu* at all.¹⁰ One is not surprised; it has been done before. When the *Victoria* went down in June, 1893, the Government of the day were asked to replace her at once, and Lord Rosebery’s answer was, as Lieut. Knox has pointed out, “The British Empire does not reel for the loss of a battleship.”¹¹ But in these days, when so many factors are at work to damage and endanger battleships in the case of war, we cannot afford to lose one. The NAVY LEAGUE itself was literally amazed, and in October¹² addressed a letter to the Press,¹³ in which

¹ See above, pp. 1, 72.

² See above, p. 4.

³ See above, p. 5. The reduction was admittedly proposed by Lord Tweedmouth, the political head of the Board (see above, pp. 72, 122), the Naval element on which was still (in July, 1906) the same as in November, 1905 (see above, p. 5, and next paragraph.)

The four “Sea Lords,” from March, 1905, to March 5, 1907, were Admiral Sir John Fisher, Vice-Admiral Sir C. C. Drury, Capt. H. B. Jackson, Capt. F. S. Inglefield, but since Oct. 21, 1904, the responsibility has been and is the responsibility of the *First* Sea Lord, Sir John Fisher (see above, p. 1).

⁴ July 11, 1906 (see above, pp. 71 *sq.*, and below, p. 230).

⁵ *N.L.J.*, August, 1906, p. 200:—“The deplorable accident to the *Montagu* has deprived his Majesty’s fleet for many months, if not for ever, of one of its most powerful units, and if the officially expressed opinion of His Majesty’s naval advisers is to be trusted, not three, nor four, but five armoured ships should constitute the main shipbuilding programme for the current year.”

⁶ See above, p. 5.

⁷ *N.L.J.*, August, 1906, p. 200.

⁸ July 27, 1906.

⁹ Aug., 1906. See above, p. 6.

¹⁰ See the Prime Minister’s (Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman’s) somewhat flippant statement for so serious a matter, Oct. 25, 1906; cited by Admiral Fremantle, *s.v.* “Unsatisfactory Replies in the House of Commons,” *N.L.J.*, Jan., 1907, p. 17. See also, above, pp. 6 (text and nn. 8, 10), 9, 35, 77 n. 11.

¹¹ See *N.L.J.*, March, 1907, p. 79, where Lieut. Knox stated—before his sudden change of front when the League was called upon to take action in May, 1907—that “he would like to have seen the Government face the loss of the *Montagu* boldly by immediately announcing that they would lay the keel of another ship to replace her.”

¹² October 19, 1906.

¹³ Reprinted, *N.L.J.*, November, 1906, p. 275. See above, pp. 72, 78 n. 3.

they deliberately pointed out that the Two-Power Standard was gone so far as this country was concerned. The only thing I will say upon that is this: that the Two-Power Standard was alleged by the President of the NAVY LEAGUE, Mr. Yerburch, at the Annual Meeting,¹ as the one thing upon which the NAVY LEAGUE would stake its existence. Well, all I have to say is, that for years past the NAVY LEAGUE has been saying not only in its Editorials, but also in its Annual Reports and Official Letters to the Press, that the Two-Power Standard is being abandoned,² and all that time, when it ought to be staking its existence upon it, it has been sitting still, gone on writing an occasional letter, and :—doing nothing. (Cheers.)

Mr. W. L. AINSLIE was the next speaker on behalf of the Executive Committee.

Mr. JOHN J. JACKSON (one of the original Founders of the NAVY LEAGUE, and for many years an active member of its Executive Committee³ :—⁴

As one of the Founders of the NAVY LEAGUE, and having been present at its first meeting, held in the Westminster Palace Hotel, I think I may say I can speak with some authority as to the object of its creation and the main features of its foundation.

An appeal was made by some patriots, signing themselves as "Four Average Englishmen," in a letter to the *Pall Mall Gazette*, the purport of which was that a League should be formed to take note of the glaring deficiencies which from time to time were occurring in our first line of defence, and to call the attention of the public and the Government of the day to these shortcomings, with a view to pressing home the grave consequences of such a dangerous condition, and arousing the country and the authorities to the urgent need of providing adequate measures by which our paramount supremacy at sea might be assured beyond all doubt. It is scarcely necessary to repeat the long-accepted and vital dogma that the very existence of this Empire rests upon the undoubted assurance of this fact. Well, upon the acceptance of this doctrine the NAVY LEAGUE was founded, and for some considerable time I was a member of the Executive Committee, and we all worked harmoniously and strenuously to achieve the aim we had unanimously subscribed to. Until quite recently I think this spirit animated every member of the LEAGUE, and its one and sole object was, through evil report and good report, to attain this supreme national end.

As to studying the whims and fancies of the Government of the day, whichever party was in power, we gave no thought to this. We were enrolled and banded together as a body of patriots who dearly loved and cared for our country's welfare and security. We experienced, however, continuous rebuffs from the various Cabinets in office, and the official hose of cold water was constantly poured upon us on every possible occasion, and not the very slightest en-

¹ May 15, 1907 (above, pp. 60 *sqq.*).

² See the various utterances cited above, pp. 62 (text and n. 3), 70-78, 78 (text and nn. 3, 4); and see also *b* low, p. 208.

³ And a former Chairman of the Defence Committee of the London Chamber of Commerce. (See above, p. 31, n. 1.)

⁴ The report of this speech is taken from the *Standard*, July 27th, 1907, p. 5, col. 4, s.v. "The Navy League: A Criticism of the Executive by One of the Founders" (referred to below, p. 224).

couragement from any Government was ever accorded to us. But we were not daunted by this treatment; we had the welfare of the Empire at heart, and were doggedly determined to yield not one inch to any First Lord or Cabinet who strove to thwart us in our task. It has always been the case, and is still the case, that First Lords, with perhaps one or two exceptions, are mere tools in the hands of the Cabinet, so far as their powers of individual action are concerned, and, instead of studying and carrying out the real needs of the country, are compelled to mould their plans and their programmes in subservience to the exigencies of the Exchequer and the dictates of party policy.

I contend that this system masks the Imperial aspect, which should at all times and under all circumstances occupy the first and foremost position.

Therefore this is where the NAVY LEAGUE comes in and should occupy a leading place and become an important factor in informing the public and pressing home fearlessly to the Government what the country really requires and means to have. But perhaps some gallant admiral or sapient official may say, "What do you know about the Navy or naval affairs as to efficiency and sufficiency? "Who are you to dictate to the Government as to their naval policy?"

Well, my reply shall be very short. We are a body of well-informed, average, Englishmen; we make naval matters the study of our life, and, being in possession of ordinary common sense, we know that 2 and 2 make 4, and do not make 5. We have, in addition, means of obtaining most valuable and official information of the real state of things, and are in this respect on an equal footing with the agents of most foreign nations, who, as a rule, know much more about our so-called naval secrets and details than the British public, and we can, upon the strength of such data, arrive at a pretty clear conclusion as to how we stand and what we need.

Therefore, I have come to the conclusion that, as the present committee of the NAVY LEAGUE have departed from their early traditions, and have sadly deviated from the true lines upon which the LEAGUE was founded, I must vote for the Resolution of Messrs. Wyatt and Horton-Smith. The very fact of the need of a NAVY LEAGUE is the assumption that the Government are not always doing their duty. With respect to the present Government, I consider them guilty of the most flagrant dereliction of duty, and they have placed and are still further placing the country in a most dangerous and insecure position in their dealings with the Navy. The Ministers of the Government are the paid servants of the nation, and we, as citizens of this Empire, have every right to see that they do their duty, and to call them to account if they fail to do so.

Capt. W. V. ANSON was to have followed on behalf of the Executive Committee; and

Mr. ROBERT WEATHERBURN, M.I.Mech.E.,¹ a member of the Executive Committee, was next to have spoken against the Amendment and for the Resolution; when:—

The PRESIDENT, without calling upon either, the time being late, himself arose, and concluded on behalf of the Executive Committee.

Mr. WYATT then rose to exercise his right of reply as mover of the substantive motion.

¹ For whom see above, pp. 90, 163, 171, 172, 173, 175, 177, 180, 181, and below, pp. 281, 319, 368, 386, 387, 405.

Mr. WYATT:—I rise to reply to a void, because it is difficult to answer nothing, and until we came to the powerful appeal made by Mr. Yerburch to you just now there was hardly an argument of any kind raised against the Resolution which I moved. I showed to you then that the Executive Committee, or the majority, had put themselves in a position of astounding inconsistency. I showed you that the ground upon which they had founded their rejection of my Amendment at the General Meeting, had been absolutely repudiated by themselves since. Have they answered that? No. Why? For the simple reason that answer is impossible. The fact is what I have stated, and the whole of their argument at the last Meeting has been shattered to atoms. I will not deal with things of no importance; I will merely mention for a moment a point made by Mr. Nield. He referred to the extreme incompetence of the present Government. Then why entrust them with our naval policy? Is not that a fair comment upon that point? But the most extraordinary argument of all is that of Mr. Ainslie. He said that the NAVY LEAGUE ought not to agitate, because if they started an agitation, the 125 members of Parliament¹ would counter-agitate, and would petition to cut down the Navy.² If you want a really typical argument of the other side, you have it there. It is a counsel of fear, or avoiding issues; the NAVY LEAGUE is to avoid the issue, to shun its duty. Then we come to Mr. Yerburch's point, when he makes a great appeal to you on the ground that we cannot now oppose the reduction of estimates. The Navy Estimates have been cut down by over six million sterling in the last three years. You have on the Executive certain members defending that reduction.

The President: May I rise to explain? I said we grounded our attitude with regard to that upon the opinion of several experts, whom I quoted.

Mr. Wyatt: The opinion of the experts you quoted is that it is a good thing to cut down the Navy Estimates by six millions. If you quote other experts you will find their opinion is exactly on the opposite side. ("Quote them.") The first experts repudiate the second experts. ("Quote.") There is Mr. Wilson; we have in the room Admiral Close, whom I believe we may claim as our supporter³; there is Admiral Clarke, Capt. Nicholetts, a present member of the Committee, Admiral Gough, and Admiral de Horsey, all of whom side with the substance of the Resolution. I will now refer to one other point. I defy you as rational people to accept the terms of this Amendment, because it is a complete contradiction of the NAVY LEAGUE to-day. It says here, "In view of the fact that our Fleets are at the present time at the level of the Two-Power Standard "with a margin." Now, the NAVY LEAGUE issued an official publication to their members⁴—and although they repudiate the JOURNAL⁵ they have not yet repudiated the official pamphlet⁴—and in it you will find a paper inserted, which takes up a large part of the pamphlet,

¹ See above, p. 4.

² Exactly what has in fact since happened *without* the Navy League doing, and, indeed, *because of* the Navy League's refusal to do, its duty. See Index, s.v. "Appeals."

³ The claim was well founded. Admiral Close gave his vote against the Committee's Amendment. In other words, he voted for the Resolution. (Cp. also Admiral Close in anticipation, *Bristol Times and Mirror*, July 15, 1907.)

⁴ The N.L. Monthly Pamphlet of, and bearing date, May, 1907. Mentioned above, p. 62 n. 3, and below, pp. 230 *sq.*, 231 n. 3.

⁵ See above, pp. 81, 130, 138 *sq.*

called "Our Naval Supremacy: Is it Assured?"¹ If you turn to p. 14 of the pamphlet you will find a statement of the number of points assigned by the NAVY LEAGUE to the fleets, representing the value of the different fleets in the world. You probably know that these "points" are the line by which the naval experts sum up the valuation of fleets—and the expert authority at the command of the NAVY LEAGUE has issued this. It assigns to England 747 points; it assigns to the United States and Germany 752 points.² So that actually, in their own official publication—not yet repudiated—dated May, 1907,³ they contradict their own statement brought forward this afternoon. I defy any reasonable people to vote for this Amendment after that. The best thing would be to take all the NAVY LEAGUE pamphlets and JOURNALS and make a gigantic bonfire of them. The JOURNAL has been repudiated, and now the pamphlet has been repudiated by this Amendment which is brought forward this afternoon.⁴ I am not going to keep you much longer. The issue is a greater issue than the Committee. I ask you to lift your minds above the question of the Committee. Their resignation is not the point to consider. The point is the safety of the country; the point is the effect which will be produced on public opinion abroad, and in Germany in particular, if this NAVY LEAGUE, by its verdict this afternoon, endorses a policy of British naval reduction. Remember in Germany there is a vast organisation, the GERMAN NAVY LEAGUE, numbering over a million members, all for activity and urging a forward policy.⁵ Do you think that their eyes have not been turned on this dispute here? Do not you think the news of this controversy has already travelled far? The issue to be decided is more important than that of the resignation of the Committee. The real point is that the verdict given here to-day will be taken abroad in Germany as being typical of public opinion of this country, and if the verdict should be in favour of naval reduction, it will be said that the NAVY LEAGUE approve a reduction in the Navy Estimates of six millions; that would be indeed a message of hope and encouragement to the GERMAN NAVY LEAGUE. They would increase their activities; they would say "England is falling behind; even its NAVY LEAGUE is ceasing to advocate for the Navy." The result will be an enormous increase of the German programme.⁶ (Cheers.) I ask you for Britain's sake not to send that message to Germany to-day. Do not tell the Germans that the heart of England is beginning to fail. Send them a different message. Show them there are still men and women who are bent upon having a naval increase, and bent upon resisting a naval decrease, and they in Germany would see that by that message you desire that the path of Britain should be upwards and not downwards amongst the nations of the world. (Cheers.)

¹ Of date, November, 1906. (Printed, at length, in *N.L.J.*, Nov., 1906, pp. 301-308). See further, below, n. 4.

² See, further, below, pp. 230 *sq.*, and see also *N.L.J.*, November, 1906, p. 306.

³ The *N.L.* Monthly Pamphlet of, and bearing date, May, 1907. See also, p. 207, n. 4.

⁴ And yet the League actually reprinted the article in question—unaltered—in a similar official pamphlet dated and issued August, 1907. (See, further, below, pp. 230 *sq.*, 231 n. 5).

⁵ See above, p. 67, and below, pp. 434 n. 6, 453, etc.

⁶ Exactly what has happened. See the new German Navy (Bill 1907) Act, 1908, below, p. 266 *sqq.*

The Committee's Amendment was then put to the vote and declared defeated by a majority of 87 to 73.

The Committee were forced, in order to sustain their position, to fall back upon proxies—proxies which they had sought against the Resolution, without submitting to the proxy-givers the terms of their own (the Committee's) proposed Amendment.¹²³⁴

NAVY LEAGUE CONDEMNED.

MORAL VICTORY OF THE REFORM PARTY.

VOTING BY PROXY.

DAILY EXPRESS, July 20, 1907, p. 1, col. 6.

"The Reform Party in the NAVY LEAGUE, headed by Messrs. Wyatt and Horton-Smith, gained a **complete moral victory**⁵ at yesterday's meeting of the LEAGUE in Caxton Hall, Westminster.

"By 87 votes to 73 they obtained a majority among the members present at the Meeting against the Amendment moved by the Executive Committee's supporters, thus securing a strong expression of disapproval of the Executive Committee's policy in advocating and defending the recent naval reductions.⁶

"Of the proxies⁷ 847"—[this should have been 897]—"were recorded in favour of the Amendment, and 556"—[this should have been 559;—exclusive of some 60 received too late for legal use,⁸ the addition of which would have made 619]—"against, the latter figures being remarkably heavy in view of the natural tendency of voters by proxy to support the party in power."⁹

THE NAVY LEAGUE'S DISASTROUS POSITION.

STANDARD, July 20, 1907 (*Leading Article*), p. 6, cols. 5-6.

That the opinion of the majority of those members of the Navy LEAGUE who were present at the Extraordinary General Meeting

¹ See above, p. 189 (text and n. 9).

² For the tactics pursued by the dominant majority of the N.L.'s Executive Committee—the effect of which (whether designed or not) was to ensure their own victory—see, generally, above, pp. 136 n. 4, 142 n. 1, 164 (text and n. 2), 189 (text and n. 9), and below, note 8, and pp. 214 (nn. 1, 2), 217 n. 3.

³ For the actual figures see below on this page (text and n. 9), and p. 213.

⁴ For an admirable summary of the whole proceedings:—see *Standard*, July 20, 1907 (referred to above, p. 189) (with one slight inaccuracy corrected below, pp. 212 sq.). See also the present and succeeding pages.

⁵ Cp. also below, pp. 210, 213, 214, 217, 231, 232 sq.

⁶ See above, p. 209.

⁷ In connection herewith, see above, n. 1, and below, n. 8.

⁸ Proxies *in favour* of the Resolution could not (unfortunately) be sent out to Members of the League as early as had been desired.

Inter alia, before we were apprised of the date fixed for the Meeting, and before, therefore, we were enabled by the Committee to fill in such date upon our forms of proxy and issue the latter to the members, the Committee had already (as early as June 30, 1907) commenced sending out their own forms of proxy. (See above, p. 142 n. 1, and p. 148 n. 2.)

Has not such action sometimes gone by the name of "stealing a march"?—to say nothing of the glaring inaccuracies contained in the Committee's urgent circulars beseeching proxies in their own favour (as to which cp. above, pp. 162 sqq., 171, 172, 173 sq., 174 sq., 176 sqq., 181, all referred to above, 136 n. 4, and p. 142 n. 1).

⁹ If the proxies and the votes given at the Meeting might accurately be added together, the result produced would be:—For the Amendment (897+73=) 970; Against (559+60+87=) 706.

held yesterday afternoon was against the naval policy of the present Administration was clearly demonstrated. Upon the position adopted by the Executive Committee of the LEAGUE we desire to make the briefest comment. At the Annual General Meeting of the LEAGUE, held last month,¹ the committee opposed the Resolution² brought forward by Mr. H. F. Wyatt and Mr. Horton-Smith. That Resolution² suggested the condemnation by the LEAGUE, upon seven specified points,³ of the recent action of the Board of Admiralty.⁴ Five out of the seven instances have been the subject of much animadversion in these columns. The other two, which relate to the building programme, we have purposely omitted to discuss; holding that the questions involved, however important, were not of immediate urgency. There was no dispute as to the facts of the case, which have all been officially confirmed. They are all, as Mr. Wyatt insisted, the direct result of the determination of the present Government to effect an economy. In our view the consequences are highly injurious to the national security; and we were so far necessarily in agreement with the opinion of Mr. Wyatt and of Mr. Horton-Smith and their supporters. And until their Resolution² was brought before the Annual General Meeting in June,⁵ we had every reason to suppose that we were also in agreement with the Executive Committee, as the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL, the official organ of the League, had criticised adversely the very points specified in the Resolution.^{2 6} But the Executive Committee, at that Meeting, opposed the Resolution² in the most unequivocal terms; nor did they hesitate to disavow responsibility for the sentiments of their own JOURNAL.⁷ They were, therefore, committed to a formal approval of the naval policy of the present Administration.⁸ We regretted their decision, because it constituted an endorsement, by a body wielding great influence, of a course of action with regard to naval affairs against which we have conceived it to be our duty strongly to protest. We regret still more that, after the defeat of Mr. Wyatt's Resolution² at the Annual General Meeting, the committee should have persisted in their determination, which we regard as mistaken; because, as Mr. Maxse pointed out in his excellent speech yesterday afternoon,⁹ the situation resolves itself into a kind of internecine conflict. Such division is much to be regretted at a time when the country requires, before all, that those who uphold its traditions shall be united.

The tenour of the original Resolution² brought forward by Mr. Wyatt and Mr. Horton-Smith¹⁰ was to the effect that the NAVY LEAGUE should record their condemnation of the diminution in our naval strength involved in the reduction of the Navy Estimates by six

¹ "Last month" should have read "last May"; May 15, 1907. (See above, pp. 60 *sqq.*)

² The motion in question took the form of an "Amendment to the Annual Report for 1906" at the Annual General Meeting of May 15, 1907 (see above, pp. 60 *sqq.*), and of a substantive Resolution at the Extraordinary General Meeting of July 19, 1907. (See above, pp. 136 *sqq.*)

³ In addition to an eighth:—in the Naval Base on the East Coast. The Resolution of July 19, 1907, further dealt with the perilous reduction of the Channel Fleet. (See above, pp. 132, 141, and see also below, pp. 212 *sq.*)

⁴ See above, pp. 60–62.

⁵ "June" should have read "May,"—May, 1907. (See above, n. 1)

⁶ See above, pp. 53, 56 *sq.*, 60 *sqq.*, 64, 70–80, 129 *sq.*, 139.

⁷ See above, pp. 81, 85, 88 *sq.*, 130, 138 *sq.*

⁸ Cp. above, pp. 89, 90, 94, 101, 104, 108, 130, 132, 137, and below, pp. 213, etc. And for the Liberal Party's Official Gratitude, see below, p. 229 n. 6, and pp. 239–240.

⁹ July 19, 1907; above, pp. 193–200.

¹⁰ May 15, 1907. (Above, pp. 60–62.)

millions during the last two years.¹ The effect of this reduction, in the terms of the Resolution² has been exemplified in the abandonment of naval stations in the West Indies, the Falkland Islands,³ Esquimalt,⁴ and Trincomali, and the withdrawal of cruisers from every quarter of the globe;⁵ by the dismissal of over 6,000 workmen from the royal dockyards;⁶ by the decrease in the *personnel* of 3,000 men;⁷ by the abolition of some 70 coastguard stations and detachments;⁸ by the failure to build an adequate number of destroyers;⁹ by the reduction in the building programme;¹⁰ and by the introduction of the short service system.¹¹ The diminution in the peace patrol of the Navy by the withdrawal of cruisers has had consequences graver than the public yet understands.¹² The matter is so serious that the Under-Secretary for the Colonies,¹³ who has never been accused of subordinating his political instincts to mere considerations of Imperial responsibility, declared in public that, unless the Admiralty could fulfil its duty, the necessary ships must be provided by another department of State.¹⁴ A more scathing criticism of Admiralty methods has—all things considered—seldom been uttered. And even Mr. Robertson, whose most cherished ideal of the exigencies of office consists in never admitting anything, has recently announced that he will consider the advisability of providing more cruisers for patrol duties.¹⁵ The reduction of the dockyard establishments has, as we have constantly shown, resulted in a scandalous accumulation of repairs, and in the employment of seamen upon dockyard work, to the detriment of their training, and to their not unnatural discontent.¹⁶ Upon the abolition of the coastguard stations,⁸ the official spokesmen of the Admiralty have preserved an ominous reticence. It has not been explained by whom the coastguard duties are in future to be performed, or why the strength of that invaluable force has been impaired. On the face of it, the thing involves a public danger and a most deplorable innovation upon naval tradition. In the same way, the introduction of the short service system¹¹ brings into the Fleet men who have no permanent interest in the Service; who, so soon as they are efficient seamen, are sent ashore, to swell the unskilled labour market, and whose influence too often tends to disaffection.

We have more than once pointed out that these aspects of the present administration—and they are but a few out of many equally injurious in effect¹⁷—make a heavy indictment, worthy of the most careful consideration. It will be observed that not one of them has any relation to strategical requirements.¹⁸ They are easily intelligible to every one. The object of each and all is to save money. We are, therefore, unable to understand the arguments of the Executive Committee of the NAVY LEAGUE, who contend that questions of strategy do not fall within their province to discuss,¹⁹ and (with some ap-

1 See above, pp. 60 *sqq.*

2 See above, p. 210 n. 2.

3 Cp. above, p. 63.

4 Cp. above, p. 63, and below, p. 384.

5 Cp. above, p. 61, and below, p. 250.

6 Above, p. 61.

7 Above, p. 61.

8 Above, pp. 61, 75, and below, p. 404.

9 Above, p. 61.

10 Above, pp. 61 *sq.*

11 Above, p. 62.

12 Cp. above, pp. 44-46, 49, 74, and below, p. 250.

13 *I.e.*, Mr. Winston Churchill.

14 See, further, above, p. 74 n. 10.

15 Cp. above, p. 74.

16 Cp. above, pp. 92, 114, and below, p. 340.

17 Cp. above, *passim* (especially pp. 13 n. 1, 14, 16, 19 *sqq.*, 23 *sq.*, etc., etc.)

18 Cp. above, pp. 102, 131, 132, 141.

19 Cp. above, pp. 65, 131, 188, 191, and below, p. 215, etc.

parent inconsistency) that the facts cited are inconsiderable details. We regard them as part of the very essence of maritime supremacy. Until the proposals of the British Government were brought before The Hague Conference, we were desirous of giving unreserved credence to the First Lord's declarations that his Majesty's Ministers were determined to maintain the maritime predominance of this country. But when we find that the British delegates are instructed to advocate the adoption of a policy which, to quote Lord Salisbury's observation on the subject, would leave the British Fleet nothing to do except to guard these shores from invasion—would leave it, as an instrument for the prevention of war, absolutely impotent¹—the real intention of the present Government is revealed. In fact, if not in word, they repudiate the whole doctrine of British sea power. Their policy must be considered as a whole. The reductions in the Fleet are but the logical consequence of the enfranchisement of the neutral, and the total abandonment of the right of search.¹ Both the Prime Minister and Sir Edward Grey have declared themselves in favour of this betrayal of the dominant national interest. It should be clearly understood, therefore, that those who commit themselves, either tacitly or openly, to approval of the reductions in naval strength, are lending their support to an integral part of a policy which aims at nothing less than the total relinquishment of British naval supremacy. Among the speakers at yesterday's meeting of the NAVY LEAGUE were several who counselled delay in attempting to arouse the country to a sense of its peril. We are unable to perceive any reason in this advice. Already the retrenchments and disastrous experiments in naval administration are incurring heavy debts which must be paid with ruinous interest in the future, and, as we believe, they have even resulted in creating an actual present danger to the national security.

THE CHANNEL FLEET AND
MESSRS. WYATT AND HORTON-SMITH.
THE NAVY LEAGUE'S BELATED AFTER-THOUGHT.²

STANDARD, *July 22, 1907, p. 8, col. 5.*

To the Editor of the STANDARD.

Athenæum Club,
Pall Mall, S.W.,
July 20, 1907.

SIR,—In your admirable report³ of yesterday's Meeting of the NAVY LEAGUE⁴ there is one slight inaccuracy which I would ask you kindly to allow me to correct.

I did not say (as your report accidentally makes it appear) that it was I myself—that is, I alone—who had prompted the League's

¹ Cp. below, p. 252.

² See above, p. 201, and below, p. 220.

³ *Standard*, July 20, 1907, p. 7, col. 7, and p. 8, col. 1, referred to above, pp. 189 n. 1, and 209 n. 4.

⁴ July 19, 1907. (See above, pp. 189–209.)

committee on the subject of the Channel Fleet by writing to you about in the month of May.¹

My action throughout has been joint action taken in conjunction with Mr. Wyatt, and the letter to which I referred² was a joint letter from us both.¹

I am, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

THE NAVY LEAGUE.

DRASTIC RECONSTRUCTION, OR—A SPLIT.

July 20, 1907.

By Mr. L. J. Maxse;—*National Review*, August, 1907, p. 844.³

The struggle between the "deadheads" of the NAVY LEAGUE, who are content to open their mouths and shut their eyes and swallow whatever the Admiralty offers them, and the "agitators," who realise that the British Navy as we know it to-day is the child of agitation and can only be preserved by agitation, came to a head on July 19,⁴ when an Extraordinary General Meeting of the League was held at Caxton Hall, Westminster, on the Requisition of Mr. H. F. Wyatt and Mr. L. G. H. Horton-Smith. Mr. Wyatt moved a long and detailed Motion condemning the action of the Committee in condoning the reductions of the Navy,⁵ which was met by an amendment⁶ moved on their behalf by Sir John Gray Hill, expressing general approval of the Committee's attitude, coupled with apprehension as to the composition of the Channel Fleet.⁷

Unfortunately for the Committee, their purpose had been hopelessly compromised since the Annual Meeting⁸—at which they had one and all declared that all was for the best under the best of all possible Admiralties—by the publication of an authorised⁹ article in the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL emphasising the perilous position of the Channel Fleet;¹⁰ and although the Committee enlisted some Members of Parliament and other celebrities¹¹ who had never done a day's work for the League to fight their cause, Sir John Gray Hill's amendment was defeated by 87 votes to 73.¹² . . . On the proxies the Committee were only supported by 847 [897¹³] members against 556 [559,¹⁴ or rather 619¹⁵], although they had moved heaven and earth by circular and otherwise. As the League contains about 2,700 members,¹⁶ half the Leaguers took no part in the proceedings.

¹ Dated, May 25, 1907 (*Standard*, May 27, 1907, p. 7, cols. 1-2), above, pp. 101-4.

² Above, p. 201.

³ Cp. below, p. 240.

⁴ July 19, 1907. Above, pp. 189-209.

⁵ Printed above, pp. 136 *seq.* (and 190).

⁶ A purely "dishing amendment." See above, pp. 189 n. 6; 196 n. 3; 201; 202 n. 5.

⁷ Printed above, p. 196.

⁸ Of May 15, 1907. (Above, pp. 60-81.)

⁹ Cp. above, pp. 152, 202.

¹⁰ Concerning this article see above, p. 143 (text and n. 4).

¹¹ See above, pp. 197, 198, 200, and below, p. 232.

¹² See above, p. 209.

¹³ 897. See above, p. 209.

¹⁴ 559. See above, p. 209.

¹⁵ 619. See above, p. 209.

¹⁶ See below, pp. 214 '238, 295.

Although not prepared to support the agitation, they evidently feel little confidence in the Committee, and if the NAVY LEAGUE is to be saved from a split—as we hope it may be—there must be a drastic reconstruction, and an infusion of new blood into the present management.

NAVY LEAGUE.

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND THE RECENT VOTE.

MORNING POST, *July 22, 1907, p. 8, col. 2*; STANDARD, *July 22, 1907, p. 8, col. 5*; TIMES, *July 22, 1907, p. 12, col. 6*.

To the Editor.

4 Paper Buildings, Temple, E.C.,
July 20, 1907.

SIR,—At the extraordinary general meeting of the NAVY LEAGUE yesterday, the present majority of its Executive Committee were upheld by those who had not heard the case against them and condemned by those who had.

In spite of all the prestige of possession, in spite of the efforts of the members of Parliament, hitherto but little known in connection with the League, whom they placed on the platform to support their amendment to our resolution, that amendment was defeated on the vote taken in the room by a majority of fourteen.

The chairman, Mr. Yerburgh, declared in his opening speech the deep desire of his party to win on the votes, not only of those absent, but of those present—not merely on proxies, but on personally given decisions. This desire was baffled. In this vital respect, they secured, not victory, but defeat.

Even in regard to the votes of the absent,¹ our opponents' measure of success was poor indeed. With all the weight of a reigning administration, with all the head office's touch with the League's members in their favour, they could secure but 897 proxies,² as against 550³ obtained by ourselves. And, as the total number of full members of the League in Britain is about 2,700,⁴ nearly half of these have shown their utter indifference to the urgent appeals made to them by the majority of the committee. In fact, only one-third of the entire voting membership of the League could be induced by those appeals to concede their support.

If their defeat (after three hours' debate) on the votes of those present at the meeting stood alone, what amount of authority or credit would remain to a Committee ruled by a majority who were unable, on an occasion so crucial, to sustain their cause?

But their failure resides not in such defeat alone. Against the actual indictment of themselves brought forward by the mover of our Resolution—an indictment crushing from the very nature of his case—they could offer, and they did offer, no word of reply. This

¹ Obtained in manner above referred to, see pp. 136 n. 4, 142 n. 1, 164 (text and n. 2), 189 (text and n. 9), 217 n. 3.

² Concerning the Committee's proxies, see above, pp. 209 nn. 2, 8, and earlier passages there referred to.

³ Or rather, 619. See above, p. 209 (text and nn. 8, 9).

⁴ Cp. above, p. 213, and below, p. 238.

morally vanquished majority, the present rulers of the NAVY LEAGUE, maintain silence as their sole defence.

And naturally. For it was shown with a conclusiveness beyond refutation that, by their authenticated¹ article in the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL for July, advance proofs of which they sent to the Press,² they had stultified their every previous utterance, and had ruined for ever their own case. They had affirmed, with loud insistence, their boundless trust in Sir John Fisher, "he being solely responsible for the efficiency of the Fleet for war" (the words used by the President of the NAVY LEAGUE at its general meeting on May 15³). Now, in their article,² they have shown this efficiency as non-existent, and Sir John Fisher's present disposition of fleets as violating every strategical rule of war.

They had intimated that the NAVY LEAGUE should never meddle with strategy,⁴ and in this article they have laid down the law upon it. They had declared to the LEAGUE and the country that the national safety was completely assured, and now they have done their best to prove that it is in grave peril.

By these means they have supplied nothing less than absolute demonstration of their immense previous error, and therefore of the necessity for their present resignation. Of what possible use can the NAVY LEAGUE be to the Empire if its affairs are to remain under the direction of gentlemen whose colossal mistake is now fact established by themselves? While they control it, what respect can it henceforth command, either in the daughter States or at home? Who will care to join it? What value can attach to its views?

In this controversy our opponents have appealed not to reason, but to their own names. Their principal, almost their sole, argument has been the threat of resignation. Let them now render a great service to the LEAGUE and to the country by giving fulfilment to that menace.

So only can they now avert that bi-section of the League of which they have avowed their fear. For if they cling to their office our course is plain. We are bound in duty and honour to that large proportion of the LEAGUE's members which has granted us its trust to go forward in this matter. Since the existing body, under its present guidance, has become false to its fundamental aims, we must, and we shall, in the event named, take the necessary steps—now well within reach—to form a new and vital organisation⁵ to advocate those deserted objects with the NAVY LEAGUE was created to fulfil.

We are, Sir, Yours faithfully,
HAROLD F. WYATT,
L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

July 22, 1907. Captain W. V. Anson's letter (of date July 19 1907) in the *Morning Post*, July 22, 1907, p. 8, col. 2.⁶

¹ See above, p. 188.

² May 15, 1907 (above, pp. 60 *sqq.*).

³ The IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE.

⁴ See above, p. 143 (text and n. 4).

⁵ Cp. above, p. 211 (text and n. 19), etc.

⁶ See below, pp. 216 *sq.*

July 23, 1907. Mr. A. W. Lafone's letter (of date July 22, 1907) in the *Morning Post*, July 23, 1907, p. 8, col. 5.¹

THE NAVY LEAGUE.

THE TWO SIDES.

MORNING POST, July 24, 1907, p. 8, col. 5.

To the Editor of the MORNING POST.

4, Paper Buildings, Temple, E.C.,

July 23, 1907.

SIR,—In the letter which you published yesterday² Captain W. V. Anson enters a further appeal for delay of any action by the NAVY LEAGUE. He says, "Agitation, when unsupported by properly ascertained facts, does endless harm, and when the NAVY LEAGUE may "want all its strength *in a few years*" [the italics are ours] "to stem "the tide of anti-militarism carried to a dangerous pitch, which it "may do, it is its duty to consider all its actions most carefully, "accumulate all the information possible, and weigh it well before "acting."

This does indeed sound like the authentic voice of the present majority of the Committee. Anti-militarism and anti-patriotism are at this present moment raging like the veritable breath of pestilence throughout Britain. They are putrefying the very springs of our national life. They are killing that love of country which is at the root of all noble self-sacrifice for country's sake. They are representing that heroic instinct which makes a man ready to give his life in battle for the land that gave him birth as something base, barbarous, and vile. In the "few years" more, during which Captain Anson wishes the NAVY LEAGUE to do nothing except accumulate information and keep on weighing it, these deadly forces will have poisoned the very veins of England, and as the Navy and Army partake of the life of the rest of our population the contagion will have spread to them also, and maimed their fighting strength.

If your readers wanted an utterance exactly typical of the majority of the Committee of the NAVY LEAGUE, assuredly they have it here. Upon that Committee Captain Anson is but a new recruit, and he might have been expected to resist the influences round him, yet already he appears to have assimilated the spirit of the Board. He is in favour of "a few years" delay before the NAVY LEAGUE attempts to do anything.

As to his contention that the Board of Admiralty, who are, of course, in effect simply departmental officials, could not possibly be influenced by the pressure of the Government, of which they are the servants, let us ask him this question:—Supposing that the present Ministry had been returned to office at the last General Election pledged to increase our armaments, instead of (as in fact they were)

¹ See below, p. 217.

² July 22, 1907. See above, p. 215.

pledged to decrease them, does he really think that that circumstance would have had no influence on our naval and military policy? But unless he thinks this, his contention that the Admiralty are entirely uninfluenced by the Government falls instantly to the ground. With regard to the necessity for properly ascertaining facts, to which Captain Anson refers, the fact that the safety of the country is endangered by existing naval conditions has been at last ascertained even by the majority of the Committee of which he is himself a member, and they have made the information public.

We turn now to Mr. A. W. Lafone's letter which appears in your columns to-day.¹ Mr. Lafone talks about the tail wagging the dog, and his position seems merely to be that it was very impertinent in a minority of the Committee to seek to impose their ideas on the majority. But we resigned from the Committee on the 13th of last May.² From that moment, therefore, the controversy ceased to be one between a smaller and a larger portion of that body. It became a controversy conterminous with the League itself, a controversy between the party of action and the party of delay, between those who want to do something now and those who want to wait "a few years" first. The contest is between the living and vital elements of the NAVY LEAGUE on the one hand, and its stagnant or retrogressive forces on the other.

Can Mr. Lafone, or anyone else, ignore the fact that we do not stand alone in this matter? Can it be forgotten that 559 members of the League sent us their proxies (to say nothing of some 60 others which arrived too late for use³), and that amongst our supporters were many of the ablest and most distinguished men of whom the LEAGUE can boast? And, finally, can Mr. Lafone deny that the audience before whom we had the honour to present our case on Friday last was one of a wholly exceptional kind in the education, the ability, the knowledge, and the patriotism of those who composed it?⁴

He would do well to deny it if he could, because it was by this audience, after exhaustive debate, that our cause was approved and that of his own party condemned.

We are, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

THE CHANNEL FLEET AND THE NORE DIVISION OF THE HOME FLEET.

July 24, 1907. The Channel Fleet; and the Condition of the Nore Division of the Home Fleet;—*Standard's* leading article, July 24, 1907, p. 6, col. 6, commencing:—

"We have repeatedly insisted that the reduction of the Channel

¹ July 23, 1907. (Above, p. 216.)

² May 13, 1907. See above, pp. 52 *sq.*

³ Thus 619 proxies (see above, p. 209),—independently of 87 members who voted personally on our side at the Caxton Hall (see above, p. 209). And for the unfair tactics adopted by the dominant majority of the N.L.'s Committee, the effect of which was to secure victory for themselves at the expense of national safety, see the passages cited above, p. 136 n. 4, and p. 142 n. 1.

⁴ Cp. also below, pp. 232, 237.

Fleet from 67 vessels to 21, by the transference of units to the Home Fleet, which is a Reserve, constitutes a grave national danger."

In the course of the article it is stated that:—"The information from our Correspondent at Sheerness, which we publish this morning" [*s.v.* "Instantly Ready" Fleet: Its Crippled Destroyers: Repairs Postponed: Defenceless East Coast" 1], "shows that the condition of the Nore Division—upon which, we have been told, the first brunt of conflict will fall—is nothing less than a public scandal."²

"DISARMING TO THE ENEMY."

July 25, 1907. "Disarming to the Enemy: French View of British Naval Folly":—*Daily Express*, July 25, 1907, p. 1, col. 6, abridging "a powerful article on 'The Dupery of Disarmament,' by M. de Lanessan in the *Siècle*," which concluded as follows:—

"Disarmament as it is being practised in Britain and France is all the more dangerous because Germany and the United States and Japan are every day increasing their power and their armaments, Germany at least with unmistakably aggressive intentions."

THE ADMIRALTY AND THE CHANNEL FLEET.

"PUBLIC SCANDAL AND DANGER."

A RECORD OF EVENTS.

*Reprinted from the STANDARD, July 25, 1907.*³

[N.B.—The passages within square brackets are our own additions.—
H.F.W. and L.G.H.H.-S.]

The following brief abstract of recent changes in naval administration will show how, by pursuing a policy of reductions under cover of a specious and deliberate disguise, the Government and the Admiralty have destroyed the Channel Fleet by depriving it of essential units, and have endangered the national security:—

PROLOGUE.

[1906.]

Liberal Government come into power,⁴ "pledged to economy." Prime Minister congratulates Cobden Club on protest against "provocative expenditure" (December 15, 1906). Comprehensive scheme of naval reductions prepared. Shipbuilding "minimum" programme cut down. Sea-going squadrons to be reduced by one-quarter of their strength. Twelve battleships and ten cruisers to be laid up.

¹ *Standard*, July 24, 1907. p. 7, col. 7.

² We would refer our readers to the *Standard* for the details. They will well repay examination.

³ This is the extract referred to below, pp. 236, 239.

⁴ See above, pp. 2, 4.

CHANNEL FLEET TO BE REDUCED FROM 67 VESSELS TO 21.

October 15, 1906. The *Standard* publishes information of intended reductions.¹

October 15-24 [1906]. Interval, occupied, on the part of Admiralty apologists, with attempts to prove that reductions actually increase strength of Fleet, and on the part of the Admiralty in designing a plausible scheme to account for a complete reversal of policy pursued under Unionist Government.

INVENTION OF HOME FLEET.

October 24 [1906]. Scheme published.² Admiralty issue Memorandum to the Press, changing name of Reserve Fleet to Home Fleet,³ calling ships laid up as preliminary to abolition, a "Special Reserve."⁴ and affirming that the "constitution of a Home Fleet will increase the immediate striking strength of the Navy." These changes denounced by the *Standard*⁵ as nothing but a disguise invented to mask the real nature of innovations and reductions dangerous to the national security.

[★ ★ ★ November 2 [1906]. Mr. H. F. Wyatt's Analysis of the Admiralty Memorandum printed in the *Standard*.⁶]

November 3 [1906]. Lord Brassey issues a Memorandum to the London Chamber of Commerce, stating that the Home Fleet would "become a new and powerful fighting force." The *Standard* expresses regret that Lord Brassey should present to the London Chamber of Commerce a document so misleading both in its premises and conclusions (which have since been utterly discredited).

November 6 [1906]. The Prime Minister, as Chairman of the Committee of Defence, states that the "redistribution of ships about to be made adds to the fighting efficiency of the Fleet."

[1907.]

REDUCTION OF CHANNEL FLEET.

January, 1907. The Channel Fleet reduced from 67 vessels to 21. Three battleships, two armoured cruisers, five protected cruisers and scouts, and 36 destroyers transferred to the Reserve (now called Home) Fleet, and distributed among various separate commands.

The *Standard* asserts that the reduction of the first line of defence from a complete Fleet to a small squadron constitutes a grave national danger, and shows that the Home Fleet, manned with nucleus crews, stationed in harbour, and split into several commands, cannot be instantly ready for war.⁷

January 1 [1907]. The Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty states that the Home Fleet will be "at all times in a state of immediate readiness for war."

CONSTITUTION OF
RESERVE, OR "HOME," FLEET.

February [1907]. The *Standard* continues to insist that ships in harbour manned with nucleus crews cannot be ready for war.

¹ See above, p. 12.

² See above, pp. 12 *sq.*

³ See above, p. 13 n. 1.

⁴ Cp. above, p. 23.

⁵ Reprinted above, pp. 19 *sqq.*

⁶ Cp. above, pp. 12, etc.

⁷ Cp. below, p. 223.

[February 19, 1907. Mr. Robertson, Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty, definitely states that the strength of the Channel Fleet is not to be increased. Cf. the *Standard's* leading articles, July 26, 1907, p. 6, col. 6, and August 10, 1907, p. 4, col. 5; and cf. also *Standard*, August 14, 1907, p. 5, col. 7.]

March 26 [1907]. Official announcement that the Nore Division will have full crews. (Compare previous official announcements that all nucleus crew ships are instantly ready for war. External pressure having forced the Admiralty fully to man the Nore Squadron, and, the *personnel* having been reduced by 3,000 men, the whole of their manning arrangements are disorganised.)

Official announcement that the *Dreadnought*, having been made flagship of Home Fleet in November, will be stationed at Sheerness. (She has never been to Sherness, and cannot go there,¹ because there is not enough water, nor will any dock in Chatham hold her.) Five admirals appointed to Home Fleet, thus disorganising the whole of the commands and destroying the effect of two years' squadron training.

April [1907]. The Home Fleet goes for its first cruise, which lasts a week, during which it has no night training.

May 1 [1907]. Lord Cawdor asks the First Lord if the Nore Squadron is ready for sea "at a moment's notice." Lord Tweedmouth replies that the Home Fleet is in a "state of development," and admits that the Nore Division (as previously stated in the *Standard*) is used as a training squadron for boys, and that it had a reduced allowance of ammunition (raised to full allowance on May 17 [1907]).

May 3 [1907]. The *Standard* again insists that the Home Fleet is not, and cannot be, immediately ready for service; that repairs are accumulating in the dockyards; and that the nucleus crews, instead of being trained, are taken to perform dockyard duties in place of discharged workmen.

[★ ★ ★ May 25, 1907. Joint letter of Mr. H. F. Wyatt and Mr. L. Graham H. Horton-Smith concerning the Channel Fleet—published in the *Standard*.² See also *Standard's* leading article of the same day.³]

June [1907]. The Channel Squadron and part of the Home Fleet cruise for training. (Second cruise in six months of the Home Fleet.)

[June 17, 1907. The Civil Lord of the Admiralty states that the Channel Fleet is "amply sufficient for the duties it is required to undertake." See below, p. 221, under July 4, 1907; and see the *Standard*, August 10, 1907 (leading article), p. 4, col. 5, and August 14, 1907, p. 5, col. 7.]

[★ ★ ★ June 22, 1907. Circular letter from Mr. H. F. Wyatt and Mr. L. Graham H. Horton-Smith to members of the NAVY LEAGUE enclosing, for signature, form of Requisition to Executive Committee to convene Extraordinary General Meeting to consider Resolution printed above, on p. . . ., dealing in part with the Channel Fleet.]

[★ ★ ★ ★ June 26, 1907. First appearance of even the *advance*-proofs of NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL's unsigned July article (liable to repudiation⁴), dealing with the Channel Fleet.]

¹ She did eventually (on February 5, 1908) manage to get there—under circumstances well narrated, *viz.* "*Dreadnought* in a River Prison," *Daily Express*, February 6, 1908, p. 5, col. 2. (See below, pp. 220, 324.)

² May 27, 1907. See above, pp. 101-4. ³ Above, pp. 104-7. ⁴ See above, p. 143 n. 4.

June 29 [1907]. Lord Tweedmouth gives "his word of honour" to the Liberal Social Club "that at this moment the British Fleet "is as strong as ever it was, and, as I think, stronger."¹

July 2 [1907]. The *Standard*, commenting on this remarkable utterance, shows that the total number of available battleships in the Navy had been decreased by 12; that the sea-going squadrons had been reduced by 13 battleships and cruisers; that the *personnel* had been reduced by 3,000 men; and that the *Channel Fleet* had been reduced by 46 vessels.

July 4 [1907]. Lord Tweedmouth states that the battleship strength of the Channel Fleet is "greater now than ever it was." (On June 17, the Civil Lord of the Admiralty had stated that the Channel Fleet was "amply sufficient for the duties it is required to undertake.")²

July 9 [1907]. The Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty denies that the sea-going squadrons had been reduced in strength, on the ground that the Nore Division of the Home Fleet is a sea-going squadron.

July 11 [1907]. The *Standard* shows that, according to his own statement, made on March 7 [1907], Mr. Robertson was unable to define the difference between a sea-going squadron and a squadron not sea-going; adopts Mr. Wyndham's simple definition of a sea-going Fleet as being a "Fleet always at sea"; and quotes the further statement of the Parliamentary Secretary, of the same day, that the Home Fleet would only have 70 per cent. sea-time, as compared with the real sea-going Fleets. (It has never had 70 per cent., or anything like it.)

July 10 [1907]. The Admiralty issue orders to mobilise the Home Fleet on July 22 [1907], thus giving twelve days' official notice (actual notice, several weeks⁴) to an "instantly ready"⁵ Fleet.

[July 15, 1907. The Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty stated that the 43 vessels transferred from the Channel to the Home Fleet were always as instantly ready for war as if they had been left with the Channel Fleet. See *Standard*, August 14, 1907, p. 5, col. 7.]

July 22 [1907]. [See above, on this page, under July 10, 1907.] The *Standard* states that, "even with several weeks' notice, it has been "with the utmost difficulty that the men have been provided to make "up the nucleus crews to full strength," and that, in the Devonport command, the Royal Marines have been required to make good deficiencies in naval ratings. (64 ships of the Home Fleet have not been mobilised; yet all the available men have been sent to sea.)

July 23 [1907]. The Civil Lord of the Admiralty declines to state whether or no the Commander-in-Chief of the Channel Fleet is responsible for the defence of the home waters, and refuses to inform Mr. Gretton whether the Admiralty would "reconsider its

¹ See above, pp. 148-9.

² Referred to below, p. 224.

³ Speaking of the *Home Fleet* on the same date (July 4, 1907), Lord Tweedmouth said:—

"The Home Fleet is *in process of development*. I do not pretend to prophesy in what position that fleet may be in eighteen months or two years' time."

And yet the Home Fleet had been officially described as an *instantly ready* Fleet. (Cp. above, pp. 18, 219 etc., and below on this page.) Cp. further below, pp. 224, 460.

⁴ See also below, pp. 223 *sq.*, 226, etc.

⁵ See above, n. 3.

"decision depriving that officer of control of the fully commissioned "torpedo flotilla in home waters."¹

July 24 [1907]. The *Standard* again insists that the reduction of the Channel Fleet from 67 vessels to 21 constitutes a grave national danger. The *Standard* also points out that, whereas Lord Tweedmouth has stated categorically that the fully-manned Nore Division was in every respect absolutely efficient and instantly ready for war :—

1. The Nore Division is not a sea-going Fleet.
2. It is neither trained with the Channel Fleet, nor held under the direct orders of the Commander-in-Chief of that Fleet.
3. One of its battleships, the *Dreadnought*, has never been to the Nore, and cannot go there.
4. Two or more of its battleships have serious defects.
5. Two new armoured cruisers have been in dock, repairing serious defects.
6. About one-third of the destroyers in full commission are constantly under repair.

Finally, the *Standard* repeats, and will continue to repeat, that the present condition of the naval defences in Home waters is a public scandal and a national danger.

GOVERNMENT AND THE NAVY.

July 26, 1907. See *Standard's* leading article, p. 6, col. 6, ending :—

"We again repeat, with a full sense of the gravity of the charge, that the Government are paltering with a serious national danger."

CHANNEL FLEET.

ADMIRALTY'S ERROR AT LAST TO BE ADMITTED—? 2

July 26, 1907. "The Channel Fleet: Reported Plan to increase its Strength: The Cruiser Weakness";—see the *Standard*, July 26, 1907, p. 8, cols. 2-3; ending :—

"An increase of the Channel Fleet seems imperative, unless something very equivalent to a direct betrayal of our naval interests is to be perpetrated."³

¹ On the following day, July 24, 1907, the Civil Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Lambert) stated that the Admiralty "are not prepared to indicate in advance the developments they have in view." See the *Standard*, July 26, 1907, p. 6, col. 6 (a highly pertinent leading article), and August 14, 1907, p. 5, col. 7.

² See below, pp. 245, 247 sq.

³ See also *Daily Express*, July 25, 1907 (leading article), p. 4, col. 5.

July 26, 1907. Mr. Yerburgh's letter (of date July 25, 1907) in the public Press;—e.g., *Morning Post*, July 26, 1907, p. 3, col. 3; *Standard*, July 26, 1907, p. 8, col. 3; *Times*, July 26, 1907, p. 14, col. 3.¹

July 27, 1907. "The Unready Fleet: Story of the Nore Battle Division";—*Standard*, July 27, 1907, p. 8, cols. 1-2. A detailed history from January 1, 1907, onwards.

GOVERNMENT'S RECKLESS TAMPERING WITH BRITISH NAVAL DEFENCE.

STANDARD, July 27, 1907, p. 6, col. 6.

(*Leading Article.*)

The information which we have published from day to day concerning the actual condition of the Home Fleet demonstrates beyond question the truth of our original contention, that the Home Fleet is not, never has been, and never can be, "instantly ready for war." In the Admiralty memorandum of October last,² announcing the formation of the Fleet, the large reductions in the sea-going squadrons were described as a mere redistribution which would increase the fighting strength of the Navy. Obviously, the whole validity of that contention rested upon the alleged readiness for war of the increased Reserve Fleet—rechristened Home Fleet to avoid inconsistency of nomenclature.³ The hypothesis has now been utterly discredited. It only needed the test of mobilisation to complete the proof of our argument. When the Admiralty Memorandum was issued, we affirmed that a fleet manned with nucleus crews, stationed in harbour, and split into various commands,⁴ was, and must remain, nothing but a Reserve, the units of which might be available for fighting purposes after a delay varying from a day or so to several weeks.⁴ The existence of the Nore Squadron, whose formation was due to an afterthought on the part of the Admiralty, has been subsequently quoted as providing a constantly ready reinforcement to the Channel Fleet, which would thereby be raised to its former strength. The force of the argument would be sensibly increased if the Nore Squadron existed, which it does not. The details of the occasional and fortuitous assembling of a few miscellaneous vessels at the Nore, which we publish this morning,⁵ afford a remarkable example of the methods of administration under the present naval governance. The readiness of the Home Fleet was an invention; the Nore Squadron is a fiction. The Home Fleet cannot be mobilised under twelve days' "official" notification, and

¹ Reprinted *N.L.J.*, Aug., 1907, pp. 232-3. For comment see below, pp. 229 *sqq.*, and also 225.

² Oct. 23, 1906. See above, pp. 12 *sq.*

³ Cp. above, p. 13 n.1.

⁴ Cp. above, p. 219.

⁵ July 27, 1907. See above on this page; and see, further, below:—(s.v. Dec. 12, 1907), pp. 273 *sqq.*; and (s.v. March 11, 1908), pp. 353 *sq.*; etc., etc.

several weeks' actual warning.¹ The Nore Squadron is "not there." Yet it is upon the strength of these pretensions that the Channel Fleet was reduced in January² from 67 vessels to 21. For seven months the first line of defence has consisted nominally of 14 battleships, actually of 12 and sometimes of 11,³ four armoured cruisers, which were absent in American waters for two or three weeks,⁴ and three unarmoured cruisers. The Admiralty, in the person of the Civil Lord, have declared that they are satisfied that the Channel Fleet is adequate for the duties it has to perform.⁵ The First Lord of the Admiralty has pledged his honour that the Navy is as strong as ever it was.⁶ He has also affirmed that the Home Fleet is in a state of development⁷—a pleasing variant upon the other phrase, "instantly ready"⁸—and that he was quite unable to prophesy what it might become.⁷ If we might be permitted a prediction, it would be that the condition to which the naval defences of this country, and particularly the Channel Fleet, have been reduced, will be long remembered as one of the most flagrant examples of reckless tampering with the gravest responsibilities which has ever discredited the Government of this country.

July 27, 1907. Mr. John J. Jackson in the *Standard*, July 27, 1907, p. 5, col. 4, *s.v.*: "The Navy League: Criticism of the Executive by One of the Founders." (Printed above on pp. 205 *sq.*)

THE NAVY LEAGUE.

STANDARD, July 27, 1907, p. 8, col. 2.

To the Editor of the STANDARD.

8, Austin Friars, E.C.,
July 26, 1907.

SIR,—As a member of the NAVY LEAGUE, may I be permitted a little space in your columns?

I feel sure there are many fellow members, and many of your readers, who have taken great interest in the articles and correspondence relative to the NAVY LEAGUE which have appeared in your paper, and who deplore the serious difference of opinion held by the present members of the NAVY LEAGUE Committee⁹ and Messrs. Wyatt and Horton-Smith. One would naturally have hoped for some satis-

¹ Cp. above, p. 221, and below, pp. 322, 379 (and cp. 476).

² Jan., 1907. See above, pp. 44 (text and n. 2), 48 (nn. 1, 2), 219.

³ And sometimes of not more than *ten*. See above, p. 123 n. 1, and see also note following.

⁴ Absent, indeed, at a time when as many as 4 of the 14 battleships of the Channel Fleet were unavailable. Cp. above, p. 123 (text and nn. 1, 2, 3). ⁵ See above, p. 221.

⁶ If not "stronger"! See above, pp. 149 (text and n. 1), 221.

⁷ See above, p. 221 n. 3.

⁸ See above, p. 221 n. 3.

⁹ It would have been more correct to say "the dominant majority of the N.L. Committee." See above, pp. 163, 164 *sq.*, 171, 172, 173, 175, 176 *sqq.*, 181, 183 *sq.*

faction from the controversy, but can we say we have that satisfaction?

I, personally, feel disappointed in the letter from our President which appears in your issue of to-day.¹ Education might naturally have been assumed to be an important part of the work of the NAVY LEAGUE, but that work clearly does not rest there. The NAVY LEAGUE's publications emphasise that the object of the LEAGUE is "to urge upon Government and the electorate the paramount importance of an adequate Navy," etc.² If the Committee fail to do this as soon as occasion demands, they are surely neglecting their duty. Messrs. Wyatt and Horton-Smith contend that for some months past the Committee have ignored the need for the exertion of their influence upon the Government of the day. It seems to me that the Committee have now seen their mistake, but, while trying to rectify it, refrain from acknowledging it.

The gist of the last speech I had the pleasure of hearing Admiral Fremantle make³ was that we required many more cruisers for the purpose of commerce protection; yet he now seems to be on the side of those who approve of reductions in the Navy. What are we to make of this? I could understand the abandonment of naval stations,⁴ had these been proved to be useless. I could also understand the delay in the building orders, in consequence of the change in naval construction alleged to be occasioned by the *Dreadnought* (so long only as the Fleet is not allowed to fall below the Two-Power Standard⁵), but I cannot understand how a reduction of 3,000 in the *personnel*⁶ and the scrapping of vessels which served a vital purpose⁷ can in any way have added to our naval power.

I should like to know why the NAVY LEAGUE Committee continue to assure us that the Navy is as strong as ever it was,⁸ and why they assert the Two-Power Standard to be fully maintained,⁹ without attempting to investigate the assurances¹⁰ received to the contrary.

I am sure Messrs. Wyatt and Horton-Smith have no desire to be false alarmists, and if by their critics they are to be styled "agitators," it is only because they are doing what they conceive to be their public duty.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

J. W. SUTHERLAND LEASK.

July 29, 1907. "J. L.'s" first letter in the *Times*—July 29, 1907—entitled "The Navy and the Navy League."¹¹

¹ July 26, 1907 (see above, p. 223, and below, pp. 229 *sqq.*).

² See above, p. 128.

³ At the Annual Banquet of the Third London Branch of the Navy League (now the First London Branch of the Imperial Maritime League, see below, pp. 228, 298), held on November 29, 1906 (*N.L.J.*, January, 1907, pp. 21 *sq.*).

⁴ See above, p. 61 (text and n. 6).

⁵ See above, p. 78 (text and nn. 3, 4).

⁶ See above, pp. 61 (text and n. 8), 140 (text and n. 7).

⁷ See above, pp. 65, 132, etc.

⁸ Following Lord Tweedmouth (above, pp. 148 *sq.*, 221.)

⁹ See above, p. 196, and see their own assurances to the contrary, above, p. 78 (text and nn. 3, 4).

¹⁰ Including their own (see preceding note).

¹¹ See hereon below, p. 226.

THE NAVY AND THE NAVY LEAGUE.

TIMES, August 3, 1907, p. 10, col. 1.

*To the Editor of the TIMES.*4, Paper Buildings, Temple, E.C.,
July 30, 1907.

SIR,—The letter signed “J. L.” and published in your issue of yesterday¹ under the above heading, raises two questions, of which the first concerns the safety of the nation, and the second the position of the NAVY LEAGUE. It is with the former question that we ask your permission to deal now.

“J. L.” is a thoroughgoing Admiralty apologist of the familiar type. He uses all the stock arguments, the sophistry of which has been repeatedly exposed, and he asserts that “they must be blind who do not see that a great strategic reorganisation of the Navy has been and is now at work.” But the essential point is whether the existing dispositions and conditions of our fleets in home waters conform with the laws of strategy, as laid down by the acknowledged masters of that art, or not. The Channel Fleet has been cut down from 67 permanent units under Admiral Wilson to 21 permanent units under Lord Charles Beresford. Does “J. L.” think that the 46 withdrawn units have been placed under conditions of higher efficiency and more instant readiness for war than they were before? And, if he thinks so, why does he think so? They were concentrated before, and they are not concentrated now. He might address himself with advantage to that point. They were before under the full control and constant supervision of the man who would have to command them in war, and they are not equally under such control and supervision now. Can “J. L.” explain wherein lies the increase in national safety here?

Besides five armoured ships withdrawn from the Channel Fleet, eight other armoured vessels have been withdrawn from full sea service. Are these ships now under conditions making for more efficiency, or for less efficiency, than they were under previously? To say that their shooting is improved is an irrelevant answer, because one must assume that it would have equally improved had the pre-existing conditions been maintained. Since their withdrawal, have they had, as a matter of fact, as much sea training as they would have had if not withdrawn? How much sea training has the Home Fleet actually experienced during the last six months? If it be true, as officially asserted, that the Home Fleet can be made ready for war at a few hours' notice, why was it necessary to give the official notification of the present mobilisation 12 days beforehand?² Is it the case that more than one-third of the battleships and cruisers now assembled for purposes of review are unfit for service?³ Is it the case that, whereas only 180 out of the 244 vessels nominally constituting the Home Fleet have now been mobilised, the whole of the available *personnel*, exclusive of the Reserves, has been used up in manning them?^{4 5}

¹ July 29, 1907.² See above, pp. 221, 223 *sq.*, and below, p. 322 (and cp. 476).³ Cp. above, pp. 16, etc., and below, pp. 237, 242, 253.⁴ Cp. Index, *s.v.* “Home Fleet,” and “Personnel.”⁵ See further below, pp. 245 *sqq.*

There may, or may not, be satisfactory answers to these questions, but your correspondent must be aware that they have been publicly raised¹ before now, and he would render very valuable service if he would furnish replies not evasive or misleading, like those given on behalf of the Government in the House of Commons, but categorical and clear.

We are, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,
L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH

THE STATE OF THE HOME FLEET. GRAVE PUBLIC SCANDAL.

July 30, 1907. State of Home Fleet :—*Standard*, leading article, p. 6, col. 6.

"The analysis of the actual condition of the Reserve, or Home, Fleet, which we publish this morning, reveals a grave public scandal. . . . The Home Fleet Review is designed to delude the uninstructed by ocular demonstration. Public money, scraped out of scamped repairs and sweated out of the wages of dockyard workmen² and seamen's pensions,³ is being lavished in a desperate attempt to cover up a deplorable reversal of administrative policy."

THE NAVY LEAGUE EXECUTIVE AND THE TWO-POWER STANDARD.

STANDARD, July 30, 1907, p. 9, col. 2.

To the Editor of the STANDARD.

82, Bruntsfield Place, Edinburgh.

SIR,—No answer has yet been made to my letter printed in your issue of June 5.⁴

As, however, the Executive of the NAVY LEAGUE and its supporters repeatedly assert, on the ground, not of intrinsic evidence, but of needlessly invoked authority, that we now enjoy, and even that by our meagre shipbuilding programme we are maintaining, a Two-Power standard of British naval strength, will you kindly allow me to supplement, by a few remarks on this subject, the first paragraph of my last note?

Of course, operative acceptance of such a criterion is quite compatible with important diminution of our naval forces relatively to those of other maritime States, even to those of the two next strongest naval Powers, separately or combined. That during the last 17 years this reduction has occurred will hardly be denied.

¹ In the columns of the *Standard*, and elsewhere.

² Cp. above, p. 61 (text and n. 7).

³ Cp. above, p. 37.

⁴ June 5, 1907. Printed above, pp. 121 sq.

On any interpretation, the so-called Two-Power Standard is more or less arbitrary and, theoretically, at least, inadequate. A few years ago the adoption of a Two-and-a-half-Power measure was favoured by some members of the LEAGUE Committee. This Executive formerly advocated compliance with the recommendations contained in the well-known Three Admirals' Report of 1888, viz., that for successful blockade of hostile ports British battleships should outnumber those of our enemies in the ratio of five to three, with an absolute minimum of four to three. It was advised that, besides, a reserve Fleet should be entirely restricted to Home waters. So far as I know, no publication of the LEAGUE has attempted to prove that for thoroughly effective blockade these requirements are excessive, or that such blockade is always superfluous.

In a pamphlet entitled "Our Naval Supremacy—Is it Assured?" still circulated by the LEAGUE,¹ the following standard, enunciated by Lord Charles Beresford in 1893, is declared to be "clear and practical." "To make the British Fleet equal in fighting strength to its possible enemies, it should be numerically superior by at least one-third."² This was applied to all classes of craft, but is implicitly³ recognised by the LEAGUE as insufficient with respect to the total number of cruisers essential for Fleet service and protection of British commerce.

In the latest report of the Executive⁴ the necessary least numerical advantage of British battleships over those of the two next strongest nations is said to be one-tenth, while in Sir J. Gray Hill's amendment⁵ to Mr. Wyatt's resolution,⁶ and in Mr. Yerburch's latest letter,⁷ this is still further reduced; for, in each, content is expressed with a Two-Power Standard with a margin," i.e., of course, any superiority, however small, possibly only a single ship!⁸

The transition to bare equality is thus very slight; and if the present assumed excellence of our *personnel*, gunnery, and strategy be emphasised, the criterion may shortly be explained to mean "absence of serious numerical inferiority to any two other fleets," or, indeed, as a constant estimable quantity, may completely disappear. By no possible manipulation of figures can it be shown that we possess, or by our naval construction are endeavouring to gain, that "considerable margin of reserve" which, according to Lord George Hamilton, is requisite for "meeting unexpected blows," and the necessity of which, in view of increased rivalry among naval nations for sea power, is even much greater than it was eighteen years ago. Only such significant excess can afford to our Empire that security which its invaluable and unique character entitles us to demand.

I am, Sir, Your obedient servant,

HY. TERO.⁹

¹ This is the pamphlet of May, 1907, referred to above, pp. 62 (n. 3), 207 (text and n. 4), 208 (text and n. 3), and below, pp. 230 *sq.*, 231 n. 5.

² See also *N.L.J.*, November, 1906, p. 301.

³ Explicitly so;—See *N.L. Annual Report for 1906* (dated May 15, 1907), p. 3, and *cp.* above, p. 78 (text and n. 5). See further, below, p. 309.

⁴ *N.L. Annual Report for 1906* (dated May, 15, 1907), p. 2.

⁵ Printed above, p. 196.

⁶ Printed above, pp. 136 *sqq.*

⁷ Of July 25, 1907 (referred to above, p. 223).

⁸ For the Cawdor interpretation of the Two-Power Standard, see below, pp. 308 *sq.*, and for the only reasonable and logical interpretation of such, *Standard*, below pp. 513, 518.

⁹ For whom see above, p. 122, and Index, *s.v.* his name.

INQUIRY CALLED FOR.

July 31, 1907. Searching Inquiry Needed;—*Standard's* leading article, July 31, 1907, p. 6, cols. 4-6, conclusively showing that there is already constituted "a sufficiently grave reflection upon the Government and the Admiralty, to warrant a most searching inquiry into their whole naval administration."

SEVEN MONTHS OF SHAM.

July 31, 1907. "Seven Months of Sham";—*Daily Express* July 31, 1907, leading article, p. 4, col. 4, dealing with the Home Fleet.¹ And see further—*s.v.* "Budget-Eye Fleet: 'Instantly Ready' arrives off Cowes: More Evidences of 'Efficiency'"—*Daily Express* (*ibid.*), p. 1, col. 2.

THE NAVY LEAGUE
AND ITS NEGLECTED DUTY.²

MORNING POST, August 3, 1907, p. 5, col. 1; STANDARD, August 2, 1907, p. 4, col. 6; etc.³

To the Editor.

4, Paper Buildings, Temple, E.C.,
July 31, 1907.

SIR,²—The statement sent to the Press on behalf of the present majority of the Executive Committee of the NAVY LEAGUE, over the signature of the League's President,⁴ is so remarkable a document that we ask your leave to comment upon it.

In the first place, it indicates the final abandonment by the League of its critical function,⁵ and the substitution of education as its primary aim.

In the next place, the majority of the Committee definitely range the NAVY LEAGUE on the side of the policy of naval reduction pursued by the present Cabinet⁶; while, as if to prove still further the completeness of their confidence in that Cabinet, they announce their belief that "command of the sea is now the first object of national policy."

¹ Cp. also *Standard*, July 25, 1907 (above, pp. 218-222).

² This letter was refused publication in the *N.L.J.* We affect no surprise. (Cp. above, pp. 50 text and n. 9; 53 n. 2; 54 n. 1; 128 n. 8; 136 n. 4; 142 n. 1.)

³ Also *Australasian World*, Aug. 8, 1907, p. 755.

⁴ Of date July 25, 1907. See above, p. 223. Reprinted *N.L.J.*, August, 1907, pp. 232-3. ⁵ See above, pp. 79, 82, etc.

⁶ Cp. the Liberal Party's Official Gratitude. above p. 210 n. 8, and below, pp. 239 *sq.*, 240 *sq.*, 247.

In spite of the facts that this Cabinet was returned to power pledged to the hilt to cut down expenditure on both services;¹ that the Prime Minister has repeatedly affirmed his ardent desire to reduce armaments²; that 122 members of the present House of Commons specially appealed to him in 1906 to reduce the Navy³; that a very large part of the supporters of the present Government entertain ideas so wildly remote from reality as to suppose that arbitration can be substituted for war; and that this very Cabinet has made proposals at the Hague Conference which involve the restriction of the power that command of the sea confers, and which have made both itself and Britain the laughing-stock of every Chancellery in Europe;—the Committee of the NAVY LEAGUE still believe that to attain the command of the sea is the principal object that this Cabinet has in view!

Probably, in the whole of our history, no belief more strikingly at variance with all the evidence of facts was ever held by a body of men to whom some degree of responsibility was supposed to attach. If this were indeed the principal object of the Ministry, what a cry of pious horror, what a shout of fury and disgust, would go up from the great body of that Ministry's supporters!

After this, it is hardly surprising to find that the Committee in effect repudiate their own letter to the Prime Minister of July 11th last,⁴ their own letter to the Press of October 19th last,⁵ their own official pamphlet of May last,⁶ and their own article (for which they had specially acknowledged responsibility⁷) in the current—July—number of the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL.⁸

In the first of these letters⁴ they urgently protested against reduction in the programme of naval construction, affirming that "not three, nor four, but five armoured ships" should be laid down⁹; and in the second⁵ (their protest disregarded) they deliberately stated:—"Here, then, is the case in a nutshell. Political considerations, implying subservience to the outcry for retrenchment, have brought about a serious reduction in our first line of defence, a direct incentive to our possible adversaries to push forward their naval preparations." ⁵ Admiral Fremantle, whom they now quote on their behalf, went even further, for in the November number of the JOURNAL he wrote:—"The reductions, then, are political, and undoubtedly "suspect." ¹⁰

In their official pamphlet of May,⁶ the statement that the Navy is not up to the Two-Power standard, far less possessed of a margin over it, is made with the most definite precision. The fighting values of the principal fleets of the world are there estimated in points. The number of these assigned to Britain is 747; to France and Germany, 744; to the United States and France, 810; and to the

¹ Cp. above, pp. 25 sq.

² Cp., e.g., above, pp. 2 sq., 5 sq., 6, 25 sq., 34 sq., 47

³ See above, pp. 4, 70, 113, 130, 197, 207, and cp. below, p. 338.

⁴ July 11, 1906. (*N.L.J.*, August, 1906, p. 200. See above, pp. 62 n. 3, 71 sq., 204.)

⁵ October 19, 1906. (*N.L.J.*, November, 1906, p. 275. See above, pp. 62 n. 3, 72 sq., 204 sq.)

⁶ May, 1907. See above, pp. 62 (n. 3), 207 (text and n. 4), 208 (text and n. 3), and below, p. 231, n. 5.

⁷ Cp. above, pp. 188, 191, 215.

⁸ *N.L.J.*, July, 1907, pp. 183-4; for which see above, p. 143 (text and n. 3).

⁹ See above, p. 204 (text and n. 5).

¹⁰ *N.L.J.*, November, 1906, p. 277. See above, pp. 11, 73 n. 1.

United States and Germany, 752. And it is added that each of these combinations is "as strong as, or stronger than, the British Navy, and could place England in a most perilous position."

At the annual meeting on May 15th,¹ our opponents disavowed all responsibility for the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL²—"the Official Organ of the NAVY LEAGUE," as it had previously been styled.³ They must now disavow all responsibility for this pamphlet,⁴ and explain to those to whom they give it that nothing therein printed is to be taken seriously. We publicly ask the President of the NAVY LEAGUE, whether the Committee propose to follow this course⁵; and if not, why not?

But even the inconsistency of the Committee's contradictory voices on the subject of the Two-Power standard fades into comparative insignificance by the side of their self-contradiction in regard to "the organisation of the First Line Fleet for instant service." For, barely a month has elapsed since they sent to the Press advance-proofs of their article, above referred to,⁶ in which they conclusively showed that the First Line Fleet is NOT organised for instant service. And now they effectually repudiate their previous demonstration.

The present utterance of the rulers of the NAVY LEAGUE amounts, in short, to the definite denial of the previous utterances which they had launched upon the world. The very conditions which they postulate for action have been proved by themselves to exist, and now, in order to avoid the action, they deny the conditions. Their position is that on the one hand they have shown the country to be endangered, and, on the other, they decline any attempt to render it safe.

Could self-stultification and abnegation of duty be more clearly shown?

Since the Committee cling to their office—despite their recent condemnation by the votes of those present at the most representative meeting of the NAVY LEAGUE ever held—their right course now is to declare the League's dissolution, and thus leave free space for the creation of a new Organisation⁷ which shall seek to fulfil the needs of the country and of the Empire.

But whether they follow this course or not, that new Organisation⁷ will be created.⁸

We are, Sir, Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

¹ May 15, 1907.

² See above, p. 81 (text and nn. 10, 11).

³ Cp. above, p. 71.

⁴ Of May, 1907. (See above, p. 230, text and n. 6).

⁵ The only answer made by the Committee was to reprint in their similar official pamphlet of August (1907)—unaltered—the very article which appeared in the official pamphlet of May (1907) to which this letter refers. Cp. above, p. 208, n. 4.

See also later, *N.L.J.*, October, 1907, pp. 287-297 ("Our Naval Supremacy: Is it Assured?") revised to October, 1907, and issued as a separate pamphlet by the Executive Committee, at p. 289, where it is definitely stated that—in battleships and armoured cruisers built and building—as "against any two Powers" England "is not to the good by 10 per cent., and cannot be said to have any margin for the protection of her commerce," and definitely admitted that "It is a serious question whether the full Two-Power Standard is being maintained."

⁶ (Printed *N.L.J.*, July, 1907, pp. 183-4.) See above, p. 230 nn. 7, 8.

⁷ The IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE.

⁸ See below, pp. 305 seq.

THE NAVY LEAGUE AND ITS NEGLECTED DUTY.¹

4 PAPER BUILDINGS,
TEMPLE, LONDON, E.C.,
July 31st, 1907.

DEAR SIR (OR MADAM),²

You will have learnt from the public Press that at the Extraordinary General Meeting of the Navy League, held on Friday, the 19th inst.,³ the present majority of the Executive Committee were upheld by those who had not heard the case against them, and were condemned by those who had.⁴ They were sustained by the votes of those absent; they were defeated by the votes of those present.⁴

Fearing to face the issue directly, they met our Resolution, not with a negative, but with an Amendment.⁵

Yet—although (seeking always to encounter argument, not with counter-argument, but with the outward appearance of authority) they put forward as speakers on their platform four past or present Members of the House of Commons⁶—this Amendment of theirs was defeated on the vote taken in the room by a majority of fourteen against it.⁷

This result was attained after an exhaustive debate of three hours' duration at by far the most representative Meeting of the Navy League ever held.⁸

Even in regard to the votes of the absent, our opponents' measure of success was poor indeed. With all the weight of a reigning administration, with all the head office's touch with the League's Members in their favour, they could secure but 897 proxies, as against 559 obtained

¹ This letter was reprinted in part in the *Standard*, August 7, 1907, p. 4, col. 6; *Daily Express*, August 2, 1907.

² Concerning the use of "Premier" type in this book, see above, p. 52 n. 5.

³ July 19, 1907 (above pp. 189 *sqq.*)

⁴ See above, p. 209 (text and nn.).

⁵ See above, pp. 191, 196, 201.

⁶ See above, pp. 190, 196, 198, 200, 206; and *cp.* also above, p. 213.

⁷ See above, p. 209.

⁸ *Cp.* above, p. 217, and below, p. 237.

by ourselves (or rather 619, if we include some 60 more received too late for use).¹

As the total number of full Members of the Navy League in Britain is only about 2,700, nearly half of these have shown their utter indifference to the urgent and repeated appeal made to them by the majority of the Committee. In fact only one-third of the entire voting Membership of the League could be induced by those appeals to concede their support to our opponents.

If the majority of the Committee attached any weight to a complete moral discomfiture, they would now resign;—but they have intimated that they have no such intention.

Yet—apart even from the Naval Controversy—the existing paralysis of the League, its cessation of effort in nearly every direction (except in regard to lantern-lectures, chiefly in boys' and girls' schools), and its miserably meagre rate of annual increase, all go to prove the failure of the line of policy to which the majority have constantly adhered.

The test of the League's growth is annual increase in the amount of subscriptions from its Members and Associates. The total increase last year under the heading "Subscriptions" for the whole of the British Isles was but £132.

A Branch in which methods have been pursued which are the exact opposite of those approved by the majority of the Committee is the 93rd.² By this Branch public meetings have been organised, at which the danger arising from a Continental Power, and the danger involved in the various naval reductions effected (including the withdrawal of the White Ensign from the seas of half the world), have been brought before the attention of audiences by ourselves.³ The result has been that this Branch has

¹ See above, p. 209 (text and nn.).

² Hon. Secretary, Miss G. E. Wyatt (for whom see below, pp. 241, 357, 469, 524, and Index, *s.v.* her name).

³ See, *e.g.*, above, pp. 28 *sqq.*, 39 *sqq.*, 47, etc.

increased in numbers, during the last twelve months, by over 250 *per cent.*¹

The 3rd London Branch again,² which is giving us its unstinted support, is living and vital, and in consequence of this vitality also shows increasing Membership.

The position now is that the present rulers of the Navy League have, on the one hand, shown the safety of the Country to be endangered, and, on the other, have declared their resolute intention to attempt nothing to make it safe.³

The proof of the Country's danger is given by themselves in their authenticated article in the current issue of the *Navy League Journal*,⁴ advance proofs of which they sent to the Press,⁵ and the present peril of the nation is still further indicated by the reference, in their Amendment at the recent Meeting, to the present state of the Channel Fleet.⁶ Yet, in face of this fact of national peril, a fact admitted and established by themselves, they have refused in the same Amendment to take any active steps to rouse the Country to a sense of the danger involved in existing Naval conditions.

Abnegation of duty could no further go.

In view, therefore, of the state of impotence, paralysis, and desertion of duty, to which the present Navy League has been reduced by the policy of the majority of its Committee, as well as in view of the large number of the League's Members who have evinced their sympathy with our aims, and, above all, in view of the admitted danger in which the Country now stands, we are clearly bound (and we have, in fact, been asked by many) to take what steps we can to establish a new Organisation⁷ which shall carry out the abandoned objects of the existing League.

¹ Concerning this Branch see further below, p. 241.

² Concerning this Branch see above, pp. 122, 124 *sq.*, and below, pp. 288, 298, 299, and Index *s.v.* "Third London."

³ Cp. above, p. 231.

⁴ *N.L.J.*, July, 1907, pp. 183-4 (above, p. 143, text and n. 4).

⁵ Cp. above, p. 143.

⁶ See above, p. 196.

⁷ The IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE, for which see below, pp. 305 *sqq.*, and *passim*.

The first of these steps is to secure some measure of financial support, since the expenses which we have incurred, in the battle which we have been fighting up to the present time, have been relatively heavy.

Those expenses, for which we are solely responsible, amount to over £200, about £80 having been expended on postage alone;—whilst printing, typing, clerical assistance, and other necessary outlays account for the rest.

Towards these expenses private contributions, amounting to about £80, have been either paid or promised by a few generous supporters.

It has been suggested to us that amongst the other supporters who either signed the forms of Requisition which procured the Meeting of the 19th inst., or sent us their proxies, or voted with us at that Meeting, there must be some, at least, who will be minded to give their help towards clearing off the present debt, and thus set us free to go forward in this matter.

We have given unstintedly of our labour and our time, and we are not only willing but eager to continue to sacrifice these to the needs of our Country.

But we do not think that it will be held unreasonable, if we ask those in whose common cause we have been fighting, to accord us some aid in regard to a past and prospective burden, the full weight of which we fear we cannot bear alone.

Therefore, we ask those supporters who can afford to do so, to grant us some assistance in this respect. Should the amount received in response to this letter exceed the balance of the expenses already incurred, we propose that the excess should be devoted towards the publication of a pamphlet recording the history of the present controversy (in the shape of a reprint of the public letters and utterances detailing our case),¹ and that the balance¹ left

¹ The amount received was almost exactly the same as the amount expended. But this book is published, notwithstanding:—(1) as a permanent record of the real facts; (2) as detailing the *causa causans* of the foundation of the Imperial Maritime League; and (3) as a work of reference in regard to the flagrant manner in which (not without the ignorant and perchance too all-unsuspecting assistance of the Old Navy League), the Liberal Government has succeeded in undermining the Naval Defences of the British Empire, in order to save money for so-called "Social Reform," and to save votes for mis-termed "Liberalism."

over (if any) should go towards defrayal of the initial expenses in connection with the foundation of the new League.

Of this new League,¹ we hope to announce the names of the Committee in due course, and we believe that they will command the confidence both of yourself and of the public at large.¹

We are, dear Sir (or Madam),

Yours faithfully,

HAROLD FRAZER WYATT,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

P.S.—We would venture to draw your attention to the admirable summary of the case with regard to the Navy given in the extract from the "Standard" of the 25th inst.,² of which we enclose a reprint.³—H.F.W. and L.G.H.H.-S.

THE NAVY LEAGUE AND ITS NEGLECTED DUTY.

*A Letter to the Members of Committees of
The respective Colonial Branches.⁴*

4, PAPER BUILDINGS,
TEMPLE, LONDON, E.C.,
ENGLAND,
July 31, 1907.

DEAR SIR,

The rapid increase in the navies of Germany and of the United States, and the swift growth of Asiatic sea-power in the Pacific, make it plain that the British Navy must also be increased, if the British Empire is to maintain its relative place amongst the competing nations of the world.

Yet:—Within the last three years the Navy estimates have been cut down by over £6,000,000 sterling of annual expenditure.⁵ 150 vessels of the Navy have been "scrapped" and not replaced.⁶ The

¹ The IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE, see below, pp. 305 *sqq.*, and *passim*.

² July 25, 1907.

³ See above, pp. 218–222;—and for explanation of the square brackets there used, see above, p. 218.

⁴ This letter found its way into print in, *e.g.*, the *Evening Post* of Wellington, New Zealand, September 28, 1907, p. 17, col. 2, etc.

⁵ See above, pp. 61 (text and nn. 1, 2), 140.

⁶ See above, pp. 61 (text and n. 6), 63, 65, 102, 105, 131, 132.

personnel of the Navy has been reduced by 3,000 men,¹ a number equivalent to the complements of four battleships. The number of workmen in the royal dockyards has been reduced by 8,000,² with the result that more than a third of the ships of the Navy are now useless through neglect of repairs.³ The White Ensign has been recalled from the seas of half the world;⁴ so that, with the exception of the Australasian Squadron, no fighting ships flying the Flag of the Navy are now found between the China station and Cape Horn, or between Cape Horn and the West Indies.

In addition, the Channel Fleet has been cut down from 67 units to 21.⁵ Thirteen powerful armoured ships, or about one-fourth of what had been our actual armoured strength at sea, have been withdrawn from sea-going squadrons, where they were under conditions making for full training and full efficiency, and placed under conditions making for less training and less efficiency.⁶ Our programme of naval construction for the current year, instead of maintaining full equality with the next two strongest fleets, is actually less than that of Germany alone,⁷ the figures being 71,100 tons to be laid down by that country, as against 70,200 tons to be laid down by Britain.⁸

The cause of all these and other naval economies is that, at the last General Election in the United Kingdom, a Government was returned to power which was pledged to reduce expenditure on armaments.⁹

You will be aware that the Navy League was founded for the express purpose of urging the need to the whole Empire of command of the sea, and of resisting decrease and advocating increase of naval strength.

We regret most deeply to have to inform you that the present majority of the Executive Committee of the Navy League in Britain have reversed these aims. They have defended and sustained every one of the reductions named,¹⁰ with the solitary exception of the reduction of the Channel Fleet, which they only at last opposed¹¹ after we had drawn emphatic attention to this vital matter in the public Press.¹²

Having long vainly endeavoured to induce the majority of the Committee to fulfil the duty which they were appointed to perform, we resigned our seats on the Board on the 13th May,¹³ and we have since brought these matters both before the public, through signed communications to the Press,¹⁴ and before the Members of the League, first at the Annual Meeting on the 15th May,¹⁵ and secondly at an Extraordinary General Meeting held in London on the 19th inst.¹⁶ The latter was by far the most representative meeting of the Navy League which has ever taken place in the British Isles.¹⁷ In education, in knowledge, in keenness of interest, and in patriotism, the audience could hardly have been surpassed by any

¹ See above, pp. 61 (text and n. 8), 140.

² See above, pp. 61 (text and n. 7), 140.

³ Cp. above, pp. 103, 226 (text and n. 3), and below, pp. 242, 291, etc.

⁴ See above, pp. 61 (text and n. 6), 140.

⁵ See above, pp. 44, 48 (nn. 1, 2), 103, 132, 141.

⁶ Cp. above, pp. 12, 14, 16, 19 *sgg.*, etc.

⁷ See above, pp. 62 (text and nn. 1, 2, 3), 140.

⁸ See above, p. 140.

⁹ See above, pp. 25 *sg.*, etc.

¹⁰ Cp. above, p. 210 (text and n. 8).

¹¹ See above, pp. 143, 196.

¹² See above, p. 103.

¹³ May 13, 1907. See above, pp. 52 *sg.*

¹⁴ See above, *passim*.

¹⁵ May 15, 1907. See above, pp. 60-81.

¹⁶ July 19, 1907. See above, pp. 189-209.

¹⁷ Cp. above, pp. 217, 232.

assembly in Britain. The debate lasted three hours, and, in the result, our opponents were condemned by those present, their Amendment to our Resolution being defeated by a majority of 14 against it.¹

The Committee, however, though thus condemned by the votes of those who had heard the case against them, were sustained by the votes of the absent, who had not heard it;² for they obtained a majority upon proxies.³ Yet even here, their measure of success was poor indeed. The total voting membership of the Navy League in the United Kingdom amounts to about 2,700.⁴ Of these but one-third, or 897, cared sufficiently for the majority of the Committee to give them their votes, while we received 559 proxies, exclusive of some 60 more which arrived too late for legal use.⁵ Many of the foremost men in the Navy League, including amongst them one whose name is honoured throughout the Empire, Mr. Rudyard Kipling, gave us their support.

As the League is generally believed in Britain (though unhappily this belief is wholly erroneous) to represent the most forward school of naval policy, the attitude for some time past imposed upon it by the majority of its Committee has had the effect of stifling criticism. The League has thus been made in effect the ally of those who wish to cut down our strength at sea,⁶ and it has in consequence become a national curse instead of a national blessing.

We cannot think that those who joined the League in order to help to rouse opinion throughout the Empire to the need of naval strength can desire to support it now that it has become in effect an instrument for supporting naval reduction.

We, on our part, are now engaged in founding a new Organisation⁷ to take up and carry on, upon a wider basis,⁸ and with energy, the neglected and abandoned objects of the present Body. In this endeavour we have already obtained promise of most powerful support, and we hope shortly to send you the programme of action of the new League. We believe that the objects proposed will command the sympathies of all who desire the maritime ascendancy of the British Empire whether in commerce or in war.

We are, dear Sir,

Yours faithfully,

HAROLD FRAZER WYATT.

(Formerly Navy League Envoy to the Colonies,
and late Hon. Secretary of the Navy League.)

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

(Hon. Vice-President of the Cambridge University Branch of the Navy League, and late Chairman of the Universities Subcommittee of the League.)

Late Members of the Executive Committee
of the Navy League.

¹ Cp. above, p. 209.

² Cp. above, pp. 209, 214, 232.

³ Concerning which see above, p. 209 (text and nn. 1, 2, 7, 8).

⁴ Cp. above, p. 214.

⁵ Thus 619. And see further above, p. 209 (text and nn. 3, 9).

⁶ Cp. above, p. 237 n. 10.

⁷ The IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE, for which see below, pp. 305 *sqq.*, and *passim*.

⁸ See below, pp. 305 *sqq.*

NOTE.—We send herewith the following enclosures, which we would venture to commend to your earnest consideration :

- (1) Our Circular Letter, dated the 22nd June, 1907.¹
- (2) The Form of Requisition therein referred to,² containing the terms of the Resolution, respectively moved and seconded by us on the 19th July, 1907.³
- (3) Our Circular Letter of the 9th July, 1907.⁴
- (4) Our Circular Letter of the 13th July, 1907.⁵

(This last Circular, coupled with a letter from ourselves in the public Press, induced at length the despatch on the 15th July, 1907, of an apologetic communication from the Committee to the League's members, admitting the previous mis-statement to which we had drawn attention, and making such reparation as was then possible.⁶)

- (5) A Reprint from the *London Standard* of the 25th July, 1907.⁷
- (6) A Letter from ourselves to the Press, dated the 31st July, 1907.⁸

H.F.W. and L.G.H.H.-S.

MORE NAVAL REDUCTION ASKED FOR.

July 31, 1907. Mr. Murray Macdonald, M.P., moves in the House of Commons a reduction of the Naval Shipbuilding Vote. Out of 349 Members present, no less than 88 voted for the motion.

Of these 88, no less than 57 were Liberals (for their names see the *Morning Post*, August 2, 1907, p. 5, col. 6), the remainder being :—Labour Members, 14, and Nationalists, 17. Total, 88.⁹

NAVY LEAGUE PUBLICLY THANKED BY AND ON BEHALF OF THE LIBERAL PARTY.

July 31, 1907.

On the 31st July, 1907, the NAVY LEAGUE was publicly thanked in the House of Commons, by Mr. Robertson (Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty), for the strenuous and timely aid which it had rendered to the Liberal Government :—

"He had never thought," he said, "to have lived to see the day "when he would be grateful—as he was grateful—for the existence "of the NAVY LEAGUE. He had not hitherto had any sympathy with "their policy, but he was on the other side now. (Laughter.) "Within the NAVY LEAGUE, there was, if he might use the expression, a 'Navier League,' which he was afraid had been the

¹ Printed above, pp. 128 *sqq.*

² See above, p. 128.

³ Printed above, pp. 136 *sqq.*

⁴ Printed above, pp. 162 *sqq.*

⁵ Printed above, pp. 176 *sqq.*

⁶ *I.e.*,—at that belated date—practically *nil*. See above, pp. 183 *sq.*

⁷ Reprinted (with additional notes within square brackets) above, pp. 218–222.

⁸ Printed above, pp. 229 *sqq.*

⁹ The figures are taken from the *Morning Post*, *ibid.*

"origin of much of the controversy and irritation that had arisen" (*Times*, August 1, 1907, p. 6, col. 4¹);—"had been the source of a "good deal of the apprehension that had prevailed on many of these "points" (*Tribune*, August 1, 1907, p. 8, col. 4).²

August 1, 1907. "Episodes of the Month" (of July, 1907):—"The Navy League: Drastic Reconstruction, or—a Split"; by Mr. L. J. Maxse; *National Review*, August, 1907, p. 844. (Reprinted above, pp. 213 sq.)

FOUNDING THE NEW NAVY LEAGUE.³

August 2, 1907. "Founding the New Navy League³";—*Daily Express*, August 3, 1907, p. 5, col. 7:—

"Mr. H. F. Wyatt and Mr. L. Graham H. Horton-Smith, the leaders of the Reform Party in the NAVY LEAGUE, are receiving hundreds of letters of sympathy, and the formation of a new and powerful organisation,³ which may be expected to represent the true state of affairs in regard to the Navy, is only a question of a short time. . . .

"As Mr. Wyatt stated to our representative yesterday:—"Mr. Robertson, Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty, in his official statement in the House of Commons, said that he never expected to be grateful to the NAVY LEAGUE, but that he was so now.⁴ The cause of this gratitude is that the dominant majority of the LEAGUE have defended and upheld in every possible way the policy of naval reduction by the present Cabinet.⁵ That majority can now make the proud boast that they are the acknowledged allies of the present Ministry in cutting down expenditure on the Fleet.⁴

"We are grateful to Mr. Robertson for the testimonial he has given us—namely, that a portion of the NAVY LEAGUE has done its duty."⁶ . . ."

August 2, 1907. "Government and the Navy: Inconsistencies of Policy: The Crippled Home Fleet: A Reply to Mr. Lambert";—*Standard*, August 2, 1907, p. 5, col. 7.

THE NAVY LEAGUE.

STANDARD, August 3, 1907, p. 5, col. 1.

To the Editor of the STANDARD.

Windsor,

August 2, 1907.

SIR,—In your Parliamentary Report, issue of 1st inst.,⁷ Mr. Robertson, in defending the Admiralty, is reported to have said "He never

¹ S.v. "Supply—Navy Estimates."

² See also *Standard*, August 1, 1907, referred to below, n. 7.

³ The IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE. See below, pp. 305 sqq., and *passim*.

⁴ See above, pp. 239 sq., and below, p. 241.

⁵ See the preceding note, and above, pp. 210 (text and n. 8), etc.

⁶ Cp. below, p. 247.

⁷ August 1, 1907.

thought that he should live to see the day when he should be grateful for the existence of a national NAVY LEAGUE."¹ Could there be any stronger condemnation of the present Executive of that LEAGUE? I used to believe that it was non-political; that is impossible now, for it has evidently found salvation.

I am, Sir, Your obedient servant,

A. J. ERRINGTON,
Captain R.N.

THE NAVY LEAGUE AND ITS SUCCESSOR.

DEAR SIR (OR MADAM),

August, 1907.

You have doubtless seen in the Press the accounts of the Navy League Controversy, and you know therefore that the dominant majority of the Executive Committee have now decided to confine the League's aims chiefly to education (principally in schools), and have abandoned the clause formerly in its Constitution binding it to point out at all times any shortcomings in respect of our First Line of defence, the Navy.^{2,3} (See the letter of the President published in the *Times* of the 26th ult.⁴)

As I have worked chiefly in order to make this aim of real effect, by increasing the numbers of the League, and thereby endowing its protests with all possible weight, I do not think it desirable now to devote more time or strength to augment the influence of a body which has given up what seems to me its primary and most vital duty.

I am, therefore, resigning the Honorary Secretaryship of the 93rd Branch.⁵

You will probably be aware that a new Organisation⁶ is in course of formation, which, while embracing objects at once wider and more definite than those of the existing moribund Navy League, will aim also at carrying out the original policy of that Body.

Your subscription to the Navy League would normally fall due on the

May I ask you to refrain from sending it to that League until you have read the Programme of the new Organisation,⁶ which I hope to send you very shortly?

I venture confidently to hope that, after reading it, you may feel with me that you will be doing your Country a far greater service by joining the new League⁶ than by continuing to support a Body which has now become the public champion of naval reduction.⁷

I have undertaken to be the Honorary Secretary of the first Branch of the new League.⁸

I am, Faithfully yours,

GRACE E. WYATT,
Late Hon. Sec. 93rd Branch of the Navy League.

¹ See above, pp. 239-40.

² Quoted above, pp. 133, 138.

³ See above, pp. 79 (text and n. 9), 133, 215, 229, 232, 237.

⁴ July 26, 1907 (above, p. 223). See above, p. 229, and below, p. 257.

⁵ Concerning this Branch see above, pp. 233 *sq.*

⁶ The IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE. See below, pp. 305 *sqq.*, and *passim*.

⁷ See above, pp. 239-241 (text and nn.).

⁸ Hon. Sec. Surrey Branch (as also Hon. Sec. Ladies' Council) of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE (see below, pp. 523 *sq.*).

THE SHAM REVIEW. THE "POLITICAL" FLEET.¹

August 4, 1907. Home Fleet Review by the King. "Sham Fleet on Parade."² "Dust in the eyes of the public!"³ A "Gigantic Sham."⁴ "The Political Fleet."⁵

¹ To give it one of its many nautical nicknames:—see *Standard's* Portsmouth Correspondent, *Standard*, October 18, 1907, p. 7, col. 2.

² *Daily Express*, July 15, 1907.

³ The phrase is that of "Nautilus" (from Portsmouth), in the *Daily Express*, August 15, 1907, p. 1, col. 8.

⁴ See *Daily Express*, July 4, 1908 (leading article), p. 4, cols. 4-5.

⁵ For the facts see (*int. al.*):—*Standard*, July 19, 1907, p. 7, cols. 4-5 (see above, p. 186, text and n. 1); July 27, 1907 (leading article), p. 6, col. 6 (printed above, pp. 223 sq.); July 30, 1907 (leading article), p. 6, col. 6 (above, p. 227), and also p. 7, cols. 1-2; July 31, 1907 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 4-6; August 2, 1907, p. 5, col. 7, and p. 6, col. 1; August 3, 1907 (*s.v.* "Coves Naval Pageant: Great Array of Ships: The Review and Its Lessons: What the Home Fleet really is," etc.), p. 5, cols. 1-2; August 5, 1907 (leading article), p. 4, col. 5; August 8, 1907, p. 6, col. 1, and (leading article), p. 4, col. 5; August 10, 1907 (a letter), p. 6, col. 1; August 17, 1907 (leading article: quoting, *inter alia*, Mr. Lambert's statement in the House of Commons), p. 4, cols. 5-6; August 21, 1907 (leading article), p. 4, col. 5; November 20, 1907, p. 4, col. 2; January 2, 1908 (*s.v.* "Year of Naval Unrest"), p. 8, col. 4 (referred to below, p. 280); Feb. 17, 1908, p. 8, col. 2;—*Morning Post*, August 3, 1907, p. 5, cols. 2 sqq., and (Mr. Douglas Murray) November 21, 1907, p. 8, col. 2;—*Daily Express*, July 15, 1907, p. 1, col. 4, and (leading article), p. 4, col. 5; July 17, 1907, p. 1, col. 2; July 22, 1907, p. 1, col. 8, and (leading article), p. 4, col. 5; July 23, 1907, p. 1, col. 7; July 31, 1907 (*s.v.* "Budget-Eye Fleet"), p. 1, col. 2, and (leading article, *s.v.* "Seven Months of Sham"), p. 4, col. 4; August 2, 1907, p. 1, col. 6; August 3, 1907, p. 1, col. 8; August 5, 1907, p. 1 (*s.v.* "Review of the Home Fleet: Lesson from History: 'Impressing' the British Public"), cols. 2-3, and (leading article), p. 4, cols. 4-5; August 8, 1907, p. 1, col. 6 (and see the *Standard* there quoted); August 24, 1907 (*s.v.* "Still Unready Fleet: Condition of the Home Defence Squadrons: Repairs"), p. 1, col. 8; July 4, 1908 (leading article), p. 4, cols. 4-5.—*Cp.*, also, *Times*, Feb. 25, 1908 (leading article), p. 9, col. 6.—See, further, *Morning Post*, March 9, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, col. 4.

On the question of repairs, *cp.* the *Spectator*, quoted in the *Standard*, August 3, 1907, p. 5, col. 2:—"We must add that the defence put forward by Mr. Robertson in regard to repairs leave us unconvinced. We cannot see that he effectively answered the allegations of the *Standard* in this respect. He certainly did not meet the criticisms made in our columns by 'Civis.'"

A good example of a ship absent from the Review through defects was H.M.S. *Terrible*, The following, from the *Standard*, July 19, 1907, p. 7, cols. 4-5, is illuminating to the last degree:—

"H.M.S. *Terrible*: An Object Lesson in Economy and Efficiency (from our Naval Correspondent)," July 19, 1907:—

"The first class cruiser *Terrible* has just been recommissioned at Portsmouth for service with the Home Fleet. Last year" [September, 1906, on her way home from China: see *Standard*, August 17, 1907 (leading article), p. 4, col. 6], "this ship broke a propeller shaft and a new one to replace it reached Portsmouth Dockyard in November [1906], *i.e.*, just eight months ago.—There it has been ever since, unfitted" [so, until November, 1907—*i.e.*, until a whole year had elapsed: see *Daily Express*, November 15, 1907, p. 5, col. 1], "and the *Terrible*, with one propeller only, figures as one of Mr. Robertson's 'fully effective warships.'—To get the propeller's shaft and enable the *Terrible* to be anything but a sham warship it is necessary to dock the ship. That means money, and there is none available.—At the present moment, with luck, the *Terrible* might make about 13 knots. A year or so ago she was doing as much as 22; and so with one propeller only might be expected to make 16 knots or so. The principles of economy have, however, been applied to all her other repairs. Her boilers, for instance, are now growing old, and consequently need more frequent refits than might otherwise obtain. They have not had them, however; there are no men to spare for work of this sort. As a result, not more than a third of her boilers will hold water properly. —Mr. Robertson's explanation of what he expects the *Terrible* to do in case of war would be interesting."

See further, in connection with the *Terrible*:—*Standard*, August 2, 1907, p. 5, col. 7; August 8, 1907, p. 6, col. 1; August 17, 1907 (leading article), p. 4, col. 6; October 18, 1907, p. 7, col. 2; November 20, 1907, p. 4, col. 2; January 18, 1908, p. 5, col. 3; June 25, 1908, p. 7, col. 7;—*Daily Express*, August 5, 1907, p. 1, col. 3, and November 15, 1907,

NAVAL REDUCTIONS AND GRAVE PERIL.

August 5, 1907. The Government and the Fleet;—*Standard's* leading article, August 5, 1907, p. 4, col. 5,—wherein, after pointing out that the "unfortunate tactics" pursued by the present Administration and the official spokesmen of the Admiralty "have inspired a feeling of distrust among a large proportion of a public naturally prone to place an unquestioning confidence in the naval advisers of the Government," the *Standard* points out that:—

"The reduction of the Channel Fleet from 67 vessels to 21 has aroused actual apprehension. We have again and again dwelt upon the imperative necessity for restoring the first line of defence to its former strength. For six months the extensive dislocation of the organisation of the Fleet, consequent upon the reductions of the present Government, has exposed this country to serious potential dangers."

August 6, 1907. "Marksmanship in the Navy: Defective Gun-sights in Battleships and Cruisers: Tests Nullified";—*Daily Express*, August 6, 1907:—

"The secret of the Channel Fleet's inferior position in the gunlayers' tests of the Navy is now revealed. . . . One or two of the 'inspired' organs of the Admiralty, which have been using the gunlayers' tests as a stick to belabour the Channel Fleet, will now be able to withdraw the unjustifiable imputations that were made in order to bolster up the 'instantly ready' Home Fleet."

HOME FLEET'S TWO-DAYS' CRUISE.

August 6-7, 1907. "Instantly Unready: How the Home Fleet Works Out in Practice: Tale of Two Nights: Apologist's¹ Striking Testimony to the Real Facts";—*Daily Express*, August 10, 1907, p. 1, col. 2.

See further—s.v. "Two Days of 'War Training': The Home Fleet and Torpedo Attacks";—*Standard*, August 10, 1907 (from its Portsmouth Correspondent), p. 5, col. 7.

p. 5, col. 1;—and Mr. Douglas Murray in the *Morning Post*, November 21, 1907, p. 8, col. 2.

It is curious (though of striking interest) to observe that the accident to the *Terrible* was entirely omitted from the "Casualties to Ships Returns" for 1906. See *Standard*, November 20, 1907, p. 4, col. 2, and June 25, 1908, p. 7, col. 7.

"The omission"—of this flagrant case of cheeseparing and neglect—"was due" (has said Mr. McKenna, the new First Lord of the Admiralty) "to inadvertence"! (See *Standard*, June 25, 1908, p. 7, col. 7, and June 26, 1908, p. 6, col. 5.) *Credat Iudæus!*

Concerning the Government's new and highly symptomatic decision as to "Casualties to Ships Returns," see now below, p. 411.

¹ The *Times's* correspondent on H.M.S. *Bulwark*.

The *Standard*, August 10, 1907 (leading article), p. 4, col. 5, comments as follows:—

"The manœuvres in which the Home Fleet was engaged from Tuesday morning to Wednesday evening have, upon the evidence of those officially recognised exponents of Admiralty policy who were privileged to witness them, furnished a last convincing demonstration of its unreadiness for instant emergency."

THE CHANNEL FLEET—NOT A FLEET.

August 7, 1907. Lord Charles Beresford and the Channel Fleet;—See the *Daily Express*, August 7, 1907, p. 1, col. 6:—

"Lord Charles Beresford arrived with the Channel Fleet in the Mersey yesterday.

"Lord Charles made the following statement to an *Express* representative on board his flagship the *King Edward VII.*:—

"I sympathise with the people belonging to the Peace Society," he said. "They want us to reduce our armaments. If we reduce our armaments it is absolutely certain we shall have to go to war. All these implements for taking people's lives are really a guarantee of peace being kept.

"This is not a fleet. A fleet under modern conditions consists of battleships, armoured cruisers, scouts and torpedo-boats. This is merely a squadron of battleships.' . . ."

HOME FLEET ACCIDENTS.

August 9, 1907. "Since the mobilisation of the Home Fleet commenced a fortnight ago no fewer than 8 destroyers have been put out of action:—in the *Rother*, *Waveney*, *Garry* . . . , *Spiteful* . . . , *Quail* . . . , *Cynthia* . . . , *Kestrel* and *Teviot*. . . ." The *Standard*, August 9, 1907, p. 5, col. 7. (See also, *s.v.* "Home Fleet Cripples";—*Daily Express*, August 9, 1907, p. 1, col. 3.)

See further—*s.v.* "More Naval Lame Ducks: Long List of Destroyers out of Action";—*Daily Express*, August 12, p. 5, col. 4:—

"It has now transpired that two more of the destroyers belonging "to the Portsmouth flotilla" [namely, the *Coquette* and the *Vigilant*] "were crippled in the operations with the Home Fleet. Thus of the "total of 12 destroyers which form the Portsmouth reserve flotilla, "only 4 are, at the conclusion of the manœuvres, fit for service.

"The complete list is as follows:—Portsmouth Flotilla, *Waveney*, *Gala*,² *Spiteful*, *Coquette*, *Vigilant*, *Kestrel*, *Teviot*, *Cynthia*; Nore "Flotilla, *Rother* and *Quail*."

¹ Cf. Lieut. Carlyon Bellairs, M.P., "The Impending Naval Crisis," *National Review*, October, 1907 (pp. 308–317), at p. 312.

² Misprint for *Garry*. See text above, on this page, and see *Standard*, August 9, 1907, p. 5, col. 7.

INCREASE IN CHANNEL FLEET FORESHADOWED.

August 9, 1907. "Naval Policy Change: Increase in Channel Fleet" foreshadowed:¹ "More Cruisers and More Destroyers";—*Standard*, August 9, 1907, p. 5, col. 7.² Cf. also the *Daily Express*, August 9, 1907, p. 1, col. 3,—s.v. "The Channel Fleet: Has the Admiralty Made Concessions?"—the *Express* observing that "while the Admiralty is making graceful concessions, it might as well make them adequately, for it is generally believed that, in response to criticisms, the Channel Fleet will sooner or later be restored to its original position, so that it may actually be a fleet and not a squadron."

NATIONAL DANGER AT LAST REALISED—?

August 10, 1907. The contemplated "Channel Fleet Increase: 3 Feeling in Naval Centres: A National Danger Realised: The *Standard* Justified";—*Standard*, August 10, p. 5, col. 7, and p. 6, col. 1;—Naval opinion at (a) Portsmouth, (b) Devonport, (c) Chatham.

Commenting upon "this contemplated increase of the Channel Fleet, by means of the restoration to it of part of the force which was transferred to the Reserve early in the year," the *Standard*, August 10, 1907 (leading article), p. 4, col. 5, writes:—

"If, as we have persistently contended, the Channel Fleet, as the first line of defence in Home waters, ought to be restored to its former strength, that measure should be carried out without a delay which (at least) involves a potential danger. . . ."

August 12, 1907. "J. L.'s" second letter (of date August 3, 1907), in *Times*, p. 10, col. 3.⁴

THE NAVY AND THE NAVY LEAGUE.

Times, August 17, 1907, p. 10, col. 4.

To the Editor of the Times.

4, Paper Buildings, Temple, E.C.,
August 12, 1907.

SIR,—The fact that your correspondent "J. L." is unable even to attempt to answer specifically any one of the questions which we put to him in your issue of the 3rd inst.⁶ is a sufficient commentary

¹ See above, p. 222, and below, p. 247.

² And see hereon *Standard*, August 10, 1907 (leading article), p. 4, col. 5.

³ See below, p. 247.

⁴ See below, pp. 245-7.

⁵ Above, on this page (s.v., August 12, 1907).

⁶ *Times*, August 3, 1907 (above, pp. 226 sq.).

upon the nature of his case. Here is an apologist who writes to you to express an admiration equally wide and vague for the naval policy of the present Government, and whose power of reply fails instantly in face of specific interrogation. His argument, if it can be called such, consists merely of two assertions—first, that no layman has a right to criticise any acts done in the name of the Admiralty; and, secondly, that the latter deserve high praise. But praise is criticism, and if “J. L.” is a layman, he has, by praising the Admiralty, destroyed his own canon.

If, however, he is himself (though anonymous) a professional expert, his thesis that no one, not possessed of similar qualification, ought to deal with matters pertaining to the sea, is well worthy of analysis.

In the first place, when Sir Richard Hawkins, whom he quotes, wrote that “the government at sea hardly suffereth a head without “exquisite experience,” did he refer to the direction of ships at sea, or to the control of naval policy by a Cabinet of landmen on shore? If the reference is to the former, the quotation is irrelevant, because no one is likely to dispute the correctness of the *dictum*. But if the reference is to the latter, then is “J. L.” prepared to maintain that the present Government exercise no control whatever over naval expenditure, and, therefore, over naval policy? But if they do exercise this control, then it is they who are obnoxious to Sir Richard Hawkins’s implied blame, and why in that case should not laymen criticise the action of laymen?

Can anything, in point of fact, be more absurd than to represent the Board of Admiralty as free agents totally uncontrolled by the Ministry, whose servants they are? Does the Government of the day in Britain really have no voice in regard to expenditure upon the Fleet, and if it decide the expenditure, must it not also largely mould the policy? It is time that this stale trick of resenting criticism by laymen upon any acts performed in the name of a board of officers who are themselves necessarily controlled by other laymen should be exposed and abandoned. The First Lord of the Admiralty is himself a layman, and he exercises a far higher degree of “government at sea” than is aspired to by any lay critic.

Apart, however, from this exploded device, your correspondent has no weapon of controversy save vague affirmation. He speaks of the “unassailable reasons” which led to the creation of the Home Fleet, but he does not tell us what these unassailable reasons were. We will venture to supply his omission, and to say that the governing motive was the desire for economy on the part of an Administration which was returned to office pledged to the hilt to cut down expenditure on the Navy.¹ In pursuit of that desire, ships have been withdrawn from conditions making for full efficiency and placed under conditions making for less efficiency.² By that withdrawal,² by the reduction of the *personnel*,³ by the commencement of the application of the fatal principle of short service,⁴ and by other changes,⁵ the fighting value of the British Navy has been reduced, sacrificed—in bald and naked truth—to the proclivities of a Government which does not

¹ Cp. above, pp. 25 *sq.*

² See above, pp. 14, 16, 19 *sq.*, 25, 132, 141, etc.

³ See above, p. 61 (text and n. 8).

⁴ See above p. 62 (text and n. 4).

⁵ Cp. above, *passim*.

believe seriously in the possibility of war,¹ and which wants money for social reforms.²

That public champion of naval reduction, the NAVY LEAGUE, now basking in the sunshine of official favour, was publicly thanked by the Government spokesman in the House of Commons, on the 31st ult.,³ for the aid which it had rendered to the Ministry.⁴

We are grateful, indeed, to Mr. Robertson for having added that there existed within the NAVY LEAGUE what he was pleased to call "A Navier League," which, he said, had been the cause of "much of the irritation and controversy which had arisen."⁵

We thank him for this testimony that a portion at least of the NAVY LEAGUE has done its duty.⁶

We are, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

INCREASE OF THE CHANNEL FLEET.

32 VESSELS ADDED.

THE "STANDARD" JUSTIFIED.

REVERSAL OF ADMIRALTY POLICY.

INQUIRY NEEDED.

STANDARD, August 14, 1907, p. 5, col. 7.

It is officially announced^{7 8} that 32 vessels of the Home Fleet are to be transferred to the Channel Fleet. By the first week in September,⁹ 2 armoured cruisers,¹⁰ 1 unarmoured cruiser, 2 scouts,¹¹ 24 destroyers, and 3 depot ships will be added to the Channel Fleet, bringing its strength to 53 vessels, or within 14 vessels of the number commanded by Admiral Sir A. K. Wilson.

¹ A Government which has—to apply a phrase of Mr. Spenser Wilkinson, *Secret of the Sea* (referred to below, p. 252 n.), pp. 21-22—"forgotten the most elementary fact of national life—the existence of conflict—and neglected its most elementary duty of naval and military preparation." (Cp. further, below, pp. 257, 296, 414.)

² Cp. above, p. 25, and below, p. 315, and Index, s.v. "Social Reform."

³ July 31, 1907.

⁴ See above, pp. 239-241.

⁵ See above, p. 240.

⁶ Cp. above, p. 240.

⁷ See (in anticipation) above, pp. 222, 245.

⁸ "On Tuesday" (Aug. 13, 1907), "Mr. Lambert, without deigning a word to account for a redistribution of the Fleet in Home waters, which completely invalidates every official contention made with regard to the Home Fleet since its formation, announced the increase of the Channel Fleet by 32 vessels. Nor has there been any endeavour on the part of those apologists of Admiralty policy who have made it their business to defend the reductions in the Fleet, to explain this momentous change in any way whatever."—*Standard*, August 17, 1907 (leading article), p. 4, cols. 5-6.

⁹ September, 1907.

¹⁰ "The *Black Prince*, from the Second Cruiser (Atlantic) Squadron, in which she will be replaced by the *Carnarvon*, from the Devonport Division of the Reserve (or Home) Fleet"—and "the *Duke of Edinburgh* from the Nore Division" of the latter Fleet. See *Standard*, August 14, 1907, p. 5, col. 7.

¹¹ *Patrol* and *Skirmisher*. See *Standard*, August 14, 1907, p. 5, col. 7.

Below we give the strength of the Channel Fleet under Admiral Sir A. K. Wilson's command, the strength to which it was reduced when he hauled down his flag,¹ and the strength to which it will be raised by the first week in September.²

			1906.		1907.		Sept., 1907.
Battleships	...	...	17	...	14	...	14
Armoured cruisers	...	...	6	...	4	...	6
Protected cruisers	...	...	5*	...	3	...	7*
Scouts	...	...	3	...	none	...	2
Destroyers	...	...	36	...	none	...	24
Total ...			67	...	21	...	53

*Including depot ships.

Commenting upon the news, the *Standard* (in its leading article), August 14, 1907, p. 4, cols. 4-5, wrote:—

"The increase of the Channel Fleet . . . is a virtual acknowledgment by the Admiralty of the fact that for the last six months the defence of the Home waters has depended in the first instance upon a small squadron of battleships and armoured cruisers, deprived of the rest of the units of which a fighting fleet should be composed. . .

"An Administration which is forced by the pressure of public opinion, point by point, to reverse its declared policy and to disprove its own most emphatic contentions, is no longer fit for its office. . . .

"The business of the Board of Admiralty is not to coin 'picturesque' phrases and advertise a policy, but to administer the British Navy. When the phrases are worn thin, and the policy changes from month to month, the nation has a right to inquire concerning the administration."

See also, *s.v.* "Channel Fleet Increased: Complete Reversal of Admiralty Policy: A Cave In: 32 Vessels taken from the Home Fleet";—*Daily Express*, August 14, 1907, p. 1, col. 2;—and, *s.v.* "Admiralty's Bitter Pill: Admitting its Error on the Shuffling of Fleets," *Daily Express*, August 15, 1907, p. 1, col. 8.

THE HAGUE CONFERENCE AND BRITISH DISARMAMENT.

August 17, 1907. "On Saturday" (August 17, 1907) "the Hague Conference, with all suitable ceremony, performed the funeral obsequies over the British Disarmament proposal. That unfortunate and ill-advised enterprise received its deathblow some weeks ago, when Sir Edward Fry had to discover that not a single delegation of importance had any intention whatever of supporting a motion that meant anything."—*Standard*, August 19, 1907 (leading article), p. 4, col. 4.³

¹ See above, pp. 44, 48 nn. 1, 2, 103, etc.

² September, 1907.

³ See further, concerning the Hague Conference, below, pp. 249, 252 (text and nn. 1, 2), etc.

AMAZING BRITISH OFFER AT THE HAGUE.

August 17, 1907. British Government's Amazing Offer at the Hague:—

"The Government of Great Britain would be prepared annually to communicate to the Powers who would do the same the programme of construction for new vessels of war and the expenditure entailed by that programme. This exchange of information would facilitate an exchange of views between the Governments as to the reductions which might be effected by mutual agreement."¹ 2

August 19, 1907. "Gunlayers' Tests: Official Returns which lead to Misconception";—"From a Correspondent."³—*Standard*, August 19, 1907, p. 6, col. 4.⁴

THE THIRD "DREADNOUGHT" CALLED FOR.

August 21, 1907. With regard to (*inter alia*) "the building of the third ship of the *Dreadnought* class, which"—to quote the *Standard* (leading article), August 21, 1907, p. 4, col. 5—"by an arrangement both humiliating and ridiculous, was made contingent upon the result of the Hague Conference";—see the *Standard* (*ibid.*):—

"The result is now before us, and . . . there is no excuse for suggesting that anything which happened at The Hague absolves us from the duty of building the additional *Dreadnought*. . . Much valuable time has" (already) "been lost."⁵

¹ Upon this "amazing offer" (*Daily Express*, August 19, 1907, p. 1, col. 2)—this "declaration so astounding that it is difficult to treat it with perfect seriousness" (*Standard*, August 19, 1907, leading article, p. 4, col. 4)—"futile or criminal?" "either useless or disastrous," a "preposterous suggestion" (*Globe*, August 19, 1907, p. 6, col. 2)—"a fatuous proposal" (*Standard*, August 12, 1908, leading article, p. 4, col. 5)—see *Daily Express*, August 19, 1907, p. 1, col. 2, and (leading article) p. 4, cols. 4-5; *Globe*, August 19, 1907 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 2-3; *Morning Post*, August 19, 1907 (leading article), p. 4, cols. 4-5; *Standard*, August 19, 1907, p. 5, cols. 1-3, and (leading article) p. 4, cols. 4-5; August 20, 1907, p. 6, col. 1, and (leading article) p. 4, col. 6; August 21, 1907 (leading article), p. 4, col. 5.

The intentions of the British Liberal Cabinet (herein displayed) may well supply the cue to the "*Kaiser-Tweedmouth*" Correspondence referred to below, pp. 335, 351, 352, 355, 360, 364, 365, 366.

² See further, concerning the Hague Conference, above, pp. 4, 6, 10, 47, 49, 50, 110, 117, 212, 230, 248, and below, pp. 252 (text and nn. 1, 2), 373, 427, 512, etc.

³ Apparently the same Correspondent as the one referred to below, *s.v.*, October 16, 1907, p. 251. See notes 5 and 6 thereto.

⁴ See further hereon (*s.v.* "Year of Naval Unrest"), *Standard*, January 2, 1908, below, p. 280.

⁵ Not until November 13, 1907, did Mr. Robertson definitely state that the "additional battleship, which had not been ordered because of the hope that the Government attached to the Hague Conference, was to be built in consequence of the disappointment of those hopes." (See *Morning Post*, November 14, 1907, p. 9, col. 5; *Standard*, November 14, 1907, p. 4, col. 3.)

Even so, however, her keel was not laid till April 2, 1908 (see *Standard*, April 3, 1908, p. 7, col. 5);—in other words, "about a week" (to quote Mr. F. T. Jane, *Ev. Standard and S.J.G.*, April 6, 1908, p. 4, col. 3) "after the expiration of the year in which she ought to have been commenced. It is worth noting" (added Mr. Jane, *ibid.*) "that the German ships of the corresponding programme were laid down last September" (*i.e.*, September, 1907).

Officially named the *Vanguard* (though originally it had been the intention to name her the *Rodney*), this battleship—the seventh *Dreadnought*—will, "unofficially" (according to the *Standard*, November 15, 1907, p. 13, col. 2), "never be anything else than 'The Hague.'"

THE ZANZIBAR INCIDENT.

FATEFUL BLOW TO BRITISH PRESTIGE.

August, 1907. The Zanzibar Affair¹:—Mutiny of Sultan's Imperial Body-guard: Sultan's Appeal to British Vice-Consul for Assistance (Zanzibar being a British Protectorate): No British Warship within hundreds of miles: British Vice-Consul driven to appeal for German Naval Assistance (to quell a disturbance in a British Protectorate, the native troops in which were commanded by a British Officer): German Naval Aid vouchsafed: Severe Blow to British Prestige in Africa;—and a cordial message of thanks to the German Government for supplementing the naval deficiencies of the greatest Naval Power on earth.

For the earliest publication of the news of this "open humiliation of the British power," "the effect" of which "upon the native mind needs no description";—see the *Standard*, Dec. 5, 1907, p. 7, col. 1, and Dec. 7, 1907, p. 7, col. 3. And see further, in regard thereto, the *Standard*, Dec. 5, 1907 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 6-7; Dec. 6, 1907, p. 7, col. 6; January 10, 1908, p. 7, col. 1; and *Daily Express*, Dec. 5, 1907, p. 1, col. 2, and (leading article, "Naval Emergencies"), p. 4, cols. 4-5; Dec. 6, 1907, p. 1, col. 6; and Dec. 7, 1907, p. 1, col. 3.²

No wonder the Liberal Cabinet would have preferred the matter to remain unknown. But, unhappily for them:—"Pede Poena Claudio."³

September, 1907. "Naval and Military Shams":—by Mr. L. J. Maxse, *s.v.*, "Episodes of the Month" (of August, 1907), *National Review*, September, 1907, pp. 21 sq.⁴

October, 1907. Episodes of the Month (of September, 1907):—"The Problem of Invasion" (with its reference to the "Emasculate Navy League"); "Growth of German Navy; Its Future Strength; Prospects of Invasion; General von der Goltz's View⁵; Surprise; Need for Naval Concentration; Military Counter-Preparation";—by Mr. L. J. Maxse, in the *National Review*, Oct., 1907, pp. 171-179.

¹ Cp. above, pp. 45 n. 1, 49 n. 3, 74 n. 9.

² Cp. also—*s.v.*, "'Hunt-the-Cruiser' (The New Naval Game)"—*Punch*, Dec. 11, 1907, p. 416, col. 1:—"The British Consul at Zanzibar was recently obliged to ask assistance from a German cruiser to aid in quelling a disturbance, as, thanks to the new naval system, there was no British warship within several hundred miles. At the time of the Jamaica earthquake, it will be remembered, a week elapsed before one of our ships arrived." [See above, p. 45.] "The delightful game of 'Hunt-the-Cruiser' need not be confined to any particular season or spot, but can be played all the year round and very nearly all the world round." ³ Hor., *Odes*, 3, 2, 31.

⁴ "This 'nobbling' of the Press on questions of national defence," he writes (at p. 21), "has greatly injured the prestige of the 'Fourth Estate,' though it has immensely increased the influence and popularity of independent journals like the *Standard* and *Spectator*, which have steadily declined the sinister suggestions of the semi-official Press Bureaus of Whitehall and Pall Mall, and have loyally devoted themselves to exposing military and naval shams. Their championship of the Channel Fleet, which was reduced from 67 vessels under Admiral Wilson to 21 under Lord Charles Beresford" (above, pp. 44, 48 nn.), "owing to Sir John Fisher's unworthy jealousy of a great and popular sailor, is beginning to tell, as under the pressure of public opinion the Admiralty have been compelled to augment the Channel Fleet" (above, p. 247). "Sir John Fisher's journalistic jackals are now in the predicament of being compelled to defend what they previously denounced. It is only the beginning of their humiliation."—(Cp. further below, p. 256, text, and n. 2.)

⁵ *Nat. Rev.*, October, 1907, p. 175 (quoted above, p. R.F.). Cp. further, concerning his views, above, p. R.F., and below, pp. 431, 435.

October, 1907. "The Impending Naval Crisis";—by Lieut. Carlyon Bellairs, M.P., in *The National Review*, October, 1907, pp. 308-317.¹

October 2, 1907. "The Truth about the Navy," by Mr. H. W. Lucy,² in the *Westminster Gazette*, p. 3, cols. 1-2 (concerning whose views see below, p. 254, text and n. 5, and 260).

October 2, 1907. "A Case for Inquiry";—*Daily Express*, leading article, p. 4, col. 4.

October 8, 1907. "Long Cruise—At Anchor: Strange Record of the 5th Cruiser Squadron" ["attached to the Nore Division of the Home Fleet"]; "Always Refitting";—*Daily Express*, October 8, 1907, p. 1, col. 4.³

October 14, 1907. "The Menace of Germany."—Speech at Marlborough by Mr. L. J. Maxse (reported *Morning Post*, October 15, 1907).

October 15-25, 1907. "Combined Tactical Fleet Exercises" in the North Sea.⁴

October 16, 1907. "Naval Gunnery: the Truth about Battle Practice: Misleading Returns":—"From a Correspondent"^{5 6}; in the *Standard*, October 16, 1907, p. 4, cols. 3-4.⁷

¹ See, on this article, the *Daily Express*, October 2, 1907, p. 1, col. 6 (s.v. "Ruining the Navy: 'Economy' which is leading to a Crisis: M.P.'s Indictment"), and (leading article) p. 4, col. 4.

² Concerning whom, see below, pp. 254 (text and n. 5), 260 sq.

³ Cp. further below, s.v. December 12, 1907, p. 275 (and see Index, s.v. "Nore Division").

⁴ See *Daily Express*, August 27, 1907, p. 1, col. 5.

⁵ See above, s.v. August 19, 1907, p. 249 n. 3.

⁶ See, further, *Standard*, November 12, 1907 (leading article), p. 6, col. 5, where the writer of the article (of October 16, 1907) is stated to be "a competent authority."

⁷ See further hereon, *Standard*, January 2, 1908 (s.v. "Year of Naval Unrest"), p. 8, col. 3:—

"On October 16 (1907), the *Standard* published a detailed account of the regulations governing the Battle Practice of the Fleet and the way in which they were carried out, conclusively proving that as a test of war efficiency the Battle Practice returns were practically worthless.

"On August 19 (1907), precisely the same conclusions were proved with regard to the Gunlayers' Tests.

"On November 5 (1907), an official announcement was published outlining reforms in the Battle Practice as suggested by the writer of the article." [See below, p. 255.]

"Yet the returns of both Gunlayers' Tests and Battle Practice had been quoted by the First Lord, as absolute proofs of the efficiency of the whole Fleet, and particularly of the Home Fleet.

"Even more significant is the fact that Admiral of the Fleet Sir John Fisher, speaking at the Guildhall on November 9 (1907)—four days after the Admiralty had publicly withdrawn their own regulations—said that the gunnery efficiency of the Fleet was 'unparalleled.'"

See further hereon *Standard* (leading article), February 4, 1908, and below, pp. 255 n. 5, 260 (text and nn. 2, 3), 286, 330 (text and n. 4), 341 sq.

END OF THE "PEACE" CONFERENCE.

October 18, 1907. End of the so-called "Peace Conference";¹—(cp. the *P.M.G.*, October 19, 1907, p. 2).²

"*Solvuntur tabulae risu.*" And most of the jeers at the expense of Britain.

REQUEST FOR INQUIRY REFUSED.

October 19, 1907. M.P.'s Request for Naval Inquiry Refused. For the extraordinary ground alleged for the refusal, see *Standard*, October 19, 1907 (leading article, "State of the Navy," p. 6, col. 6, cited below, p. 253, nn. 12, 13).

ADMIRALTY POLICY.

METHODS OF THE FIRST SEA LORD.

STANDARD, October 19, 1907, p. 9, col. 3.

To the Editor.

SIR,—In the public-spirited campaign which you have carried on in the interest of our first line of defence, you have very properly called attention to many things which are making for deterioration in the strength of the Navy: the reduction of the sea-going

¹ "The 'Peace' Conference" (at the Hague) "has seemed a misnomer. The Maritime 'War' Conference would have been a more accurate description."—*Standard*, October 14, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, col. 6.

² For the "Results of the Peace Conference," see *Standard*, October 18, 1907 (leading article), p. 6, col. 5-6, the following passages in which are especially worth quoting:—

"The abolition of contraband and the establishment of an International Prize Court, for instance, proposed by the British delegates, would, by completing the enfranchisement of the neutral begun by the Declaration of Paris in 1856, remove at a blow the most powerful incentives to keep the peace known to history. . . . There are two ways by which war may be prevented, or at least indefinitely postponed. One is by removing the causes which lead to hostilities. The other is by making war a calamity so widespread and so dreadful that it is regarded with horror by every citizen."

"A flat refusal" (wrote the *Standard*, October 14, 1907, leading article, p. 6, cols. 6-7, "to ratify the convention as regards the Prize Court would, no doubt, emphasise the failure of the Conference. Better the admission of a sufficiently notorious fact than that Britain should go into the next great naval war with her fighting arm tied behind her."

An admirable exposition of the reasons, which should have prevented Great Britain from becoming a party to the Declaration of Paris, will be found in "*The Secret of the Sea*"—(a chapter extracted from "*The Great Alternative: A Plea for a National Policy*," by Mr. Spenser Wilkinson, published for the N.L. 1895)—pp. 11 sqq. "Signed by all the Great Powers of Europe, but not by the United States" [*ibid.*, p. 11] [nor by Spain: see Mr. J. J. Robson in *Standard*, December 31, 1908, p. 8, col. 2]. " . . . it seems incredible that any English Ministry should have tamely agreed to so serious a diminution of the effectiveness of the particular force upon which depend the Empire, the greatness, and the very independence of Great Britain" (*ibid.*, p. 13).

Mr. Wilkinson was even able to show (*ibid.*, pp. 12-13, that "in" the event of "a war between England and any other Power . . . the new rule" actually "operates as an inducement to" British Colonies "to secede from the British Empire."

"The present [British] Government"—wrote the *Standard*, August 12, 1908 (leading article: "Peace Conference Results"), p. 4, col. 5—"desire completely to enfranchise the neutral. It is affirmed that much suffering will thereby be prevented, and also that, as Great Britain is likely to be a neutral Power (a pure supposition, for which there is no evidence), her interests will be served. That position is really, though not ostensibly, founded on the principle that British naval supremacy is not to be maintained. It is a logical development of the policy of reduction of armaments. The immediate consequence of freeing neutrals from all risk and responsibility would be to remove at a stroke the strongest known guarantee of peace. If Great Britain is to retain her naval supremacy, she will neither yield her rights of adjudication in her Prize Courts to another tribunal nor mitigate any of the restrictions upon contraband of war."

See further, hereon, *Standard*, October 9, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, col. 5 sq., and Mr. Gibson Bowles' work "*The Declaration of Paris of 1856*," therein referred to; and see also Mr. John J. Robson's detailed letter (above referred to) in *Standard*, Dec. 31, 1908, p. 8.

¶ Cp. further below, p. 512.

squadrons¹; the inadequacy of the building programme,² especially in destroyers (to replace those that are wearing out³),⁴ and fast, light cruisers for scouting purposes⁵; to dangerous arrears of repairs,⁶ and to the unwisdom of adopting the short service system into the Navy,⁷ and of keeping sailors in barracks instead of at sea.⁸

But there is another direction from which, under the present administration, danger threatens the Navy; a very serious danger indeed, upon which, if you have mentioned it, you have not laid sufficient stress. I will not beat about the bush in speaking of it. It is this:—*Since the present First Sea Lord has been at the Admiralty, a system of espionage*¹³ *has grown up in the British Navy. Officers are reported upon, privately and unofficially, to Whitehall.*⁹ Any criticism among ourselves of Admiralty policy is whispered and not openly discussed as in the old days. A feeling of *suspicion* is growing in consequence; officers look askance at their neighbours, and keep their mouths shut for prudence sake, for it is pretty obvious that no man who has a bad secret record can hope for promotion or employment. It is easy to imagine what the effect of this feeling must be on the *esprit de corps* of the commissioned ranks. *Good men want to get out of the service as quickly as possible, and soon, if his dictatorship last long enough, the First Sea Lord will be able to surround himself with an impenetrable ring of his own supporters.*⁹ I have said so much because I feel that my duty towards my country justifies a breach of the regulations of the service.⁹ Money can make good shortages of material and arrears of repairs, but all the wealth of England cannot remedy the destruction of a corps of officers which centuries of splendid traditions have built up.⁹ I believe that the methods of Sir John Fisher are ruining the tone and moral of that corps. That is why I have spoken.

I understand that an inquiry into the policy and actions of the Board of Admiralty has been refused by the Prime Minister on the ground that if it were granted Sir John Fisher would resign.¹⁰ Surely if he has done nothing worthy of reproach he ought to welcome investigation.⁹

I am, Sir, Your obedient servant, NAVAL OFFICER.^{11 12 13}

¹ See above, pp. 12, 14, 16, 19 *sqq.*, etc.

² See above, pp. 61 *sq.* (text and nn.).

³ Cp. above, pp. 77 n. 3.

⁴ See above, p. 61 (text and n. 10).

⁵ Cp. above, p. 78 (text and nn. 5, 6).

⁶ See above, pp. 16, 25, 226, 242, etc., and below, p. 256. ⁷ See above, p. 62 (text and n. 4).

⁸ See above, pp. 16, 37, etc.

⁹ The italics in this letter are ours.

¹⁰ See *Standard*, Oct. 19, 1907 (leading article, "State of the Navy"), p. 6, col. 6 (referred to above, p. 252):—"Mr. Bellairs, M.P., has stated that the Prime Minister has refused the request made to him by a number of Members of the House to hold an Inquiry into Naval Administration upon the ground that, if he acceded to it, the First Sea Lord would resign. This extraordinary reply is merely an evasion of the real point in question."—See also below, pp. 258, 266, 285, 293, 316, 323, 330, 333, 343, 348, 401, 410, etc.; and *Standard*, Jan. 2, 1908 (leading article), p. 4, col. 6; March 18, 1909 (leading article), p. 8, col. 6; *Morning Post*, March 20, 1909, p. 7, col. 3.

¹¹ A "distinguished naval officer"; see *Standard*, Oct. 19, 1907, p. 6, col. 6 (leading article), wherein it is stated:—"We are in possession of full knowledge of the circumstances of the case." "No graver indictment," the *Standard* continues, "could be brought against a high official than that which is plainly set forth in this letter."

¹² Upon this "letter from a distinguished naval officer" (cp. preceding note) see, especially, *Standard*, October 19, 1907 (leading article), p. 6, col. 6.

¹³ On this system of *espionage* see also—in addition to *Standard*, Oct. 19, 1907 (leading article), p. 6, col. 6 (see preceding notes)—*Daily Express*, Nov. 1, 1907 (leading article), p. 4, col. 5;—and, again, *Standard*, Nov. 2, 1907 (leading article); Nov. 12, 1907 (leading article), p. 6, col. 6; Nov. 22, 1907 (leading article), p. 6, col. 5; Jan. 2, 1908 (*s.v.* "Year of Naval Unrest"), p. 8, col. 4; Jan. 16, 1908 (letter of "Longships," referred to below, p. 291), p. 5, col. 2; April 23, 1909, p. 9, col. 3; *National Review*, Nov. 1907, p. 339 (below, p. 254 n. 6); *Outlook*, quoted in *Standard*, July 11, 1908, p. 7, col. 2; Sir

NAVY LEAGUE COMMITTEE.

ADMIRAL FREMANTLE'S RESIGNATION.

Oct., 1907. Admiral Fremantle resigns Vice-Chairmanship¹ of, as also his seat² on, the Executive Committee of the NAVY LEAGUE.³

November, 1907. "Episodes of the Month" (of October, 1907):—"The German Emperor's Visit"⁴; The Hague War Conference; National Defence; A Liberal Protest⁵; The Autocrat of the Admiralty; Where are the Opposition?—by Mr. L. J. Maxse, in the *National Review*, November, 1907, pp. 329-331 and 335-341.⁶

INVASION.

November, 1907. "Invasion";—by the Military Correspondent of the *Times*; in the *National Review*, November, 1907, pp. 468-484.⁷

George E. Armstrong, April 2, 1909, and in *Standard*, April 21, 1909, p. 5, cols. 1 sq.—(whereon see also *Standard*, April 22, 1909, p. 7, col. 1, leading article, "Discipline in the Navy," and April 23, 1909, p. 9, col. 3)—and further in *Times*, April 23, 1909, p. 7, col. 4; Mr. H. F. Wyatt in *P.M.G.*, April 23, 1909 (Extra-late Edition), p. 1, col. 4; Sir George Armstrong, again, in *Times*, May 3, 1909, p. 4, cols. 5 sq., and thereon, *Globe*, May 3, 1909, p. 6, cols. 2 sq. (leading article, "Private and Secret"); and Mr. H. W. Wilson in *Nat. Rev.*, May, 1909, p. 399; and *Standard*, May 20, 1909 (leading article: "Admiralty Methods"), p. 8, cols. 6 sq., which sums up the whole matter as follows:—"Out of all this undignified shuffling and evasion certain plain facts emerge. There has been established at the Board of Admiralty a system of 'delation' or espionage, of which the two instances which have come to light" [in April and May, 1909] "are clear proof. There are other instances, which have not yet been exposed. The letters, passages from which have been published, are only two of a series (as, indeed, Mr. McKenna incautiously admitted yesterday). . . . The system . . . permeates the whole Service, and if the present Government continue to condone and even to support it, the *moral* of the Navy will be ruined. . . . Mr. McKenna stated yesterday that the First Sea Lord is responsible for this state of things. Then the First Sea Lord must be requested to resign."

Cp. also, *s.v.* "Favouritism," below, pp. 259, 294, 319.

¹ "Temporarily . . . during his absence in India," said the *N.L.J.*, November, 1907, p. 312. Admiral Fremantle had long since returned from India (he was in England in July, 1908)—but he did not resume the Vice-Chairmanship. Another was appointed in his place.

² See *N.L.J.*, November, 1907, p. vi.

³ We have reason to believe that, in the opinion now held by the Admiral, the view taken by ourselves has been right, throughout, and that taken by the Old Navy League wrong. Cp. *e.g.* below, p. 402.

⁴ For its object, see below, pp. 267 sq.

⁵ The anxiety aroused in the Navy . . . is effectively set forth by Mr. H. W. Lucy, a leading if not the leading Liberal journalist, who has never taken part in a 'scare' in his life, and who is as little of a Jingo as the Bishop of Hereford, in a letter to the *Westminster Gazette* of all places (October 2), which we would commend to all those who have allowed themselves to be beguiled by the Admiralty Press *claque*.—Mr. L. J. Maxse, *National Review*, November, 1907, at pp. 336-7.

See further, in reply to Sir John Fisher's *ipse dixit* at the Guildhall, on November 9, 1907 (cp. below, p. 258, text and n. 1), Mr. L. J. Maxse, *s.v.* "The 100,000 Germans," in the *Standard* of November 12, 1907, p. 7, col. 5 (printed below, pp. 260 sq.).

⁶ Concerning the system of "espionage" in the British Navy see *ibid.*, p. 339 (referred to above, p. 253 n. 13). See, further, above, pp. 253 sq. (text and nn.).

⁷ See also the grave warning of Admiral Sir Algernon de Horsey, *s.v.* "The German Naval Programme," *Morning Post*, January 15, 1908, p. 4, col. 4.

Mr. Balfour's speech of May 11, 1905, to the effect that the successful invasion of these islands was impossible in face of our maritime power, has long been regarded as one fraught with the most serious danger to the British Empire.

"Unhappily"—(wrote the *Morning Post*, October 31, 1906, leading article)—"Ministers, both of the late and of the present Government, have expressed ideas about the Navy which make those who are acquainted with competent opinion tremble. First came the idea that a mere fraction of the Navy was enough to make invasion 'impossible'—the most false and dangerous doctrine ever preached by a British Minister." (The italics are ours.)

.. Happily, however, Mr. Balfour would appear, more recently, to have receded somewhat from the position which he thus had taken up four years ago.

Cp. also the *Standard*, December 18, 1907 (leading article), p. 6, col. 7. And see further, below, *s.v.* August 7, 1908, pp. 443 sqq.

HISTORY OF THE STATE OF THE NORE DIVISION.

November, 1907. "The Home Fleet: A Criticism."—(A History of the State of the Nore Division of the so-called "Home Fleet 1");—by "Carausius" in the *United Service Magazine*, November, 1907, pp. 131-139.²

"DESTROYING THE DESTROYERS."

November 1, 1907. "Destroying the Destroyers: Cheap Economy and its Disastrous Results: Worn-out Ships";—*Daily Express*, November 1, 1907, p. 1, col. 3, wherein is proved in the most lucid detail the plight into which, for "economy at any price," the destroyer flotillas of Britain have been allowed to fall.

See also the *Daily Express*, leading article—"See What We Save!"—of the same date, p. 4, col. 5.

November 2, 1907. The Insubordinate Signal of Sir Percy Scott—for which he was perforce reprimanded.^{3 4}

BATTLE PRACTICE ALTERATIONS.

November 5, 1907. Battle Practice of the Fleet. Alterations for the Future.⁵

¹ Cp. above, p. 13 n. 1.

² See the references hereto in *Standard*, November 22, 1907 (leading article: "State of the Navy"), p. 6, cols. 5-6; and for the gist of it see *Standard*, December 12, 1907, p. 7, cols. 5-6 (reprinted below, pp. 273 *sqq.*).

For the state of the Nore Division in (a) July, 1907, see above, pp. 217 *sq.*; (b) Dec., 1907, see below, pp. 273 *sqq.*; (c) Feb. 1908, below, pp. 323, 324, 325; and (d) March, 1908, below, pp. 353 *sq.* See further, Index, s.v. "Nore Division."

³ See *Standard*, November 11, 1907, p. 9, col. 7; November 12, 1907, p. 7, col. 4; November 14, 1907, p. 4, col. 3; July 8, 1908, p. 7, col. 1; *Globe*, July 11, 1908, p. 4, col. 2; etc.; *Morning Post*, November 18, 1907 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 6-7; January 11, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, col. 6; July 9, 1908 (letter of "Admiral"), p. 5, col. 6 (below, p. 417); and many of the passages cited below (s.v. July 7, 1908), p. 415.

In connection herewith see also—s.v. "Naval Discipline: Unprecedented Incident in the Channel Fleet"—the letter of "Indignant" in *Standard*, January 29, 1908, from which we extract as follows:—

"I enclose for your perusal an article cut from a newspaper of recent date, which I have just received from my son, who is an officer in His Majesty's Navy. As you will see, that article contains a deliberate personal attack upon the present Commander-in-Chief of the Channel Fleet, under cover of a so-called explanation of the late incident in which Rear-Admiral Sir Percy Scott received a reprimand. . . . What I desire to make public is the fact" (the italics are ours, and we have seen no denial of the allegation) "that a copy of the newspaper containing expressions grossly insulting to the Commander-in-Chief of the Channel Fleet was posted to every officer in that fleet in a sealed envelope."

⁴ Cp. further below, pp. 278 n. 1, 417, 422; and see also "An Observer" in *John Bull*, April 24, 1909, p. 470.

⁵ Above, p. 251 n. 7. See below, p. 260 (text and n. 3), and *Times*, November, 5, 1907, p. 6, col. 2. For comment upon the astounding speech of Sir John Fisher on November 9, 1907, in face of these alterations of November 5, 1907, see above, p. 251 n. 7, and below, pp. 258 (n. 1), 260 (text and n. 3), 286, 330 (text and n. 4), 342, etc., and Index, s.v. "Battle-Practice," "Gunnery," and "Fool-Gunnery."

THE NEW NAVY LEAGUE¹

THE PRESENT LEAGUE AND ITS NEGLECTED DUTY.

STANDARD, November 9, 1907, p. 9, col. 2.

To the Editor.

4, Paper Buildings, Temple, E.C., Nov. 7, 1907.

SIR,—There are many signs that the British public cannot much longer remain indifferent to the multiplying proofs of the blight which is threatening the naval strength of this country.

It might be useful at this time to summarise a few of the salient evils to which public attention has now been repeatedly drawn. Here, for instance, are seven :—(1) Secret inspiration of the Press²; (2) wilful neglect of vitally necessary repairs³; (3) large reduction in sea-training of the Fleet⁴; (4) introduction of short service⁵; (5) insufficiency of *personnel*⁶; (6) insufficiency of dockyard hands⁷; (7) disposition of forces determined by finance, instead of by strategy.⁸

The real opinion of the Navy regarding these disastrous changes is well known to all those who are in contact with it. Of the evils named, the first is necessary in order to enable the Government to afflict the Navy with the other six. The end in view is reduction of expenditure; and in order to attain that end it is necessary to manufacture a state of the public mind which shall be favourable to the measures taken. Hence the indefensible practice of providing organs of the Press with Admiralty briefs, which are then published, not as mere emanations from authority, but as representing the unbiased thoughts of editors. This application to Britain of the method of the late Prince Bismarck, though it has been repeatedly denounced, has yet gone unpunished. What will future generations think of its introduction?

The effect of the other six mischiefs enumerated has been so often and so completely exposed in your own columns that to dwell on them now would be superfluous. What now seems needed is determined effort—on the platform as well as in such portion of

¹ The IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE. See below, pp. 305 *sqq.*, and *passim*.

² See hereon, *e.g.*,—*Standard*, Dec. 12, 19 and 20, 1906; Jan. 9, 1907; July 8, 1907, p. 7, col. 1; Aug. 3, 1907, p. 5, col. 1; Aug. 8, 1907, p. 6, col. 1, and (leading article) p. 4, col. 5; Aug. 14, 1907, p. 4, cols. 4–5; Nov. 11, 1907, p. 9, col. 5; Jan. 7, 1908 (letter of "Naval Reader"), p. 9, col. 1; Jan. 10, 1908, p. 7, col. 1; Jan. 18, 1908, p. 5, col. 3; Feb. 29, 1908, p. 9, col. 3; July 1, 1908 (leading article), p. 8, col. 4; July 30, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, col. 6; April 23, 1909, p. 9, col. 2, etc., etc.;—*Daily Express*, July 17, 1907, p. 1, col. 2; Aug. 2, 1907, p. 1, col. 6; Aug. 3, 1907, p. 1, col. 8; Aug. 6, 1907 (above, p. 243); Oct. 2, 1907, p. 4; Nov. 27, 1907, p. 1, col. 2; Jan. 21, 1908, p. 5, col. 3; Feb. 6, 1908 (leading article), p. 4, col. 5, Aug. 18, 1908; March 18, 1909, p. 1, col. 3; March 22, 1909, p. 1, col. 2, and p. 4, col. 5;—*Forl. U.S.I.*, Feb. 1907 (Admiral Fremantle, Dec. 6, 1906), p. 154;—*Morning Post*, Dec. 28, 1906 (Lieut. Carlyon Bellairs, M.P.); Jan. 11, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, col. 6; July 8, 1908 (leading article), p. 8, col. 6; July 10, 1908 (letter of "A Retired Naval Officer"), p. 4, col. 7; March 20, 1909, p. 7, col. 3;—*National Review*, Dec., 1906 (Mr. H. W. Wilson: quoted in *Standard*, Jan. 12, 1907); Sept., 1907, p. 21 (Mr. L. J. Maxse, quoted above, p. 250); Oct. 1907 (Lieut. Carlyon Bellairs, M.P.), pp. 308–317; Nov., 1907, pp. 336–7;—*Spectator*, Feb. 8, 1908, pp. 209–210 (below, p. 335); July 18, 1908, p. 78; March 27, 1909, p. 486, col. 1;—Mr. F. T. Jane in *N.L.J.*, July, 1907, p. 214; Mr. H. W. Wilson, in *Daily Mail*, Jan. 8, 1908; and Mr. L. J. Maxse, in *National Review*, Feb., 1909, p. 872; and "Civis" in *Spectator*, 1907 (quoted in *Standard*, April 23, 1909, p. 9, col. 2. See further below, pp. 342, 401, 422, etc.

³ See above, p. 253 n. 6.

⁴ See above, pp. 12, 14, 16, 19 *sqq.*, 25 (text and n. 4), 37, 253.

⁵ See above, p. 62, text and n. 4.

⁶ See above, p. 61, text and n. 8.

⁷ See above, pp. 61, text and n. 7.

⁸ See above, pp. 56, 88, 102, 131, etc.

the Press as is still open to independent criticism¹—to awaken the mind of Britain to these unhappy facts. Manifestly, such work should be that of the Navy League, which was created exactly for such purpose. But the Navy League, while for ever protesting its non-party aims, has become in substance a department of the present Government,² and has reaffirmed recently its intention to devote itself henceforth mainly to educational work,³ which, being interpreted, means practically lantern lectures by a single paid lecturer in boys' and girls' schools, and an occasional printed publication.⁴

Great Britain is, therefore, to all practical intent, in a far worse position than it would be in if it had no so-called Navy League. That its watch dog should be asleep would be bad. That the watch dog should be taking active part with the burglar is worse.

Such a state of things cannot be permitted to continue; and we have deep pleasure in informing your readers that the formation of a new and vital maritime league is now almost complete.⁵

The new league, which has promise of most powerful support, will advocate as the first means of securing command of the sea the creation of a genuine Strategy Department within the Admiralty, as desired by the late Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Geoffrey Hornby;⁶ a department not destitute of all authority like the present Intelligence Department and the Portsmouth War College, but possessed of the right to give authoritative advice on matters strategical.⁷ Had such a department with such authority existed, the grave national danger which was involved (as you often and ably pointed out) in the reduction of the Channel Fleet from 67 units to 21 could never have been incurred.⁸

The dire mistake thus made has since been implicitly admitted by the partial restoration of the strength of that fleet.⁹ But in the present weakness of our military forces, and with a Government in office which does not believe seriously in the possibility of war,¹⁰ the need of devising means to prevent the recurrence of so profound an error is clear.

The new league will take up, in addition, the neglected or abandoned duties of the Navy League. It will also urge the necessity of legislation to check the growth of the number of foreign officers and men in the British Mercantile Marine, with

¹ Cp. above, p. 256 (text and n. 2).

² Cp. above, pp. 108, 239 *sq.* (text and nn.), 240 *sq.*, 241, etc.

³ See above, pp. 229, 241.

⁴ Cp. above, pp. 79 (text and n.), 229, 241, etc.

⁵ THE IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE. See below, pp. 305 *sqq.*, and *passim*.

⁶ Cp. above, pp. 185, and below, pp. 263, 307 *sq.*

⁷ "Everything"—said Lord Charles Beresford, at Salters' Hall, November 20, 1907 (as reported in *Times*, November 21, 1907, p. 5, col. 6)—"now depended on *strategy*, which meant scheming out beforehand what they had to do in war time. Success in war depended on the accuracy and forethought of strategy in times of peace, and in these days our system of *strategy* should be complete before war was entered upon. That side would win which had prepared itself best in time of peace."

"A wrong distribution of" naval "force made during peace may be impossible of correction on the outbreak of war. . . . The composition and distribution" of fleets "must, at all times, even in peace, be regulated by the same considerations of *strategy* as must govern them during war. To my mind, this proper regulation of the movements of fleets is an important part of that readiness for naval war which constitutes what I have called the latent or potential command of the sea."—Mr. Spenser Wilkinson, *Secret of the Sea* (referred to above, pp. 247, 252), pp. 18, 19.

⁸ Cp. above, pp. 44, 48 (nn. 1, 2), 132, 141, 222, 223, 243, 244, 245, 247 *sq.*, and below, pp. 308 etc.

⁹ See above, pp. 247 *sq.*

¹⁰ Cp. above, p. 247, and below, pp. 296, 414.

due regard always to the legitimate interests of British ship-owners; and, further, it will oppose with its whole energy the anti-national views of the disciples of the Little England and Socialist schools of thought.

We would ask all those who approve of these aims, and desire to aid in their realisation, to communicate with us at once.

We are, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

SIR JOHN FISHER'S ASTOUNDING SPEECH AT THE GUILDHALL.

November 9, 1907.

November 9, 1907. The Guildhall Banquet. Sir John Fisher's astounding Speech.¹

SIR JOHN FISHER AND THE CONSTITUTION. THE GUILDHALL SPEECH.

STANDARD, *November 13, 1907, p. 8, col. 2.*

To the Editor of the STANDARD.

4, Paper Buildings, Temple, E.C.,

November 12, 1907.

SIR,—By the constitutional theory which has prevailed in this country for about two hundred years, the Ministers of the Crown are responsible for the national safety. Whatever else is doubtful, this is certain; and of this responsibility they cannot divest themselves, for, if they did, they would cease to be an Administration.

How, then, comes it that a man who is not a Minister, but a subordinate servant, of the Crown is allowed to take upon himself the function of the Cabinet, as Sir John Fisher took it at the Guildhall banquet, and assure the country of the perfect state of the Navy? The ultimate responsibility for its excellence rests, not with him, but with his masters, for if in the hour of trial he turned out to be wrong it is they whom the nation would punish by expelling them from office.²

Let British citizens be clear on this point, if on no other under

¹ It is a curious coincidence that it was on this very day (November 9, 1907) that Admiral of the Fleet Sir Frederick Richards, G.C.B., a predecessor of Sir John Fisher as First Sea Lord, was penning his considered letter to the London Chamber of Commerce, reprinted below, p. 264. Cp., also, below, p. 264.

Concerning this speech itself see further above, pp. 251 n. 7, 254 n. 5, 255 n. 5, and below, pp. 260 *sq.*, 284 *sqq.*, 300, 316, 330 n. 4, etc.

² A poor consolation that, too, for the British Empire in the hour of its defeat. What availed it Carthage in the hour of her defeat to crucify her vanquished admirals and generals? What will it avail defeated Britain to expel from office the self-seeking politicians responsible for her vanquishment?

heaven. Either the King's Government is responsible for the Navy, or it is not. If it is not, then that Government has abdicated in favour of Sir John Fisher. If it is, then Sir John Fisher has outraged the primary principle of the British Constitution by taking upon himself what, in the nature of things, can only be the duty of the advisers of the Sovereign.

Consider it again. Hitherto, the servant of the Crown, other than a Cabinet Minister, so long as he discharged properly his own personal task, has been immune from all attack or censure in Parliament regarding the general adequacy and efficiency of his Department. Why? Because the man responsible in the eyes of the nation for that Department has been its Parliamentary head, a Cabinet Minister, and, behind the latter, the Cabinet as a whole. But if this servant is to be allowed to get up at a Guildhall banquet and declare, *urbi et orbi*, the perfection of the result which his Department produces, evidently that servant cannot enjoy that immunity any longer.

Hitherto it has been the political party which returned a Ministry to power which has had to bear the brunt, if the vital interests of the nation suffered. If the Navy were found inadequate, whether in strength or in training, to the nation's needs, the Opposition in Parliament and in the country would quite necessarily and rightly impugn the occupants of the front benches in Parliament.¹

But if these occupants suffer one of their servants to speak instead of themselves; if they try, however unavailingly, to fling off their own responsibility and put it upon him, then they deprive him, and he deprives himself, of his servant's mantle of protection from public attack.

They convert him from a subordinate servant of the Crown into a partisan of themselves. They are not to be blamed, their conduct of affairs is not to be challenged, because he, their servant, guarantees that conduct to be right.

Sir, hitherto even those who realised the deadly harm which was being wrought in the Navy,² in ways that you have again and again pointed out,³ have generally abstained from open, public, and direct censure of Sir John Fisher. But now that, to the violation of all constitutional usage, he has chosen to take upon himself the function of a Cabinet Minister, he has ceased to have any right to his cloak of sacrosanct security, and all who love their country and know her peril are now entitled to make Sir John Fisher the mark for public scorn as they recall those written words of his which you quote to-day⁴: "Favouritism is the secret of efficiency."⁵

We are, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

¹ See above, on p. 258, n. 2.

² Cp., e.g., above, pp. 252 sq. (text and notes), 256 (text and notes); etc.

³ See above, *passim*.

⁴ *Standard*, November 12, 1907, p. 7, col. 5, and (leading article) p. 6, col. 6.

⁵ Cp. further below, pp. 294 (text and nn. 10, 11), 319.

⁶ Compare also, for "*Espionage*" in the British Navy, above, pp. 252 sq. (text and notes).

SIR JOHN FISHER REFUTED BY HIMSELF.

November 12, 1907. On Sir John Fisher's Guildhall Speech;—See the *Standard's* admirable leading article, November 12, 1907, p. 6, cols. 5-6, in which it is shown (*int. al.l*) that, in regard to the gunnery of the British Fleet, "the Battle Practice, as hitherto regulated, does not represent war conditions even approximately"² and that "the Admiralty have, indeed, lately announced that new regulations of a totally different character are to be introduced."³

SIR JOHN FISHER & "NULLI SECUNDUS."⁴
"PUNCH'S" VIEW.⁵

"There seems to be a difference of opinion between the Prince of Wales and Sir John Fisher. Some little time ago His Royal Highness, speaking at the Guildhall, cried, 'Wake up, England!' Sir John Fisher, speaking in the same place, has now issued the advice: 'Sleep quietly in your beds.'⁶

* * *

"Meanwhile it is good to know that 'Our Navy is second to none.' But—so was our war air-ship."⁴

SIR JOHN FISHER
AND "THE 100,000 GERMANS."⁷

STANDARD, November 12, 1907, p. 7, col. 5.

To the Editor of the STANDARD.

SIR,—Sir John Fisher, in what is described in the Press as a "breezy" speech at the Lord Mayor's Banquet on Saturday evening,⁸ made very merry over "a red hot but charmingly interesting magazine writer," who, according to the speaker, had been victimised by a *Punch* correspondent into printing the statement that "an army of 100,000 German soldiers has been practised in embarking on the German Fleet." As there is every reason to suppose that the *National Review* is the organ in question, perhaps, Sir, you will allow me to point out that the statement was not, as Sir John Fisher suggests, borrowed from *Punch*, but from a leading Liberal paper, the *Westminster Gazette*, which is neither sensational, alarmist, "anti-German," nor comic, where it appeared (October 2⁹) in a letter over the signature of Mr. H. W. Lucy, one of the most

¹ The whole article merits the most careful perusal.

² See *Standard*, October 16, 1907, cited above, p. 251.

³ Cp. above, pp. 251 n. 7, 255; and see further as to this, *Standard*, January 2, 1908 (*s.v.* "Year of Naval Unrest");—

"In particular, the one test which has constantly been adduced in Parliament, and out of it, as a conclusive proof of the 'efficiency' of the Fleet—its achievements in gunnery—has been shown to be utterly fallacious."

See also *Daily Express*, February 3, 1908, p. 8, col. 2; and see further below, pp. 302, 330.

⁴ For the fate of the British "*Nulli Secundus*" (in October, 1907), see below, pp. 427 n. 4, 441.

⁵ *Punch*, November 20, 1907, p. 366, col. 1.

⁶ Cp. also below, pp. 261 (text and nn. 2, 3), 271, 280, 284, 285, 388;—and for Lord Tweedmouth's re-echoing of the words, below, pp. 261, 271, 280, 285, 388.

⁷ Cp. above, p. 254, n. 5.

⁸ Nov. 9, 1907.

⁹ Oct. 2, 1907.

respected and responsible of Liberal journalists.¹ The figure may be exaggerated—Mr. Lucy was presumably repeating what he had heard on good authority—but all the world except the Defence Committee, and apparently the Admiralty, is aware that Germany is devoting her great talents to the problem of embarking and disembarking troops, and that at her recent manœuvres a considerable force was sent to sea and brought back again, the incident being openly discussed in the German Press, and it will take something more decisive than the *ipse dixit* of Sir John Fisher to convince serious people that only “one solitary regiment was embarked.”²³

Since he has been ashore, the First Sea Lord has developed an unspeakable contempt for “scaremongers,” but when he was afloat he was a public-spirited and patriotic promoter of “scares,” and he would hardly deny that the present British Navy, which *ex hypothesi* is *nulli secundus*,⁴ owes its existence exclusively to the efforts of “scaremongers.”

Although we are exhorted by Sir John Fisher⁵ to sleep quietly in our beds so long as the present *régime* endures, the blustering tone of his speech, which is somewhat out of harmony with the modest and manly traditions of the great, silent Navy, is calculated to have an opposite effect. It may tickle the ears of the groundlings at a banquet, but it leaves a nasty taste in the mouth next morning, because it is so painfully reminiscent of the tragic swagger of inefficient War Ministers on the eve of historic disasters. That our politicians are self-complacent, that the British public are self-complacent, goes without saying; but it is painful to find that same perilous spirit pervading Whitehall, and so far from increasing confidence, Sir John Fisher’s speech will encourage the critics to remain *toujours en vedette*.

I am, Sir, Your obedient servant,

L. J. MAXSE.

Cp. above, p. 254 (text and n. 5).

² Concerning Germany’s intention and capacity to invade this country successfully cp. above, pp. 47, 254, and Index, *s.v.* “Germany” and “Invasion.”

³ The following extract from “Lieutenant-Colonel’s” letter in the *Standard*, August 25, 1908, p. 7, col. 2 (referred to, again, below, pp. 421 n. 3, 443 n. 3), shows that such operations as those referred to by Mr. Lucy and Mr. Maxse are no new thing on the part of Germany:—

“Those of your correspondents who deride the idea of an attack by Germany on this country would,” he writes, “do well to take into consideration not only their own wishes and theories, but also certain acts of the German Government.

“Three years ago what are termed combined naval and military manœuvres were carried out in the North Sea; *i.e.*, a considerable force of German soldiers, horse, foot, and artillery, were embarked on transports, were taken out a certain distance to sea, were brought back and landed on the coasts of Germany on an open shore; the whole operations being an exact rehearsal of those necessary for an attack on a country inaccessible except by crossing the ocean. Anybody who has had experience in landing horses, guns, etc., on an open shore will realise that such a dangerous and costly operation would never be attempted by a practical nation unless there was some very important object in view.

“If Germany were to be engaged in a war with her Continental neighbours it would certainly not be necessary to embark her cavalry and horse artillery on ships as a preliminary to attack; and, if these combined manœuvres were not intended as a rehearsal for some future invasion of the United Kingdom, it would be interesting if some of your correspondents would explain what their object was.”

See also, in similar connection, the letter of “Patriot” in *Standard*, August 29, 1908, p. 4, col. 6.

(The rest of “Lieutenant-Colonel’s” letter, above referred to, deals with German espionage in Britain, for which see also below, *s.v.* July 12, 1908, p. 421.)

⁴ Cp. above, p. 260, text and n. 4.

⁵ And also by Lord Tweedmouth. See above, p. 260 n. 6, and below, p. 271.

STRATEGY AND THE NAVY.

MORNING POST, November 16, 1907, p. 2, col. 5.

To the Editor of the MORNING POST.

4, Paper Buildings, Temple, E.C.,
November 13, 1907.

SIR,—Your columns have throughout years past contained luminous and recurrent comment on the necessity of a Strategy Department within the Admiralty having authority in matters strategical.¹

The existing Naval Intelligence Department at the Admiralty and the War College at Portsmouth fail altogether to fulfil this need—because, although they may well supply the nucleus or starting-point of the required Department, they are at present wholly devoid of the authority which is essential to give effect to knowledge.

The proof of their want of authority is not far to seek. It is to be found in the recent reduction of the Channel Fleet from 67 units under its previous Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sir A. K. Wilson, to 21 units under its present ruler, Lord Charles Beresford,² and in the increase again of that reduced force.³ It must be obvious to every reasoning person that the great reduction and the large subsequent increase cannot both have been justifiable in presence of an external situation, which has throughout remained constant. Either the reduction was unjustified or the increase was uncalled for.

As a matter of fact, the true nature of the situation is now becoming widely appreciated.

It is recognised that the Channel Fleet was cut down merely to satisfy that policy of retrenchment in naval expenditure of which Mr. Asquith boasted in a speech delivered last month⁴ and reported by an ironic fortune on Trafalgar Day.⁵ Further, it is now seen that while the reduction endured, namely, for a period of several months, this country was in a position of grave peril. There was actually, indeed, a period⁶ when Lord Charles Beresford was left with but eleven battleships⁷ (three of the fourteen battleships of his command being under repair) and three unarmoured cruisers—and with no destroyers under his immediate control—to face the numerically far superior and the perfectly-composed German High Sea Fleet.⁸ And this, too, at a time when the whole burden of the immediate defence of Britain against sudden attack was practically thrown upon this weakened command owing to the fact that further

¹ Cp, e.g.,—of the *Morning Post's* more recent leading articles,—July 2, 1907, p. 6, cols. 6-7 (printed above, pp. 148 *sqq.*); July 8, 1907, p. 6, cols. 6-7; July 19, 1907, p. 6, cols. 4-5 (above, p. 184 n. 2); October 8, 1907, p. 6, cols. 5-6;—and also (since November 13, 1907):—December 11, 1907 (as quoted in *E.S. and S.J.G.*, December 11, 1907, p. 8, col. 3); March 9, 1908, p. 6, cols. 4-5; March 11, 1908, p. 6, col. 5; April 7, 1908, p. 6, cols. 5-6; October 22, 1908, p. 6, col. 6; October 24, 1908 (as quoted in *E.S. & S.J.G.*, October 24, 1908, p. 8, col. 3); Nov. 17, 1908, p. 8, cols. 5 *sq.*; December 29, 1908, p. 4, col. 5; March 19, 1909, etc., etc. See also Mr. Spenser Wilkinson's articles, "The Vital Question concerning the Navy," *Morning Post*, January 24 and 25, 1907, and (third article) February 12, 1907 (above, p. 46). See further above, pp. 149 *sq.*, 167, 184, 185, 257, and below, pp. 265, 269, 307, 317, 410, 413 *sq.*

² See above, p. 257, text and n. 8.

³ See above, p. 257, text and n. 9.

⁴ October, 1907.

⁵ October 21, 1907.

⁶ See above, p. 123.

⁷ The case was even worse at one period in regard to battleships. See above p. 123 n. 1.

⁸ Concerning the German High Sea Fleet see above, p. 145, text and nn.

"economics" (namely, reduction of sea training,¹ inadequate manning,² and, in the case of many units, neglect of vitally-needed repairs³) prevented the Home Fleet from being in a state of "instant readiness for war."

Had a Department existed which was not merely charged with strategical study, but possessed of the right to give authoritative advice in matters strategical, it is inconceivable that retrenchments could have been permitted which imperilled the continuance of the people of this country as an independent nation.

To secure the creation of such a Department was the original object with which the now fast dying Navy League was formed,⁴ and with which Admiral of the Fleet Sir Geoffrey Hornby, the greatest naval authority of the time, accepted its presidency.⁵ But Admiral Hornby's death followed all too soon; and the NAVY LEAGUE, in timidity, repudiated its special aim at the first breath of opposition.⁶

A new organisation is now, however, rapidly taking shape,⁷ to which powerful support is promised, and which will advocate, as the first means of securing command of the sea, the creation of such a Department as that above indicated.

The full programme of the new organisation will shortly be issued; and we would venture to ask those of your readers who may be in sympathy with its objects and who wish to receive further information concerning its aims kindly to communicate with us at once.

We are, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

MR. ROBERTSON AND FLEET DISTRIBUTION.

November 13, 1907.

Extract from statement read at the Dinner of the London Chamber of Commerce, November 13th, 1907:—

MORNING POST, *November 14, 1907.*

"In regard to the distribution of the Fleet, . . . he could not "conceive a Board of Admiralty yielding up its responsibility in that "matter, even to the House of Commons, much less to voluntary "societies and private persons, and yet it was in regard to the "distribution of the Fleet that the Sea Lords had been most unfairly "assailed by such parties."

But *fact*, as Mr. Robertson might have remembered, is ever stranger than *fiction*.

¹ See above, pp. 16, 19 *sqq.*, 25, etc.

² Cp. above, p. 61, text and n. 8.

³ See above, pp. 242 (text and n. 5), etc.

⁴ See above, pp. 185, 257, and below, pp. 307 *sq.*

⁵ See above, p. 185, and below, pp. 307 *sq.* ⁶ Cp. above, p. 185, and below, p. 308.

⁷ The IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE. See below, pp. 305 *sqq.*, and *passim*.

LATE FIRST SEA LORD'S CALL FOR INQUIRY.

Letter from
Admiral of the Fleet
 Sir FREDERICK W. RICHARDS, G.C.B.,
formerly First Sea Lord,
 to
The Secretary of
The London Chamber of Commerce.

Read at the Meeting of the Chamber,
 November 13, 1907.

34, Hurlingham Court, London, S.W.,
 November 9, 1907.¹

DEAR SIR, Touching the paragraph in your letter which invites me to express an opinion as to "whether an Official Enquiry is needed into the scope and effects of the recent changes in the Navy," I must confine myself to the reply that the more serious of the changes in question—commencing with the Memorandum of Lord Selborne, dated December, 1902, on the Entry and Training of Naval Officers—are in their nature **hazardous experiments**,² the ultimate effect of which on the Efficiency of the Naval Service, and the Commercial and General Interests of the Empire, can only be determined when the time of trial comes in the more or less distant future.

Unless thereunto required before a responsible Tribunal, I prefer not to express my opinion on these matters in detail, but I entertain no doubt that a **Commission of Enquiry**,² such as is contemplated in the question, would tend to clear the air, and would assure the **all-important**² purpose of directing the attention of the Nation to the issues involved in a policy to which it has been committed.

The appointment of such a Commission at an early date would admit of definite conclusions being arrived at, **while yet there is time**² to take any action which may be considered necessary to the future well-being of the Navy.

I am, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

(Signed) FREDK. RICHARDS.³⁴

¹ It will be observed that this letter was written on the very day of Sir John Fisher's bragging utterances at the Guildhall. (See above, p. 258.)

² The emphasis of the type is ours.

³ The earliest publication of this letter *verbatim* in the Press was, we believe, that of the *Daily Express*, November 26, 1907, p. 5, col. 2, *s.v.* "'Experimental' Navy: Admiral's Urgent Demand for Inquiry";—but we give the letter here in its order of date as communicated to the Chamber.

⁴ This letter formed part (p. 7) of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE Pamphlet mentioned below, p. 338, n. 1.

THE LONDON CHAMBER OF COMMERCE.

November 13, 1907.

*Views of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Frederick W. Richards, G.C.B.,
and Admiral Sir R. Vesey Hamilton, both former First Sea Lords.*

It was during the discussion which followed the first dinner of the Session of the London Chamber of Commerce—November 13, 1907—that the now famous letter of Sir Fredk. Richards¹ was read. In the *Standard*, Nov. 14, 1907, p. 4, col. 3, we read as follows:—

"Referring to a letter read from Admiral Sir Frederick Richards, advocating an inquiry into the state of the Navy, Mr. Spenser Wilkinson said he fully agreed with that notion. He deprecated the idea that the Home Fleet was ready for war, and declared that it was necessary that advice as to the preparations for war should be given by a great expert in strategy. The present state of the Navy, he thought, conclusively proved that the advice upon that subject did not emanate from a man who was such an expert. (Hear, hear.)

"Admiral Sir Vesey Hamilton was of the opinion that an inquiry into the present condition of the Navy was **most necessary.**"²

Commenting upon this Call for Inquiry, cp. the *Standard*, leading article, November 15, 1907, p. 6, cols. 6-7:—

"We have demonstrated more than once that the grave state of demoralisation of the Navy demands a full and impartial inquiry, and it is of the utmost significance that two of Sir John Fisher's predecessors at the Admiralty—Admiral of the Fleet Sir Frederick Richards and Admiral Sir Vesey Hamilton—should have supported this on the 13th inst."

See also Mr. Spenser Wilkinson's letter next referred to, and the very pertinent observations of the *Morning Post*, November 18, 1907 (leading article), p. 6, col. 7 (cp. below, pp. 266 n. 3, 268).

November 16, 1907. "The Nation in Danger";—by Mr. Spenser Wilkinson, *Morning Post*, Nov. 16, 1907, p. 7, col. 3, commencing:—

"Will you permit me to attempt very briefly to tell your readers the truth about the present state of the Navy?" After giving the reasons for his view "that the management of the Navy is in dangerous hands"—a view which a large number of private communications during the preceding eighteen months had convinced him to be also the view "held by the greater part of the officers of the Navy, especially by those whose experience, attainments, and character mark them out for the respect of their brother officers."—Mr. Wilkinson concluded as follows:—

"The Board of Admiralty is dominated by one man whose strength—*consensu omnium*—consists in his determination to have his own way and to crush out of the Navy those who disagree with him or will not be his tools, and whose weakness—*consensu omnium*—is that his subject is not war.³ The only hope for the Navy is in a

¹ Reprinted above, p. 264.

² The emphasis of the type is ours.

³ Cp. further, *Morning Post* (leading articles), July 14, 1908, p. 6, col. 6; Dec. 29, 1908, p. 4, col. 5; March 20, 1909, p. 7, col. 3. And cp. further, above, p. 149.

public¹ inquiry to which those now in authority, who have so loudly proclaimed the excellence of their own works, cannot honestly object."² 23

LIBERAL MEMORIAL TO THE PREMIER FOR MORE REDUCTION.

STANDARD, November 16, 1907, p. 14, col. 7.

"A memorial, signed by 136 supporters of the Government in the House of Commons, has been handed to the Prime Minister, in which an earnest appeal is made in favour of a reduction of expenditure on the Army and Navy."⁴

November 18, 1907. "Reorganised Home Fleet: Nore Division to be Strengthened" (next spring⁵): "Warnings Headed";—*Daily Express*, November 18, 1907, p. 1, col. 7; and see the leading article of same date, p. 4, col. 5.

THE NEW GERMAN NAVY BILL. ALL-ROUND INCREASES.

November 18, 1907. The new German Navy Bill and Estimates published;—providing for an increase in expenditure totalling in 1908 "£3,337,939, or considerably over 3½ millions sterling,"⁶ 78 and even more in the years to follow. See thereon (with detailed explanations)—*Daily Express*, November 18, 1907, p. 1, col. 7; *Morning Post*, November 18, 1907, p. 8, col. 3, and (leading article) p. 6, cols. 6-7; *Times*, November 19, 1907, p. 5, col. 5; *Standard*, November 19, 1907, p. 7, col. 4; November 20, 1907, p. 7, cols. 4-5; *Morning Post*, November 20, 1907, p. 4, cols. 2-3, and p. 7, col. 7; *Times*, November 20, 1907, p. 7, col. 1, and (leading article) p. 11, cols. 3-4; November 23, 1907, p. 5, col. 1; *Standard*, November 25,

¹ Concerning the meaning of the word "public" in this connection, cp. below, p. 327.

² Concerning Sir John Fisher's threat to resign if an Inquiry were granted, see, e.g., *Standard*, Oct. 19, 1907, p. 6, col. 6, and p. 9, col. 3 (above, p. 253).

³ See hereon *Morning Post* (leading article), Nov. 18, 1907, p. 6, cols. 6-7 (above, p. 265); *Spectator*, Nov. 23, 1907 (leading article), p. 806; and cp. below, p. 484.

⁴ For earlier and later appeals, see Index, s.v. "Appeals."

⁵ The "next spring" (1908) came and went. The anticipations were not realised. For what happened, see below (s.v. June 19, 1908), pp. 408 sq.

⁶ *Times*, November 20, 1907 (leading article), p. 11, cols. 3-4.

⁷ "The total of the" German "Estimates for the current year (1907) is given in the *Naval Annual* as £13,628,247. . . . The total expenditure contemplated" for 1908 "is £16,966,186."—*Times*, Nov. 20, 1907, p. 11, cols. 3-4.

[It is to be noted that the German Navy Estimates of 1907, just referred to, were themselves "an increase of 1½ millions on the preceding year" (1906), while "in 1901" they "amounted to" only "about 9½ millions" (*Pall Mall Gazette*, Dec. 6, 1907).]

⁸ "The greater part of this increase" (of over 3½ millions in 1908) "is absorbed by a greatly enlarged expenditure on new construction and armaments, the total of which amounts to £8,550,000, an increase of £2,127,000 over the current estimates; but some portion of the expenditure on armaments appears to be allocated to the provision of additional ammunition for land forts, and does not therefore represent a direct addition to naval strength on the seas."—*Times*, Nov. 20, 1907 (leading article), p. 11, cols. 3-4

1907; *Morning Post*, November 30, 1907 (leading article), p. 6; *Standard*, December 10, 1907, p. 7; *Daily Mail* (Mr. H. W. Wilson), January 8, 1908 (referred to below, p. 287), and March 3, 1908 (leading article).¹²³

The British public may do well to be reminded that the German Emperor took care to be in England at the time,⁴ with the obvious

¹ The effect of this new German Navy Bill (now the German Navy Act, 1908)—termed by the *Westminster Gazette*, April 22, 1908, "The new German Navy Bill for the reduction of the age-limit for battleships,"—was thus briefly described in *Standard*, December 16, 1907 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 5-6:—

"The recent decision of Germany to reduce the official age of battleships from twenty-five years to twenty years will involve her laying down four armoured ships of the largest class for the next four years."

² "Provided that no further additions are made, the cumulative effect of this systematic expansion will be to increase the cost of the [German] Navy to £20,500,000 in 1909, to £22,000,000 in 1910, and to over £23,000,000 in 1911. The fact that the estimated expenditure for the succeeding years up to 1917 appreciably decreases almost from year to year seems to confirm the views that the programme for the next four years is intended to be complete in itself."—*Times*, Nov. 23, 1907, p. 5, col. 1.

The figures as given by "Reuter," under date Nov. 23, 1907 will be found—*s.v.* "German Navy Estimates: Heavy Armament Expenditure"—*Standard*, Nov. 25, 1907, as follows:—

"The memorandum attached to the naval estimates gives most interesting figures, showing the increase in the estimated German naval expenditure during the ten years 1908 till 1917. The Navy Department gives the total expenditure for the period named at £208,600,000, being an increase of over £49,300,000 compared with the estimated cost set out in the memorandum attached to the estimates in 1906. A comparative table shows that the estimated expenditure for next year" (1908) "amounts to £16,950,000, an increase of £2,600,000 on the figures mentioned in the 1906 memorandum; and for the ensuing years as follows:—

1909,	£20,250,000,	increase	£4,900,000.
1910,	£22,000,000,	increase	£6,250,000.
1911,	£23,050,000,	increase	£7,055,000.
1912,	£22,450,000,	increase	£6,150,000.
1913,	£21,500,000,	increase	£5,100,000.
1914,	£20,800,000,	increase	£4,650,000.
1915,	£20,050,000,	increase	£3,850,000.
1916,	£20,450,000,	increase	£4,200,000.
1917,	£20,850,000,	increase	£4,350,000.

"Hence for the next ten years" (*provided always that no further additions are made*) "the cost of the navy will average annually £20,850,000. Of the £49,300,000 increase, resulting from this comparison, no less than £35,900,000 is allotted for ships and armament. . . . Of the grand total of £208,600,000 for ten years, £104,400,000 is set apart for ships and armament. (The estimated strength of the navy *personnel* for 1908 is fixed at 50,323 officers and men, being an increase of 3,576 over last year.)"—[Cp. above, p. 65 n. 11, and below, p. 287.]

"In the British Navy Estimates for 1907-8," comments the *Standard* (November 25, 1907, *ibid.*), "the total sum required amounted to £31,419,500. Of this sum, £8,100,000 is being devoted to new construction—over a million less than was voted last year."

"It appears to be generally assumed in Berlin"—to quote, in conclusion, the *Times*, November 20, 1907 (leading article), p. 11, cols. 3-4—"that the published programme must not be regarded as final beyond the year 1911, and from the heavy consequential expenditure—some of which is not even now shown in the Navy Estimates themselves—for the enlargement of docks, the deeper dredging of waterways, the widening of the Kiel Canal" (*see next note*) "and the increased provision of reserves of guns and ammunition, there can be no doubt as to the thoroughness and magnitude of the plans which are being elaborated in Berlin for the development of German naval power."

³ (Note to preceding note, *ad fin.*:—) "The deepening and widening of the Kiel Canal, which will cost about £11,000,000, is being paid for by the Minister of the Interior, although the work is undertaken almost exclusively in the interests of the Navy,"—see the writer of "Our Endangered Sea-Supremacy" in the *Quarterly Review* (October), 1908, quoted in *Standard*, October 17, 1908, p. 4, col. 5 (cp. below, p. 456). (And cp. also Mr. W. Arnold Burgess in *Standard*, January 23, 1908, p. 4, col. 2).

⁴ Cp. *Standard*, March 7, 1908, p. 6, col. 5; Mr. L. J. Maxse, *National Review* February, 1908, pp. 840-1.

intention of diminishing hostile comment so far as possible by his presence. He succeeded. "It would scarcely be opportune just now," wrote the *Times*, November 20, 1907, p. 11, col. 4, "when the German Emperor is the honoured guest of our Sovereign and his people, to consider in any detail the reaction that the expanding naval expenditure of Germany is likely to have sooner or later on the naval policy of this country." And the Kaiser was so good as to prolong his stay accordingly.

THE NATION IN DANGER.

NAVAL REDUCTIONS.

DEMAND FOR PUBLIC INQUIRY.

MORNING POST, November 20, 1907, p. 4, col. 4.

Mr. Spenser Wilkinson's letter in the *Morning Post* of Saturday² and the leading article in Monday's issue³ have again drawn public attention to the present state of the Navy. Mr. Wilkinson, in his letter, referred to the indiscriminate scrapping of a very large number of ships⁴; the policy "which has left our Admirals with few, if any, cruisers except the great armoured vessels"⁵; the breaking-up of the Channel Fleet, and the division of the command.⁶ In conclusion, he said that the frame of mind which pervaded the Navy at present was one of despair, and urged the necessity of a public¹ inquiry.

AN AUTOCRATIC PERSONALITY.

Mr. H. F. Wyatt, a former envoy of the NAVY LEAGUE to the Colonies and one of the two principal protagonists in the recent NAVY LEAGUE controversy,⁷ told a representative of the *Morning Post* yesterday that he cordially agreed with Mr. Spenser Wilkinson's letter.⁸ "To scrap and not to replace ships of war,"⁴ said Mr. Wyatt, "is simply to reduce the strength of the Navy. So far as this has been the case it is symptomatic of the rage for economy at any price which, behind all protestations of the desire for efficiency, has been the moving cause of so many naval reductions. There are two main factors at work. One is the desire to reduce expenditure on the Services in order to obtain money for old-age pensions or for social reform,⁹ and the other is the autocratic personality of Sir John Fisher. Armoured cruisers are utterly unfitted for scouting work in shallow waters like the North Sea, and yet for want of others they would have to be used in the event of war.¹⁰ I would strongly endorse the statement of Admiral Sir Frederick Richards, a former First Sea Lord, than whom a higher authority could scarcely be quoted, that a public¹ inquiry should be instituted into the present state of the Navy.¹¹ I believe that all sorts of evil

¹ On the word "public," cp. above, p. 266 n. 1.

² November 16, 1907. (Above, pp. 265 sq.)

³ November 18, 1907 (referred to above, p. 265).

⁴ Cp. above, pp. 65, 102, 131.

⁵ Cp. above, pp. 102 sq.

⁶ Cp. above, pp. 44, 48 (text and nn. 1, 2), 257, etc.

⁷ See above, pp. 52 onwards.

⁸ Above, pp. 265 sq.

⁹ Cp. below, p. 315, and Index, s.v. "Social Reform."

¹⁰ Cp. above, pp. 102 sqq.

¹¹ Cp. above, p. 264.

influences emanating from the same sources would be discovered, of which the great mass of the nation has no suspicion.¹ At a meeting at Wandsworth Common to-morrow, over which Sir Henry Kimber, M.P., will preside, I will move, and Mr. Horton-Smith will second, a Resolution in favour of such an inquiry.² A Royal Commission is not wanted—we all know what the late Lord Salisbury said about Royal Commissions—but rather a Committee, independent of the Government of the day, on which would serve retired naval officers of long experience and acknowledged authority, like Admiral Sir Frederick Richards, while members of the two Houses of Parliament, representing equally both parties, and business men of wide knowledge of affairs could also with great advantage be added.”

THE MENACE OF GERMANY.

“The Admiralty,” proceeded Mr. Wyatt, “has implicitly admitted its error in reducing the Channel Fleet,³ by its recent action in again increasing it,⁴ although even now it is not up to its former dimensions.⁵ With regard to Germany, while every effort should be made to keep on good terms with our neighbour, the fundamental fact never to be lost sight of is that the causes which force the two countries into antithetical positions are beyond the reach of statesmen and writers. The real secret of German hostility to Great Britain is to be found in her birth-rate,⁶ which accounts for Germany’s desire for territorial expansion, and that is a fact which can scarcely be altered by diplomacy. There is one final point. We intend to make it the aim of the new League which is now being formed and is receiving considerable support, to arouse public opinion to the need of a department of strategy in a position of authority in matters strategical at the Admiralty.”⁷

NAVAL REDUCTIONS.

PUBLIC MEETING AT WANDSWORTH.

DEMAND FOR INQUIRY.

November 20, 1907.

A public meeting⁸ was held at Wandsworth on November 20, 1907,—“To protest against Naval Reductions.” Sir Henry Kimber, Bart., M.P., was in the chair.

The following Resolution, moved by Mr. Harold F. Wyatt, and seconded by Mr. L. Graham H. Horton-Smith, was carried—with but two dissentients⁹:—

“That this Meeting deeply deplores the continued Reductions in

¹ Cp. above, p. 259 text and nn.

² Cp. below, pp. 269 *sq.*

³ Above, pp. 44, 262, etc.

⁴ See above, pp. 247, 262, etc.

⁵ Cp. above, pp. 44, 247, 262, etc.

⁶ Cp. above, pp. 23, 26, 29, and below, pp. 277, 381, 432, 444, 504.

⁷ Cp. above, pp. 262 *sq.*, and below, pp. 306 *sqq.*, and Index, *s.v.* “Strategy Department.”

⁸ For an account of this Meeting see *Morning Post*, November 21, 1907, p. 8, cols. 2-3; *Standard*, November 21, 1907; *Daily Mail*, November 21, 1907, p. 5, col. 6; *Daily Express*, November 21, 1907, p. 1, col. 3.

⁹ The two dissentients were the Secretary and another member of the Committee of the old Navy League (Dr. Ginsburg), who presumably did not relish the position into which that League (through the efforts of themselves and others) had fallen.

the Navy Estimates, with their results in the diminution of the number of men, the neglect of repairs, and the lessening of training at sea, and it strongly endorses the recommendation of Admiral Sir Frederick Richards that a public¹ Inquiry should be held into the state of the Navy."²

THE TWO-POWER STANDARD.

November 20, 1907. "The Two-Power Standard (from our Naval Correspondent)";—*Morning Post*, November 20, 1907, p. 4, cols. 2-3, in the course of which it is stated:—

"The position is sufficiently deplorable. It is evident enough that if we had an equality with Germany and the United States two years ago, we have it no longer. If, however, as official optimism says, we still have an equality, we must mend our ways, and that right speedily, or we shall lose it. We cannot go on indefinitely voting 5½ millions a year less than the next two Powers, nor can we profitably continue to devote 2 millions a year less than those two Powers do to new construction. . . ."

November 20, 1907. Lord Charles Beresford, on "an *Ideal Navy*";—see *Standard*, leading article, November 22, 1907, p. 5, col. 5.

November 21, 1907. "The Nation in Danger: Naval 'Economy': Necessity for Inquiry" into the present state of the Navy;—Mr. John J. Jackson (for whom see above p. 31), in the *Morning Post*, November 21, 1907, p. 8, col. 2.

THE NORE DIVISION.

November 21, 1907. The State of the Nore Division of the Home Fleet;—"Cripples in Dock: How the Government Keeps the Navy Ready";—*Daily Express*, November 21, 1907, p. 1, col. 3.³

¹ On the word "public," cp. above, p. 268, n. 1.

² Upon the case presented to the meeting by Mr. Wyatt and Mr. Horton-Smith, see —s.7. "State of the Navy," the *Standard*, November 22, 1907 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 5-6, pointing out (*inter alia*), that:—"During the present year, under the new scheme of redistribution, the strength of the Fleet immediately available for war has actually been reduced by some 25 per cent., while the Channel Fleet, the first line of defence in Home waters, has been deprived of those subsidiary units—cruisers, scouts, and torpedo flotillas—without which the battle squadron is comparatively helpless. The scheme was originally devised in order to effect an economy. The Government and the Admiralty have endeavoured to disguise that object by means of a variety of ingenious explanations and a characteristically skilful use of 'terminology.' "By (1) the restoration of the Channel Fleet to something very like its original strength, and by (2) the failure to create an adequate squadron at the Nore, the Admiralty" have "destroyed their own case." The leader concludes as follows:—"The demand for a strict inquiry into naval administration cannot much longer be postponed."

³ See also *Standard*, November 22, 1907 (leading article), p. 5, cols. 5-6, and December 12, 1907, p. 7, cols. 5-6, reprinted below, pp. 273 sq. See also Index, s.v. "Nore Division."

"SLEEP QUIETLY IN YOUR BEDS."

November 22, 1907. Lord Tweedmouth re-echoing at Exeter the words of the First Sea Lord, who had said (in the course of his astounding Guildhall speech of November 9, 1907¹) that people in this country might go to "sleep quietly in their beds."²

FRESH PLEA FOR INQUIRY.

November 23, 1907. "The State of the Navy: a Fresh Plea for Inquiry";—by "Civis," *Spectator*, November 23, 1907, pp. 812-14.³

THE CASE FOR INQUIRY.

November 28, 1907. "The Navy and the Nation: The Case for Inquiry";—*Standard*:—I. Nov. 27, 1907, p. 8, col. 4, "Training of Officers";—II. Nov. 28, 1907, p. 7, "Abolition of Ships";—III. Nov. 29, 1907, p. 8, col. 5, "Nucleus Crew System";—IV. Nov. 30, 1907, p. 8, col. 5, "Reductions of 1906";—V. Dec. 2, 1907, p. 8, col. 5, "The Home Fleet";—VI. Dec. 4, 1907, p. 4, col. 4, "Neglect of Repairs";—VII. Dec. 5, 1907, p. 4, col. 1, "Reductions in Detail."

"ROSYTH—AT LAST."⁴ "THE CHINESE FARCE."⁵

November 30, 1907. The Rosyth Naval Base; "Final decision to carry out this work"⁶;—Speech by Lord Tweedmouth at Duns; *Scotsman*, December 3, 1907.⁷ "It was a very serious resolution

¹ See above, pp. 258, 260, 261.

² Cp. hereon *Morning Post* leader, "Sleep, England!" November 28, 1907, p. 6, cols. 5-6, pointing out that "the most striking statement in Lord Tweedmouth's speech was to the effect that he and his colleagues did not forget the great burden which the Naval Service cast upon the nation, and that 'there was nothing they would not do to reduce it as much as they could.'"

³ Cp. hereon *Spectator*, leading article, "The Navy and its Chief Need," November 23, 1907, pp. 805-6;—"In view of the facts we have given, and of those set forth in more detail by 'Civis,' we once again ask the Government to grant an inquiry into our Admiralty administration and into the state of the Navy as a whole, and to make that investigation as impartial and fair-minded as it is thorough."—See also (on "Civis's" letter) *Standard*, November 25, 1907 (leading article: "A Naval Investigation"), p. 6, cols. 6-7.

⁴ This heading is the title of the *Times*' leading article, Dec. 6, 1907, p. 11, cols. 5-6.

⁵ See above, pp. 79, 97.

⁶ Final decision at the end of 1907! Rosyth was purchased for the express purpose in 1903-4 (cp. above, pp. 62 text and n. 5, 199, and see Mr. Pretymann, *Standard*, November 23, 1906).

In July, 1904, "Good progress: no delay: no change of policy," in regard to Rosyth, was the official announcement of the then Government (see *s.v.* "Parliamentary Intelligence, House of Commons," *N.L.J.*, August, 1904, p. 230).

And yet, so late as May 1, 1907, after admitting in the House of Lords that "he believed it to be absolutely necessary that we should have on the East Coast a dock capable of taking our biggest ships," Lord Tweedmouth went on to say that:—"He was not prepared to say offhand which was the best place for it. At present plans were being prepared for a dock and basin at Rosyth."—*Morning Post*, May 2, 1907 (leading article), p. 6. "In other words," wrote the *Morning Post* (*ibid.*), "in fear of doing wrong, the Admiralty is doing nothing."

⁷ See also *Standard*, December 5, 1907, p. 8, col. 4.

for the Government to have arrived at"¹;—Lord Tweedmouth, at Chelmsford, December 3, 1907; *Scotsman*, December 4, 1907.^{2,3}

¹ It was decided upon in the early spring of 1903 and the land acquired by the late Government for the very purpose! See above, p. 271 n. 6; and cp. *Times*, December 6, 1907 (leading article), p. 11, col. 5; *Morning Post*, December 7, 1907, p. 9, col. 1.

² See also *Morning Post*, December 4, 1907, p. 5, col. 4; *Times*, December 6, 1907; p. 11, col. 5.

³ Speaking in the House of Lords on May 1, 1907, Lord Tweedmouth said that there was one possible dock in a private yard on the East Coast which would take a *Dreadnought*, that, namely, at Hebburn on the Tyne; "he believed it might be possible to squeeze a *Dreadnought* into that, but it was extremely doubtful, and he was inclined to say that, if the *Dreadnought* was a crippled ship, it would be almost impossible for it to get into that dock at all. **So he thought he might fairly say that they had not got a dock on the East Coast at all which would take a 'Dreadnought.'**"—*Times*, May 2, 1907, p. 6, col. 3.

Mr. Robertson's statement in the House of Commons, July, 1907, was (carefully read) to the same effect:—"The only dock on the East Coast capable of taking the *Dreadnought*, *Lord Nelson* and *Invincible* class, was Stephenson's [at Hebburn] on the Tyne, —which," he said, "would accommodate them *under favorable conditions and moderately light draught*" (the italics are ours).—*Daily Express*, July 17, 1907, p. 1, col. 2.

Mr. McKenna's definite admission in the House of Commons (April 26, 1909) to the effect "that there is not a single dry dock on the East coast into which a damaged *Dreadnought* could enter if she were drawing more water than ordinarily in consequence of some of her water-tight compartments being flooded"—reported in *Daily Express*, April 27, 1909, p. 1, col. 4—leaves the matter beyond dispute.

(Mr. Lambert's observation, in the House of Commons, that Portsmouth and Devonport were two "harbours on the East Coast" into which the *Dreadnought* could go—*Standard*, July 2, 1907, p. 9, col. 5; see also *Standard*, September 15, 1908, p. 4, col. 6—will not readily be either forgotten or forgiven).

One vastly important point in connection with the *Dreadnought*, which may pertinently be touched upon here, is referred to as follows in the *Standard*, May 30, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, col. 5:—"Sir William White explains, what has not until now been made known, that the *Dreadnought* draws 5 feet more water than is figured in the official tables, which give the 'normal displacement.' The variation between the official 'normal displacement' and the deep-load draught has hitherto been only 4 to 8%. In the *Dreadnought* it is 24%, so that, instead of drawing 26½ feet, she draws when fully loaded 31½ feet."

With regard to dock No. 9 at Chatham (which has often been, and is even now, quoted as capable of taking a *Dreadnought*, but which "is not broad enough to take a *St. Vincent*, is exceedingly difficult of access for a large ship, and has never been used by the *Dreadnought*," *N.L.J.*, Feb. 1908, p. 45) see *N.L.J.* (l.c.):—"which latter Journal, however (the Journal of the old Navy League), seems to be sublimely unaware of the reason underlying the fact last mentioned, namely, that (as pointed out by the *Standard*, July 24, 1907, p. 7, col. 7), "with a strange perversity, the lock, through which a ship must pass before reaching it" (i.e., before reaching dock No. 9), "is too narrow for the '*Dreadnought*'!" The lock in question is, in fact, of exactly "the same width as" the *Dreadnought* herself; namely, "82 feet wide"—"so that it is, of course, impossible for the *Dreadnought* to get through" (*Daily Express*, September 15, 1908, p. 4, col. 4; and see also *Standard*, September 15, 1908, p. 4, col. 6).

And now with regard to Rosyth itself:—"It will take 7 years from January next (Jan., 1909) to complete the naval dockyard at Rosyth," said Mr. McKenna (the new First Lord) in the House of Commons, June 23, 1908; see *Standard*, June 24, 1908, p. 4, col. 2—"and the Admiralty are satisfied with that arrangement."

So the *British Dreadnoughts* have to await their Rosyth till January, 1916!—and the Admiralty were actually satisfied with such an arrangement!—at a time when no less than "eight docks capable of containing a *German Dreadnought* are either completed, building, or projected in the North Sea" (vide Mr. W. Arnold Burgess in *Standard*, Jan. 23, 1908; see also *N.L.J.*, Jan. 1908, p. 3, Feb., 1908, p. 45; and cp. further in this connection *Daily Express*, May 25, 1908, p. 1, col. 7, and below, in the present note).

It had actually been the Government's original intention to spread it over an even longer period, over as many as ten years (see Lord Tweedmouth at Duns, November 30, 1907, quoted in *Daily Telegraph*, December 3, 1907, p. 11, col. 7, and Lord Tweedmouth's "Statement Explanatory," February 24, 1908, printed in *Times*, February 25, 1908, p. 4, col. 4).

In any case, however, the amount to be spent upon it in the year 1908 (only some £30,000; see the Estimates) was upon the face of it totally and ludicrously inadequate. "In other words," as truly observed by the *Morning Post's* Naval Correspondent, *Morning Post*, February 26, 1908, "Rosyth is not yet to be begun; the scheme is 'hung up' for another year, in spite of its urgency."

(For the official details of the proposed Naval Establishment at Rosyth, as issued by the Admiralty, March 9, 1908, see *Standard*, March 10, 1908, p. 9, col. 3. See further, this note, *infra*.)

Dec. 5, 1907. Zanzibar Affair reported by *Standard* (above, p. 250).

COMPARATIVE RAPIDITY OF SHIPBUILDING.

December 9, 1907. Admiral Tirpitz (Minister of Marine)—during the debate on the new German Navy Bill (for which see above, pp. 266 sq.)—stated to the Budget Committee of the Reichstag as follows:—

“We have already built battleships more quickly than England, and much more quickly than France or the United States.”¹

THE HOME FLEET.—“READINESS” IN NORTH SEA.

3 SHIPS OUT OF 37.

STANDARD, *December 12, 1907, p. 7, cols. 5-6.*²

(FROM A SHEERNESS CORRESPONDENT.)

Were it not a well known fact that the present rulers of the Navy are imbued with a fine contempt for the lessons of history, the

So recently as August 29, 1908, Mr. Cochrane, M.P., speaking at Largs, was able to assert (see *Glasgow Herald*, August 31, 1908, p. 7, col. 3) that:—“From a recent visit he paid to that spot” (Rosyth) “he could assure them that there was no appearance of any attempt to set about the work in a business-like manner.”

The latest (Lord Granard's) defence of the Government,—for lack of a “Rosyth” on the East Coast—was that 6 Dreadnoughts could lie protected behind the boom at Sheerness! (See *Morning Post*, November 25, 1908, s.v. “Imperial Parliament: Naval Policy”). The fallacy of such an argument was ably exposed by Mr. P. A. Hislam, *Daily Express*, November 27, 1908, p. 4, col. 5, as also by the *Express*' Special Correspondent at Sheerness, December 9, 1908, in *Daily Express*, December 10, 1908, p. 1, col. 3 (cp. also Mr. L. G. H. Horton-Smith at R.U.S.I., December 9, 1908, *Jol. of R.U.S.I.*, February, 1909, p. 183); and the boom in question is now cynically known as:—“Granard's Boom.”

Despite the urgency of the matter, it was not until January or February, 1909, that the Rosyth contract was actually placed (see *Globe*, February 8, 1909, p. 9, col. 2);—with seven years as the estimated time for completion (see *Globe, ibid.*), though the contractors are to be entitled to earn a premium if they complete the works sooner (*Globe, ibid.*). It is to be observed, however, that “the bonus,” thus “offered to the contractor to expedite the work,” was offered, not because of the national urgency of the work, but only “in view of” the prevailing “unemployment” (see Mr. McKenna himself, in the House of Commons, November 2, 1908, quoted in *Standard*, November 3, 1908, p. 4, col. 2). (The bonus, as then stated by Mr. McKenna, was to be “£800 a week”: see *Standard, ibid.* :—It will have to be paid by the Unionists.)

“If all goes well,” wrote the *Graphic*, February 27, 1909 (Supplement, p. 3), “the work should be completed by 1916. This is in sharp contrast with the energy with which Germany has pushed forward the enlargement of her naval establishments on the North Sea Coast. Three huge docks for the accommodation of ships up to 25,000 tons have been built in three years at Wilhelmshaven, while an entirely new base is under construction at Brunsbüttel (the “entrance to the Kiel Canal), where two large docks and other works are to be completed in 1911.” (And see further, this note, *supra*; and see also below, p. 359); and cp. Mr. H. W. Wilson in *Nat. Rev.*, May, 1909, p. 397.

Speaking in the House of Commons on May 13, 1907. Mr. McKenna admitted that:—“Presuming that two docks are to be built at Brunsbüttel, and regarding them as coming within the category of ‘immediately contemplated’ . . . it may be said that *built, buildings, and projected*, there are *twelve* docks understood to be capable of taking the German battleships now under construction. This number includes 7 Government docks, 2 private dry docks, and 3 private floating docks. *Ten* docks will be accessible from the North Sea; the other two are at Kiel; but one of these, a floating dock, might conceivably be transported to the Elbe in case of necessity.” (See *Times*, May 14, 1909, p. 6.)

(For the Admiralty's official description and details of the Rosyth contract, see *Globe*, February 11, 1909, p. 8, col. 2.)

An interesting article on “The Rosyth Scheme” (with considerations of a Clyde and Forth Canal, long advocated by Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Campbell: see, e.g., *Journal of R.U.S.I.*, February, 1907, pp. 159 sq.), by the *Morning Post*'s Naval Correspondent, will be found in *Morning Post*, December 18, 1907, p. 3, cols. 1-2.

¹ See *Standard*, December 10, 1907, p. 7 (and cp. also Mr. H. W. Wilson, *Daily Mail*, January 8, 1908), and cp. above, p. 32 text and n. 3, and below, p. 282.

² See also, s.v. “Nore Division,” Mr. W. A. Burgess, *Standard*, Dec. 17, 1907.

present condition of the country's naval guard in the North Sea would be a matter as much for surprise as it is for alarm. Three hundred and fifty years ago the principles which are to-day so lightly ignored by my lords of Whitehall were laid down by that much despised monarch Philip II. of Spain in words which should be hung in letters of brass at the entrance to the Admiralty. During the reign of Queen Mary, Philip was anxious for the assistance of the English Navy in a campaign against the French; but the Council told him that the Fleet was unfit for sea, with an added promise that "the best of the ships, with the pick of the sailors and soldiers on board, should, as soon as possible, be sent to guard the Channel." This was not enough for the King, who wrote (September, 1555) a vigorous marginal note on the minute, saying that "England's chief defence depends upon its Navy being always in good order to serve for the defence of the kingdom against all invasion. It is right that the ships should not only be fit for sea, but instantly available." (Hume's "Life of Philip II.")

The closing words of Philip's note have been much in requisition during the last twelve months. Last January the Admiralty placed in those waters where, if ever our naval supremacy is challenged, the first onslaught will be felt, a force formed chiefly from the vessels withdrawn from the sea-going Fleets, whose readiness and efficiency none has ever doubted; and over and over again the country has been assured that this new force, the Home Fleet, would be "instantly available" for any emergency. It is a claim that has with almost monotonous frequency been shown to be void of justification. Of the twelve armoured ships nominally composing the Nore Division of the Home Fleet, it has been shown by a writer in the *United Service Magazine*¹ that only six ships² were available during any of the first nine months of its existence. What is the condition of that Fleet to-day?

BATTLESHIPS.

According to the Navy List (official), the Battle Squadron of the Nore Division of the Home Fleet consists of the following ships:—

Dreadnought, flagship of Commander-in-Chief.

Bulwark, flagship of Rear-Admiral.

London.

Magnificent.

Majestic.

Victorious.

The *Dreadnought* has been in commission for twelve months, out of which she has spent twenty-three days in the North Sea. She has never been to her nominal headquarters, the Nore, and is now in the Mediterranean . . . having served a useful term as "decoy" ship for those who were anxious to expound upon the strength of the Home Fleet.

The *Bulwark*, *Majestic* and *Victorious* are undergoing refit in Chatham Dockyard, whither they went, the first-named on October 31, and the other two on November 5. The battle squadron at the Nore therefore consists at the present moment—and has done

¹ *U.S.M.*, November, 1907, pp. 131-139 (referred to above, p. 255).

² On the average. See *Standard*, November 22, 1907 (leading article, "State of the Navy"), p. 6, cols. 5-6.

for five weeks—of two battleships, the *London* and *Magnificent*. Both of these are waiting for their turn to go to Chatham, and are to go up on December 17 and January 16 respectively. Two (defective) battleships out of six is, therefore, the degree of readiness of which the North Sea battle squadron can boast.

ARMoured CRUISERS.

The Fifth Cruiser Squadron, attached to the Nore Division, is in a slightly better condition. At first this squadron comprised six ships, but one, the *Duke of Edinburgh*, was transferred, with the *Black Prince*, to the Channel Fleet, as a result of the continued complaints of *The Standard*¹ as to the manner in which that Fleet had been weakened in order, ostensibly, to create the "instantly ready" Home Fleet, but actually to effect a saving on the coal and ammunition bills. The five remaining ships are:—

Leviathan, flagship of Rear-Admiral.

Achilles.

Cochrane.

Natal.

Warrior.

Two of these ships are in dock at Chatham, the *Natal* and *Achilles*, having left Sheerness for that purpose on November 22. The *Leviathan* is to go up on January 15, and the *Cochrane* on January 6. The only ship of the whole armoured division of the Nore Fleet that is actually fit for service—that is, which is not either in dock or waiting to go into dock—is the *Warrior*. As she was in dockyard hands almost continuously from the date of her commissioning, June 1, to November 9, it ought to be possible to assume her fitness for war without undue optimism.

The following is a summary of the battle and armoured cruiser divisions of the Home Fleet:—

					Ships.
Nominal strength	...	...	...	...	11
Ships in dock	...	...	...	...	5
Waiting to go into dock	...	...	...	...	4
In the Mediterranean	...	...	...	...	1
Ready and fit for war	...	...	...	...	1

These figures are curious reading in the light of the following paragraph, taken from the "Arrangements Consequent upon the Redistribution of the Fleet," issued in 1905:—

"Orders have been given that, as a rule, not more than one large armoured vessel of a fleet or squadron is to be under repair in dockyard hands at one time, so as to ensure the various fleets and squadrons being kept always at their effective strength and ready for instant service."²

It will be seen that at this moment no fewer than five ships of the Home Fleet's Nore Division are in dock.

When the arrangements as to refitting these ships were being drawn up, the Admiralty evidently foresaw the possibility of hostile

¹ And others, including ourselves and those with us; see above, pp. 102 sq., 201, 213, 220 etc.

² See further, below, pp. 406, 452 sq.

criticism, for it was stated that, in order that the strength of the division should not be reduced, a number of emergency ships would be specially sent round to Sheerness from Portsmouth and Devonport, their crews being brought up to full strength by parties of men from the ships in dock. The following were the arrangements as published :—

DEVONPORT.

Bulwark replaced by *Hannibal*.

Majestic replaced by *Mars*.

PORTSMOUTH.

Victorious replaced by *Prince George*.

Natal replaced by *Berwick*.

Achilles replaced by *Ariadne*.

The story of the Home Fleet has been such a continued series of make-believes that it is scarcely necessary to say that none of these substitute ships has been sent to Sheerness, although the vessels originally comprising the Fleet have been absent for periods varying from six to three weeks. The statement was issued for popular consumption only.¹

DESTROYERS.

We now come to the destroyers. On the last cruise of the Commodore in command of the "Eastern Group," sixteen ships out of a nominal twenty-four were mustered, and went through the usual "war-training" of steaming in line at fifteen knots between two North Sea lightships. The absentees were the *Orwell* and *Earnest*, which collided during the recent manœuvres, the *Fawn*, which went aground, and the *Erne*, *Ness*, *Panther*, *Thorn*, and *Vulture*, all refitting. Orders have now been issued which will reduce the North Sea flotillas to two ships, the *Ure* and the *Nith*. All the others are to go into dockyard hands for refit, although the *Flirt*, *Thrasher*, *Thorn* and *Welland* have all been in dock for defects to be remedied during the last month. The two scouts attached to the flotilla are also to go to Chatham.

SUMMARY.

This, then, is the condition of the Home Fleet, Nore Division :—

	Nominal.	In dock.	Waiting for docking.	Ready
Battleships	6	3	2	0*
Armoured cruisers ..	5	2	2	1
Scouts	2	—	2	0
Destroyers	24	22		2

* *Dreadnought* in the Mediterranean.

This is the fleet which Lord Tweedmouth has assured the country would be "constantly ready for any emergency,"² and of which

¹ Here follows (in the *Standard*) a reference to the *Berwick*, a cruiser which "is, in fact, and has been since the Home Fleet was formed, the official 'stand-by' [of the Admiralty], and her performance can in no way be taken as typical of the condition of the whole of the nucleus crew ships."

² Cp., e.g., above, p. 223.

Rear-Admiral Finnis, commanding the battle squadron at the Nore, said in August last¹: "There is no better fleet in the British Navy." It is now, as the above table shows, a "fleet" of one armoured cruiser and two destroyers. No wonder that it is known amongst those other fleets which Admiral Finnis despises as "the Sheerness collection of misfits."

MR. HALDANE PREPARED TO THROW OVER THE TWO-POWER STANDARD.

December 16, 1907. The Two-Power Standard jeopardised even in theory. "Lip-service" openly discarded.—See Mr. Haldane (Minister for War), speaking at Hanley, December 16, 1907, quoted by *Standard*, December 17, 1907, p. 8, col. 4, and by Lieut. Carlyon Bellairs, M.P. (s.v. "The Proposed Naval Inquiry"), in the *Morning Post*, December 31, 1907. See also *Morning Post*, December 17, 1907 (leading article), p. 6, col. 7; *Standard*, January 2, 1908 (s.v. "Year of Naval Unrest"); and *Morning Post* (leading article), January 24, 1908.²

THE UNITED STATES NAVY.

December 16, 1907. The American Pacific Fleet commences its 14,000 mile Cruise from Hampton Roads, Virginia, by way of the Straits of Magellan,³ to the Pacific.⁴—"New page in American Naval History and an event of International Interest⁵" (*Standard*, December 12, 1907, p. 8, col. 5; *Daily Express*, December 16, 1907, p. 1, col. 7; *Standard*, December 16, 1907, p. 7, col. 1; and, s.v. "New Page in American History," *Evening Standard and S.J.G.*, December 16, 1907, p. 6, col. 4.)

¹ August, 1907, the month of the "Political Fleet's" "Sham Review, for which see above, p. 242.

² "Mr. Haldane, the Cabinet preacher of science" (wrote the *Morning Post*, leading article, January 24, 1908), "has lately" (December 16, 1907) "sounded a note of despair. He does not see how Great Britain with only 40" [44] "millions can keep up a Two-Power Standard when one of the two Powers, Germany, has a population of 70" [62: see below, p. 432] "millions," and when another, the United States (see Mr. Haldane's speech, as referred to in the *Globe*, December 17, 1907, p. 1, col. 2) has a population of 90 millions.

Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman refused to count France for the purpose of the Two-Power Standard (see above, p. 6, and for comment, pp. 22, 30, 34, 35, 38, 39, 41, 72, 203, 277, etc.), and now apparently Mr. Haldane would perforce exclude both Germany and the United States! With regard to the exclusion of the latter, see:—Mr. Haldane, further, at Blair Athol, February, 1908 (as referred to in *Standard*, February 19, 1908, leading article),—boldly venturing the assertion that the Two-Power Standard had not officially been interpreted as including the United States Navy (for the real facts as to which cp. above, p. 6 n. 6, and below, pp. 308, 472)—and see also the Admiralty apologist cited by the *Standard*, July 28, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, col. 5.

With France, Germany, and the U.S.A. excluded, which might be the countries to be included?

³ Some day to give place to the Panama Canal, "which, we are frequently told" (to quote the *Morning Post's* Naval Correspondent, *Morning Post*, Dec. 18, 1907, s.v. "The Rosyth Scheme," p. 3, col. 1), "will 'double the striking force' of the American Navy."

⁴ The voyage was completed by, and the Fleet back again at Hampton Roads on, Feb. 23, 1909; see *Daily Express*, Feb. 22, 1909, p. 1, col. 6.

⁵ *Standard*, Dec. 16, 1907, p. 7, col. 1.

INQUIRY INTO THE STATE OF THE NAVY.

December 17, 1907. "The state of weakness and unreadiness for war to which the Navy has since 1906 been reduced (made worse by the accompanying decline of discipline 1); . . .—The maintenance of harmony between strategy and policy the secret of success in war; . . .—Prompt and full inquiry into the state of the Navy and the probable conditions of a War";—pressed upon the Government;—*Morning Post*, December 17, 1907 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 6-7.

NAVY LEAGUE ATTITUDE DEFINED.

"WE BACK SIR JOHN FISHER."

December 23, 1907.

December 23, 1907. "We back Sir John Fisher";—the anomalous but actual position adopted by the Old Navy League (we quote from the words of its own secretary in a published interview:—), see *Daily Mail*, December 24, 1907, p. 3, col. 4.²³

December, 1907. "Sir John Fisher and the Navy";—by the Rev. F. Shadwell, *N.L.J.*, January, 1908, pp. 6-7.

DEFENCELESS SCOTLAND.

December, 1907. "Defenceless Scotland";—by Mr. H. W. Wilson (written October, 1907), *National Review*, December, 1907, pp. 578-590.

THE PROPOSED NAVAL INQUIRY.

BY LIEUT. C. BELLAIRS, M.P.

December 31, 1907. "The Proposed Naval Inquiry";—by Lieut. Carlyon BellaIRS, M.P., in the *Morning Post*, December 31, 1907, from which we extract the following:—

"The position of the Prime Minister in refusing the request of over 220 Members of Parliament for an inquiry into the experiments

1 "The mutiny at Portsmouth" (above pp. 92, 114, and below, p. 340) "has hardly been forgotten, and yet even now" (to quote the article in question) "statements are circulated intended to justify or to palliate the recent insubordination of an admiral" (*i.e.*, Sir Percy Scott; see above, p. 255).

2 Cp. further below, pp. (284), 286, 290, 293, 393, 401, 410, 484.

3 Already on December 9, 1907, in a Public Letter to the Press (reprinted in *N.L.J.*, Jan., 1908, p. 6), they had declared that:—"We accept" Sir John Fisher's "assurance" "*without demur.*" (Cp. below, pp. 278, 286, 484.) And this they followed up in April, 1908, by the no less astonishing declaration that:—"The assurance of the Admiralty *must be accepted.*" (See *N.L.J.*, April, 1908, p. 103, and below, pp. 278, 370, 375, 396, 485, text and n. 1.)

which Admiral of the Fleet Sir Frederick Richards has since stigmatised as hazardous¹² is incomprehensible. . . .

"The demand for an inquiry into the state of the Navy is now known to have received the support of Sir John Fisher's predecessors in office, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Frederick Richards¹² and Admiral Sir Vesey Hamilton.¹² The demand is backed by Sir William White, than whose authority on many of the vexed questions there is none higher, and Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge, one of the most distinguished of the succession of naval officers who have held the post of Director of Naval Intelligence.²³ It is well known that Admiral Sir Reginald Custance is the author of the *Blackwood* articles on the state of the Navy,⁴ so there can be no question of his opinion. The Admiralty have further acknowledged that active list officers commanding fleets have taken the extreme course of sending in written protests against some of the most important changes in naval policy which have been made.⁵

"In the *Morning Post* of November 16 last⁶ there is a grave warning from a distinguished publicist, Mr. Spenser Wilkinson, in which it is stated that as the result of confidential communications he is convinced that the greater part of the officers of the Navy, and among them the most capable, hold the belief that 'the management of the Navy is in dangerous hands.' The most experienced of those who have held the great position of First Lord of the Admiralty, the late Lord Goschen, gave utterance to a similar warning when he referred to his 'certain knowledge' of the 'widespread alarm, deep apprehension and anxiety' in regard to the future efficiency of the Navy.⁷ It has been positively stated⁸ that Sir George Clarke, than whom there is no more competent authority on questions of fighting administration and the problem of Imperial Defence, has quitted his great post on the Committee of Imperial Defence with feelings of the gravest anxiety in respect of the administration of the Navy. . . .

"There exists . . . indirect evidence that the position is as well understood in Berlin as was the administration of the French Army prior to 1870. Immediately after hearing Admiral von Tirpitz make his secret and confidential communications to the Budget Committee"—["during the recent debate on the (German) Navy Bill"; see *Morning Post*, December 19, 1907, p. 7, col. 5],—"the Socialist leader, Herr Bebel, who has been a constant preacher of the uselessness of German attempts to rival the British Navy,⁹ said that "England may experience a terrible *débâcle* in a naval war."¹⁰

¹ See above, p. 264.

² Cp. also *Standard*, January 29, 1908.

³ Cp. also below, p. 292.

⁴ These articles—issued over the *nom de plume* "Barfleur," and under the title of "*Naval Policy: a Plea for the Study of War*"—have since been published by Wm. Blackwood and Sons in book form.

⁵ Cp. (in this connection) above, pp. 264 *sqq.*

⁶ November 16, 1907. See above, pp. 265 *sq.*

⁷ Lord Goschen's words will be found quoted at length in the *National Review*, Oct., 1907, p. 309.

⁸ See *National Review*, Oct., 1907, p. 309.

⁹ Even so recently as December 6, 1907, Herr Bebel, on behalf of the German Socialist party, had "delivered a severe indictment of Germany's policy of Naval expansion." See *Standard*, December 10, 1907, p. 7. (See above, p. R.F.)

¹⁰ See *Morning Post*, December 19, 1907, p. 7, col. 5; and see above, p. R.F.

We are asked by the Admiralty—for both Lord Tweedmouth¹ and Sir John Fisher² have used the words—to go to sleep, and this was precisely what the French nation was asked to do, and the penalty was Sedan and an indemnity. The inquiry was nevertheless held after the war, and the report was to the effect that the French Army was beaten by its own bad administration rather than [by] the arms of its adversaries. . . .”³

RECORD OF NAVAL ADMINISTRATION IN 1907.

A YEAR OF NAVAL UNREST.

1907.

NEED FOR IMPARTIAL INQUIRY.

THE “STANDARD’S” EXPOSURES.

Under the heading, “Year of Naval Unrest : Vacillating Admiralty : Need for Impartial Inquiry : The *Standard’s* Exposures,” the *Standard*, January 2, 1908, gives an admirable and detailed record of the Naval administration (or, rather, *mal*-administration) of 1907;—concluding with the undeniable statement that:—

“The *Standard* and its supporters . . . may claim to have exposed the true state of affairs in the Navy, and to have forced concessions upon seven essential points upon the Government and the Admiralty.”

The record is one which constitutes the very gravest indictment of those responsible for the safety of the British Empire in the year of grace 1907, and it is a matter of urgency that the vital and essential **Inquiry into the state of the Navy**, which has been demanded by the highest and most competent authority,⁴ shall no longer be either refused or delayed.⁵

¹ At Exeter, November 22, 1907. See above, pp. 261 n 5, 271, and below, p. 285.

² November 9, 1907. See above, pp. 260, 261, 271, and below, p. 285.

³ Compare hereon the *Morning Post’s* endorsement (leading article), December 31, 1907, from which we extract as follows:—

“The state of the Navy is a matter of supreme national importance. . . Mr. Carlyon Bellairs, in a letter which we publish this morning [see above, pp. 278 *seq.*], gives his reasons for wishing that an inquiry should be held into the state of the Navy. . . We abide by the principles which we have for many years tried to set forth, and, if at the present time we go further than the exposition of principles and approve of the demand for inquiry, it is because the neglect of principles has led to a state of things more dangerous than has ever existed within our recollection. Inquiry has its dangers, too, for in this country public inquiries into the Services have usually been dilatory, seldom conclusive, and have never been followed by the action to which they pointed. Yet an honest inquiry, an inquiry instituted for the sole purpose of discovering the truth, would undoubtedly lead to the nation’s knowing how it stands. . . .”

⁴ See above, pp. 264, 265, etc.

⁵ “We continue,” wrote the *Standard*, Jan. 1, 1908, p. 7, col. 4, “to advocate an impartial inquiry into the present naval administration by recognised authority.” And, again, on Jan. 2, 1908 (leading article), p. 4, col. 6:—“The summary which we publish this morning” (Jan. 2, 1908, referred to in the text) “of the history of the Royal Navy for the past year” (1907), “should, we believe, serve fully to justify the demand for a public and impartial inquiry into the state of the Navy.”

THE YEAR 1908

INQUIRY DEMANDED.

January 1, 1908. Full, Independent, and Impartial Inquiry into the present Naval Administration and into the present State of the Navy—Demanded. See *Standard*, January 1, 1908, p. 7, col. 4; January 2, 1908, p. 4, col. 6, &c.¹

CAPT. NICHOLETTS, R.N.,

RESIGNATION FROM THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE OLD NAVY LEAGUE.

January, 1908.—Capt. R. B. Nicholetts, R.N.,^{2 3} resigns his seat upon the Executive Committee of the Navy League.⁴ His support is now wholly given to the Imperial Maritime League, and he is a member both of its General Council and of its Executive Committee.⁵

MR. ROBERT WEATHERBURN'S

RESIGNATION FROM THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE OLD NAVY LEAGUE.

January, 1908.

MR. ROBERT WEATHERBURN, M.I.Mech.E.,^{6 3} resigns his seat upon the Executive Committee of the NAVY LEAGUE. His support is now wholly given to the Imperial Maritime League, and he is a member both of its General Council and of its Executive Committee.

¹ Cp. above, p. 280, and Index, *s.v.* "Inquiry."

² For whom, see above, pp. 137, 165, 166, 180, 207.

³ Concerning the use of "Premier" type in this book see above, p. 52, n. 5.

⁴ Cp. *N.L.J.*, January, 1908, p. vi, and February, 1908, p. iv.

⁵ Since the above was written, Capt. Nicholetts has unhappily passed away (dying in August, 1908).

⁶ For whom, see above, pp. 90, 163, 171, 172, 173, 175, 177, 180, 181, 206, and below, pp. 319, 368, 386, 387, 405.

GERMAN SHIPBUILDING RAPIDITY.

January, 1908. German Rapidity of Shipbuilding :—"Admiral Tirpitz has told the Reichstag this month that Germany can build as fast as England" (Mr. H. W. Wilson, "To the Sea Lords," *Daily Mail*, January 8, 1908).¹ Admiral Tirpitz has since had the signal honour of being summoned by the Kaiser to the Upper House of the Prussian Diet.²

THE CONDITION OF THE NAVY.

MEETING AT PLUMSTEAD.

January 4, 1908.

A debate was held at the Central Schools, Plumstead Common, on January 4, 1908, the subject debated being "The Unsatisfactory Condition of the Navy."³

Mr. E. A. H. Jay, L.C.C., was in the chair, and the debate was opened by Mr. Harold F. Wyatt.

The following Resolution, moved by Mr. Wyatt, and seconded by Mr. A. G. Rolstone, was carried with but few dissentients :—

"That this Meeting deplores the grievous weakening of our naval strength through the neglect of repairs,⁴ the diminution of training at sea,⁵ and the reduction of the *personnel*;⁶ It approves the objects of the Imperial Maritime League;⁷ And it endorses the demand for a public^{7a} inquiry into the state of the Navy, as recommended by two former First Sea Lords, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Frederick Richards and Admiral Sir R. Vesey Hamilton."⁸

THE NATION AND THE NAVY

NEW YEAR ENDEAVOUR

DEMAND FOR AN INQUIRY

DUTY OF UNIONISTS

STANDARD, January 9, 1908, p. 7, cols. 1-2.

To the Editor of the STANDARD.

4, Paper Buildings, Temple, E.C.,

January 8, 1908.

SIR,⁹—The beginning of a new year seems an appropriate time in which to make fresh endeavour to save the most immediately vital

¹ Cp. also Admiral Tirpitz in the Reichstag, December 9, 1907, to the same effect (*Daily Express*, December 10, 1907, p. 7, col. 5, and *Standard*, December 10, 1907, p. 7, col. 5). See further, above, pp. 32 n. 3, 273.

² See above, p. R.F., and below, p. 359.

³ For an account of this Meeting see the *Plumstead News*, January 7, 1908, p. 2, col. 7.

⁴ See above, pp. 16, 25, 74, 226, 242, etc.

⁵ See above, pp. 14, 16, 19, 132, 141, 246, 253, 256, etc.

⁶ See above, p. 61, text and n. 8.

^{7a} On the word "public," cp. above, p. 266 n. 1.

⁷ See below, pp. 305 *sqq.*

⁸ See above, pp. 264 *sq.*

⁹ Under the heading "The Nation in Danger," this letter was published also in the

of all British interests. That this interest is the preservation of our supremacy at sea will be admitted by all men, with the exception of Socialists and other anti-patriots, to whom the continuance of the independence of their own country is a subject of indifference.

As you well pointed out in a recent leading article,¹ the present "Cabinet hoped and intended to divert many millions sterling from the Navy and the Army," and the extent to which the partial execution of this intention has prejudiced the safety of the country is a matter which evidently demands the consideration of Parliament as soon as it meets.

At this point, however, we are confronted with an undoubted difficulty, which it is vain to ignore. In actual fact, as apart from mere constitutional theory, the Cabinet of the day controls with authority practically absolute the greater mass of its supporters in the House of Commons. Even if these did not agree, as they probably do agree, with a policy of retrenchment of expenditure upon national defence, no help in the direction of criticism of that policy can be expected from more than one or two amongst them.

On the other hand, the Labour party, as a whole, has not yet been awakened to the fact, however obvious, that its own future is bound up with the efficient maintenance of national defence. On the contrary, no thesis is more commonly expounded on Labour platforms than that of the irrelevance of such defence to the working classes. Labour orators, with but few exceptions, constantly declare that the working men of Britain are in a state of abject slavery (that is, as they mean, to their employers, not to their unions), and that the conquest of Britain by a foreign Power would make not the slightest difference to them. The Labour party is all in favour of "pouching," for social reforms,² the money devoted to safeguard the heritage of British liberty, which their forefathers died to win. As for the Nationalist members, they are, for the most part, the avowed enemies of everything British; they regard the two Services as instruments possibly to be used against themselves, and the diminution of these Services is to them a source of joy.

It remains, after these eliminations, that either the Unionist party must take up in earnest the subject of national defence in

Morning Post, January 9, 1907; with this difference, that the following paragraph was substituted for the first seven paragraphs of the letter as printed in the text:—

"SIR,—It must have occurred to many of your readers to wonder that the Unionist Party in Parliament have not yet taken any collective steps to draw attention to the many sources of disquietude in respect of our Naval strength which have formed the subject of comment in your columns. It is, however, easy to see that there are two reasons for the reluctance to take this action, of which the first is that the Navy has never in modern times been brought into the arena of party. What is the motive of this abstention? Clearly it is that if once the Navy be made the football of party it may be dealt with according to party exigencies, instead of according to national needs. In other words, the fear is that the Navy may be prejudiced, and therefore also the safety of the country. This fear is one of the two reasons, and an honourable reason, why the Unionist Party in the House of Commons has hitherto refrained from collective action in regard to a subject the immediate importance of which surpasses every other that can be discussed."

This letter was also printed in part—*s.v.* "Naval Inquiry: The Unionist Party's Duty to the Country"—*Daily Express*, January 9, 1908.

¹ *Standard*, Dec. 30, 1907 (leading article, "Government and Defence"), p. 6. col. 6.

² Cp. below, pp. 315, 450, and see Index, *s.v.* "Social Reform."

the House of Commons, or that it will not be taken up in that assembly at all.

Now the Unionist minority in the House is very reluctant to touch the most immediately vital part of this question of national defence, for two reasons, of which *The First* is that the Navy has never in modern times been brought into the arena of party.

What is the motive of this abstention? Clearly, it is that, if once the Navy be made the football of party, it may be dealt with according to party exigencies instead of according to national needs. In other words, the fear is that the Navy may be prejudiced, and, therefore, also the safety of the country.

This fear is one of the two reasons, and an honourable reason, why the Unionist party in the House of Commons has hitherto refrained from collective action in regard to a subject the immediate importance of which surpasses every other that can be discussed.

But the cause for this abstention has now been removed. For, if the dangers feared from that collective action have already accrued; if the Navy has been already prejudiced; if the safety of the country has been already endangered; if the exigencies of the Liberal party have already been allowed to govern the administration of our Fleet; then evidently the dread of producing such results is destroyed by the fact that they are already accomplished facts.

It cannot be maintained that the principle is stronger than the reason which underlies the principle. It cannot seriously be contended that the Unionist party is bound to stand by and see the national safety destroyed, rather than incur a charge of party motive by seeking to secure that safety through collective action in Parliament.

In this case, the evil of leaving the question alone is incomparably greater than what might once have been considered the evil of raising it.

But the answer from Government apologists, such as the committee of the old Navy League, will be a general denial of the facts,¹ and a general endorsement² of Sir John Fisher's intimation that the Navy is now in a condition of unparalleled perfection.³ That declaration, made at the Guildhall banquet on November 9,³ stands between this country and the reality of safety, between the Navy and the removal of economies under which the Navy groans. Yet, within four days of Sir John Fisher's advice to his countrymen to go to sleep, two admirals of the highest experience, each of whom had in the past held the same office of First Sea Lord now held by himself, felt compelled to recommend the institution of a public⁴ inquiry into the state of the Navy.⁵

Here then, assuredly, is the key of the position for the Unionist party. They cannot themselves investigate allegations. They cannot themselves prove the presence of administrative evils in face of administrative denials. But they can, as a body in the House of Commons (and also in the House of Lords), demand the public⁴ inquiry advised by Admiral of the Fleet Sir Frederick Richards⁵ and Admiral Sir R. Vesey Hamilton.⁵

¹ Cp. their case at the Annual Meeting of May 15, 1907 (above, pp. 52 *sq.*, 60 *sqq.*), and below, p. 256. ² Cp. above, p. 273, and below, pp. 286 (text and nn. 3, 4), 484.

³ November 9, 1907. (Cp. above, p. 258 *sq.*, 258 n. 1 (para. 2), and below, pp. 300, 330 n. 4. ⁴ On the word "public," cp. above, p. 266 n. 1. ⁵ See above, pp. 264 *sq.*

If the result of that inquiry should be to show that the Navy is in very fact in the state of admirable efficiency, both in *matériel* and in training, alleged by Sir John Fisher and by his supporters in the Press and in the old Navy League, how great and how legitimate a triumph will all these enjoy!

Then at last the country might feel enabled, so far at any rate as the Navy is concerned, to sink into that desired slumber,¹ untroubled by evil dreams.

But if, on the other hand, a contrary result should follow, from how great and terrible a danger will the country have been preserved!

And this at least is certain, that, even apart from the weighty recommendation of two former First Sea Lords,² the case for inquiry is overwhelming. The fact (which you have made public³) that during last month the only available vessels of the Nore Division of the Home Fleet were one cruiser, the *Warrior*, and two destroyers,⁴ is by itself more than sufficient to establish the urgent national need of investigation. For here we have in untraversable reality the violation of the solemn pledge which has been repeatedly given by the Admiralty to the nation that this division of ships should be kept constantly in a state of "instant readiness for war."⁵

The nation has a right to know the cause of that violation. Is it "economy"? Or is it sheer contempt on the part of the Cabinet for the needs of national defence?

And what hindrance exists to the institution of this inquiry? Only the resolve of Sir John Fisher, as announced by the Prime Minister, to resign if it be granted.⁶

Here we reach *The Second* of the two reasons which in this great matter have paralysed the action of the Unionist party. For Sir John Fisher was originally appointed by them, and how then can they press for an inquiry the first effect of which will be (because he so chooses) his resignation?⁶

But of the two evils, which is the greater: the evil of wilfully neglecting a high public duty, namely, that of calling for an inquiry urgently necessary to the safety of Britain, or the evil of an implicit admission that the original estimate of Sir John Fisher may possibly have been mistaken? There is no disgrace in such error; the greatest men have sometimes perpetrated similar mistakes; but there would be deep disgrace to the Unionist party if they were to continue to refrain from fulfilling their duty to the Empire for such a cause.

One More Question may naturally be asked by us. It is:—What part is being taken by the old and moribund Navy League in pressing for this inquiry?

It has long neglected every function which it was created to

¹ Recommended both by Sir John Fisher (November 9, 1907, above, pp. 260, 261, 271, 280) and by Lord Tweedmouth himself (November 22, 1907, above, pp. 261 n. 5, 271, 280).

² See above, p. 284.

³ *Standard*, December 12, 1907, above, pp. 273 sqq.

⁴ See above, pp. 275 sq.

⁵ See above, pp. 223, 276.

⁶ See *Standard*, November 12, 1907 (leading article), p. 6, col. 6 (referred to, again, above, p. 259 n. 4); and also above, pp. 253, 266, and Index, s.v. "Fisher" and "Inquiry."

discharge, save that of arranging lectures in boys' and girls' schools.¹ It refused to move when strongly urged to do so by that large body of its own members who supported our action in the controversy of last summer.²

But here at last, the world will say, is a duty plain and pertinent. Here is a task which, by the motive in forming its creation, it must be impelled to assume. Will not the old Navy League consent to help England by helping to obtain the inquiry? The answer may be given in the words of its secretary, as reported in the Press:—"We back Sir John Fisher";³ and in those of the committee's recent letter, reproduced in their JOURNAL this month, that they accept Sir John Fisher's assurance "without demur."⁴

Thus amongst the bitter opponents to the only remedy for neglected repairs,⁵ and lessened personnel,⁶ and diminished training,⁷ and fallacious gunnery tests,⁸ is the LEAGUE which was formed to foster the naval strength of Britain.

They ask only for more battleships to meet the German programme—more battleships which will be left to rot in port with half-trained crews unless the present administrative methods are changed; but they oppose the only means which can change them. They "back Sir John Fisher."³

Happily, there is a New Navy League,⁹ which, through toilsome labour, the difficulty of which can be appreciated only by those who have participated in similar undertakings, has now almost reached maturity, and the new LEAGUE, powerfully supported as it is, will not shun plain duty, but will resolutely press, with strong insistence, for the Inquiry which Sir John Fisher and his¹⁰ Navy League deny.

We are, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

BRITISH NAVAL REDUCTIONS OF THE PAST 3 YEARS AND THE NEW GERMAN NAVY BILL.

January 8, 1908. "To the Sea Lords";—by Mr. H. W. Wilson in the *Daily Mail*, January 8, 1908, with reference to "the new German naval proposals," from which we extract the following:—

"What have the Sea Lords done during the past three years? . . . Necessary expenditure of every kind has been postponed, the con

¹ Cp. above, pp. 79 (text and n. 8), 229, 241.

² Cp. above, *passim*; especially, pp. 52 *sq.*, 60 *sqq.*, 189 *sqq.*

³ See above, pp. 278, 284, and below, pp. 290, 293, 393, 401, 410, 484.

⁴ *N.L.J.*, January, 1908, p. 6. (See further below, p. 484.)

⁵ See above, p. 282, text and n. 4.

⁶ See above, p. 282 text, and n. 6.

⁷ See above, p. 282, text and n. 5.

⁸ See above, pp. 251 (text and n. 7), 255 (text and n. 5), 260 (text and n. 3), and below, pp. 330 (text and n. 4), 341 *sq.*

⁹ The IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE. See below, pp. 305 *sqq.*, and *passim*.

¹⁰ See Index, *s.v.* "Fisher" and "Old N.L."

struction of docks on the East Coast has been delayed, and the Estimates have been reduced by the convenient process of allowing obligations to stand over to the future. . . . Such enormous reductions as the following have taken place between 1904-5 and 1907-8 in the annual votes:—

In the Navy Estimates	£6,400,000
Shipbuilding vote	3,100,000
Coal vote	350,000
Ammunition vote	685,000
Guns, vote for.....	354,000

And these reductions . . . have been carried out at a period when the two Navies next in power to the British were greatly increasing their outlay. It stands to reason that the process of reduction on the British side, accompanied by a process of steady increase in the German and American naval expenditure, must alter the position of the various countries.¹²

"At the same time, the number of men in the British dockyards has been reduced by 8,000, and the total of British officers and men has been cut down by 3,000, though the *personnel* of the German Navy is being systematically augmented year by year.³⁴ . . ."

"If" (following the precedent of 1898) "England had last year replied in similar fashion to the German *Novelle*, as the Act is commonly called which was passed in 1906, greatly augmenting the size and fighting qualities of the German ships, it is at least probable that there would have been no German Navy Act of 1907-8, and that the country would not have been called upon to meet another and more extensive German programme. . . ."

"If . . . there is" (now) "no adequate reply, they" (the German people) "will inevitably be encouraged to make further and more strenuous exertions, and we may expect, as the semi-official Press of Germany has hinted, to see the Act of 1907" [1908] "followed by another in 1910. . . ." ⁵

PEACE PARTIES AND OUR NAVAL SUPREMACY.

January 10, 1908. Peace Parties and Our Naval Supremacy:—Resolution passed unanimously at the Meeting of the National Council of Peace Societies, January 10, 1908 (reprinted *Standard*, January 17, 1908, p. 4, col. 3):—

"The National Council of Peace Societies observes with great regret the statement by Mr. W. T. Stead in the *Review of Reviews* for December (1907), that 'the Peace party is even more anxious to maintain our naval supremacy than the Jingoese.' The Council, which contains representatives of nearly every peace organisation in the United Kingdom, is *unaware of any 'peace party' holding the above-quoted opinion.*"

¹ See above, pp. 60 *seq.*, 78, 203.

² Cp., analogically, but in another connection, above, p. 15.

³ Cp. above, pp. 65 n. 11, 267 n. 2. (For the official figures see *Daily Express*, s.v., "Fewer Men in the Fleet," March 11, 1909, p. 5, col. 4.)

⁴ In 1903 the *personnel* of the German Navy stood only at:—Active List, 33,542; Reserves, 20,000 (see Mr. H. W. Wilson's articles, Sept., 1903, published in the Old N.L.'s Monthly Pamphlet of Sept., 1903). For its present number see preceding note.

⁵ Cp., e.g., the *Kölnische Volkszeitung*, cited in the *Times*, November 23, 1907, p. 5, col. 1.

THE NEW NAVY LEAGUE.

*Copy of Resolution*¹ *passed unanimously at a specially convened Meeting of the Executive and General Committees of the Third London Branch of the Navy League, held at the Midland Grand Hotel, St. Pancras, on Saturday, the 11th January, 1908.*²

That this Meeting deeply deplores the grievous weakening of our Naval strength, involved in the neglect of repairs,³ the reduction of the *personnel*,⁴ including the diminution of the coastguard,⁵ the introduction of short service,⁶ and the lessening of training at sea,⁷ etc. ; It strongly endorses the recommendation of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Frederick W. Richards, G.C.B., and Admiral Sir R. Vesey Hamilton, G.C.B., themselves both former First Sea Lords, that a public inquiry^{7a} should be instituted into the state of the Navy ;⁸ It laments the old Navy League's attitude in this and other respects ;⁹ It considers that no useful national purpose will now be served by further support of that League ; Accordingly it recommends the Third London Branch of the old Navy League to consider the advisability of dissolving the Branch, and of reconstituting it as a Branch¹⁰ of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE (the new Navy League).¹¹

Further, that this Meeting authorises the Honorary Secretaries to forward this Resolution to the Press.¹²

¹ Concerning the use of "Premier" type in this book see above, p. 52, n. 5.

² See further below, p. 298.

³ See above, p. 282, text and n. 4.

⁴ See above, p. 282, text and n. 6.

⁵ See above, pp. 61 (text and n. 9), 75 (text and n. 8).

⁶ See above, pp. 37 (text and nn. 2, 4), 62 (text and n. 4).

⁷ See above, p. 282, text and n. 5.

^{7a} On the word "public," cp. above, p. 266 n. 1.

⁸ See above, pp. 264 *sq.*

⁹ Cp. also the earlier action of the Branch, above, pp. 122, 124 *sq.*

¹⁰ Below, p. 298.

¹¹ For which see below, pp. 305 *sqq.*, and *passim*.

¹² Cp. further below, p. 298.

THE TWO VOICES OF THE NAVY LEAGUE.

STANDARD, *January 13, 1908, p. 9, col. 2.**To the Editor of the STANDARD.*4, Paper Buildings, Temple, E.C.,
January 12, 1908.

SIR,—It appears hardly necessary to answer the letter of the secretary of the old Navy League, which appears in your issue of Friday last,¹ in view of the completeness of the reply to it furnished by the letter of the organising lecturer of the same league, which you inserted, most appropriately, immediately over that of the secretary.¹ The secretary's epistle is dated the 9th²; the lecturer's the 8th.³ The secretary fiercely denies our assertion that the league has long neglected every function which it was created to discharge, save that of arranging lectures in boys' and girls' schools.⁴ The lecturer—the sole official lecturer whom the league possesses—dwells and expatiates upon and boasts of the nature and extent of his labours in the very direction which the secretary repudiates.

It cannot, indeed, often have happened previously that two officials of the same league, writing from the same office on two successive days, have supplied, the one a flat contradiction and the other a striking corroboration, of the essential truth of an allegation affecting their society; nor would it have been easy to supply the world with a plainer proof of the chaos which prevails in the Navy League's counsels.

Observe, again, that while our indictment covered the wide field of what should be, but is not, the league's activity, the secretary's answer only attempts to deal with one corner of it. We charge the league with general neglect—that is, with terribly imperfect performance—of every function save one. The secretary replies that, as regards that one function, we are wrong, for his league actually managed to hold as many as six meetings for adults in the whole of Great Britain and Ireland during the month of December last. This is in itself a miserably poor achievement for a league which should have been growing in vitality and power throughout the 13 years of its existence. How does it compare with the efforts of the Navy League of Germany, which has given as many as 1,900 lectures in a single year?⁵

But if the secretary were right in supposing, as he evidently does suppose, that to hold six meetings for adults in one month is an astonishing feat, how far would that imaginary source of elation go to prove that the old Navy League—Sir John Fisher's Navy League—has not neglected all its other duties? It was formed to stir, to inspire, to lead public opinion in relation to naval strength. It was formed to point out and to resist naval economies destructive of naval efficiency. Can any human being justly and truly say that it has discharged these tasks? What assistance has it given to you in your long and heroic crusade on behalf of the

¹ January 10, 1908.² January 9, 1908.³ January 8, 1908.⁴ Cp. above, pp. 134, 286.⁵ For an account of the German Navy League see above, p. 67, and below, p. 453.

menaced maritime supremacy of this country? What help is it now giving towards the institution of the inquiry which two former First Sea Lords have recommended?¹ They give not help, but hindrance. They—"Back Sir John Fisher."²

We are, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,
L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

NAVY LEAGUE

WHAT IS IT DOING FOR THE NAVY?

STANDARD, *January 13, 1908, p. 9, col. 2.*

To the Editor of the STANDARD.

(An Extract.)

29, Kingsthorpe Road,
Sydenham, S.E.,
January 11, 1908.

SIR,—The secretary of the old Navy League tells us in your issue of the 10th inst.³ that Navy League meetings have been held and branches formed, and one notes his pride at having induced a noble Duke to join his organisation. But he has forgotten one little thing in his letter. It is a very small thing indeed compared with the organisation of his league, but it is something which the man in the street rather wishes to know—viz., *What is the Navy League doing for the Navy?* In its anxiety to organise has not the object of the organisation been entirely forgotten?

I say nothing against the lectures to children. It is, of course, a good thing to bring the children up to be proud of the Navy, but it is most essential that the Navy should be maintained in a state that will justify their pride. It is not a good thing that the league which poses as the protector of the interests of the Navy should set the youth of the country (whom they profess to instruct) so bad an example of honour and loyalty as it has displayed in its conduct towards its own journal, repudiating it at one time and quoting it as an authority at another, when it suits its purpose.⁴ Is this the course of conduct with which the children of to-day, who may become the future officers and men of the Navy, are to be inspired? And are the children also to be taught, what may so plainly be implied from the letter of the secretary of the league, that so long as meetings are held and new branches formed it is a matter of minor interest as to what the league does to advance the interests of the Navy?

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

ARTHUR C. LANGHAM.

¹ See above, pp. 264 *sq.*, 284.

² See above, pp. 278, 284, 286, and below, pp. 293, 393, 401, 410, 484.

³ January 10, 1908. See above, p. 289.

⁴ See Index, *s.v.* "Old N.L."

DESTROYERS.

January 15, 1908. "The Navy and the Nation: The Destroyer Force: Dangerous Inferiority";—*Standard*, January 15, 1908, p. 7, col. 7.¹

THE ADMIRALTY LAP-DOG.

THE NAVY LEAGUE.

January 16, 1908. Letter—entitled "The Navy League's Policy"—by "Longships," *Standard*, January 16, 1908, p. 5, col. 2;—wherein the writer, after referring to his life "in a naval port, and practically amongst the officers there," and to the *espionage* which has crept into the Navy (for which see above, *s.v.* October 19, 1907, p. 252), gives it as his view that:—

"The Navy League" had now "sunk from its proud position of national watch-dog to the contemptible rôle of Admiralty lap-dog."²

"BLIND SAMSONS OF THE BRITISH NAVY."³

CRUISER DEFICIENCY.

January 17, 1908. "The Navy and the Nation: Cruiser Deficiency: Blind Battleships";—by the *Standard's* Naval Correspondent, *Standard*, January 17, 1908, p. 4, col. 2, concluding (after a careful and detailed account of the facts) as follows:—

"During the last three years the present Naval administration has burdened the country with a huge assemblage of capital ships, while neglecting to provide the essential fleet units, without which the large armoured squadrons are not only useless, but give a positive advantage to the enemy⁴; has dangerously reduced the Imperial peace patrol⁵; and, in so doing, has deprived officers and men of an invaluable training, and left British commerce to take care of itself.⁶ 7

STATE OF REPAIRS.

January 18, 1908. "The Navy and the Nation: State of Repairs: Some Instances": A Grave State of Affairs Disclosed.—*Standard*, January 18, 1908, p. 5, col. 3.

Inter alia, we find that:—"As for destroyers, they are a by-word. . . . It is less than the truth to say that one-third of the destroyer force is defective."

¹ See below, p. 292.

² Cp. above, p. 108 (text and n. 2).

³ See below, note 7.

⁴ See Index, *s.v.* "Complementary Units."

⁵ The mere mention of Jamaica, St. Lucia, and Zanzibar will suffice to recall some of the evil effects of such reduction. Cp. above, pp. 44 *sqq.*, 45, 49, 50, 74, 100, 250, 273, and below, p. 341.

⁶ Cp. above, p. 36; and see Index, *s.v.* "Commerce."

⁷ This article (*Standard*, Jan. 17, 1908) formed the text of an admirable letter by Mr. W. Arnold Burgess ("The Present Naval Policy; Blind Samsons of the British Navy") in the *Standard*, January 23, 1908, p. 4, cols. 2 *sq.*

INQUIRY ADVOCATED BY ADMIRAL SIR CYPRIAN BRIDGE.

January 20, 1908. National Defence Association¹: Naval Discussion;—Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge in favour of Inquiry. See *Standard*, January 29, 1908.²

THE NAVY AND THE NATION.

POLICY OF THE ADMIRALTY.

SIR JOHN FISHER'S CASE.

STANDARD, January 20, 1908, p. 4, cols. 1-2.

To the Editor of the STANDARD.

4, Paper Buildings, Temple, E.C.,
January 19, 1908.

SIR,—On the 15th inst.³ you added one more to your many terrible exposures of the "economies" which are rotting the British Navy. You showed that the answer put by his official adviser (that is, speaking practically, by Sir John Fisher) into the mouth of the Parliamentary Secretary of the Admiralty on the 31st of last July⁴ was contrary to fact, to common sense, and human reason. That answer included the statement that "the number of destroyers wanted depended on the use that was to be made of them, and not on the number which might be in possession of other Powers."

You pointed out that "the first and chief purpose of our destroyers" is "to watch for, pursue, and destroy the enemy's destroyers, or conversely, to elude them and attack the battle fleet by night," and that the proposition that in this work the number of the enemy's destroyers does not make any difference is one which is not tenable by any reasoning process known to man.

You recalled the fact that there are but 47 British destroyers, modern, completed, building, and projected, to 48 German, and that "in a year's time Germany will have more than double the number of new destroyers then completed by Great Britain."

You also drew public attention to the circumstance that one-third of our total existing destroyer force is unseaworthy, through lack of repair, and that, while Germany keeps a hundred destroyers in full commission, we keep in full commission but 48.⁵

In the same issue of your paper in which you published these and other facts⁶—sufficient of themselves, one would suppose, to convince all thinking men of the dire need of united public effort to procure inquiry into the state of the Navy—appeared a letter from an apologist of the OLD NAVY LEAGUE,⁷ calling us "mean and cowardly"

¹ Founded in or about January, 1907. See *Times*, January 14, 1907.

² See also above, p. 279.

³ *Standard*, January 15, 1908. See above, *s.v.* "Destroyers," p. 291.

⁴ July 31, 1907.

⁵ Cp. further, below, pp. 339 *sq.*, and Index, *s.v.* "Destroyers."

⁶ *Standard*, January 15, 1908.

⁷ Mr. R. F. Roxburgh, in *Standard*, Jan. 15, 1908, p. 8, col. 1.

in that we continue to demonstrate the lamentable neglect of public duty on the part of the Committee of that LEAGUE in having actually supported, in place of having denounced, the many outrageous "economies" which, as they have already half ruined our strength in destroyers, so also are crippling the efficiency of our entire Fleet.

We, on our part, are of opinion that we should indeed be open to this charge if, knowing the facts regarding the Navy, which are now public property, and having been long and intimately associated in the past with the OLD LEAGUE, we abstained from drawing public attention to the deep dereliction of public duty, of which, through both the action and inaction of its Committee, it has been, and is still, guilty.

To us the true "meanness and cowardice" would appear to reside, if anywhere, in the presumption of that Committee in continuing to ask for support and subscriptions from members of the OLD LEAGUE and from the public when they have not only during the past year reversed the function of fostering and defending our naval strength, which the LEAGUE was created to fulfil, but are now at this time "*backing*"¹ the very man (Sir John Fisher) who has threatened to resign rather than endure the public inquiry² that is the only remedy for the insidious evils which are fast paralysing our sole defence against starvation and invasion.

To turn to another point. As on the 15th *inst.*³ you exposed the administrative neglect which, for the sake of economy, has placed our destroyer flotilla in a position of practical inferiority to that of even one Power, Germany, so, on the 17th,⁴ you exposed the manner in which the battle fleet of Britain has been put at grievous disadvantage by the failure to replace the scouting cruisers and gunboats, etc., "scrapped" in 1904. You recorded that the Admiralty then "abolished so great a proportion" (59 cruisers and 41 gunboats) of "the light cruiser force that the battle fleets were left nearly impotent," and you mentioned certain vessels which had had large sums expended on them for repairs in time not long preceding that of their being thus cast away.

It seems now to be almost universally admitted that the "scrapping" of some of these vessels was nothing less than a prodigious error of judgment, and that our present deprivation of them (and of the substitutes for them which should have been, but have not been, built) has enormously decreased our chance of victory in the event of war.

It is, therefore, highly pertinent to ask: Who was responsible for this colossal act of administrative imbecility? Now the question of the ships to be abolished and the ships to be retained was clearly one of those in respect to which the Government of the day, whether Unionist or Liberal, was bound to follow the opinion of its professional advisers, that is, of the Board of Admiralty.

But the man who was then and is now the almost autocratic head of that Board, reigning over it with an authority to which no previous First Sea Lord has ever approached, is Sir John Fisher.

It is he who is primarily and chiefly responsible for this act of prodigious and now generally admitted folly. It is he who has thus

¹ See above, pp. 278, 284, 286, 290, and cp. also below, pp. 393, 401, 410, 484.

² See above, p. 253, and Index, s.v. "Fisher" and "Inquiry."

³ January 15, 1908. See above, pp. 291, 292.

⁴ January 17, 1908

been principally instrumental in depriving our battle fleet of the light cruisers necessary to its success in war.

This is the man whom another of your correspondents, Mr. Arnold White, has again rushed into print to defend.¹

As an apologist, whether for Sir John Fisher or for Sir John Fisher's NAVY LEAGUE, Mr. White has not been altogether a success. For your readers can scarcely yet have forgotten the desperate efforts which he made in your columns last summer² to maintain that we were wrong in asserting that during the previous ten years Britain had laid down but 64 destroyers to 72 laid down by Germany. As the fact was what we had stated it to be,³ Mr. White's mistake at last became patent to the world, and he was obliged to retire, defeated, from his task. But, "most unkindest cut of all," the OLD NAVY LEAGUE itself, which he had championed at such cost to his own renown, has since, *more suo*, repudiated its own protagonist. For even as the LEAGUE threw over its own JOURNAL and its own editor, Mr. H. W. Wilson, and all articles, signed or unsigned, which had ever appeared in it, save such (of which there was none) as had the *imprimatur* of the whole Committee,⁴ so has it now thrown over Mr. Arnold White. Let Mr. White discover the proof of this fact in the revised edition of "Our Naval Supremacy—Is it Assured?" issued by the LEAGUE as lately as October last.⁵ He will find on page 25 of that pamphlet⁶ the exact statement respecting British and German destroyers which we made and which he traversed in so many letters to you. We must, however, admit that this publication of the OLD NAVY LEAGUE is liable to be repudiated by the Committee at any moment, should they find it inconvenient.⁷ In that case Mr. White might consider himself (temporarily) reinstated.

Mr. White quotes in this connection the words which we wrote in the *Standard* of November 13 last :⁸—"All who love their country and know her peril are now entitled to make Sir John Fisher the target for public scorn"; but, for some strange reason, he has left his quotation unfinished in the middle of the sentence. The sequent lines which we wrote and he omits⁹ were :—"As they recall those written words of his" (*i.e.*, of Sir John Fisher's), "Favouritism is the secret of efficiency."^{10 11}

We are, Sir, Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

¹ *Standard*, January 17, 1908, p. 4, cols. 2-3.

² Summer, 1907. See above, pp. 115, 119 *sq.*, 120, 127, 202 *sq.*

³ See above, p. 61, text and n. 10.

⁴ See above, pp. 160, etc.

⁵ October, 1907. And reprinted, *N.L.J.*, October, 1907, pp. 287-297.

⁶ And *N.L.J.*, October, 1907, p. 296.

⁷ See above, pp. 81, 85, 143, 161, 202 n. 4.

⁸ November 13, 1907, above, p. 259.

⁹ The Old Navy League has proved itself equally guilty of mutilation. See below, p. 319.

¹⁰ "Favouritism." Cp., on "Espionage," above, pp. 252 *sq.*

¹¹ Under the heading "Favouritism and Efficiency," *Standard*, January 24, 1908, p. 5, col. 1, will be found two interesting letters by "Late R.N." and "Viking" respectively, in reply to a letter of Mr. A. White, in *Standard* of January 23, 1908. (Cp. also below, p. 319, text and nn. 11, 12.)

THE NAVY AND THE NATION.

THE OLD NAVY LEAGUE.

ITS POSITION REVIEWED.

STANDARD, *January 22, 1908*, p. 4, cols. 3 sq.*To the Editor of the STANDARD.*4, Paper Buildings, Temple, E.C.,
January 21, 1908.

SIR,—The piteous appeal for help from the public made in your columns yesterday¹ by the Committee of the OLD NAVY LEAGUE is obviously a result of the numerous resignations of membership which have proceeded from their disastrous desertion of the LEAGUE'S principal objects.

After twelve and a half years' work,² the total number of full members of that LEAGUE in the British Isles amounted only to about 2,700.³ Of these, giving the figures roughly, some 600 gave their proxies to us last summer, 900 gave them to the majority of the committee, and 1,200 preferred to remain neutral.⁴ Considering that, as we have previously pointed out, the Committee constituted the reigning administration, that they had all the prestige of authority, and the full use of all the LEAGUE'S funds and of its official channels of communication, this result was not less than astonishing.

The result of the extraordinary general meeting of the LEAGUE, held on July 19 last,⁵ was, however, more surprising still, for at that meeting—by far the most representative ever held by the LEAGUE—the amendment to our resolution, brought forward by the Committee, was defeated, on the personal vote taken in the room, after three hours' exhaustive debate, by a majority against them.⁶

We think it well to recall these facts, because the Committee would appear to hope, judging from their present letter to you, and from the appeal for support which they venture to make, that the public will already have forgotten the events of last July.⁷

But what right have they, or how can they expect, to receive extraneous aid, when so large a portion of the LEAGUE'S own members have so emphatically declared their disapproval of the policy which the Committee have seen fit to pursue? No wonder, if the subsequent defection from the LEAGUE has been large!

Perhaps, however, the best comment on the Committee's letter to you is simply to quote from the printed constitution of the OLD LEAGUE, as this was laid down in its early days, and as it is still

¹ *Standard*, January 20, 1908.

² The Navy League was founded in January, 1895.

³ Cp. above, p. 213.

⁴ For the exact figures—see above, p. 209.

⁵ July 19, 1907; above, pp. 189 sqq.

⁶ Cp. above, p. 209.

⁷ July, 1907; above, note 5.

printed (or was, at any rate, up to last May¹) in the official publications by which it is sought to attract members :—

1. This association shall be called "THE NAVY LEAGUE." Its purpose shall be to secure as the primary object of the national policy "The Command of the Sea."

2. The general aims of the NAVY LEAGUE shall be—

(a) To spread information, showing the vital importance to the British Empire of the naval supremacy upon which depend its trade, Empire, and national existence.

(b) To call attention to the enormous demands which war would make upon the Navy, and to the fact that the Navy is not strong enough to meet them; and at all times to point out any shortcomings in this respect.¹

(c) To call attention from time to time to such measures as may be requisite to secure adequate preparation for the maritime defence of the Empire.

(d) To urge these matters on public men and, in particular, upon candidates for Parliament.

Now, how much has the Committee of Sir John Fisher's Navy League either done or attempted to do during the last twelve months to carry out their aims, to attain which the LEAGUE was founded? With the possible exception of the aim defined in paragraph (a) of clause 2 not a word is said in the Committee's appeal of any effort or of any desire to achieve those great objects. They state that "the LEAGUE has been engaged in educating the masses to a knowledge of the necessity for a preponderating sea power." But what sense or reason is there in imparting such education, and at the same time forcing the LEAGUE to stand by, voiceless and motionless, while that "preponderating sea power" is being paralysed by a score of evils which you have exposed?² At the very time when the LEAGUE should have been active as never before—at the very time when it should have resisted and denounced the deadly economies with which the present Government (for the sake of saving money for social reforms) have already gone far to ruin the efficiency of the Navy—the Committee have actually supported and sustained those economies,³ and this in defiance and repudiation of all the articles in their own JOURNAL,⁴ on which our case was based.⁵

The Committee boast of the many branches which have been formed "in every corner of the Empire." Many of those branches were founded, and many were resuscitated from a state of practical death, by one of ourselves.⁶ But those branches were neither started nor revived on the assumption that the Committee of the LEAGUE at home would abandon their own defined objects and fail to resist the reduction of naval efficiency by a Government that does not believe seriously in the possibility of war.⁶ Had a knowledge of the

¹ May, 1907. And at any rate also up to August, 1907.—In the monthly Pamphlet issued by the Old N.L. in June, 1908, however, the Constitution will be found to have been altered by the omission of (*int. al.*) the words "*and at all times to point out any shortcomings in this respect.*" The alteration is illuminating in the last degree,—especially in view of the stress laid upon the italicised words in the *N.L. Annual Report for 1906*, p. 3 (see above, pp. 83 n. 2, and 133 n. 1).—(Cp. further below, pp. 309 n. 4, and 310 n. 1.)

² Cp. above, *passim*.

³ Cp. above, *passim*.

⁴ Cp. above, pp. 53, 60 *sqq.* (text and nn.), etc.

⁵ Cp. above, pp. 53, 60 *sqq.*, etc.

Cp. above, pp. 247, 257, and below, p. 414

future action of the Committee of the LEAGUE at home been imparted to those who joined it during the work of the LEAGUE's envoy ^{1a} in the distant parts of the Empire, not a man would have come forward. The appeal to them was made on other lines than those which are now being followed by the Committee. They were asked to help an organisation which was the foe of naval reduction and the defender of naval strength, and which was pledged to do its best to oppose naval abuses, from whatever quarter they might arise.

The proper course for the Committee now to pursue seems clear, since they appear to be sincerely of opinion that the original views of the LEAGUE were mistaken, and since they consider that general educational work should be practically its only endeavour—whether amongst school children or adults¹—they should now call another "extraordinary general meeting" of the LEAGUE, at which its dissolution should be declared. Those who favoured the restricted policy of the Committee could then form amongst themselves a small society which would be amply sufficient to maintain the work of the present official lecturer, the total cost of which does not exceed £500 or £600 per annum.

As for the Liscard Training Home at Liverpool, that excellent and valuable institution, established, as the Committee state, not by them, but by the Liverpool branch, could be continued just as well after the dissolution of the central body as it is now. The principal sources of its maintenance are, we believe (though on this point we are open to correction), grants either from the funds of the local branch or contributions from members of that branch, and from the public. We do not know that the London Committee give any material support to it from the funds which they administer. The Windsor training brig might be maintained in like fashion to the Liscard Home. In this case, also, it is the local branch which finds or procures the money—not the central body.

But all those members and associates of the LEAGUE who still adhere to its original ends might be recommended to transfer themselves to the new and vital organisation which is taking shape.² Its aims will embrace all the objects defined in the constitution of the OLD NAVY LEAGUE, but will be at once wider and more definite than those.³

As the NEW LEAGUE² has an amount of support which promises to it sustained and vigorous life, the course proposed is the only one calculated to avoid friction and controversy in the future.

We should, perhaps, make reference, before we close, to the letter⁴ of your anonymous, or at least pseudonymous, correspondent, "Warspite."⁵ (The second half, at any rate, of his name has evidently been most appropriately chosen.) He is wroth with us because we have formed what, in his excellent courtesy, he is

^{1a} Mr. H. F. Wyatt, formerly Volunteer Navy League Envoy to the Colonies. See above, pp. 181, etc.

¹ See also, to the same effect, the Old Navy League's yet more recent Official Letter to the Press (over the signatures of Mr. Yerburch, Mr. Seymour Trower, and the secretary), September 25, 1903, appearing in the *Standard*, September 28, 1903, and the *Times*, September 23, 1903, and reprinted, *N.L.J.*, October, 1903, p. 314.

² The IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE. See below, pp. 305 *sqq.*, and *passim*.

³ See below, pp. 305 *sqq.*

⁴ Entitled "Imperial Maritime League."

⁵ *Standard*, January 20, 1908, p. 4, col. 2.

pleased to term "a fungus society" to carry forward the abandoned work of the OLD LEAGUE, while we yet remain members of the latter. Was ever a more monstrous complaint framed? Did the members of that LEAGUE join it for its own sake, or for the sake of the interests and principles which it was created to serve? And when its governing Committee throw overboard those interests and principles, and, in the sacred name of "no-party," abstain from opposing the party now in power in their attempt to save money at the expense of the Navy—is then the first duty of those members, including ourselves, towards the country, or towards the Committee? To ask that question is to answer it. We hold that we serve our country's vital interests by striving to induce the adoption of the course outlined in this letter, and to that end we remain, and intend to remain, temporarily, members of the organisation which once fostered naval strength.

We are, Sir, Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,
L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

"WITHIN SIX YEARS FROM TO-DAY."

January 23, 1908. "Within Six Years from To-day";—a grave warning from "Ionides," in *Morning Post*, January 24, 1908;—on which see the *Morning Post's* leading article of the same day.¹

THE NEW NAVY LEAGUE. ADHESION OF OLD LEAGUE'S LEADING LONDON BRANCH.²

January 23, 1908.

STANDARD, January 25, 1908, p. 8, col. 4.³

"At a Special General Meeting of the Third London Branch of the Old Navy League, held on Thursday evening, the 23rd inst.,⁴ a Unanimous Resolution was passed to dissolve that Branch, and to reconstitute it as the First London Branch of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE (the New Navy League)."⁵

¹ A passage (concerning Mr. Haldane and the Two-Power Standard) will be found, reprinted from this leading article, above, p. 277.

² Concerning the use of "Premier" type in this book see above, p. 52, n. 5.

³ See also *Naval and Military Record*, January 30, 1908, etc.

⁴ January 23, 1908, at 8 p.m.;—St. Benet's Schoolroom, Lupton Street, Kentish Town, N.W.

⁵ The Meeting was specially convened, in accordance with and in relation to the Resolution unanimously passed by the Executive and General Committees of the Branch on January 11, 1908 (printed above, p. 288), and for the purpose of considering the Recommendation therein contained. Full notification both of the Meeting and of its

THE NAVY AND THE NATION.

CASE FOR AN INQUIRY.

ADMIRALTY'S APOLOGISTS.

STANDARD, January 24, 1908, p. 5, col. 1.

To the Editor of the STANDARD.

4, Paper Buildings,
Temple, E.C.,
January 22, 1908.

SIR,—Mr. Alan Burgoyne should direct his heavy jests upon the Executive Committee of the Old Navy League, of which he is himself a member, and not upon us. For the moment, not we, but they,¹ are calling for additional battleships to increase a Navy which he considers to be already so superfluously overwhelming. For the moment, not we, but they, are demanding extra *Dreadnoughts*.

Painful indeed, in view of his colleagues' recent manifesto to this effect and his present letter to you, must be his future relations with them!² For, if his own estimate of the relative naval strength of Britain and Germany were correct, then he would have magnificently proved the immense folly of the step just taken by his

object, together with a printed copy of the Resolution of January 11, 1908, was duly sent, under date January 15, 1908, by the Hon. Secretary, Mr. W. H. Hills, to all adherents of the Branch;—and a printed reminder was also despatched to all by him, under date January 17, 1908.

The following extract from a letter with reference to the Meeting in question—which, under the heading "The Old Navy League," was addressed by ourselves to the Editor of the *Standard* on January 28, 1908, and which was published in the *Standard*, January 29, 1908—may well be reprinted here:—

"All the Members and Associates of the branch, which numbers some hundreds, had received the fullest and most explicit notice of the object for which the meeting was called. Associates paying not more than 2s. 6d. per annum were yet included in this notification, and we have not heard from the Secretary of the Branch, by whom these notices were sent out, that any Member or any Associate wrote a line of protest against the course of action which their Executive and General Committees had already, in special joint meeting, unanimously recommended to them" [see above, p. 288], "namely, the Dissolution of the Branch, and its Reconstitution as an offshoot of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE.—The Chairman on Thursday last" [January 23, 1908] "was the Branch President, Mr. Moon, late Member for St. Pancras, who has been, throughout the controversy, a consistent supporter of the Old League. Mr. Moon naturally used his utmost efforts to prevent those present from coming to the decision which, however, they reached. The fact that the vote given was unanimous, despite all the persuasions to the contrary of an influential Chairman, testifies very strongly to the strength of conviction on the part of the audience.—Mr. Moon naturally resigned on finding the Old Navy League, whose cause he represented, *completely beaten*."

It is, we suppose, scarcely necessary to add (save to record the fact) that the allegations of the *N.L.J.*, March, 1908, p. 97, as to the extent of the secession, are (to use the mildest term) misleading, bearing (as they do) but the faintest resemblance to the facts. We do not comment further, for our readers will by this time have become aware that the actions of the Navy League Committee have throughout been characterised by the greatest unfairness alike to their own members and to those who have opposed them. See Index, *s.v.* "Old N.L."

¹ See *N.L.J.* February, 1908, pp. 37 *sq.*

² Cp. for a later illustration of "Divided Counsels" in the Committee of the Old Navy League, below, p. 457. (Cp. also, below, p. 375, n. 18.)

associates on the Old Navy League's board. We are driven to suggest to Mr. Burgoyne that immediate resignation from that Committee is now his only possible course. How can he remain a member of it when he has publicly signified his contempt of their action, although to that action he was himself a party?

Mr. Burgoyne kindly informs the world that an Inquiry into the state of the Navy "would be absurd." That is his opinion. It is not the opinion of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Frederick Richards, nor of Admiral Sir Richard Vesey Hamilton.¹ As both of these officers have filled in the past the post of First Sea Lord, now held by Sir John Fisher,² we think that we may say, without any discourtesy to Mr. Burgoyne, that their considered and responsible recommendation of the Inquiry which he calls "absurd" carries more weight than his implied gibe at them.

The advice which they have given¹ acquires, as we have previously pointed out, additional and profound significance from the fact that they took this step³ four days after Sir John Fisher, at the Guildhall banquet,⁴ had shouted out to the universe at large his own unstinted laudation of his own work.

Of course the real answer to Mr. Burgoyne is that he has shown himself incapable of understanding the entire case for the Inquiry. His elaborate statistical tables are totally beside the point. Everyone knows, except the Executive Committee of the old League, which has apparently forgotten it, that we have, on paper, an overwhelming superiority in armoured ships to any one Power, but the question which is vital to the life of Britain is not that of superiority on paper, but of fighting superiority in ships instantly ready for war at the moment when the stroke falls. If our foe would be considerate enough to give us six months' notice of his intention to attack us, and if during those six months we strained every nerve to accomplish the neglected repairs, to make good the diminished training, and to remove the causes for discontent which are destroying the spirit of the Navy, then doubtless the unbridled optimism of a naval apologist of Mr. Burgoyne's stamp might have some justification.⁵

But, unhappily, this is a source of reliance in which no thinking men could find satisfaction. As Japan struck Russia suddenly in the darkness of night, so must we expect our foe to strike us. At that moment, naval efficiency (which Mr. Burgoyne dismisses with one contemptuous reference) and "instant readiness for war" will be the only factors that will concern the population of these Islands. Of what avail, then, will be the imposing paper strength (though absolutely satisfying to a Mr. Burgoyne) of a Nore Division of the Home Fleet if the only units of it actually fit for war should be—as you showed was the case last month⁶—one cruiser and two destroyers? The factors which Mr. Burgoyne and his like despise

¹ See above, pp. 264 *sq.*, etc.

² See above, pp. 264 *sq.*

³ November 13, 1907. See above, pp. 264 *sq.*

⁴ November 9, 1907. See above, pp. 258 *sq.* (text and n. 1), and p. 264 (text and n. 1).

⁵ For further comment on and reply to Mr. Burgoyne see Mr. Henry Tero in the *Standard*, January 24, 1908, p. 5, col. 1, and January 30, 1908, p. 8, col. 2.

⁶ *Standard*, December 12, 1907 (above, pp. 273 *sqq.*).

and wilfully ignore will then make the whole difference to this country between Victory and National Destruction.

We are, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,
L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

THE FORTHCOMING NAVY ESTIMATES.

STANDARD, January 27, 1908, p. 6, cols. 5 sq.

(Leading Article.)

One of the most important matters with which Parliament will have to deal in the proximate session is the Navy Estimates. The first duty of every Government is adequately to provide for the defence of the Empire. . . . The German programme for 1908 now includes three battleships and one large armoured cruiser, an increase of one battleship. A comparative estimate of British and German programmes shows that in 1910 Germany will have 4 new battleships (usually referred to, upon very insufficient evidence, as *Dreadnoughts*) and 1 new large armoured cruiser; while Great Britain will have 7 ships of the *Dreadnought* class, and 3 new large armoured cruisers. That is the situation, according to existing circumstances, as regards big ships.¹ . . . It is, however, exactly at this point in the argument that we desire to point out an indescribably important omission, which is to be remarked both in the speeches of his Majesty's Ministers and in the writings of the defenders of Admiralty policy in the Press—who have been very busy of late. That omission is nothing less than the failure to take into account any element in naval strength whatsoever other than the number of battleships. We might add that this singular omission even extends to ignoring all battleships except what are called *Dreadnoughts*.

The profound ignorance of the elementary conditions of naval warfare exhibited in this respect constitutes nothing less than a grave national danger. Against the injurious fallacies to which it gives rise we have constantly protested in these columns. We have shown that the naval administration of the last three or four years has resulted in the complete reversal of the historic policy of the British Navy, tried and proved by the warfare of centuries. The training of officers, upon whom, after the next few years, the whole conduct of the Fleet will depend, has been, in the words of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Frederick Richards, one of the greatest administrators the Navy has ever known, made the subject of "a hazardous

¹ The *Times*, February 18, 1908, p. 3, col. 1, puts the case as follows:—"Great Britain . . . should, in the spring of 1910, have a fleet of 10 *Dreadnoughts* and *Invincibles* in commission and effective, while at that date neither in Europe nor in America will a similar ship have been completed. It will not be, indeed, until about twelve months later" [the spring of 1911] "that the great vessels which France, Germany, and the United States have been laying down, or are preparing to lay down, will pass into an effective state."

experiment."¹ Whole squadrons of useful fighting ships have been abolished.² Cruisers have been withdrawn from patrol duty all over the world.³ The sea-going squadrons have been reduced by nearly 25 per cent.,⁴ and the sea-going training of officers and men has been decreased in a proportion.⁵ The augmented Reserve Fleet,⁶ which has been declared to be instantly ready for war,⁷ has never been ready for war; nor, under the conditions of its institution, can it ever be instantly ready. No adequate provision has been made for repairing the ships of the Reserve (called Home⁸) Fleet, which is, therefore, in a state of rapidly progressive decay. At the same time, the almost entire neglect of the Admiralty to build cruisers has left the battle squadrons nearly helpless,⁹ the distant parts of the Empire undefended,¹⁰ and commerce unprotected.¹¹ Concurrently, the omission to provide a progressive and a reasoned scheme for replacing the torpedo flotillas as they become worn out has given one Power, and that Power Germany, an actual predominance in the factor which will determine the next war fought in narrow waters.¹² The *personnel* has been reduced,¹³ and short service has been introduced¹⁴—ostensibly to create a large reserve, actually in order to save pensions.¹⁵ For the past three years the money voted for repairs has been demonstrably inadequate, and it has become no longer possible to conceal the serious accumulation of repairs in every class of vessel throughout the Fleet,¹⁶ especially among destroyers.¹⁷ Upon this vital point misleading returns have been presented to Parliament, and detailed information has been consistently withheld. Finally, the gunnery practice of the Fleet, whose excellence has been declared to be the test of war efficiency, has been demonstrated in these columns neither to afford any fair comparison between the merits of one ship and another, nor to bear any true relation to the requirements of war;¹⁸ and the Admiralty have since withdrawn their existing regulations, announcing that new conditions would be substituted.¹⁹ In the meantime, the nation has been called upon to expend huge sums of money upon gigantic battleships, for which the necessary complementary Fleet units have not been provided, nor have docks been built in which these great vessels can be repaired. While naval opinion is sharply divided as to the value of the *Dreadnought* type,²⁰ and before any other nation has built a similar vessel, six more have been built or projected.

Upon every one of these points—to name but these—we have

¹ See above, p. 264.

² See Index, *s.v.* "Scrapping."

³ See above, pp. 57, 61, 65, 74, 84, 91, 99, 129, 131, 140, 179, 211, 233, 237, 302, 370, 409.

⁴ See above, pp. 12, 14, 16, 16 *seq.*, 38, 58, 92, 218, 226, 237, 253, 302, 375, 398.

⁵ See Index, *s.v.* "Sea-Training."

⁶ See above, pp. 13, 41, 162, 186, 218, 223, 227, 247, 255, and below, pp. 371, 398, 412, and *cp.*, p. 458.

⁷ See above, p. 221 n. 3.

⁸ See above, pp. 13, 41, 44, 106, 219, 223, and below, pp. 371, 398, 412.

⁹ See above, pp. 270, 293, and below, pp. 341, 347, 372, 426, 436 (454), 498, 499, etc.

¹⁰ See Index, *s.v.* "Empire," "Jamaica," "St. Lucia," "Scrapping," and "Zanzibar."

¹¹ See above, pp. 36 *seq.*, 291, and Index, *s.v.* "Commerce."

¹² See Index, *s.v.* "Destroyers" and "Germany."

¹³ See above, pp. 61, 140, and Index, *s.v.* "Personnel."

¹⁴ See Index, *s.v.* "Short Service."

¹⁵ See above, pp. 37, 91, 107, etc., and below, pp. 316, 320, 341.

¹⁶ See Index, *s.v.* "Repairs."

¹⁷ See Index, *s.v.* "Destroyers" and "Repairs."

¹⁸ See Index, *s.v.* "Gunnery."

¹⁹ See above, pp. 251, 255, 302, 330, 342.

²⁰ *Cp.*, *e.g.*, Sir William White, below, p. 404.

adduced the actual facts of the case, in so far as the public interest justified their publication. And although, in consequence, we have been exposed to invective and misrepresentation, as well as to the legitimate arguments of controversy, our statements have not been disproved. It is characteristic of the ignorance to which we have referred, that the arguments urged against our indictment usually take the form of statistics, in which the volume of water displaced by British battleships is compared with the volume of water displaced by foreign battleships, and the weight of the number of projectiles which might—by a desperate effort of imagination—be fired at one time from the British Fleet is compared with a similar phenomenon occurring in foreign navies; and the result is triumphantly acclaimed as incontestably proving that the British Fleet is immeasurably predominant. These statisticians do not, however, suggest that the relative displacements of a battleship and a torpedo are an index to the comparative fighting powers of these instruments of war. We have no doubt whatever that these extraordinary contentions are put forward in all sincerity. For years the public has been taught that, in war, material is everything and the rest nothing. The present naval administration has been conducting the business of the Navy upon the strict material basis. There is no strategical department at the Admiralty.¹ From 1887, when the Intelligence Department was instituted, until August 10, 1904, the First Sea Lord was charged with the duty of preparation for war. Under the Order in Council of August 10, 1904,² the First Sea Lord retained that office, but he was also charged with the responsibility of all the other departments. Roughly speaking, this change amalgamated the war, or thinking, department with the supply, or material, department. In the result, the thinking department practically ceased to exist. The Fleet was built and organised without reference to war.

It is under these conditions, and in face of the disorganisation of the Fleet and its immense disproportion of big ships over the rest of the Fleet units, that a mad cry has been raised for more *Dreadnoughts*. On the other hand, a powerful and an increasing demand for an *impartial Inquiry into the State of the Navy*³—a demand to which Admiral of the Fleet Sir Frederick Richards and Admiral Sir Vesey Hamilton have lent their invaluable authority⁴—has arisen throughout the country. We give the Government every credit for their declared intention to maintain the supremacy of the Fleet. But the immediate and extremely important question to be decided is not a simple matter of whether it is or is not advisable to build more battleships, but in what manner the money voted for the Navy during the last three years has been expended, when a further question, depending upon the answer to the first, has to be settled: Whether the country is justified in entrusting a continued large expenditure to the present naval administration.

¹ Cp. above, p. 149; below, pp. 306 *sq.*; and see Index, *s.v.* "Strategy Department."

² See above, p. 1.

³ The italics are ours.

⁴ See above, pp. 264 *sq.*, etc.

[Jan. 27, 1908

*The Foundation of the "Imperial Maritime
League"—the New Navy League—followed
on January 27th, 1908.*

(See next page.)

THE IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE

(The New Navy League)

**FOUNDED TO SECURE THE MAINTENANCE OF
BRITISH SEA POWER**

Jan. 27, 1908¹

THE LEAGUE'S PROGRAMME²

4, PAPER BUILDINGS,
TEMPLE, LONDON, E.C.

January, 1908.³

DEAR SIR OR MADAM,⁴—

Following upon our last Circular Letter to you, we now send you the Programme² of "The Imperial Maritime League,"⁵ formed to fill the place left vacant by the paralysis of the Navy League and by its desertion or reversal of the objects which it was created to fulfil.

The New League

The Royal Navy and the Merchant Navy are universally admitted to be the twin necessities of the Home Islands

¹ The (49th) birthday of the German Emperor, as it chanced.

² This Programme is here reprinted exactly in the form in which it was issued to the Press at the date of the League's Foundation, January 27, 1908.

The letter to the Press, which accompanied it, will be found reprinted below, pp. 314-327.

³ January 27, 1908 :—the actual date of the Imperial Maritime League's foundation.

⁴ Concerning the use of "Premier" type in this book, see above p. 52, n. 5.

⁵ To which anticipatory reference will have been found above, pp. 215, 231, 234-277, 238, 240, 241, 256, 263, 269, 288, 297.

and of the whole British Empire. Without the first, war could not be averted, nor, during war, could the life of that Empire and of our home-population be maintained. Without the second, National starvation and ruin must inevitably ensue. The two services are, moreover, intimately connected:—(1) by the incorporation of a large number of officers and men of the Mercantile Marine in the Royal Naval Reserve, and (2) by the necessary dependence of the Navy upon the merchant marine for transport services of all kinds in war. Again, the growth of the Mercantile Marine means increase of National wealth, and hence increase of power to pay for our fighting fleets.

The Imperial Maritime League will accordingly concern itself with the Royal Navy and the Merchant Navy alike.

The Ends in View

The ends which the new League seeks shall be:—Increase in the Sea-Power of the British Peoples; their closer Union; and their intra-Imperial Organisation for Defence.

SPECIFIC AIMS

(1) Command of the Sea as the National Policy

Since to possess Command of the Sea is the governing condition of our National life, the new League's first aim will be to make the fulfilment of that condition the primary object of the National Policy.

(2) Creation of a Strategy Department within the Admiralty

In order to gain and keep Command of the Sea, it is evidently necessary not only to have men and *matériel*, but also to know how to use these to the best advantage.

This knowledge is 'Strategy';—by which we under-

stand those dispositions of forces which precede battles. These dispositions, in at least the case of other countries, are made in peace as well as in war.

There is no Department of Strategy at the Admiralty, *having authority in matters strategical*.^{1 2}

The existing Naval Intelligence Department at the Admiralty,³ and the Royal Naval War College at Portsmouth,⁴ have no such authority.

What is needed, is :—(1) That there should be a Department within the Admiralty, charged with strategical study and with nothing else save what is germane to strategy, and (2) That any decisions of the Cabinet of the day, which control the movements of naval forces, should be based upon the advice of the head of such Department, who should himself (whether as First Sea Lord or otherwise) be a Member of the Board of Admiralty.

This vital subject was considered by Mr. SPENSER WILKINSON in articles written in 1894-5, and afterwards published by him in two works entitled respectively "The Command of the Sea" and "The Brain of the Navy."

From the earlier articles arose the idea of the old Navy League;—and the special aim with which that League was founded, and with which **Admiral of the Fleet Sir Geoffrey Phipps Hornby, G.C.B.**, the greatest Naval authority of the time, accepted the office of its President, is given in the following letter, written with reference to the recent controversy and published on the 17th of July last :⁵—

"MY DEAR WYATT,—I have read the Requisition for an Extraordinary General Meeting of the NAVY LEAGUE. As far as my recollection goes, and I was one of the original members of the League, the object of the movement was to bring about the creation at the Admiralty of a Strategy Department, with authority in matters strategical.⁶ As Vice-President I was commissioned to ask the late Admiral Sir Geoffrey Hornby to accept the Presidency of the League. He said to me, 'What are you driving at?' and on my replying 'At getting a General Staff at the Admiralty,' said at once emphatically, 'To get

¹ Cp. above, pp. 262, etc., and see Index, *s.v.* "Strategy Department."

² Called by the *Standard*, March 29, 1909, p. 4, col. 1 :—an "Admiral Staff (the German *Admiral Staff*) equivalent to the General Staff of the Army."

³ Cp. hereon, Mr. H. W. Wilson, in *Nat. Rev.*, May, 1909, p. 399.

⁴ Cp. below, p. 371.

⁵ Reprinted above, pp. 184 *sq.*

⁶ Cp., also, *Morning Post*, March 20, 1909 (leading article).

that I will do anything,' and agreed to accept the Presidency. Unfortunately he died before he had had the opportunity of taking any part in the business of the League. When a few months afterwards the Executive Committee not only abandoned but repudiated this original policy, I had no further use for the League and resigned my membership. But if there were a return to a more vigorous policy, such as I gather that you have in mind, I should hope that the League might after all attain its object.

Yours very truly,

SPENSER WILKINSON."¹

Had such a Department with such authority existed, the admittedly dangerous depletion of the Channel Fleet in the early months of the past year could never have been permitted.²

The reason why the majority of the Committee of the Navy League abandoned and repudiated its special aim³ was that they were afraid that they might encounter powerful opposition if they pursued it.

The new League will, however, pursue that aim, whether it encounter powerful opposition or not.

Therefore the second specific aim of the new League will be, that:—As the essential means to win and hold Command of the Sea, it will seek to procure the creation of a Strategy Department within the Admiralty with authority in matters strategical.

(3) Standard of Naval Strength

The Imperial Maritime League adopts the Standard stated by Lord Cawdor on the 3rd November, 1906, to have been during years past that of the Admiralty, namely, strength adequate to defeat any combination of any two Powers, and, over and above the superiority of force necessary to ensure such defeat, a further 10 *per cent.*

¹ Cp. above, pp. 262 *sq.*, etc.

² Cp. above, p. 257.

³ See above, pp. 185, 263, and below, pp. 317, 393, 410.

margin for contingencies.¹ The League adopts the accepted qualification, that this Standard—commonly known as the “Two-Power Standard”—has no application to cruisers, in regard to which a much larger British superiority is on all accounts admittedly necessary.² The League, moreover, adds the proviso, that the Standard named may require to be raised, in the event of the International relationships of the British Empire being varied to its disadvantage.³

(4) Fulfilment of the Old League's Duties.

The next purpose of the Imperial Maritime League will be to carry out the neglected or abandoned “general aims” of the Navy League. These⁴ were:—

- (a) “To spread information, showing the vital importance to the British Empire of the Naval supremacy upon which depend its trade, empire, and national existence.”

¹ See *Jol. of R.U.S.I.*, Feb. 1907, p. 152;—and, for what such (or indeed any) Two-Power-Standard to be effective must involve, cp. above, pp. 34 (n. 2), 228 (n. 8), and below, pp. 435 *sq.* (text and nn.), 471 (n. 5, p. 472), 513 (text and nn. 4, 5, 6), 518 (nn. 8, 9).

² See Lord Selborne (as First Lord of the Admiralty), in the House of Lords, March 24, 1903, quoted *N.L.J.*, April, 1903, pp. 102-3; and at Glasgow, April 2, 1903, quoted in *N.L. Annual Report for 1906* (dated March 18, 1907), p. 3; and Lord Spencer (former First Lord of the Admiralty), in the House of Lords, March 21, 1905, quoted in the *Journal of the R.U.S.I.*, February, 1907, p. 146.

Cp. also Admiral Fremantle in *N.L.J.*, February, 1902, p. 25; and in *N.L. Annual*, 1907-8 (dated October, 1907), p. 89. (See further above, p. 78, text and n. 5.)

³ This Proviso exactly anticipated the admission (*involving its correctness*) which has since been made by Lord Tweedmouth, as First Lord of the Admiralty, in his letter to Lord Cawdor, former First Lord of the Admiralty (written under circumstances referred to below, p. 357, and) published in the *Times* of March 20, 1908:—

LORD TWEEDMOUTH AND THE TWO-POWER STANDARD.

Reprinted from the TIMES, March 20, 1908.

“Admiralty, Whitehall, March 19, 1908.—My dear Cawdor.—In view of what you said in your reply last night, and the line of criticism taken in some of the newspapers this morning, I wish to say that my words, ‘any reasonable probable combination of foreign Powers,’ were intended as an extension, and not a restriction, of the definition of a Two-Power Standard. I go the whole length of the Prime Minister’s and Chancellor of the Exchequer’s statements and perhaps a little further.

“Very sincerely yours,
“TWEEDMOUTH.”

Compare also, in the same direction, the views expressed by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman himself in 1885 (above, p. 6, n. 6)—as detailed and developed by Lieut. Carlyon Bellairs, M.P., in the *National Review*, June, 1907, p. 619.

⁴ As fixed at the Annual Meeting of that League on Jan. 28, 1897; see (in combination) the *N.L. Annual Report for 1896*, dated Jan. 1897, p. 5, and the Report of the Proceedings at that Meeting as printed in *N.L.J.*, Feb. 1897, pp. 7 *sq.*

- (b) "To call attention to the enormous demands which war would make upon the Navy, to the fact that the Navy is not strong enough to meet them, and at all times to point out any shortcomings in this respect."¹
- (c) "To call attention from time to time to such measures as may be requisite to secure adequate preparation for the maritime defence of the Empire."
- (d) "To urge these matters on public men and, in particular, upon candidates for Parliament."

(5) Increase of British Seamen for British Ships

The objects for which Command of the Sea by the British Navy is necessary are three. They are:—

- (1) To prevent invasion by sea of Great Britain, or of Ireland, or of any part of the Empire.
- (2) To safeguard the Empire's sea-borne commerce and all its military transit.
- (3) To enable the British Peoples, throughout their dominions, to pursue national advantage amongst the other competing nations of the world.

But the British Peoples could not achieve the second object, and would on that account be disqualified from seeking the third object, if the number of foreign officers and foreign seamen in ships of the British Mercantile Marine be suffered to grow without check.

British merchant ships of which the officers and the crew were mainly foreigners might be British in name and in law, but after the outbreak of a Naval War they would be unlikely long to remain British in fact. For ships so manned might require protection not only against the enemy's cruisers, but also against their own officers

¹ Cp. above, p. 309 n. 4 (as also above, p. 83 n. 2, p. 133, text and n. 1, p. 138, text and n. 2, 296), and (in connection therewith) above, p. 296, n. 1.

and their own crews, and this latter protection the Royal Navy, however powerful, could not supply.

On the other hand, it has always to be borne in mind that any restriction of the sources from which crews are supplied to British ships involves, under existing conditions, loss to British shipowners, who are already affected by many legislative limitations.

The Imperial Maritime League will, therefore, advocate the careful consideration by Parliament of means by which to increase the supply of British mercantile officers and men, and to improve the position and prospects of these, without thereby casting any additional burden upon British shipowners.

“ Party Grounds ”

To refrain from opposing determined and continuous reduction of naval expenditure by a British Government, for the reason that such Government represents a political party, is in effect to make the Organisation, so refraining, a mere adjunct of the party responsible for such reduction. In the present state of International forces, the new League will be opposed to any reduction of British naval strength, whether in men, *matériel*, or training, from whatever quarter such reduction may be advocated; and if it should appear at any time that this resistance can best be effected on party lines, party lines will at such time be followed.

It must, again, be borne in mind that neither the Navy nor the Army can in the least avail for National Defence unless animated by the spirit of self-sacrifice for country, that is to say, patriotism, and by the military, that is to say, the fighting spirit. And yet, at the present time, a third political “ party,” comprising the great majority of Socialists and those amongst the supporters of the present Government appropriately termed “ Little Englanders,” is perpetually engaged in denouncing both

patriotism and the fighting spirit. The new League will, accordingly, point out that these denunciations are poisonous to the life of Britain, and that those who deal in them are in effect the advance agents of a Foreign Power.

Subject to these limitations, the League will have no "Party" prepossessions, and it will welcome the co-operation of all patriotic men and women.

Summary

The objects of the Imperial Maritime League may, then, be shortly summarised as follows, namely:—

To secure that the primary object of the National Policy shall be to win and hold Command of the Sea.¹

The creation of a Strategy Department within the Admiralty with authority in matters strategical.

The maintenance of a Navy in every respect equal to the Standard indicated above, and fulfilling the additional needs of the Empire in regard to cruisers;—and further the maintenance of such Navy in an indubitably efficient state.

To carry out the unfulfilled "general aims" of the old [Navy] League in their widest application.

The consideration by Parliament of the best means of reducing, so far as may be reasonable and practicable, the foreign element in the British Mercantile Marine, and of improving the position and prospects of the mercantile officer and man, without casting any additional burden upon the British shipowner.

Advocacy of all means which shall tend to unite and simplify the action of Great Britain and of the kindred Nations throughout the Empire in all matters of defence, sea-borne trade, and commerce.

¹ Concerning "Command of the Air," see below, p. 427, n. 3.

We ask all those who sympathise with these great ends to help towards their attainment by joining:—

THE IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE

Rates of Subscription

HON. VICE-PRESIDENTS (Ladies and Gentlemen)	{ £25 0 0 life payment £5 5 0 annual ,,
MEMBERS	{ £10 10 0 life ,, £1 1 0 annual ,,
ASSOCIATE-MEMBERS	{ 10 6 annual ,, 5 0 annual ,,
ASSOCIATES	{ 5 0 annual ,,
SUPPORTERS (Working Men and Women)	1 0 annual ,,

We are, Yours faithfully,

HAROLD FRAZER WYATT,
L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

Founders and Joint Honorary Secretaries.

★ The urgent National need for the new League¹ is shown by the fact that two Admirals of the highest experience, namely, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Frederick W. Richards, G.C.B., and Admiral Sir R. Vesey Hamilton, G.C.B., both former First Sea

¹ In many a quarter, expected or unexpected, the Foundation of the Imperial Maritime League was hailed with welcome, and its aims approved. See, especially, *Daily Express* January 28, 1908 (leading article:—"Hands off the Navy"), p. 4, col. 4:—"Its founders wish it to be not a party movement, but a national uprising to secure the very foundations on which the historic greatness of England and the present safety of her daughter nations rest. We earnestly hope that no clouds of partisan controversy will be allowed to dim the clearness of this tremendous issue . . . Membership of or association with the New League is a test of true patriotism." Also *Morning Post*, January 29, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, col. 5 sq.:—"It is impossible not to approve the undertaking of the Imperial Maritime League. . . . The immediate proposal of the League is that there shall be 'such a full and independent inquiry into the state of the Navy as shall place the country in possession of the actual facts.' . . . The next specific aim will be 'to secure the presence of a General Staff at the Admiralty' . . . a measure urgently necessary, a measure the neglect of which . . . is the principal cause of the imperfection of the Admiralty's preparations for the event of war . . . Among all the matters to be considered by Parliament in the Session which begins to-day none is more important than that of Inquiry into the state of the Navy." Also the *Standard*, January 28, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, col. 7:—"We cordially commend to the support of our readers the new 'Imperial Maritime League.' . . . It is directly to the interest of every British subject to help forward, each in his measure, an enterprise so patriotic and so necessary. The necessity, indeed, has not, perhaps, been so urgent for many years as—for more reasons than one—it has become to-day." Also the *Australasian World*, January 30, 1908, writing, in so many words:—"How 'Pam' would have gloried in being President of the Imperial Maritime League!"—And also *Birmingham Gazette*, January 28, 1908; *Blackpool Gazette*, January 31, 1908 (giving its views that "Membership of or association with the new League is a test of true patriotism"); *Newcastle Journal*, January 29, 1908; *People*, February 16, 1908; etc.; etc.

Lords, have felt themselves bound to take the profoundly significant step of publicly recommending the institution of a Commission of Inquiry into the scope and effects of the recent changes in the Navy. Yet, in face of powerful opposing influences, the grant of this Inquiry can hardly be hoped for without that sustained effort, in the Country at large, which can only proceed from the efforts of an Organisation. To press ceaselessly for this Inquiry will be the immediate duty of a new and living Navy League.

The League will shortly take permanent Offices, the Address of which will be duly notified.¹

THE IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE

(THE NEW NAVY LEAGUE)

Founded to secure the Maintenance of
British Sea-Power

January, 1908.

*Letter sent to the Press of the United Kingdom
At the date of the League's Foundation,
January 27, 1908.*²

4, PAPER BUILDINGS,
TEMPLE, E.C.,
27th January, 1908

SIR,

We send you the programme³ of the Imperial Maritime League,⁴ which has been founded to secure by the action of its Members in Parliament and in the country that the Sea-Power of the British Empire shall be maintained, and that the efficiency of

¹ See below, p. 362.

² Published, in whole or in part, in:—*Birmingham Gazette*, January 28, 1908; *Bristol Times*, January 28, 1908; *Daily Chronicle*, January 28, 1908; *Daily Express*, January 28, 1908, p. 8, col. 1; *Daily Graphic*, January 28, 1908; *Daily Mail*, January 28, 1908; *Hampshire Telegraph*, February 1, 1908 (cp. *Manchester Daily Guardian*, January 28, 1908); *Morning Advertiser*, January 28, 1908; *Morning Post*, January 28, 1908; *Naval and Military Record*, January 30, 1908; *Newcastle Journal*, January 29, 1908; *Outlook*, February 1, 1908; *Portsmouth Evening News*, January 28, 1908; *Scotsman*, January 28, 1908; *Standard*, January 28, 1908, p. 4, cols. 4-5; *Times*, January 28, 1908, p. 6, col. 6; *Tribune*, January 28, 1908; *Western Morning News*, January 28, 1908, etc.

³ Together with this letter was sent also a list of some of the more important of those who had already joined either the Council or the Committee (or both) of the New League. For their names see *Morning Post*, January 29, 1908; *Standard*, January 28, 1908, p. 4, col. 4; *Times*, January 28, 1908, p. 6, col. 6; *Daily Express*, January 28, 1908, p. 8, col. 1.

Later published lists will be found referred to below, pp. 362, 403, 466, 512, 519, 522 (text and n. 5).

⁴ Printed above, pp. 305 *sqq.*

the Navy shall not continue to be sacrificed to the exigencies of party warfare, as evinced in the present reduction of necessary expenditure on the Navy for the purpose of saving money for social reforms.¹

Since the prorogation of Parliament, evidence has accumulated that such reduction has been practised, with results increasingly serious, for some time past.

To give a single instance :—The statement has been published,² and has not been disproved, that on December 12th last,³ and for several weeks previously, but 1 cruiser (the *Warrior*) and 2 destroyers were actually present and in a fit condition for war out of the 6 battleships, 5 cruisers, 24 destroyers, and 2 scouts, of which the Nore division of the Home Fleet was nominally constituted.⁴ All the other units of that division were, it has been stated, either in dock for repairs or waiting to go there, with the exception of the *Dreadnought*, which was in the Mediterranean.⁵

¹ Cp. in this connection the words of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman (the late Prime Minister) himself, in his speech at the Albert Hall, December 21, 1905 (above, pp. 2, 25) ;—and, more recently, the words of Mr. Lloyd George, Chancellor of the Exchequer, in the Debate on the Budget Resolutions ("Old Age Pensions Debate"), May 25, 1908, as quoted (*s.v.* "Competition of Armaments") in the *Times*, May 26, 1908, p. 8, col. 6 :—

"A very weighty criticism was made by the right hon. member for Rushcliffe" (Mr. Ellis, of unenviable "Streams of Facts in the Boer War" notoriety). "He made a very strong appeal for economy, especially in military armaments. It was a very useful appeal, and I hope that it will carry weight in the proper quarters. (Cheers.) A good deal has been done in the last two or three years, and I do not despair of more being accomplished in the coming year. (Cheers.) *When so much has to be done in the way of social reform*" [the italics are ours] "it does seem a piece of gigantic folly that we should be spending hundreds of millions a year on machinery for blowing each other's brains out. (Cheers.)"

(For pertinent comment upon Mr. Lloyd George's speech see *Standard*, May 28, 1908—leading article: "The *Entente* and its Responsibilities," *ad fin.*—p. 6, col. 5.)

See Mr. Lloyd George, again, in his "Amazing Speech" of July 28, 1908 (reported *Times*, July 29, 1908, p. 10, cols. 2-3), for general comment whereon see below pp. 430 *sqq.*

Compare also Mr. Lambert, Civil Lord of the Admiralty, last year, May 17, 1907 (quoted in the *Naval and Military Record*, May 23, 1907):—"After all, if they had to spend money on defensive forces, they could not have it to use for the *social purposes which were needed in the United Kingdom*" [the italics are ours]: "and he doubted not were needed also in the other countries of the world."

See also Mr. Asquith himself (the present Prime Minister) in the House of Commons, June 2, 1908 (*Times*, June 3, 1908, *s.v.* "Finance Bill," p. 10, col. 5):—

"An hon. gentleman yesterday from the benches below the gangway asked me what I meant when I said last year that I was trying to lay the foundation for old-age pensions. I can answer the question. . . . We have deliberately postponed dealing with this matter" [of old-age pensions] "until we had laid what we conceived to be a solid financial foundation for the future. How have we laid it? In the first place, we have effected, I am glad to say, large economies during the last three years in the spending services of the country. . . . very substantial economies. . . . *That is the way in which we have sought to lay the foundation for the necessary expense on social reform.*" [The italics are ours.] See further below, p. 450, text and n. 9.

Compare the leading Berlin Radical organ, the *Tagblatt* (cited in *Standard*, August 12, 1908, p. 5, col. 3):—"The British Government must fulfil their promises of *social reform*, but these are incompatible with the present naval and military budgets."

² *Standard*, December 12, 1907; above, pp. 273 *sqq.*

³ December 12, 1907.

⁴ In all :—but 3 out of 37.

⁵ See above, pp. 274 *sq.*

Since the country has been repeatedly given to understand by the Government that this division is kept always in a state of instant readiness for war,¹ as the first reinforcement of the Channel Fleet in the event of sudden hostilities, a state of things such as that described amounts to a gross violation of what in effect was a solemn pledge given by the guardians of the nation to those who have trusted them with the charge of the national safety.

There is exceeding reason to fear that like economy, exhibited in the delay or the imperfect performance of necessary repairs,² has crippled a large part of the destroyer flotilla of this country, so that its strength on paper stands in no relation to its strength in fact.²

Another most dangerous economy is to be apprehended in the introduction of the short-service system, in order to avoid the necessity of paying pensions.³

The extraordinarily evasive nature of the answers to questions affecting the Navy, given in the House of Commons during last session, and the fact that, not infrequently, such answers were accompanied by private requests to the Members concerned, not to press their questions, seem to afford further proof that the real state of the Navy is not what it has been represented to be by Sir John Fisher in his unprecedented speech at the Guildhall banquet on November 9th.⁴ For in cases where the answer to the question, if affirmative, would have proved the efficiency of the *matériel* of the Navy, the request that in the public interest it may not be urged amounts to admission that this efficiency does not exist.

In view of these and of other considerations, of which want of space prevents the detail, the need seems clear of organised effort, such as is proposed by the new League, to prevent the fighting strength of the Navy from being further rendered up as an offering to the needs of a party budget. (It may well be noted in this connection that some 130 parliamentary supporters of the present Government have recently petitioned the Cabinet to reduce yet further the naval estimates.^{5a})

The instrument by which alone this offering can be averted is the institution of such a full and independent inquiry into the state of the Navy as shall place the country in possession of the actual facts. Yet in face of the circumstance that Sir John Fisher has threatened to resign (as Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman has publicly stated) rather than endure an inquiry,^{5b} and that the result of such inquiry might seriously interfere with the plans of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, it is most unlikely to be granted save

¹ Cp. above, p. 276.

² See Index, *s.v.* "Destroyers" and "Repairs."

³ Cp. above, p. 302, text and n. 15, and see Index, *s.v.* "Short Service."

⁴ November 9, 1907. See above, pp. 258, etc.

^{5a} See above, p. 265, and see further, Index, *s.v.* "Appeals."

^{5b} See above, pp. 253, etc.

in response to determined and organised endeavour. To make that endeavour through its supporters both inside and outside of Parliament will therefore be the first object of the new League,¹ and in view of the powerful aid obtained the prospect of thus rendering effective national service is great.

Apart from this immediate purpose, the League's first specific aim will be to secure the presence of a general staff at the Admiralty—corresponding to that which inspires the disposition of the German Navy.² It was with the express purpose of obtaining such a staff (as is narrated by Mr. Spenser Wilkinson in his letter to one of ourselves published on the 17th of last July³) that the late Admiral of the Fleet Sir Geoffrey Hornby accepted in 1895 the Presidency of the old Navy League. Unfortunately, the death of that distinguished officer, the highest naval authority of his time, occurred very soon afterwards, and that League then abandoned this original object,⁴ which will now be pursued by the new League with all possible energy.

Beyond these aims which have reference to the Royal Navy, the new League will also take up the cause of the Merchant Service, equally essential to our national life, and it will advocate the careful consideration by Parliament of means by which to increase the supply of British mercantile officers and men, and to improve the position and prospects of these, without thereby casting any additional burden upon shipowners, who are already affected by many legislative limitations.⁵

The League will not merely resist, but will denounce as enemies to the liberties of this nation, all those who decry the fighting spirit and the ideals of national duty, without which those liberties cannot be preserved.⁶

We ask all, to whom these plain and definite aims appeal, themselves to come forward and join with those already thus united in common effort for a great national cause.

We are, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH,

Founders

And Joint Honorary Secretaries,

Imperial Maritime League.

¹ Cp. above, pp. 3 13 *sq.*

² See Index, *s.v.* "General Staff" and "Strategy Department."

³ July 17, 1907. Reprinted above, pp. 184 *sq.*, 307 *sq.*

⁴ See above, pp. 185, 308.

⁵ Cp. above, pp. 257, 310, 311, 312.

⁶ See above, pp. 311 *sq.*

OLD NAVY LEAGUE'S ATTACK.

January 29, 1908. Attack from the Old League's Committee (dated January 28, 1908) in the *Army and Navy Gazette*, Feb. 1, 1908; *Bristol Times and Mirror*, Jan. 31, 1908; *Harrogate Advertiser*, Feb. 1, 1908; *Naval and Military Record*, Feb. 6, 1908; *Shipping Gazette*, Jan. 29, 1908; *Standard*, Jan. 30, 1908; *Times*, Jan. 29, 1908; and reprinted *N.L.J.*, Feb., 1908, p. 47.

REPLY TO THE OLD NAVY LEAGUE

January 30, 1908.

The following Reply¹ to the Letter from the Committee of the Old Navy League—(the latter sent to the Press generally,² and thence reprinted in *The Navy League Journal* of February 1908³)—was published in *The Times*, Feb. 1, 1908, p. 4, col. 6; *Bristol Times and Mirror*, Feb. 7, 1908; *Harrogate Advertiser*, Feb. 10, 1908; *Naval and Military Record*, Feb. 21, 1908; etc., etc.⁴

[Note:—It is, perhaps, needless to say (but it is the fact) that the Old League's Committee, after publishing their attack in the *N.L.J.*,⁵ refused⁶ to publish the reply to that attack.⁷]

THE IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE.

4, Paper Buildings,
Temple, London, E.C.

January 30th, 1908.

To the Editor.

SIR,—The secretary of the Navy League, in a letter which you published yesterday,⁸ commits himself, and inferentially his committee, to the statement that "the founders of the new organisation "have not hesitated to make assertions more consonant with their "desires than with the truth." To this allegation we give **emphatic denial**, and we **challenge*** the committee whom the

* **Note:—This challenge has remained unmet.**

¹ See above, on this page.

² Despite our written request.

³ Cp., similarly, above, pp. 53, 54, 190, 229, and below, pp. 327, 394.

⁴ Concerning the use of "Premier" type in this book see above, p. 52, n. 5.

⁵ See above, on this page.

⁶ *N.L.J.*, February, 1908, p. 47.

⁷ This letter formed pp. 8 *sq.*, of the I.M.L. pamphlet mentioned below, p. 338 n. 1.

⁸ January 29, 1908. See above, on this page.

secretary serves to substantiate it if they can. The only instance of its meaning afforded is that we have attributed paralysis to the action of their league. This attribution we believe to be correct, but manifestly the point is one on which diversity of opinion must exist.

But in making the assertion we referred, as the secretary must be well aware, neither, as he implies, to the secession of members of its committee, such as Mr. L. J. Maxse,¹ Mr. Robert Weatherburn,² and ourselves,³ nor to the defection from the ranks of its private members, large as we have reason to believe that this has been,⁴ but to the lamentable failure of the league, under its present direction, to resist and to denounce the financial starvation of the Navy by the present Government.

In face of gross neglect of bounden duty by an individual or a corporate body, paralysis of function may well be predicated of either.

The secretary of the Navy League makes mention also of some words of ours relating to the present First Sea Lord,⁵ but he (or the committee responsible for his letter) is careful to provide your readers with a fragment only of the utterance in question and to leave out its causal part.⁶ The sentence which he thus mutilates refers to the unprecedented speech made by the officer named at the last Guildhall banquet,⁷ and it was published in a letter addressed to one of your contemporaries on November 12th.⁸ It was as follows :—

“ But now that, to the violation of all constitutional usage, he has chosen to take upon himself the function of a Cabinet Minister, he has ceased to have any right to his cloak of sacrosanct security, and all who love their country, and know her peril, are now entitled to make Sir John Fisher the mark for public scorn as they recall those written words of his which you quote to-day⁹—‘ Favouritism ‘ is the secret of efficiency.’ ”¹⁰

These words were written by us, on our sole responsibility, before the foundation of the Imperial Maritime League. Personally we stand by them; for the fact that Sir John Fisher has lived faithfully up to his own precept is well known in the Navy.^{11 12}

We have, however, a right to demand that henceforth, whenever it pleases defenders of naval retrenchment to quote them, they shall quote them in full.¹³

¹ See above, pp. 54, 80 *sq.*

² See above, p. 281.

³ See above, pp. 52 *sq.*

⁴ Cp. above, *passim*.

⁵ Sir John Fisher.

⁶ Cp. above, p. 294, and below, p. 320.

⁷ Nov. 9, 1907. See above, pp. 258 *sq.*, etc.

⁸ Nov. 12, 1907. See *Standard*, Nov. 13, 1907, p. 8, col. 2 (above, pp. 258 *sq.*).

⁹ *Standard*, Nov. 12, 1907.

¹⁰ See hereon, above, pp. 253 n. 13, 259, 294, and below, n. 12.

¹¹ Cp. also Mr. L. J. Maxse in the *National Review*, Nov., 1907, p. 336; *Standard*, Nov. 12, 1907 (leading article), p. 6, col. 6; *Morning Post*, March 9, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, col. 4; etc., etc.

¹² On the prevailing favouritism, see Sir George Armstrong, Bart., in *Standard*, April 21, 1909, p. 5, col. 2, and in *Times*, April 23, 1909, p. 7, col. 4, and May 3, 1909, p. 4, cols. 5 *sq.*

¹³ Cp. above, pp. 259, 294.

But your correspondent, not content with thus garbling an extract from a published letter, proceeds to garble also an extract from the programme of the new league. The clause is this:—

“To refrain from opposing determined and continuous reduction of naval expenditure by a British Government, for the reason that such Government represents a political party, is in effect to make the organisation, so refraining, a mere adjunct of the party responsible for such reduction. In the present state of international forces, the new league will be opposed to any reduction of British naval strength, whether in men, *matériel*, or training, from whatever quarter such reduction may be advocated; and if it should appear at any time that this resistance can best be effected on party lines, party lines will at such time be followed.”

It is the fact that the secretary of the old league omits not only the whole of the first sentence, which gives the reason for the second, but also the initial words of the latter—namely, “in the present state of international forces.” His motive for the second omission is obscure, but for the first, obvious. For he knows well that the inaction of his league constitutes exactly the case contemplated in the eliminated lines, and that his committee, by obstinate refusal to oppose constant stinting of expenditure necessary to naval efficiency, have in effect made that league the mere adjunct of the Radical party.¹

In face of the fact that a large number of our battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, have been crippled through the neglect, or the imperfect performance, of repairs;² in face of the diminution of the *personnel*;³ of the depletion of stores;⁴ of the diminution of sea training;⁵ of the introduction of short service⁶ (to avoid pensions⁷); the Navy League, muzzled by its committee, has remained mute, or has been suffered to open its mouth only in defence of these great evils.⁸

We believe it to be the first duty of a league, founded to secure the sea power of Britain, when one party in the State for political purposes starves the Fleet, to rouse the other party to the need of resistance.⁹ For how otherwise can resistance be effectual? Therefore in the present case, we hope and we believe that the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE will do its utmost, through the powerful supporters who have honoured it with their adhesion, to rouse the Unionist party to the fulfilment of this paramount obligation.

Against the present Government we bring the direct charge that they have laid party hands, for party ends, on the fighting strength of that Navy which is as the Ark of the Covenant to the British peoples.

We are, Sir, Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH,

Founders of The Imperial Maritime League.

¹ See *passim*, and Index, *s.v.* “Old N.L.,” “Handmaid,” “Lap-Dog,” and “Liberals.”

² See Index, *s.v.* “Battleships,” “Cruisers,” “Destroyers,” and “Repairs.”

³ See above, pp. 61, 140, and Index, *s.v.* “Personnel.”

⁴ See Index, *s.v.* “Stores.”

⁵ See Index, *s.v.* “Nucleus Crews” and “Sea-Training.”

⁶ See above, pp. 62, 141, and Index, *s.v.* “Short Service” and “Long Service.”

⁷ See above, p. 37.

⁸ Cp. Index, *s.v.* “I.M.L.” and “Unionists.”

⁹ See above, n. 1, and *passim*.

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE.
THE STATE OF THE NAVY.
PUBLIC MEETING AT CLAPHAM.
DEMAND FOR INQUIRY.

January 30, 1908.

A Public Meeting was held at St. Anne's Hall, Venn Street, Clapham,¹ on January 30, 1908, under the auspices of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE—"To press for the public² Inquiry into the State of the Navy, recommended by Admiral of the Fleet Sir F. Richards, G.C.B., and Admiral Sir R. Vesey Hamilton, G.C.B., both former First Sea Lords of the Admiralty."

Major Frank Johnson was in the chair; and amongst those announced to speak were the Rev. Canon C. P. Greene (who, however, unhappily died a few days before the meeting was held), the Hon. Claude G. D. Hay, M.P., Mr. H. F. Wyatt, and Mr. L. Graham H. Horton-Smith.

The following letter from Mr. Claude Hay, who was unable to attend, was read:—

"5, Connaught Square, W.,
"January 30, 1908.

"Dear Sir,—I much regret that my duties in the House of Commons and the fact that I have to preside at a Meeting in the East End will prevent me attending the Meeting at Clapham over which you will preside this evening.

"I would only say that I thoroughly approve the excellent aims of the Imperial Maritime League; and that, had I been able to be present, I should have strongly advocated what I understand to be the special object of the Meeting, namely, the institution of a full and independent enquiry into the state of the Navy.

"The fact that I, in common with many others, including your universally respected M.P., Mr. Thornton, have in the past supported the NAVY LEAGUE has rendered support of the new organisation imperative, to safeguard national interests—the NAVY LEAGUE having become impotent and a mere appanage of the present unpatriotic Government.

"Faithfully yours,
"(Signed) CLAUDE G. HAY."

The following Resolution, moved by Mr. Harold F. Wyatt, seconded by Dr. Eugene Cronin, and supported by Mr. L. Graham H. Horton-Smith, was carried unanimously:—

THE RESOLUTION

"That this Meeting deeply deplores the grievous weakening of "our Naval strength involved in the cutting down of the Naval "expenditure,³ and shown in the neglect of repairs,⁴ the diminution

¹ For an account of this Meeting see *Standard*, January 31, 1908, p. 4, col. 7; and February 4, 1908 (leading article); *Morning Post*, January 31, 1908, p. 5, col. 3; *Ev. Stand. and S.J.G.*, January 31, 1908; *Daily Express*, January 31, 1908; *Clapham Observer*, February 8, 1908, p. 2.

² On the word "public," cp. above, p. 266 n. 1, and below, p. 327.

³ See above, pp. 61, 139 *sq.*, etc.

⁴ See above, p. 320 n. 2.

"of the *personnel*,¹ the lessening of sea training,² and the failure to "build light cruisers.³ It strongly approves the objects of the "Imperial Maritime League,⁴ and it advocates the institution of a "full and impartial and independent Inquiry into the present state of "the Navy."⁵

FOOL GUNNERY IN THE NAVY.

By "ST. BARBARA."

(First Article.)

BLACKWOOD'S MAGAZINE, Feb., 1908, pp. 308-316.

Page-headings of the Article :—"Fatal Flaw in Gunnery Practice"—"Studied Deception of the Public"—"Fraud in Naval Battle-Practice"—"Want of Efficiency⁶ in Naval Officers."^{7 8}

February, 1908. "Episodes of the Month (of January, 1908) :—Illegitimate Influences; New Theory of German Navy; The Germans at Home; German Espionage" (in Britain)⁹; "The Northern Question¹⁰";—by Mr. L. J. Maxse, in the *National Review*, February, 1908, pp. 840-844.

THE TWO-POWER STANDARD ABANDONED.

February, 1908. "Is the Two-Power Standard Abandoned?"—by Mr. H. W. Wilson; in *The National Review*, February, 1908, pp. 902-914.

THE "ANTE-ESTIMATES" MOBILISATION.

February 1, 1908.

February 1, 1908. The "Ante-Estimates" Mobilisation;—concerning which see below, s.v. April 22, 1908, p. 379.

¹ See above, p. 320 n. 3.

² See above, p. 320 n. 5.

³ See Index, s.v. "Cruisers."

⁴ Set forth above, pp. 305 *sqq.*

⁵ Cf. above, pp. 264 *sq.*, and Index, s.v. "Inquiry."

⁶ Not through any fault of their own.

⁷ See, on this Article, *Standard*, February 4, 1908 (s.v. "Fool Gunnery: The Real Meaning of Efficiency"), p. 8, cols. 1-2, and (leading article), p. 6, col. 6; and *Daily Express*, February 3, 1908 (s.v. "Fool Gunnery"; Serious Criticism of the Admiralty's Policy; 'Inviting Disaster'), p. 8, col. 2. (See also *Standard*, Jan. 27, 1908, leading article.)

⁸ Second Article below, p. 348. Third article below, p. 360.

⁹ Cp. hereon below, pp. 421 *sqq.*

¹⁰ See further, below, p. 379

THE "OBSERVER" AND
ITS "AUTHORITATIVE" DEFENCE OF THE ADMIRALTY.
INQUIRY SCOUTED.

February 2, 1908. The *Observer's* so-called "authoritative"¹ defence of the Admiralty, February 2, 1908;²—followed by its hasty and unedifying (if not altogether unamusing) retreat, on February 9, 1908, from the position which, under the auspices of its new editor, Mr. Garvin, it had taken up only a week before.³

The *Observer's* retreat followed naturally and perforce upon—and the "authoritative" defence alike vanished under—the trenchant and unanswerable criticisms of the *Standard*, February 3, 1908, p. 9, col. 5, and (leading article) p. 6, cols. 6-7; *Morning Post*, February 4, 1908; and *Spectator*, February 8, 1908.⁴

"But the Admiralty"—observed the *Spectator*, the day before the retreat⁵—"does not court Inquiry. The language with which it repudiates the suggestion of it is only equalled by the un-English boastfulness with which Sir John Fisher 'tempts Providence' in his speeches.⁶ We must say that this frame of mind fills us with dismay."

LORD BRASSEY AND THE TWO-POWER STANDARD.

February 3, 1908. "The Two-Power Standard Abandoned: Striking Confession by Lord Brassey;" Feb. 3, 1908;—*Daily Express*, Feb. 4, 1908, p. 5, col. 4.

THE "INSTANTLY READY" NORE DIVISION.

February 3, 1908.

"At the moment of writing" (Feb., 1908) "the 'instantly ready' British naval forces in the North Sea comprise 5 vessels out of a nominal 36, the remainder being under repair, etc."—Mr. Percival A. Hislam, *The Admiralty of the Atlantic*, Feb., 1908, p. 83, n. 1.⁶

¹ The expression is taken from the *Observer* itself, Feb. 2, 1908, p. 7, col. 1, and will be found so printed (between inverted commas) in the *Standard*, Feb. 3, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 6-7.

² From (as proved to be the case: see *Observer*, February 9, 1908) the pen of its new editor, Mr. Garvin;—whose appointment as such (after being editor of the *Outlook*) will be found mentioned in *Ev. Stand. and S.J.G.*, January 11, 1908.

³ See *Observer*, February 2 and 9, 1908.

⁴ Cp. also below, pp. 422 sqq.

⁵ *Spectator*, February 8, 1908.

⁶ Cp.—*s.v.* "Not Ready! What the *Dreadnought* will find at the Nore"—*Daily Express*, February 3, 1908, p. 8, col. 2:—

"Here is a summary of the fleet awaiting the *Dreadnought*:—

	Ready.	In dock.
Battleships	2	3
Armoured cruisers	3	2
Destroyers	0	24
Protected cruiser	0	1
	5	50"

See, further, the state of the Nore Division under dates December 12, 1907 (above, pp. 273 sqq.), and February 5, February 6, and March 11, 1908 (below, pp. 324, 325 [text and n. 3], 353 sq.). Cp. further, Index, *s.v.* "Nore Division."

THE "STANDARD" JUSTIFIED.

February 4, 1908. "The Navy and the Nation: The *Standard* Justified: Nine Points of Policy Conceded";—*Standard*, February 4, 1908, p. 7, col. 7.

"ST. BARBARA" AND THE LACK OF CRUISERS.
COURTING DISASTER.

February 5-6, 1908. "The Maimed Fleet: Navy and the Lack of Cruisers: 'Whisker Ships;—'"

"The Maimed Fleet: Admiralty Policy of No Cruisers: Courting Disaster";—two articles (respectively so entitled) by "St. Barbara," *Standard*, February 5, 1908, p. 9, cols. 3-4, and February 6, 1908, p. 8, cols. 2-3.

MURRAY-MACDONALD AMENDMENT FOR REDUCTION
WITHDRAWN ONLY ON TERMS.

February 5, 1908. The Murray-Macdonald Amendment to the Address, February 5, 1908,¹ namely:—

"But, while rejoicing that Your Majesty's relations with foreign Powers continue to be friendly, we humbly express our regret that there is no indication of any intention to reduce expenditure on armaments."² ³

By leave withdrawn in the House of Commons⁴—apparently on terms⁵ and with a promise of a subsequent date for debate on the whole subject.⁶

"DREADNOUGHT IN A RIVER PRISON."

February 5, 1908. "*Dreadnought* in a River Prison: Home Fleet's Flagship at Sheerness"—at last,⁷ "after having to wait for the top of one of the highest tides known at Sheerness for some years."⁸—*Daily Express*, February 6, 1908, p. 5, col. 2.

¹ Referred to already in *Standard*, January 31, 1908 (leading article), p. 6.

² Text reprinted from *Standard*, February 5, 1908, p. 6, col. 7.

³ Appropriate comment might be gathered from (above) p. 50 (text and n. 3); and see Index, *s.v.* "Appeals" and "Germany."

⁴ See *Standard*, Feb. 6, 1908 (leading article).

⁵ See *Standard*, Feb. 6, 1908, p. 7, col. 4.

⁶ See *Standard*, Feb. 6, 1908, p. 4, col. 2, and p. 7, col. 4. And see below, pp. 349, 350 *sq.*

⁷ Cp. above, p. 323, n. 6, and below, p. 325.

⁸ Concerning the *Dreadnought's* exceptional and unintended draught see above, p. 272, etc.

STATE OF THE "INSTANTLY READY" NORE DIVISION.

February 6, 1908. The State of the Nore Division:—*Daily Express*, February 6, p. 5, col. 2: "The nominal strength of the Nore Division is 36 fully-manned, instantly ready ships. The arrival of the *Dreadnought*¹ brings the total actually ready up to 6."² 3

LORD ESHER'S LETTER TO OURSELVES

Dated January 22, 1908

PUBLISHED IN THE PRESS 4

February 6, 1908

A carefully calculated attack⁵ upon the Imperial Maritime League, upon which comment will be found presently,⁶ and which, happily, has had precisely the opposite effect to that which was intended.⁷ 8 (The publication of the letter was, of course, in every

¹ Above, p. 324.

² See above, p. 323, n. 6.

³ For the state of the Nore Division (a) during the first nine months of its existence, see above, pp. 255, 274; (b) in Dec., 1907, above, pp. 273 *sqq.*; (c) in Feb., 1908, above, pp. 323, 324 *sq.*; (d) in March, 1908, below, pp. 353 *sq.* (And see, further, Index, *s.v.* "Nore Division.")

⁴ *E.g.*, *Army and Navy Gazette*, Feb. 8, 1908; *Belfast News Letter*, Feb. 6, 1908; *Birmingham Post*, Feb. 6, 1908; *British Mercury*, Feb. 6, 1908; *Civil and Military Gazette (Lahore)*, Feb. 28, 1908; *Daily Chronicle*, Feb. 6, 1908; *Daily Express*, Feb. 6, 1908 (for whose leading article see below, note 6); *Daily Mail*, February 6, 1908; *Daily Mirror*, Feb. 9, 1908; *Daily News*, Feb. 6, 1908; *Daily Telegraph*, Feb. 6, 1908 (together with leading article, upon which see below, p. 328, n. 1); *Dublin Daily Express*, Feb. 6, 1908; *Englishman (Calcutta)*, Feb. 2^d, 1908; *Ev. Stand. and S.J.G.*, Feb. 6, 1908; *Glasgow Evening News*, Feb. 6, 1908; *Glasgow Evening Times*, Feb. 9, 1908; *Glasgow Herald*, Feb. 6, 1908; *Indian Daily Telegraph*, March 1, 1908; *Irish Times*, Feb. 6, 1908; *Liverpool Daily Post*, Feb. 7, 1908; *Liverpool Echo*, Feb. 6, 1908; *Manchester Evening News*, Feb. 6, 1908 (leading article); *Manchester Guardian*, Feb. 6, 1908; *Morning Advertiser*, Feb. 6, 1908; *Morning Leader*, Feb. 6, 1908; *Morning Post*, Feb. 6, 1908 (see the latter's leading article printed below, pp. 332 *sqq.*); *Naval and Military Record*, Feb. 13, 1908; *Northern Whig*, Feb. 6, 1908; *Nottingham Guardian*, Feb. 6, 1908; *Nottingham Evening News*, Feb. 6, 1908; *Reading Mercury*, Feb. 8, 1908; *Sheffield Independent*, Feb. 6, 1908; *Standard*, Feb. 6, 1908 (for whose comment see below, note 6); *Star*, Feb. 6, 1908; *Times*, Feb. 6, 1908; *Tribune*, Feb. 6, 1908; *Weekly Times and Echo*, Feb. 9, 1908; *War Office Times and Naval Review*, Feb., 1908; *Western Mercury*, Feb. 6, 1908; *Western Morning News*, Feb. 6, 1908; *Yorkshire Observer*, Feb. 6, 1908.

⁵ In the interests of Sir John Fisher; see below, pp. 326, 328, 331.

⁶ See below, pp. 326 *sqq.*, and see also *Morning Post* (leading article), Feb. 6, 1908 (reprinted, in part, below, pp. 332 *sqq.*); and see also the pregnant comment of the *Daily Express*, Feb. 6, 1908 (leading article), p. 4, cols. 4-5; *Standard*, Feb. 7, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 5 *sq.*; Mr. F. T. Jane, *Ev. Stand. and S.J.G.*, Feb. 17, 1908, *s.v.* "Under the White Ensign" (below, pp. 335 *sq.*); and *cp.* further, *Spectator*, Feb. 8, 1908 (leading article), p. 210 (the *Spectator* describing Lord Esher's letter as "ominous and undesirable in its expression and in all its circumstances").

⁷ *Cp.*, *e.g.*, below, p. 362, etc.

⁸ Thanks in part, at any rate, to its industrious circulation (as we gather) by the old and decadent Navy League, which, impotent itself, could ill brook potency in others.

It is curious to note that printed copies of Lord Esher's letter in pamphlet form—with the ingenuous heading "It is stated in the public Press that the Right Hon. Lord Viscount Esher, G.C.V.O., K.C.B., has," etc. etc.—and, of course, without copies of our *Reply thereto*—reached Members of the Council of the Imperial Maritime League in mysterious anonymous fashion;—in one case, at least, within about a week of Lord Esher's letter appearing in the Press, and with the postmark "London, S.W."; and, in

sense unwarrantable;—but let that pass for the moment; further comment upon this aspect of the letter will be found below.¹)

COMMENT²

ON LORD ESHER'S PUBLISHED LETTER

TO THE FOUNDERS OF

THE IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE.^{2 3}

LORD ESHER, in his eagerness to defend Sir John Fisher, has been led to misrepresent, unintentionally of course, but materially, the first object of the Imperial Maritime League, an unfortunate result which we are certain he would himself be amongst the first to deplore. This result has followed from his having thought himself at liberty, first to send a public reply to a private letter, secondly to publish quotations from that private letter (so marked, "Private"), and thirdly to make public reference to the terms of a printed circular also sent him, which circular was conspicuously headed "Proof: Subject to revision: "Not for publication." It was not unnatural that these several departures from ordinary usage should lead to error on his part in his comment. And they have.⁴

For Lord Esher imputes to the League the desire that "a public inquiry" should be held into the state of the Navy." This is not its desire, in the sense in which

another case, addressed in a handwriting almost certainly identified as that of a clerk in the Head Office of the Old League. Were these, then, sent out by the Navy League? If not, to whose interest was it to send them?

Even so late as March 18, 1903, the secretary of the Navy League would appear (from correspondence before us) still to have been sending out Lord Esher's letter—unaccompanied (as we understand) by our reply thereto. Cp., in similar connection, (a) above, pp. 50, 53, 56, 58 *sq.*, 129, 142, 164, 167, 174; and (b) above, p. 318. (See further, below, p. 328, n. 1.)

¹ See pp. 326 *sq.*, 331.

² Introductory comment (by ourselves) forming p. 10 of the I.M.L. Pamphlet referred to below, p. 338, n. 1.

³ Concerning the use of "Premier" type in this book see above, p. 52, n. 5.

⁴ To say nothing of nearly starting a European Conflagration.

Lord Esher applies the term, and as his erroneous imputation might conceivably do the League some harm, his regret should, we submit, be at once and strongly expressed to the public. The desire for a "public" inquiry¹ (by which was intended an inquiry appointed by public authority—not, of course, an inquiry conducted in public) was, indeed, expressed in the private letter to himself, and in the private proof, but later consideration led to the elimination of the word "public," because its liability to misconstruction was observed.

REPLY TO LORD ESHER

February 7, 1908.

The following Reply²³⁴ to Lord Esher is reprinted from the *Morning Post*, February 8, 1908, p. 8, col. 6; *Standard*, February 10, 1908, p. 7, col. 7, and p. 8, col. 1; *Daily Express*, February 8, 1908, p. 1, col. 8, and p. 8, col. 1, etc.⁵

[Note:—Needless to say, the Old League's Committee, while reprinting Lord Esher's letter in the *N.L.J.* (March, 1908, p. 90), refused (notwithstanding our written request, in the name of common fairness) to print our reply.⁶ We can only presume that once again such conduct took its rise in fear lest Navy Leaguers might ascertain the real facts of the naval situation and urge the Com-

¹ So called. Cp. e.g., above, pp. 266, 268, 280, 282, 284, 288, 321. For the meaning of the word, see the text, and below, pp. 389, 399, 413, 482, 506.

² Concerning the use of "Premier" type in this book see above, p. 52, n. 5.

³ This letter formed pp. 11-13 of the I.M.L. Pamphlet mentioned below, p. 338, n. 1.

⁴ For Introductory Comment hereto see text above, pp. 326 sq.

⁵ This letter appeared also, in whole or in part, in the:—*Belfast News Letter*, February 14, 1908; *Birmingham Gazette*, February 8, 1908; *Daily Mail*, February 8, 1908; *Daily News*, February 10, 1908; *Glasgow Evening News*, February 14, 1908; *Glasgow Herald*, February 10, 1908; *Irish Times*, February 10, 1908; *Jackson's Oxford Journal*, February 15, 1908; *Liverpool Courier*, February 10, 1908; *Morning Leader*, February 8, 1908; *Naval and Military Record*, February 13, 1908; *Newcastle Journal*, February 10, 1908; *Northern Whig*, February 14, 1908; *Scotsman*, February 10, 1908; *Yorkshire Herald*, February 11, 1908; etc.

⁶ Cp. also above, p. 318.

mittee too insistently to action—that *one* course so abhorrent to their souls! Some day the truth will dawn on Navy Leaguers despite them all; *and then*—1.]

THE IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE.

4, Paper Buildings,
Temple, London, E.C.,
7th February, 1908.

To the Editor.

SIR,

As great prominence has been given in the Press generally to the letter from Lord Esher to ourselves which was published yesterday,² we appeal with confidence to your courtesy and fairness to give like prominence to this reply.

The public has now to thank Lord Esher for the authoritative assurance that the sole author of many recent and almost revolutionary changes in the Navy is the present First Sea Lord, Sir John Fisher.

It is not we who are responsible in this instance for the introduction of that officer's name. It is Lord Esher. It is he who fits the cap. It is he who assigns to his friend³ a degree of autocratic authority exceeding anything hitherto suspected. All the great changes of the last three years, it now appears, were decided on definitely by Sir John Fisher alone so far back as 1903.

Lord Esher has "a series of memoranda" in his possession, dated September and October of that year,⁴ which definitely proves this fact. Therefore, since Sir John Fisher's accession to the office of First Sea Lord in October, 1904,⁵ his colleagues on the Board of

¹ The Navy League Committee's conduct finds an apt parallel in that of the *Daily Telegraph*, equally anxious to back up the present Naval régime—regardless of aught else beside—

That organ published Lord Esher's attack (see above, p. 325, n. 4). That organ added a leading article by way of further attack (see above, p. 325, n. 4). And that organ, also, refused to let its readers see our reply. And yet, curiously enough, in its issue of March 9, 1908, one of its own Correspondents pointed out that Lord Esher's letter, though finding its way mysteriously—"mysteriously" forsooth!—into the Press, was not intended for publication.

The vaunted "Freedom of the Press" in England, established over 200 years ago (in 1695), established more by accident than design (see Mr. A. V. Dicey's *Law of the Constitution*, 4th ed., 1893, pp. 248 *seq.*, and one of ourselves, *s.v.*, "The Bicentenary of the Press," *Times*, December 24, 1895), bids fair indeed to become a euphemism for that "Tyranny of the Press" whose further developments may prove little short of disastrous to the Empire.

The *Times*, though giving publication to Lord Esher's letter and not printing our reply thereto, had at least the courtesy to refrain from associating itself with an attack, for discussion of which it was not intending to afford space in its columns.

² See above, p. 325.

³ Cp. "His" (Lord Esher's) "close friendship with Sir John Fisher," spoken of by the *Army and Navy Gazette*, May 2, 1908.

⁴ September and October, 1903.

⁵ October 21, 1904. See above, p. 1.

Admiralty (we now know) have merely been registrars of his predetermined decrees.¹ We have at least elicited from Lord Esher an important piece of public information.

His letter is one of the most striking proofs yet afforded of the deadly fear of an inquiry into the state of the Navy, entertained by the friends and supporters of the present First Sea Lord.² It is also an illustration, not less remarkable, of the logical weakness of their position, even when stated, as in this instance, by a clever exponent.

For the sole argument employed by Lord Esher against inquiry is this fact that the various naval changes, whose value is challenged, were determined on by Sir John Fisher so long ago as the autumn of 1903. But the only question important to the country is whether these changes are prejudicial or otherwise to naval efficiency. How is that question affected by the date at which they were planned? A naval authority at least as high as Sir John Fisher, namely, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Frederick Richards, who himself filled for six years the office now held by the former, has described the recent changes in the Navy, commencing with those relating to the entry and training of officers, dated December 1902, as being "in their nature hazardous experiments," and he has publicly and in writing intimated his opinion that an inquiry into the scope and effects of these changes "would assure the all-important purpose of directing the attention of the Nation to the issues involved in a policy to which it has been committed."³ This opinion has also been publicly endorsed by another former First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir R. Vesey Hamilton.⁴ Their words are the measured words of ripe experience, uttered by men who have no ends to serve save their country's good, and they will be ignored by this Nation at its peril.⁵

But apart from such measures "for increasing the efficiency of the fighting Fleet," as diminishing the aggregate amount of its training at sea,⁶ and introducing the principle of short service,⁷ there are other points in the administration of Sir John Fisher which can scarcely have been specified by him on the occasion of that visit by Lord Esher to Government House, Portsmouth, to which the latter refers. Or did Sir John Fisher then inform his guest that he had in reserve yet another measure for increasing efficiency, to be put in force when he attained the office of First Sea Lord, and that this measure was to cripple a large number of our battle-

See also the *Broad Arrow*, Feb. 15, 1908. (Cp. further, *Morning Post*, March 20, 1908, p. 7, col. 3.)

² See Index, s.v. "Inquiry."

³ See above, p. 264.

⁴ See above, p. 265, etc.

⁵ Cp. also the *Broad Arrow*, Feb. 15, 1908.

⁶ See Index, s.v. "Redistribution Scheme of Oct., 1906"; "Channel Fleet"; "Sea-Training."

⁷ See above, pp. 62, 141, and Index, s.v. "Short Service" and "Long Service."

ships, cruisers, and destroyers by the delay or the imperfect performance of repairs?¹

We hardly think it probable that this particular plan forms part of the present First Sea Lord's original design, though it has figured very conspicuously indeed in the work which he has actually carried out during his last two years at the Admiralty.²

Did Sir John Fisher also intimate his intention to sanction gunnery tests in the Navy having no relevance to war,³ in which practice was to be carried on at short ranges and stationary targets instead of at long ranges and moving targets?^{4 5}

The reason for, at any rate, the neglect of repairs is written across the field of party politics at the present time so broadly and so plainly that none but the blind can refuse to see it. The present Government were returned to office deeply pledged to reduce expenditure on both services.⁶ That pledge they have tried to fulfil, in the case of the Army, by direct reduction, in the case of the Navy by so-called "measures for increasing efficiency" which are the direct outcome of the application of a system of financial starvation. Refusal or delay is the common response at the docks to officers who ask for repairs to their ships.

Meanwhile, a very large and influential portion of the Radical party is even now clamouring for further diminution of the service estimates, that is, for further lessening of this country's safety. Witness Mr. Murray Macdonald's proposed amendment to the address.⁷ Wilfully to disregard the connection between this

¹ See above, p. 320, text and n. 2.

² See above, *passim*, and Index, *s.v.* "Repairs."

³ Cp. above, p. 251 (text and n. 7).

⁴ In his extraordinary speech at the last Guildhall Banquet (Nov. 9, 1907, above, pp. 258 *sqq.*) Sir John Fisher laid supreme emphasis on the perfection of the gunnery of the Royal Navy. Let us recall his words as reported in the *Times* :—

"The gunnery efficiency of the Fleet has surpassed all records—it is unparalleled—and I am lost in wonder and admiration at the splendid unity of spirit and determination 'that must have been shewn by everybody from top to bottom to obtain these results.'"

From the illuminating series of articles entitled "Fool Gunnery" and published in the Feb., March, and April numbers of *Blackwood's Magazine*, 1908 (see above, p. 322, and below, pp. 348, 360, and see also *Morning Post*, May 6, 1908, leading article, p. 6, col. 6, extracted below, pp. 388 *sq.*, *Standard*, June 15, 1908, leading article, p. 6, cols. 6–7, extracted below, p. 407 n. 5, and Index, *s.v.* "Gunnery" and "Fool-Gunnery"), the world now knows—what many knew before—that this proud boast was entirely lacking in all serious value.

The world now knows that the gunnery tests thus referred to by Sir John Fisher were bogus tests (see below, p. 348), having no (or next to no) relevance to war, and that the Admiralty (with Sir John Fisher as its Naval head) had themselves already implicitly admitted the dimensions of the error made, by the wide nature of the alteration in the character of these tests effected only three or four days before the fateful Guildhall speech;—namely, on Nov. 5, 1907 (see above, p. 251 n. 7, 255, text and n. 5; *Standard*, Feb. 4, 1908, leading article, referred to above, p. 251 n. 7; and cp. *Globe*, Nov. 8, 1907, p. 3, col. 2; etc.).

⁵ See further, below, pp. 341 *sq.*

⁶ See Index, *s.v.* "Appeals," "Pledged," "Social Reform."

⁷ See above (*s.v.* Feb. 5, 1908), p. 324. And see, for the subsequent appeals for yet further reductions, Index, *s.v.* "Appeals."

immensely powerful demand, importunate during two years past, and the naval policy which has been actually pursued, is the very madness of partisanship.

The rest of Lord Esher's letter, we would say with all courtesy, is hardly worthy of himself, or of reply.

Former First Lords of the Admiralty are in this country the very last men (as Lord Esher must be well aware) who would be likely to join any league or society whose object is to move opinion in regard to the Navy. With reference to the Imperial Maritime League, in the eyes of all impartial men the wonder will be that it should have obtained in its earliest beginnings so wide and powerful a body of support as that with which it has been honoured—support far wider and more powerful than that of which Lord Esher was aware at the date of his letter.¹ In addition to its very notable group of sympathisers in both Houses of Parliament, no less than nineteen *⁵ Officers of Flag rank, besides other of junior grade, have consented to serve upon its Council, so that the new League is able to point at its very inception to an array of naval opinion exceeding, we think, any of which the old Navy League can boast after an existence of thirteen years.

In regard to Lord Esher's daring statement that "there is not "a man in Germany, from the Emperor downwards, who would not "welcome the fall of Sir John Fisher," we would only point out that this is the utterly uncorroborated assertion of an individual opinion which is entirely opposed to all probability, and, as our information leads us to believe, to all fact.²³

We may perhaps observe, in conclusion, that we think it a little unusual to insert quotations from a letter marked "Private" in a reply to that letter sent to the public Press. This, however, is what Lord Esher has seen fit to do in his eagerness to defend his friend, Sir John Fisher.⁴

We are,

Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT.

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

* *Note*:—*Now Twenty-One*.^{5 6}

¹ January 22, 1908 (see above, p. 325).

² An appropriate further comment might have been added, namely, that:—
If Lord Esher honestly believes Sir John Fisher to be a source of strength to the British Navy, the inference is that in Lord Esher's opinion the German Emperor desires the weakening of that force; and we commend this opinion to British Radicals.

³ The "Kaiser-Tweedmouth" Correspondence referred to below, pp. 333 n. 9, 335, 351, 364 *seq.*, 366, etc., must we think, have made Lord Esher regret his statement here printed.

⁴ Cp. above, p. 328.

⁵ *Twenty-One*, March 5, 1908;—cp. above, p. 327 n. 3, and below, p. 338 n. 1.

⁶ *Now Twenty-Four* (Feb. 24, 1909). See below, pp. 522, 524, 525.

LORD ESHER AND THE NAVY

(But—"Who is Lord Esher?")

THE MORNING POST
UPON LORD ESHER'S LETTER*Extract from Leading Article*6 Feb. 1908¹

AN interesting constitutional question is raised by a letter which we publish this morning. Who is Lord Esher? The founders² of the Imperial Maritime League have asked Lord Esher to join their association, and Lord Esher wishes the public to have the benefit of the letter³ in which he declines that honour. The reasons which he gives have a certain interest. It appears that he is an intimate friend of the First Sea Lord, Sir John Fisher.⁴ At any rate he says that in 1903 he was Sir John Fisher's guest at Portsmouth, when that officer unfolded to him his plans, and that he was delighted with certain lectures by the gallant Admiral which as a guest he had the privilege of hearing. He adds of his own knowledge a most interesting piece of information. "There is not a "man in Germany," he says, "from the Emperor downwards, who "would not welcome the fall of Sir John Fisher."⁵ These are the interesting passages of the letter. It hardly concerns the public that Lord Esher does not care to risk his name on a committee except in distinguished company, and that in the absence of the names of Lord Spencer, a veteran from whom agitation is not expected, Lord Selborne, who would hardly be justified in leaving South Africa at the present moment in order to agitate about the Navy, Lord George Hamilton, the author of the proposal that the great ports of the United Kingdom should defend themselves at their own expense, and Lord Cawdor, whose influence when at the Admiralty is to the public an unknown quantity, he will not join the association. This sort of public reply to a request to join an association, "that A., B., C., and D., distinguished persons, have "not joined, therefore I will not join," is, perhaps, creditable to the writer's discretion, but is hardly the mark of an independent judgment. Lord Esher quotes the words of the gentlemen who wrote to him² to the effect that, by the economies introduced, the Navy as a fighting force has been most dangerously reduced, and says: "I suppose you honestly think that Sir John Fisher and the "Sea Lords have lent themselves to so indefensible an enterprise," and adds that if they have done so they deserve the fate of Admiral

¹ The first and third paragraphs of this article formed pp. 14 *sq.* of the I.M.L. Pamphlet mentioned below, p. 338, n. 1.

² Ourselves.

⁴ See above, p. 328.

³ See above, p. 325.

⁵ Quoted above, p. 331.

Byng.¹ But no one has yet suggested that the Sea Lords intended to reduce the fighting power of the Navy. What is suggested is that economies to which they have consented have, in fact, had that effect. Everyone will sympathise with Lord Esher's sense of loyalty to his friend² Sir John Fisher, and will understand that he does not wish to be associated with the demand for an inquiry into the recent management and present state of the Navy, an inquiry which must result either in the justification or the condemnation of Sir John Fisher's methods, an inquiry which, moreover, Sir John Fisher, for reasons which have not been made public, by no means courts.³ But the reasons published by Lord Esher, in so far as they concern his unwillingness to appear except in the most distinguished company, and his confidence, which everyone shares, that the Sea Lords have never intended to ruin the Navy, are hardly of public interest. The only new contribution to the subject is the statement of the views of every German from the Emperor downwards.⁴

As regards the views of the Germans from the Emperor downwards⁴ we have our own opinion, based upon the observation of many years—years that began long before the advent of Lord Esher. . . . A very persistent attempt has been made by the German Government to influence English opinion⁵ and the British Government.⁶ This is a part of the traditional policy of Germany inaugurated by Prince Bismarck. The great Chancellor was always ready to intrigue against the Ministers of foreign States. Thus he pulled all the strings to bring about the removal of Lord Granville from the Foreign Office, not without success. In the same way the present German Government with much demonstration brought about the disappearance of M. Delcassé from the French Foreign Office.⁷ The German Government has not changed its methods. Every means is used to influence not only English opinion—the Press is manipulated as much as possible,⁸ and those who know what is going on well know how far the attempts to influence from Berlin the English Press are carried⁸—but also the British Government.⁹ If the present Admiralty had made, and were still making, serious strategical and other mistakes and were demoralising the *personnel* of the Navy, the German Government would move Heaven and

¹ Cp. hereon, *Daily Express*, March, 18, 1909.

² See above, p. 328.

³ See above, pp. 253, etc.

⁴ Quoted above, p. 331.

⁵ See below, notes 8, 9.

⁶ Cp. below, note 9.

⁷ For an illuminating explanation of the German ill-will against M. Delcassé, see M. Stéphane Lauzanne's "Diplomatic Revelations" in the *Matin*, November, 1908 (abstracted in the *Globe*, Nov. 4, 1908, p. 7, col. 2, s.v. "The German Crisis: French Revelations: Dogger Bank Episode: Kaiser's Scheme to entrap England";—and in the *Daily Express*, Nov. 5, 1908, p. 1, col. 3, s.v. "Plot that failed: How Germany planned to discredit Britain").

⁸ Cp. also below, pp. 359, 443.

⁹ Cp., e.g., the "Kaiser-Tweedmouth" Episode, above, p. 331, n. 3, and below, pp. 335, 351, 356, 360, 364 sqq. 366; and see *Standard*, March 10, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, col. 6.

earth to keep the present Admiralty in office. In that effort perhaps some of its influence over a portion of the Press¹ might by the German authorities—who have little respect [by] their own Press—be regarded as an activity in the lower sphere. In the higher sphere they would be delighted to have the assistance of such a voice as that of Lord Esher. Of course, Lord Esher speaks from conviction. So does his friend Mr. Haldane.² Mr. Haldane soon after his appointment went to Berlin, and was much gratified by the warmth of his reception by the military authorities. He came back not only an admirer of their system, in which he was quite right, but convinced of their benevolence to this country, a conviction that does more credit to his sentimental susceptibility than to his sagacity.

But who is Lord Esher? His letter is almost in the style and tone of a Prime Minister. Yet so far as we know he is not even a member of the Government. His name was first known to the public as a member of the War Commission which reported itself to be incompetent to consider matters of policy and of strategy, which also reported that there ought to be more ample means outside the Regular Army of expanding the military forces, and that there might be a little more co-ordination in the War Office. Lord Esher appended his personal opinion that the War Office was less satisfactory than the Admiralty, and ought to be reconstituted on the Admiralty model. It was a rash opinion, for the War Office had just carried on a great war with wonderful administrative success, though there had been disasters caused by wrong policy for which the War Office was not to blame, whereas the Admiralty has had no great war to deal with for a century. Next, Lord Esher was associated with Admiral Sir John Fisher on a committee of three commissioned by Mr. Balfour's Government in the King's name to destroy the War Office and put together some new thing in its place. That was done, and the country is no better off. Of the origin and cause of these activities of Lord Esher no explanation has been given. He is not known to have had naval or military experience. He has never been among the so-called "experts," the persons who without being professional soldiers or sailors have given some evidence of acquaintance with the arts of war. Yet he appears to have more influence on the management of both the Army and the Navy than any other person. The only credentials given in his letter are the intimacy which he declares he possesses with the wishes of the German public and the German Emperor.³ At the present moment, and in regard to the British Navy, we can hardly regard that declaration as a recommendation to the confidence of the British public.

¹ Cp. above, p. 333, text and n. 8.

² Concerning Mr. Haldane see below, pp. 355, 361.

³ Quoted above, p. 331

ADMIRAL FITZGERALD AND THE NEED FOR INQUIRY.

February 7, 1908. Need for Inquiry—Endorsed by Admiral C. C. Penrose FitzGerald¹;—*Standard*, February 9, 1908, p. 9, cols. 3-4.

THE ADMIRALTY AND THE PRESS.

February 8, 1908. "The Admiralty and the Press"; Protest against Official 'Inspiration'²; Renewed Demand for Inquiry into Effect of Recent Naval Administration;—*Spectator*, February 8, 1908, pp. 209-10.³

DEMAND BY "CIVIS" FOR INQUIRY WITHOUT DELAY.

February 15, 1908. "The State of the Navy; Lord Esher's Letter";—Demand:—for "An Inquiry without delay into the 'scope and effects' of recent changes made in naval training and Admiralty organisation and administration; and that the actual state of efficiency and repair of our existing Fleet shall be maintained."—By "Civis," *Spectator*, February 15, 1908, pp. 256-8.⁴

THE KAISER AND LORD TWEEDMOUTH.

February 16, 1908. Date of the Kaiser's Letter to Lord Tweedmouth, First Lord of the British Admiralty (the British Naval Estimates still hanging in the balance).⁵

UNDER THE WHITE ENSIGN.

THE IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE.

BY MR. FRED. T. JANE.

EVENING STANDARD AND S.J.G., *February 17, 1908.*

"In some quarters during the last few days it has been industriously suggested that the Imperial Maritime League is an anti-Fisher Association, or a wing of those internal naval politics which

¹ With a warning:—"It must be distinctly understood that the Inquiry, to be of any use, must not be a packed one." (See, again, *Standard*, April 23, 1909, p. 9, col. 3.)

² See, as to this, above, p. 256 (text and n. 2).

³ See also hereon *Daily Express*, February 8, 1908, and *Standard*, February, 8, 1908, p. 8, col. 5.

⁴ "'Civis' pointing out"—as the *Standard* wrote, February 15, 1908, p. 7, col. 2—"that the need for an inquiry into the state of the Navy finds its strongest proofs in the new facts supplied by Lord Esher himself."

⁵ The existence of this letter was first made public by the *Times*, March 6, 1908 (below, p. 351). For the facts, and for comment, see below, s.v. March 6, 1908, p. 351, and further, below, pp. 355, 356, 360, 364 *seq.* (and see the "Pedigree" given below, p. 365).

most people afloat regard as a bad thing for the service all round. This view of the New Navy League is entirely incorrect. Its sole article of faith is 'Navy before Party'—in other words, it demands an all-powerful Navy without any consideration for 'political needs.' It does not care a straw as to what policy may be necessary to keep up the Radical majority, or to make Sir John Fisher acceptable to the greatest number of M.P.'s. In a word, it denies 'expediency' as a factor in Navy Leagues. The gospel that it preaches has been preached in nearly every story written by Rudyard Kipling, and no amount of thunder from Lord Esher can alter the essential facts.

"If, then, the Imperial Maritime League becomes, in effect, an anti-Radical Association, the blame lies with those 130 M.P.'s whose anti-naval policy is so evident just at the present moment. There will be some difficulty in finding naval officers to object to it because it promises to be inconvenient to Radical politicians of the Keir Hardie and Murray Macdonald variety. As for Admiral Sir John Fisher, if he stands against the Little Englanders, he will find the Imperial Maritime League behind him right enough."

THE IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE.

THE FLEET, March, 1908, p. 78, col. 1.¹

To the Editor.

82, Bruntsfield Place, Edinburgh.

February, 1908.

SIR,—My attention has been drawn to your article in the January number of *The Fleet* regarding the "Imperial Maritime League" and the proposed inquiry into the state of our Navy. Some supporters of the new organisation would gladly participate in courteously conducted controversy concerning the sufficiency of our Navy and cognate themes. Their task, however, is rendered peculiarly difficult by the attribution to them of sinister motives, and they are sorely tempted to practise verbal retaliation.

Your assertion that the Imperial Maritime League "will be purely party political, and will be run by men violently in favour of Tariff Reform—so violently, in fact, that they will not stop at anything to gain their ends," is singularly misleading and unjust. This body will be *non-party*, and will co-operate with any political party only so far as may be deemed desirable for securing the adequacy and thorough efficiency of our Fleet. There is no universal connection between members of the League and Tariff Reformers. Your suggestion that belief in the efficacy of a defensive tariff is the cause of dissatisfaction with our Navy seems a complete inversion of fact; for, at least in many cases, the latter state of mind has, through recognition of the need of enlarged revenue, occasioned the former. In other cases, both may be effects of a common cause.

¹ In the same issue (March, 1908, p. 81), *The Fleet* published an exceedingly clever cartoon entitled "Ye Patriotic Pageant," eminently reminiscent of the Great Fight in the Navy League (1907), and of the consequent rise of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE. The horse and rider of the NEW LEAGUE were seen, already, to be rapidly overtaking the horse and rider of the Old. Even Lord Esher's indiscretions were not forgotten by the cartoonist:—and "Paper Buildings" (whence the Navy League Fight was conducted, and whence the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE took its rise) were given an immortality which they well deserved.

Again, if concomitance of agitation in favour of a stronger Navy, with either acceptance of fiscal reform or opposition to the Government, be treated as a ground of complaint, then impartiality will likewise condemn association of approval of the condition of our Fleet with maintenance of free imports or support of the Government. Both are alike political.

The action of those who have reluctantly been compelled to promote the institution of a new League can most easily and truly be explained by acknowledgment of the sincerity of their profession. They claim that *consistency* has instigated their conduct; that the grave changes of policy exhibited by the Executive of the old League during the last few years have been unjustified; and that a fresh organisation is indispensable for realisation of the originally avowed aims of a retrograde society.

I am, Yours faithfully,

HY. TERO.

February 18, 1908. "Building Programmes of the Sea-Powers." *Times*, February 18, 1908, p. 3, cols. 1-6.

NAVY ESTIMATES.

LIBERAL MANIFESTO FOR REDUCTION.

February 19, 1908. Manifesto, signed by Sir John Brunner, M.P., and Mr. Murray-Macdonald, M.P., on behalf of the "Executive Committee of the Liberal Members of Parliament, moving for a reduction of expenditure on Armaments"—issued.¹

REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS.

"OLD FRIENDS WITH NEW FACES."

February 25, 1908. "Reduction of Armaments: Old Friends with New Faces";—The title of the first of a series of four articles by Mr. H. O. Arnold-Forster, M.P., in *Standard*:—No. I. (just mentioned), Feb. 25, 1908, p. 9, cols. 1-2; No. II. ("Reduction of Armaments: Policy on its Merits"), Feb. 26, 1908, p. 9, cols. 1-2; No. III. ("Reduction of Armaments: The Case of the Army"), Feb. 27, 1908, p. 9, cols. 1 sq.; No. IV. ("Reduction of Armaments: The Estimates"), March 2, 1908, p. 4, cols. 1-2.

¹ For its terms see *Standard*, February 19, 1908, p. 8, col. 1.

THE IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE

Founded to secure the Maintenance of
British Sea-Power

27 Jan. 1908

*Here—and Here—did England help me:
How can I help England?—say.*

("LETTER TO THE 5,000"¹)

4, PAPER BUILDINGS,
TEMPLE,
LONDON, E.C.,
February, 1908.

DEAR SIR, OR MADAM,²—

We send you the programme of the Imperial Maritime League, which has been founded to secure by the action of its Members in Parliament and in the country that the Sea-Power of the British Empire shall be maintained, and that the efficiency of the Navy shall not continue to be sacrificed to the exigencies of party warfare, as evinced during the last two years in the insidious reduction of necessary expenditure on the Navy for the purpose of saving morning for social reforms.³

The knowledge that a very large and influential number of the supporters of the present Government in the House of Commons have a fixed desire to reduce this Naval expenditure is now the common property of the world.⁴

¹ A Circular Letter—known in the I.M.L. as the "Letter to the 5,000"—written and printed February, 1908 (prior to the announcement of the Navy Estimates), and issued on or about March 5, 1908.

This letter was issued, together with other matter, in the form of a 16 pp. Pamphlet, whereof:—Pp. 1-5 contained this letter;—P. 6, the names of the new League's Honorary Auditor and Bankers;—P. 7, the letter (dated November 9, 1907) of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Frederick Richards (printed above, p. 264);—Pp. 8 *sq.*, our Reply to the Old Navy League, dated January 30, 1908 (and reprinted above, pp. 318 *sqq.*);—P. 10, our Introductory Comment (printed above, pp. 326 *sq.*) on Lord Esher's published Letter to ourselves;—Pp. 11-13, our Reply to Lord Esher, dated February 7, 1908 (and reprinted above, pp. 327-331);—Pp. 14 *sq.*, a reprint of the 1st and 3rd paragraphs of the *Morning Post's* very pertinent leading article of February 6, 1908 (reprinted in the main, above, pp. 332 *sq.*).

² Concerning the use of "Premier" type in this book see above, p. 52, n. 5.

³ See above, p. 315; below, p. 450; and Index, *s.v.* "Social Reform."

⁴ Cp. Index, *s.v.* "Appeals," "Pledged," "Liberals," and "Reductions."

The facts are now also becoming appreciated that this Government were returned to office deeply pledged to the diminution of expenditure in respect of both services ;¹ that they have been subjected to ceaseless pressure to redeem this promise ;² and that, in order to redeem it, **they have throughout the last two years financially starved³ the Royal Navy.** Thus the naval service, which it was the hope of all patriotic men to keep outside the arena of party-politics, has been dragged by the Radical party into that arena. To satisfy their own supporters (clamorous for reduction), and to save money for other purposes,⁴ the fighting efficiency of the existing British Fleet has been to a large extent sacrificed by ceaseless and secret economies.

The principal directions in which these economies have been exercised are the following :—

(1) *Delay, or imperfect performance, of repairs.*⁵—

On December 12th last,⁶ and for five weeks previously, the Nore Division of the Home Fleet consisted nominally of 6 battleships, 5 cruisers, 24 destroyers, and 2 scouts. **Of these vessels but one cruiser, the *Warrior*, and two destroyers were actually present and fit for service.** All the other units were either in dock or waiting to go into dock, with the exception of the *Dreadnought*, which was in the Mediterranean. The Nore Division is the first reinforcement of the Channel Fleet in the event of war. These facts were published on December 12th last,⁶ and they have remained uncontroverted from that date to this.⁷

The nominal number of our destroyers already built, or building and completing, is 155. Of those already built, one-third are unserviceable by reason of delayed repairs,⁸ and **only 34 are available for work in the North Sea, as**

¹ See Index, *s.v.* "Pledged."

² See above, pp. 61, 139 *sq.*, etc., and Index, *s.v.* "Financial Starvation."

³ Cp. above, p. 338, text and nn. 3, 4.

⁴ Cp. above, p. 338, text and nn. 3, 4.

⁵ See Index, *s.v.* "Repairs."

⁶ December 12, 1907. See above, pp. 273 *sqq.*

⁷ Cp. Index, *s.v.* "Appeals."

⁸ Cp. also, above, pp. 323, 324, 325.

⁹ Cp. also, above, pp. 323, 324, 325.

¹⁰ Cp. also, above, pp. 323, 324, 325.

¹¹ Cp. also, above, pp. 323, 324, 325.

¹² Cp. also, above, pp. 323, 324, 325.

against a flotilla of a hundred German destroyers and torpedo boats, designed for work in that Sea.¹ On July 4th,² in the House of Lords, Lord Tweedmouth declined to give any public information as to the state of repairs.

(2) *Discharges of dockyard hands.*—

So far back as May last the number of men employed in the Royal dockyards had been diminished by **over 8,000**, namely, from 35,340 in 1904 to 27,315 in 1907.³ Bluejackets, belonging to the nucleus crews of ships of the Home Fleet, have been employed to do the work of these discharged men, with the result of causing intense dissatisfaction amongst the former, of which the mutiny at Portsmouth in November, 1906,⁴ was a significant symptom. In this manner both the repairing and the building capabilities of the Royal dockyards have been immensely reduced,⁵ while the Government has discontinued the system of sending ships for repairs to private dockyards.

(3) *Diminution of sea-training.*—

Towards the end of 1906 and during 1907 a fourth of the armoured ships composing the Mediterranean, Atlantic, and Channel Fleets, namely, 7 battleships and 6 armoured cruisers, were withdrawn from those Fleets, in which their officers and crews received full training at sea, and were relegated to the Home ports and to conditions under which they received greatly **lessened sea-training**.⁶

(4) *Failure to build light cruisers.*—

In 1904, 59 cruisers of all classes, 41 gunboats, and 16 sloops were struck off the active list of the Royal Navy.⁷ Some were "scrapped," some were laid up. These

¹ Cp. *Naval and Military Record*, Oct. 22, 1908, showing 81 destroyers and 45 torpedo boats to the credit of Germany. And see also *Standard*, Jan. 30, 1909 (leading article), p. 8, col. 6, showing that Britain has only between 30 and 40 destroyers fit for effective work in the North Sea, while our German Rivals have between 70 and 80 destroyers and between 40 and 50 torpedo-boats built for, and fit for, work in that Sea.

² July 4, 1907.

⁴ Cp. above, pp. 92, 114, 278.

⁶ See above, p. 320, text and n. 5

⁷ Cp. above, pp. 65, 131 *sq.*; and see Index, *s.v.* "Scrapping."

³ See above, p. 61, text and n. 7.

⁵ See Index, *s.v.* "Dockyard Workmen."

have not been replaced.¹ **This failure to replace them has absolutely crippled the fighting efficiency of our battle squadrons**, since these are powerless without scouting cruisers to act as eyes and ears.² Most particularly would these squadrons be paralysed from this cause in the event of a war in the shallow waters of the North Sea.

It is rumoured that some light cruisers are at last to be laid down, but probably two years will elapse before the first-begun of these can be commissioned. In the meantime, the paralysis of our battle fleets must continue.³

It has also to be remembered that the insufficiency of light cruisers involves great diminution of power to protect our sea-borne trade, including **the imports of food and raw material** essential to the nation's life.⁴ Again: the same cause has already largely impaired the peace-patrol of the Empire, with results which have been conspicuous and shameful, in the several cases of Jamaica,⁵ St. Lucia,⁶ and Zanzibar.⁷

The effect of each one of the changes above enumerated has been to save money. To refuse to see the obvious and palpable connection between this money-saving and the desire and the pledge of the Radical party to reduce expenditure on the Navy is to be wilfully blind.

Other economies which may be named are:—The introduction of short service⁸ (to avoid the necessity of paying pensions⁹) and the diminution of the *personnel* from 131,000 men in 1904 to 128,000 in 1907¹⁰—a reduction equivalent to the complements of four battleships. The country has also to realise the now admitted fact that the recent gunnery tests of the Navy up to the present date have been tests with no true relevance to conditions of war,¹¹ practice having been carried on at stationary targets instead of at moving targets.¹²

¹ Cp. above, pp. 65, 132.

² See Index, *s.v.* "Battle-Squadrons."

³ Cp. below, p. 347, text and nn.

⁴ See Index, *s.v.* "Commerce."

⁵ See above, pp. 44 *seq.*

⁷ See above, p. 250.

⁸ See above, pp. 62, 141, 320 (text and n. 6).

⁹ See above, pp. 37, 320 (text and n. 7).

¹⁰ See above, p. 61, text and n. 8.

¹¹ See Index, *s.v.* "Gunnery" and "Fool-Gunnery."

¹² Cp. above, p. 330 (and see further, *Daily Mail*, March 4, 1909, p. 5, col. 5).

The fact that the Admiralty have at last, in response to public pressure, promised to alter materially the character of these tests is a tardy admission of the fallacious nature of those previously applied.¹

The nation is also confronted with the novel phenomenon of constant subterranean inspiration of a large portion of the Press by the Admiralty, in defiance of all precedent, and in violation of the King's regulations.²

In view of all these considerations, the national importance of which will be apparent to you, **to build more battleships and armoured cruisers is evidently a wrong policy, unless measures are at the same time taken to restore our present Fleets to a state of fighting efficiency.**

At the present time the strength of the British Navy on paper stands in no relation to its strength in fact.

And yet at this present time the real contest with Germany for sea-supremacy is beginning, and **at this present moment, owing to the disorganisation of the naval service, and to the lack of medium cruisers and available destroyers,**³ we are absolutely unprepared for war.

In view of these considerations, the national importance of which will be apparent to you, the Imperial Maritime League believes that the appointment by the Government of a Commission of Inquiry into the scope and effects of recent changes in the Navy is a matter of urgent national necessity.⁴

You will see from the letter annexed⁵ that one of the highest living naval authorities, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Frederick Richards, who himself filled for six years the office of First Sea Lord, has declared the more serious of

¹ See above, pp. 251 (text and n. 7), 255 (text and n. 5), 260 (text and n. 3), 330 (text and n. 4), 341 *sq.*, and below, p. 360, text and nn. 6, 7; and Index, *s.v.* "Gunnery" and "Fool-Gunnery."

² See above, p. 256, text and n. 2.

³ See Index, *s.v.* "Cruisers" and "Destroyers."

⁴ Cp. above, pp. 264 *sqq.*

⁵ The letter reprinted above, p. 264.

the changes in question to be "**in their nature hazardous experiments.**"

His words are the measured words of ripe experience, and this Nation will ignore them at its peril.

Another former First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Richard Vesey-Hamilton, has also strongly endorsed the recommendation of an Inquiry.¹

The world now knows from Lord Esher's letter to ourselves,² which appeared in the public Press,³ that so many of these "hazardous experiments" as have been effected during the last three years, were carried out at the sole instigation of one man, Sir John Fisher, in accordance with his pre-determined resolve,⁴ taken before his accession (in October, 1904⁵) to his present office of First Sea Lord.

As these "hazardous experiments" include revolutionary changes in the training and organisation of the Navy; as they vitally affect, for good or ill, the safety of the nation; **the case for an inquiry** into their scope and effects **is placed beyond all possibility of reasonable dispute.**

For the nation cannot allow its safety to be dependent on the correct judgment of one man, when two other men, of equal authority with himself, intimate doubt of its validity.⁶

Yet in face of the circumstances that the present First Sea Lord, Sir John Fisher, has threatened to resign rather than endure an inquiry,⁷ and that the result of such inquiry might seriously interfere with the plans of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, it is most unlikely to be granted save in response to determined and organised endeavour.

¹ See above, pp. 265, etc.

² Dated January 22, 1908.

³ See above, p. 325.

⁴ See above, p. 329.

⁵ See above, p. 1.

⁶ See above, pp. 342 *sq.*

⁷ See above, p. 253.

Therefore we make most earnest appeal to you, if you desire the continued safety and independence of the Nation, to join now (if you have not joined it already) the only existing Organisation which will make the effort to procure the institution of an Inquiry its first purpose.

The general aims of the League, and its terms of membership, are clearly stated in its programme.¹

No less than **Twenty ★ Admirals**^{1a} have already joined the League's Council, a full list of which is enclosed.²

We are,

Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,
L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH,
Founders and Joint Honorary Secretaries
Imperial Maritime League.

★ Now Twenty-One.^{2a 2b}

THE IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE
AND THE CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE

February, 1908.

February, 1908. Letter from the Imperial Maritime League to the leading Chambers of Commerce in the United Kingdom.^{3 4}

¹ Printed above, pp. 305 *sqq.*

^{1a} Now Twenty-Four. See below, pp. 522 (n. 1), 523 (n. 11).

² Cp. Index, preliminary notes, and *ss.*, "G.C."

^{2a} Twenty-One, March 5, 1908;—cp. above, pp. 327 (n. 3), 331 (n. 5), and 338 (n. 1).

^{2b} Now Twenty-Four (Feb. 24, 1909). See below, pp. 522, 524, 525.

³ With the exception of the London Chamber of Commerce, whose views were considered to have been sufficiently ascertained in November, 1907 (see above, pp. 264-5).

*The letter referred to in the text, addressed (on behalf of the Executive Committee of the Imperial Maritime League) to the Chambers of Commerce of the United Kingdom, bearing date "February, 1908," and address "4, Paper Buildings, Temple, London, E.C.," was framed upon much the same lines as the Circular Letter printed above, pp. 338 *sqq.* :—The several facts of the naval situation were detailed; and especial attention was drawn to the view of the Imperial Maritime League (consequent upon those facts) that :—"the appointment by the Government of a Commission of Inquiry into the scope and effects of recent changes in the Navy is a matter of urgent national necessity." It was specifically mentioned that :—"the more serious of the changes in question," had been already declared by Admiral of the Fleet Sir Frederick Richards (himself formerly First Sea Lord) to be "in their nature hazardous experiments" (see his letter of November 9, 1907, printed above, p. 264, of which a copy was enclosed); and emphasis was laid upon the further fact that :—Sir Frederick Richards' recommendation of such an Inquiry had been strongly endorsed (see above, p. 265) by another former First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir R. Vesey Hamilton.*

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE.

PUBLIC MEETING AT NORWOOD.

February 25, 1908.

A public meeting¹ was held in St. Aubyn's Hall, Church Road, Norwood, S.E., on February 25, 1908, under the auspices of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE:—"To press for an Enquiry into the State of the Navy, as recommended by Admiral of the Fleet Sir F. Richards and Admiral Sir R. Vesey Hamilton."

Mr. Rowland Hunt, M.P., was in the Chair;—and amongst those announced to speak were Mr. L. Cope Cornford, Mr. J. T. Middlemore, M.P., Mr. J. Sidney-Turner, J.P., Mr. H. F. Wyatt, and Mr. L. Graham H. Horton-Smith.

The following Resolution, moved by Mr. Wyatt, and seconded by Mr. Horton-Smith, was carried unanimously:—

THE RESOLUTION

"That this Meeting deeply deplores the system of financial starvation applied to the Navy during recent years² and the consequent crippling of a large number of battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, through the delay or the imperfect performance of repairs;³ It laments the failure to replace the fifty-nine cruisers removed from the Navy List in 1904,⁴ the diminution in the aggregate sea-training of the Fleet,⁵ the reduction of the personnel,⁶ and the fact, now known, that the gunnery tests have had no true relevance to war;⁷ And it strongly urges the institution of a Commission of Inquiry into the scope and effects of recent changes in the Navy, as recommended by the two former First Sea Lords, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Frederick Richards and Admiral Sir Richard Vesey Hamilton."⁸

THE NAVY ESTIMATES 1908-9.

INSUFFICIENCY AND—"POSTPONEMENT."

February 25, 1908. The Navy Estimates, 1908-9, detailed in *Standard*, Feb. 25, 1908, pp. 7 sq.; *Morning Post*, Feb. 25, 1908, p. 9;⁹—and see the First Lord's "Statement Explanatory," printed in the *Times*, Feb. 25, 1908, p. 4;—The Two-Power Standard coming

¹ For an account of this Meeting see *Standard*, Feb. 26, 1908; *Daily Express*, Feb. 26, 1908; *Morning Post*, Feb. 26, 1908, p. 8, col. 6; *E.S. & S.J.G.*, Feb. 26, 1908.

² Cp. above, pp. 60 sq., 139 sq., 339; and see Index, s.v. "Financial Starvation."

³ See above, p. 320, text and n. 2.

⁴ See above, pp. 65, 131 sq.; and Index, s.v. "Scrapping."

⁵ See above, p. 320, text and n. 5.

⁶ See above, p. 61, text and note 8.

⁷ See above, pp. 251, 255, 341 sq.

⁸ See above, p. 264 sq., etc.

⁹ See, in anticipation, *Standard*, Feb. 24, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 5-6;—and upon these estimates themselves see the *Standard's* criticisms, Feb. 25, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 6-7; Feb. 26, 1908 (*Standard's* Naval Correspondent:—"Navy Economics: Policy of Starvation: Two-Power Standard in Danger: Striking Figures"), p. 7, col. 1, and (leading article, criticising the First Lord's "Statement"), p. 6, col. 6; March 4, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 4-5; March 7, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 5-6; March 10, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 5-6; March 12, 1908, p. 6, cols. 4, 5, and (leading article), p. 6, cols. 5-6; and see also *Daily Express*, Feb. 25, 1908 (leading article); *Morning Post*, Feb. 25, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 4-5; Feb. 26, 1908 (*Morning Post's* Naval Correspondent), p. 4, cols. 3-4; March 10, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 5-6; March 11, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 4-5; *Daily Mail*,

in subsequently for much discussion;—Mr. Haldane's attitude¹ in particular being remarkable; ² Mr. Asquith's ³ only less so ⁴ (see Mr. Rowland Hunt's acute criticism of the latter's speech⁴), and Lord Tweedmouth's (in the House of Lords⁵) creating such widespread alarm⁶ as was only allayed by his public letter of explanation to Lord Cawdor⁷ to the effect that his meaning had been misunderstood.⁸

THE NEED FOR AN INQUIRY.

SIR JOHN FISHER'S ALARM AND THREAT.

DAILY EXPRESS, MORNING POST, and STANDARD, *March 2, 1908*.⁹

To the Editor.

4, Paper Buildings, Temple, E.C. *February 29, 1908.*

SIR,—In connection with the statement respecting the Navy Estimates laid before the House of Commons certain facts stand out, to which we ask your leave to draw attention.

(1) The number of armoured ships to be laid down this year by Britain is two.¹⁰ The number to be laid down this year by Germany is four.¹⁰

(2) The number of protected cruisers to be laid down is

Feb. 25, 1908 (leading article), and *Times*, Feb. 25, 1908 (leading article), p. 9, cols. 5-6; and March 2, 1908 (Mr. H. W. Wilson), p. 7, col. 3. And see, generally, the Parliamentary discussion of the Navy Estimates in question.

Even apart from any consideration of these Estimates for 1908-9 upon their merits, so little money is to be expended this year (1908-9) in connection therewith (cp. below, pp. 347, 350), that the word "*Postponement*" might well be selected as their most fitting motto. Cp. *Standard*, Feb. 27, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, col. 5; and Lord Cawdor in the House of Lords, March 18, 1908, quoted *Daily Express*, March 19, 1908, p. 1, col. 2.

The following is the opening and pertinent comment of the careful and detailed article by the *Standard's* Naval Correspondent entitled "Navy Economies: Policy of Starvation: Two-Power Standard in Danger: Striking Figures," *Standard*, Feb. 26, 1908, p. 7, col. 1 (just cited, p. 345, n. 9):—

"The prevailing opinion on the Navy Estimates in Service Circles is that the Government is playing the favourite political game of handing trouble on to the next. It is, of course, well known that Lord Tweedmouth's administration has in a sense lived on the stores accumulated under the Cawdor régime" [cp. also Mr. H. F. Wyatt, *Standard*, Feb. 26, 1908, p. 8, col. 2]; "but this supply is practically exhausted, and now has to be made up. It is made up at the expense of the building programme." And see Index, s.v. "Stores."

¹ March 2, 1908.

² See *Times*, March 3, 1908 (leading article), p. 10, col. 1; *Morning Post*, March 3, 1908 (leading article), p. 7, cols. 5-6; *Daily Express*, March 3, 1908 (leading article), p. 4, col. 4, etc. Mr. Haldane's record in regard to the Two-Power Standard was already not above reproach. See above, pp. 277, 298, and below, p. 431.

³ March 10, 1908. ⁴ See below, s.v., March 10, 1908, p. 352, n. 8. ⁵ March 18, 1908.

⁶ See, e.g., *Morning Post*, March 19, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, col. 5; *Standard*, March 19, 1908, p. 7, col. 1, and (leading article) p. 6, col. 5.

⁷ March 19, 1908.

⁸ See above, p. 309, and below, p. 357.

⁹ Published also in:—*Birmingham Gazette*, March 2, 1908; *Blackpool Gazette*, March 6, 1908; *Broad Arrow*, March 7, 1908; *Glasgow Evening News*, March 13, 1908; *Globe*, March 2, 1908; *Harrogate Advertiser*, March 7, 1908; *Manchester Courier*, March 2, 1908; *Naval and Military Record*, March 5, 1908; *Northern Whig*, March 2, 1908; *Yorkshire Herald*, March 2, 1908; etc.; etc.

¹⁰ See further hereon, below, p. 347, n. 4, and (as to the insufficiency of money allocated in 1903-9 to the British, as compared with the German, ships) below, pp. 350, n. 6, 391.

six.¹²⁵ The number of cruisers of all classes removed from the active list of the Navy in 1904 was 59 (together with 41 gunboats and 16 sloops).³ Thus we begin to replace, four years later, one-tenth of the cruisers of which the country was then deprived.²⁴⁵⁶

(3) The number of destroyers to be laid down is 16.⁴⁷ The nominal number of our destroyers already built, or building and completing, is 155. Of those already built, one-third are un-serviceable by reason of neglected repairs,⁹ and only 34 are available for work in the North Sea,¹⁰ as against a flotilla of 100 German destroyers and torpedo boats, designed for work in that Sea.¹¹

(4) However momentous the question of new construction may be to the country, a fact more momentous still is the condition to which the policy of financial starvation has already reduced our existing Fleet. A large number of our existing armoured ships have been crippled, like our destroyers, by the neglect or the imperfect performance of repairs.¹²

(5) That the aggregate sea training of the Navy has been immensely diminished can no longer be denied.¹³ The large saving in stores shown in the Estimates is a proof of this.

¹ On July 30, 1907, Lord Twee'mouth said in the House of Lords that "the Admiralty had in their minds a new and extended cruiser construction policy, which he hoped would be brought forward next year (1908). After all," he said, "the cruiser was the ship which kept our predominance over the seas, and it was to this class of vessel that they looked to safeguard our commerce and injure as much as possible the commerce of the enemy." (*Standard*, July 31, 1907, p. 4, col. 2;—cp. also *Standard*, Dec. 16, 1907, leading article, p. 6, col. 6).

Is this provision of six protected cruisers the "new and extended cruiser construction" spoken of by Lord Tweedmouth?

If it is, we can only echo the *Standard's* statement (Feb. 25, 1908, leading article, p. 6, col. 6), that the number is "ridiculously inadequate."

² No protected cruisers were laid down in 1904, none in 1905, none in 1906, and only one (the *Boadicea*) in 1907. See *Daily Express*, March 22, 1909 (*s.v.* "Sleep Quiet in your Beds: Fisherism in Figures"), p. 4, col. 7; and cp. *Morning Post* (Naval Correspondent), March 31, 1909, p. 5, col. 1.

³ Cp. above, p. 340.

⁴ According to the *Standard*, Aug. 29, 1908, p. 5, col. 5, "five" of the six "small cruisers of this year's programme have not yet" (Aug. 29, 1908) "been laid down, nor have the contracts for their construction been awarded yet" (Aug. 29, 1908). "The same is true of the sixteen destroyers in the 1908-9 programme."

"The Navy Estimates for the present year" (1908-9, above, pp. 345 *sq.*)—writes the *Daily Express*, Sept. 11, 1908 (leading article), p. 4, col. 3—"provide for the construction of 1 battleship, 1 armoured cruiser, 6 protected cruisers, 16 destroyers, and a number of submarines. Up to the present time" (Sept. 11, 1908) "only one of these vessels has been ordered—a small cruiser, which was laid down at Pembroke Dockyard on June 15" (1908). "No contract for any of the other vessels has yet" (Sept. 11, 1908) "been placed. It is," continues the *Express*, "a matter of extreme urgency that such vessels as are to be built should be ordered at once. It is the custom of the Government to postpone the laying down of new ships until well into the year following the presentation of the Estimates. The first to be begun of last year's armoured ships was the *St. Vincent*, launched yesterday" (Sept. 10, 1908: see below, p. 419), "which was laid down on Dec. 30" (1907). [*Note*:—Mr. McKenna admitted in the House of Commons on Oct. 19, 1908, that "the battleship of this year's programme" [*i.e.* 1908] "will" only "be laid down in January, 1909, and the armoured cruiser in Feb., 1909;"—see *Standard*, Oct. 20, 1908, p. 4, col. 5; and, for a comparison with German action, see *Daily Express*, Oct. 24, 1908, p. 1, col. 2, below, pp. 461 *sq.*].

⁵ As to the small amount to be provided for these six in 1908-9, see:—below, p. 426, n. 2; *Morning Post* (Naval Correspondent), Oct. 7, 1908, p. 4, col. 2; *Standard*, Oct. 15, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 4-5; and cp. also *N.L.J.* March, 1908, p. 69. ("At a guess, if we may judge by the analogy of the *Boadiceas*, the total cost of each" of these six ships "will work out at about £400,000;—*Morning Post's* Naval Correspondent in *Morning Post*, March 15, 1909, p. 7, col. 4.)

⁶ Even the specifications for 5 of the six (other than the one mentioned above, n. 4) were only ready for issue on Oct. 8, 1908 (see *Daily Express*, Oct. 9, 1908, p. 5, col. 2); and the tender, according to Mr. McKenna himself, were only to be received by Nov. 5, 1908 (see *Standard*, Oct. 20, 1908, p. 4, col. 5).

(6) The country now knows that the gunnery tests have been bogus tests, designed not to secure success in war, but advertisement of an alleged but non-existent efficiency.¹

(7) The need for an enquiry into the scope and effects of recent changes in the Navy, as recommended by two former First Sea Lords, is obvious and urgent.

(8) Sir John Fisher has declared his intention to resign rather than face such enquiry.

(9) Lord Esher has shown in his letter to ourselves, sent by him to the Press, that Sir John Fisher is solely responsible for all the more serious of the changes introduced into the Navy during the last three years.

We are, Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,
L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

THE SUBDUED NAVY LEAGUE.

March, 1908. "The Naval Estimates";—Navy League's leading article in *N.L.J.*, March, 1908, pp. 69 sq.

It is not uninteresting to compare this mild pronouncement of the Navy League, when faced by facts, with the League's antecedently fulminant leading articles, *N.L.J.*, Jan., 1908, pp. 3 sq., and Feb., 1908, pp. 37 sq.

The Navy League would seem to have expected powerful support in high quarters, and to have been left in the lurch!

"FOOL GUNNERY" IN THE NAVY.—By "ST. BARBARA."
Second Article;—BLACKWOOD'S MAGAZINE, March, 1908, pp. 442-460.²

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE.

Covering Letter addressed to Secretaries of
CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE.

4, Paper Buildings, Temple, E.C., March 2, 1908.

DEAR SIR,—In accordance with the wish of the Executive Committee of the Imperial Maritime League, we send you the enclosed letter which (having regard to its unavoidable length) has been printed for greater convenience of perusal.³

Notes to p. 347 continued:—

7 But only a paltry amount (about £4,000) was voted to be spent on each of them in the year 1908-9. See below, pp. 426, n. 2, 451 (and cp. *N.L.J.*, March, 1908, p. 69). [German methods (see below, pp. 437, n., 451, n. 8) form a striking contrast.] As to the 16 destroyers, see further below, pp. 437 n., 449 nn., 451 n. 7.

⁹ Cp. above, pp. 291, 292 sq., 316, 320, 329, 339, 345

¹¹ Cp. above, p. 340.

¹² Cp. above, p. 320.

¹⁰ Cp. above, p. 340.

¹³ Cp. above, p. 320.

¹ See as to this:—"Fool Gunnery in the Navy," by "St. Barbara," in *Blackwood's Magazine* for Feb., March, and April, 1908. See above, pp. 322, 330 n. 4, and below, in text, and p. 360. See also "St. Barbara" in *Standard*, May 4 and 5, 1908 (below, p. 387).

² See preceding note; and see hereon (*s.v.* "'Fool Gunnery' in the Navy: 'Blackbird Shooting': 'War Preparation Neglect'"), *Standard*, February 29, 1908, p. 9, col. 3.

³ For the gist of the letter in question see above, p. 344 n. 4.

The accompanying leaflet gives the names of some of those constituting the League's Council or Committee. It will be observed that no less than twenty Admirals¹ are supporting this movement.

In view of the urgency and the national importance of the matters at issue, we would venture to appeal to you to take the earliest possible opportunity to bring the League's communication to the notice of the President and Council of your Chamber.²

We are, Sir, Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

THE MURRAY-MACDONALD MOTION FOR REDUCTION.

March 2, 1908. Mr. Murray-Macdonald's Motion for the Reduction of Armaments voted on. Its text was as follows:—

"That, in view of the continued friendly relations with foreign Powers announced in the gracious speech from the Throne, this House trusts that further reductions may be made in expenditure on armaments, and effect be given to the policy of retrenchment and reform to which the Government is pledged."³ 4 5 6 7

NAVY ESTIMATES CUT DOWN ADMITTEDLY TO SATISFY MR. MURRAY-MACDONALD AND HIS LITTLE-NAVY GROUP.

March 3, 1908. Navy Estimates admittedly cut down in consequence of the Murray-Macdonald Amendment. The following is extracted from the *Times* report of the proceedings of the Committee of Supply of March 3, 1908:—

"Mr. A. LEE:—I put a direct question to the right hon. gentleman. Does the right hon. gentleman deny that the Navy Estimates have been cut down since the hon. member for Falkirk put his amendment on the paper?⁸ (Cheers.) (Mr. E. Robertson made no response.) He does not deny it, because he knows he cannot deny it. (Cheers.) That fact sufficiently proved that the present Government were not trustworthy guardians of the national defences. (Cheers.)"⁹

¹ Now 24. See below, pp. 522 (n. 5), 523 (n. 11, p. 524). The *Daily Express* has described the Imperial Maritime League as "*The League of Admirals*" (see below, pp. 362 n. 5, and 522, text and nn. 2, 5, 6).

² See further below, pp. 355, 356, 358, 373, 397, etc.

³ Reprinted from *Daily Express*, March 2, 1908, p. 1, col. 6.

⁴ "Pledged":—Cp. above, pp. 25, 26, 29, 30, 39, 104, 105, 108, 194, 217, 218, 230, 237, 246, 315, 339, 341, and below, pp. 382, 389, 391, 414, 450, 479. Cp. also Mr. Asquith's admission at Leeds (and his statement of how much the Liberal Cabinet had already done, by way of reduction of naval and military expenditure, to redeem such pledge), Oct. 10, 1908, quoted *Standard*, Oct. 12, 1908, p. 7, col. 7 (referred to above, p. 105).

⁵ For the history of this Motion see above, *s.v.* February 5, 1908, p. 324.

⁶ For criticism of this Motion see *Morning Post*, March 3, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 4-5; *Daily Express*, March 3, 1908 (leading article), p. 4, col. 4; and cp. also above, pp. 324, 330, and below, p. 351. Compare, further, the reports of the debate in the House of Commons to which it gave rise.

⁷ There voted on March 2, 1908, for Mr. Murray-Macdonald's motion 73;—against it (including the Unionist party), 320.

⁸ Cp. above, *s.v.* February 5, 1908, p. 324.

⁹ Cp. below, p. 351.

THE HALF-ONE-POWER STANDARD.

STANDARD, March 9, 1908; DAILY EXPRESS, March 10, 1908;
OUTLOOK, March 14, 1908, etc.¹

4, Paper Buildings,
Temple, E.C.,
March 5, 1908.

SIR,—The Executive Committee of the Imperial Maritime League ask your permission to place before your readers the following considerations regarding our naval strength:—

(1) The issue before the country between the national and the anti-national parties is now perfectly plain. The former desire to preserve, the latter to destroy, the accepted standard of naval strength agreed on in 1889 by Liberals and Conservatives alike.²

(2) On November 3, 1906, Lord Cawdor, late First Lord of the Admiralty, defined this standard as strength adequate to defeat any combination of any two Powers, and, over and above the superiority of force necessary to ensure such defeat, a further 10 *per cent.* margin for contingencies.³ This standard has, however, never been intended to apply to cruisers, in regard to which a much larger British superiority has been hitherto admitted to be necessary.⁴

(3) This accepted standard has now been, in every point save words, abandoned by the present Government in response to the pressure exercised by the anti-national section of their supporters.

As regards the future provision of large armoured ships, a Half-One-Power standard (at most) is substituted for the standard hitherto defined as essential to the safety of this nation and this Empire.

In specific fact not even this Half-One-Power standard is to be attained. For some nine-tenths of the cost of the new programme is postponed beyond this year;^{5 6} whereas Germany (for instance) is providing funds sufficient to complete her new ships in the shortest possible time.⁶

(4) In the House of Commons, on the 4th *inst.*,⁷ Mr. Robertson, Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty, was unable to deny the direct charge made by Mr. Lee that the Navy Estimates had been cut down, with the consent of the Board of Admiralty, after the

¹ Published also in the:—*Alnwick Gazette*, March 14, 1908; *Australasian World*, March 12, 1908; *Birmingham Gazette*, March 9, 1908; *Birmingham Post*, March 9, 1908; *Bristol Times and Mirror*, March 9, 1908; *Bury Post*, March 13, 1908; *Cambridge Express*, March 13, 1908; *Dublin Daily Express*, March 10, 1908; *Glasgow Evening News*, March 9, 1908; *Globe*, March 9, 1908; *Gosport Journal*, March 19, 1908; *Jackson's Oxford Journal*, March 14, 1908; (cp.) *Manchester Guardian* (short paragraph) March 9, 1908; *Naval and Military Record*, March 12, 1908; *Newcastle Daily Chronicle*, March 10, 1908; *Northern Whig*, March 10, 1908; *Sunday Sun*, March 15, 1908; etc.

² Cp. above, pp. 16, 39, 196, and Index, *s.v.* "Two-Power Standard."

³ See above, pp. 308 *sq.*

⁴ See above, p. 309.

⁵ Cp. above, pp. 346 (n. 10), 347 (nn. 5, 7), and next note (6).

⁶ Cp. Mr. Cochrane, M.P., speaking at Largs, August 29, 1908 (*Glasgow Herald* August 31, 1908, p. 7, col. 3):—"With a view to keeping the appearance of economy in the Estimates of this year (1908) only a sum of £140,000 had been taken" by the British Government "in respect of each" of the two large armoured ships of our 1908-9 programme, "whereas Germany took £400,000 in the" same "year" (1908) "for each" of her four large armoured ships of her corresponding programme.

⁷ This should have been "3rd *inst.*" (*i.e.* March 3, 1908). See above, p. 349.

leader of the anti-national party had put his amendment¹ on the paper.²

The present Board of Admiralty has, therefore, failed to protect the Navy against dangerous reduction.

This established certainty will stand on record in history.

(5) In view of this surrender to the forces of anti-nationalism, and of the peril consequently threatening the naval supremacy of this country, upon which its national existence depends, the Executive Committee of the Imperial Maritime League venture now to make a most earnest and strenuous appeal to all patriotic men and women to unite, without distinction of party, in organised endeavour to resist naval reductions. The Inviolability of the Empire must be placed above party politics.

They therefore ask all those thus minded to communicate without delay with the honorary secretaries of the League.

We are, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,
L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH,
*Joint Honorary Secretaries,
Imperial Maritime League.*

"UNDER WHICH KING?"

(THE KAISER AND LORD TWEEDMOUTH.)

TIMES, March 6, 1908, p. 11, col. 6.

To the Editor of the *Times*.

[Germany],

March 4, 1908.

SIR,—I consider it my duty to ask you to draw the attention of the public to a matter of grave importance.

It has come to my knowledge that his Majesty the German Emperor has recently addressed a letter³ to Lord Tweedmouth on the subject of British and German naval policy, and it is affirmed that this letter amounts to an attempt to influence, in German interests, the Minister responsible for our Navy Estimates.

The letter is undoubtedly authentic, and a reply to it has been despatched.

In these circumstances, and as the matter has become an open secret owing to the number of persons to whom it has, most unwisely and unfortunately, been made known, I venture to urge that the letter in question, together with the reply, should be laid before Parliament without delay.

I am, etc.,

"YOUR MILITARY CORRESPONDENT."⁴ 5

¹ Above, p. 324.

² See preceding note; and cp. also above, p. 349.

³ Dated February 16, 1908, and incidentally referred to in its order of date, above, p. 335. See further, the pages cited above, p. 335 n. 5.

⁴ Col. Repington. See *Daily Express*, May 19, 1908, p. 1, col. 2; *Observer*, March 8, 1908; *Sheffield Telegraph*, March 9, 1908; etc.

⁵ See further, below, pp. 355, 356, 360, 364 *seq.*, and the "Pedigree" given on p. 365.

THE KAISER'S LETTER
TO THE FIRST LORD OF THE BRITISH ADMIRALTY.¹
PUBLICLY CONDEMNED BY THE "TIMES."

March 6, 1908.^{2 3 4 5}

"THE KAISER'S FIGHT FOR TIME."
WILLIAM THE CONQUEROR II.

March 8, 1908. "The Kaiser's Fight for Time";—*Observer*, March 8, 1908 (leading article), from which we extract as follows:—

"German maritime power, unlike the naval strength of any other people, may be—and will be, if we suffer ourselves to be played with—the medium for an invasion by a second William the Conqueror. Things as strange have happened, and a decade hence things as strange may be possible if our pacifists have their way. That is why it must be the special and inflexible object of British policy to counteract the Kaiser's naval purposes. We do not demand that the German Emperor's letter⁶ shall be published;⁷ but we do urge, with all the earnestness in our power, that the whole Nation shall make with one voice the fitting and unflinching reply."

MR. ASQUITH AND HIS ONE-POWER STANDARD.

March 10, 1908. Mr. Asquith's 'Lip-Service' to the Two-Power Standard,—followed by a Qualification interpreting it as only a *One-Power* (Germany) Standard.^{8 9}

¹ For the gist of it see the foregoing:—"Under Which King?" The letter in question bore date February 16, 1908 (see above, p. 335),—and "arrived when the" British "Navy Estimates were the subject of burning controversy in this country" (*Outlook*, March 14, 1908, leading article, p. 357, col. 2)—indeed, when the British Navy Estimates were still "hanging in the balance" (see above, pp. 335, 351, and below, p. 365).

Its Publication was demanded, and it was refused by the Government. See *Standard*, March 10, 1908. (Cp. also below, pp. 360, 365 n. 5.)

² See *Times*, March 6, 1908 (leading article), p. 11, col. 4, and also March 7, 1908 (leading article), p. 9, cols. 3-4; March 10, 1908, p. 9, cols. 4-5.

³ See also *Morning Post*, March 7, 1908 (leading article); and *Standard*, March 7, 1908 (leading article); March 25, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, col. 6.

⁴ See, in this connection, above, pp. 335, 351, and further, below, pp. 355, 364, 365.

⁵ Lord Tweedmouth's removal eventually ensued—and in his fall he dragged Mr. Robertson with him. For further comment on their fall see below, pp. 364 *sqq.*

⁶ Above referred to, p. 335.

⁷ For its gist see above, p. 351.

⁸ See the admirable speech of Mr. Rowland Hunt, M.P., who followed in the debate; and see above, *s.v.* February 25, 1908.

⁹ This destructive Qualification, astounding to say, went almost unnoticed in the Press.

⁹ Mr. Asquith stated that, if the then existing British and German naval programmes were carried out, Germany will have as many as 13 ships of the *Dreadnought* type in the winter of 1911 to Great Britain's 12 (cp. Mr. L. J. Maxse, *National Review*, Feb. 1909, pp. 870 *sq.*); and while asserting that he must take such steps as might be necessary to prevent Great Britain from falling behind Germany in that regard, it never seemed to occur to him that he had a *Two-Power* Standard to keep up. (Cp. further below, pp. 425; 455; 461; 462, nn. 1, 2; 478 *sq.*)

HOME FLEET EXERCISES.

THE NORE DIVISION.

41 PER CENT. OF ARMOURD SHIPS LEFT BEHIND.

STANDARD, *March 11, 1908, p. 9, col. 2.*

(FROM OUR NAVAL CORRESPONDENT.)

The Nore Division of the Home Fleet left Sheerness on Monday for its first cruise of the year.¹ It is due to arrive at Invergordon, Cromarty Firth, to-morrow, where it will remain until the 30th *inst.*,² carrying out mining, gunnery, and torpedo exercise, leaving on that date for its headquarters. It is supposed to have consisted of the "Battle Squadron," the "Fifth Cruiser Squadron," and a number of smaller cruisers and gunboats (the "Eastern Group of Destroyers" left Sheerness on Thursday last³). The truth is that the Battle Squadron, the Fifth Cruiser Squadron, and the Eastern Group of Destroyers were not able, even after monopolising practically the whole of the attention of the dockyard staff at Chatham since November last,⁴ to proceed to sea at full strength.

Take first of all the Battle Squadron. According to the Navy List the units of this squadron are:—

Dreadnought.
Bulwark.
London.

Majestic.
Magnificent.
Victorious.

Three of these vessels, however, are still at Chatham Dockyard—the *London*, *Magnificent*, and *Victorious*—and therefore unable to accompany the fleet to sea. In other words, the "Battle Squadron" of the North Sea Fleet is 50 *per cent.* short of its nominal strength. The Admiralty have submitted only with reluctance to this great shrinkage in the strength of the Nore Battle Squadron. They have endeavoured to bring it, for the purposes of this cruise, up to full strength; and the best they have been able to do is to bring the *Cæsar* round from the Portsmouth Division of the Home Fleet to take the place of the *Victorious*, at five weeks' notice.

We next come to the Fifth Cruiser Squadron. This will now consist of six ships, namely:—

Shannon.
Warrior.
Leviathan.

Achilles.
Natal.
Cochrane.

Four of these—the last four in the list—are able to accompany the fleet on its cruise, the *Cochrane* having come down from Chatham after refit last week. The *Leviathan* remains there. The *Leviathan* is the flagship of the admiral commanding the squadron, and she is to be replaced in that capacity by the *Shannon*, which was to

¹ For the state of the Nore Division (*a*) during the first nine months of its existence, see above, pp. 255, 274; (*b*) in Dec., 1907, above, pp. 273 *sqq.*; (*c*) in Feb., 1908, above, pp. 323, 324, 325. (And see further, Index, *s.v.* "Nore Division.")

² March 30, 1908.

³ Thursday, March 5, 1908.

⁴ November, 1907.

commission at Chatham yesterday. It is interesting to note, however, that, although the *Shannon* commissioned yesterday, which day will no doubt be reckoned henceforth as that of her completion, no less than £45,000 remains to be spent on her in the next financial year—after April 1 next.¹ It is clear, therefore, that she will not be ready for sea for several weeks yet. The Fifth Cruiser Squadron has gone to sea 33 *per cent.* short of its strength. In the Portsmouth and Devonport Divisions of the Home Fleet are three armoured and eleven first-class protected cruisers; but of these not one is, on the evidence, fit to be commissioned to take the place of the two missing ships.

With regard to the torpedo craft, it was hoped that the commodore would have been able to create a record by taking to sea with him the whole of his destroyers—a feat which has not yet been accomplished since the two flotillas, each twelve boats strong, first came into existence. But it was not to be. Two destroyers were left behind, and a third, the *Nith*, sustained a slight injury, and had to be docked before going to sea. This concludes the fully commissioned portion of the Home Fleet. The details may be summarised as follows:—

			Nominal strength.		Proceeded to sea.		Percentage missing.
Battleships	...	...	6	...	3	...	50
Armoured cruisers	...	...	6	...	4	...	33
Total armoured ships			12	...	7	...	41·6
Scouts, etc.	...	...	3	...	3	...	0
Destroyers	...	...	24	...	22	...	8

The Admiralty, as is well known, is inordinately proud of the nucleus crew system. At Portsmouth there are supposed to be perfect arrangements for bringing up the complements of the *Cæsar* and of all other ships there—a total of 53 battleships, cruisers, and torpedo craft—to full strength on the shortest possible notice. How is it that the *Cæsar* has had to draw her balance crew from the *Victorious*, which belongs to the fully commissioned Nore Division?

It is the same with the nucleus crew cruisers *Dido* and *Charybdis*. If sufficient men are not forthcoming to complete one battleship and two cruisers to full crews from two-fifths, where are they to be found to commission the 137 vessels in the Portsmouth and Devonport Divisions of the Home Fleet? Perhaps some of them are amongst the 3,000 by which the *personnel* of the Navy has been reduced since 1904.²

March 13, 1908. "The Military Geography of the British Empire"—an Address delivered to the Royal Scottish Geographical Society by Mr. L. S. Amery—printed in the *National Review*, May, 1908, pp. 469-488.³

¹ *I.e.*, after April 1, 1908.

² See above, p. 61, text and n. 8.

³ See also *Standard*, March 14, 1908, p. 8, col. 3 (abstract of the address), and (leading article thereon), p. 6, cols. 5-6.

THE KAISER
AND THE BRITISH MINISTER FOR WAR.

DAILY GRAPHIC, *March 14, 1908, p. 7, col. 4.*

To the Editor of the DAILY GRAPHIC.

4, Paper Buildings, Temple, E.C.,
March 13, 1908.

SIR,—The visible effects of the letter from the German Emperor to Lord Tweedmouth¹ are fading, yet one result remains,² which is the question whether any like communication has been sent by the former to the Secretary of State for War.

Any Member of Parliament who would put this question in the House of Commons would render a public service. If an answer can truly be given in the negative, the public mind would be reassured.³

We are, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,
L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

GERMAN SHIPBUILDING CAPACITY.

March 14, 1908. "German Shipbuilding Capacity";—by the *Times'* Berlin Correspondent, *Times*, March 14, 1908, p. 7, col. 5.^{4 5}

TO THE GLASGOW CHAMBER OF COMMERCE.

4, Paper Buildings, Temple, E.C.,
March 14, 1908.

DEAR SIR,—We would venture most earnestly to commend the enclosed circular letter to your consideration.⁶ The Glasgow Chamber of Commerce has so deep an interest in the maintenance of the British Navy that we appeal with confidence to it to give a lead in the matter referred to.

The question is not of a party character, both because it relates to the protection of the whole of our Empire and of our sea-borne trade, and because the cleavage of opinion respecting it is far less between Liberals and Conservatives than between Liberals them-

¹ See above, pp. 335, 352 (and see also next note).

² A second result, not at the time to be foreseen, was the fall of the First Lord: see below, pp. 364 sq.

³ See further, below, *s.v.* April 2, 1908, p. 361. (And cp. below, p. 360, n. 5.)

⁴ Recalling in detail the information furnished by the great German yards themselves, so far back as the winter of 1905, "with regard to the capacity for expansion and the power of rapid construction possessed by the German shipbuilding industry."

See also *Times*, March 30, 1907; and also November 20, 1907, the latter giving details of the extensions of their works by the German shipbuilding yards in view of the new German Navy Bill (for which see above, pp. 266 sqq., and cp. also below, p. 359).

⁵ Cp. also below, p. 359.

⁶ See above, p. 344.

selves. A section of the Liberal party who desire the reduction of our naval strength has succeeded in getting the Navy Estimates reduced.¹ On the other hand, all the older and saner forms of Liberalism are in line with the Unionist party on this great national issue.

The Greenock Chamber of Commerce has already² declared its agreement with the views set forth in the League's circular letter. Other Chambers have expressed their intention of carefully considering the subject.³

We are, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.⁴

THE KAISER-TWEEDMOUTH CORRESPONDENCE AND MR. L. J. MAXSE.

March 17, 1908. "The German Emperor and Lord Tweedmouth";⁵—Mr. L. J. Maxse's reply⁶ to Mr. E. Villiers, M.P.—*Standard and Times*, March 18, 1908; reprinted (and see further) *s.v.* "Correspondence," in the *National Review*, April, 1908, pp. 334-6.⁷

"BATTLE" PRACTICE.

HOW THE HOME FLEET'S FIRING WAS TESTED.

March 17, 1908. "'Battle-Practice': How the Home Fleet's Firing was Tested";—From the *Standard's* Naval Correspondent, quoting grave information indicative "of a system which, without conducing to any real preparedness for war, is," he writes, "deliberately utilised to support the policy of the present Board of Admiralty" (see *Daily Express*, March 17, 1908, p. 5, col. 1)—and, for that purpose, we may add, to throw dust in the eyes of the public.⁸

¹ See above, pp. 349, 350 *sq.*

² March 13, 1908; Letter from the Hon. Secretaries of the Greenock Chamber of Commerce and Manufactures to ourselves:—"Dear Sirs—*The Imperial Maritime League*—We have to acknowledge receipt of your circular letter of the 2nd inst." [March 2, 1908, printed above, p. 348.] "The Directors of this Chamber desire us to state that, as in the interest of the commerce of this country a strong navy is essential, they therefore approve of a Government Inquiry into the scope and effects of the recent changes in the Navy."

³ See *e.g.*, below, p. 358.

⁴ See further the letter "to the Members of the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce" individually, below, *s.v.* April 11, 1908, pp. 373 *sq.*

⁵ See, above, pp. 335, 351, 355, and below, pp. 361, 364 *sqq.*

⁶ Of date March 17, 1908.

⁷ Correspondence arising out of the speech delivered by Mr. Maxse at Brighton, March 14, 1908, and reported in *Standard*, March 16, 1908, p. 7, col. 4.

⁸ For confirmation see further *Daily Express*, April [1], 1908, p. 5, col. 5—*s.v.* "'Fool-Gunnery': How the Home Fleet has been coddled" ("in order that it might shew a high figure of merit in the battle practice returns": *Daily Express*, *ibid.*, p. 5, col. 5)—and *cp.* also *Daily Express*, May 14, 1908, p. 5, col. 6.

LORD TWEEDMOUTH ON THE TWO-POWER STANDARD.
GENERAL ALARM.

March 18, 1908. Navy Estimates: House of Lords Debate: Dealing with (*int. al.*) the Two-Power Standard: Lord Tweedmouth's Formula. March 18, 1908. See the account given in *Morning Post*, March 19, 1908; *Times*, March 19, 1908.

Lord Tweedmouth's views, as expressed upon this occasion, gave rise to such grave and general alarm throughout the country¹ that, in order to allay it, he was constrained to write to Lord Cawdor his public letter of March 19, 1908, published in the *Times*, March 20, 1908, and reprinted above, p. 309 (cp. also above, p. 346).

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE.

PUBLIC MEETING AT EDINBURGH.²

March 23, 1908.

The Edinburgh Branch of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE founded; Hon. Sec., Mr. H. Tero, M.A.³

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE BRANCHES.

The Branches of the League already⁴ founded are⁵:—(1) North-West London and Kentish Town (the "First London"),⁶ Hon. Sec., W. H. Hills, Esq.,⁷ Assistant Hon. Sec., J. R. Shelley, Esq.⁸ (2) Hampstead (the "Second London"), Hon. Sec., B. H. P. Robinson, Esq.^{8a} (3) The County of Surrey, Hon. Sec., Miss G. E. Wyatt.⁹ (4) The County of Herts, Hon. Sec., Miss Ida G. Cruttwell-Abbott.¹⁰ (5) Edinburgh, Hon. Sec., Henry Tero, Esq., M.A.³

¹ See, *int. al.*, Lord Cawdor, late First Lord of the Admiralty, towards the close of the debate, reported *Morning Post*, March 19, 1908, and see *Morning Post* itself, March 19, 1908 ("Parliamentary Correspondent" and leading article); etc.; etc.; etc.

² For an account of this meeting—at which Mr. H. F. Wyatt was present to explain the motives and causes which had led to the formation of the New LEAGUE, as also to explain the objects of the LEAGUE, the present state of the Navy, and the work which the LEAGUE had to do—see the *Scotsman*, March 24, 1908, p. 6, col. 7.

For further account of this Branch see the *Edinburgh Evening Dispatch*, May 14, 1908, p. 4, col. 5. (See also the letter on the Two-Power Standard, from the pen of its Hon. Sec., Mr. H. Tero, in *Standard*, Nov. 17, 1908, p. 10, col. 7.)

³ For whom see preceding note, and Index, *s.v.* his name.

⁴ *I.e.*, by March 23rd, 1908.

⁵ For Branches founded later, see Index, *s.v.* "I.M.L."

⁶ See above, pp. 128, 234, 288, and below, p. 386.—President (elected June 18, 1908):—Councillor Alfred Solomon.

⁷ For whom see above, p. 299, and below, p. 386.

⁸ For whom see below, p. 520, and Index, *s.v.* his name.

^{8a} And later, Mr. G. R. Toller.

⁹ For whom see above, pp. 233, 241, and below, pp. 469, 524.

¹⁰ For whom see Index.

NORTH STAFFORDSHIRE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE.

MEETING AT STOKE-UPON-TRENT.¹

March 25, 1908.

On behalf of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE, Mr. H. F. Wyatt addressed the Chamber, by special invitation, with regard to the present Naval position—The President of the Chamber, Major Cecil Wedgwood, D.S.O., in the chair.

After the address, the President moved, the Vice-President (Captain A. E. Blizzard) seconded, and Mr. J. Ridgway supported, the following Resolution, which was carried unanimously:—

THE RESOLUTION.

"That this Chamber considers that the National Insurance "is being invalidated by the financial starvation of the Navy,² "and it strongly urges the institution of an Inquiry into the "state of the service, as recommended by two former First Sea "Lords of the Admiralty, Admiral Sir Frederick Richards and "Admiral Sir Richard Vesey-Hamilton."³

GERMANY AND THE NORTH SEA.

HER THREATENING POSITION.

March 26, 1908. "Germany and the North Sea: Her Great Naval Base";—see *Standard*, March 26, 1908, p. 5, cols. 1-2, giving an admirable and detailed account of Germany's Great War-Preparations to the south of her East Frisian Islands, on the North Sea⁴—with especial reference to canalisation for the war-purposes of Emden⁵ and Wilhelmshaven.⁷

¹ For an account of this Meeting see *Birmingham Post*, March 25, 1908; *Staffordshire Sentinel*, March 26, 1908; *Daily Express*, March 26, 1908, p. 5, col. 2; *Standard*, March 26, 1908.

² Cp. above, p. 345, text and n. 2.

³ See above, pp. 264 sq.

⁴ Cp. above, p. 154 n. 4.

⁵ Concerning which see next note, and also below, pp. 432 (text and n. 1), 444.

⁶ Cp. Mr. Arnold White, *s.v.* "England and Germany," *Standard*, Aug. 13, 1908, p. 4, col. 6 (referred to below, p. 443 n. 3):—"The warning that I venture to give to my fellow-countrymen is that Germany intends attacking this country, and that her intentions are revealed not merely by the construction of an aggressive navy on borrowed money, but by the provision on the Frisian Coast, more especially at Emden, of all the apparatus required for a sudden raid or invasion of England. This apparatus consists of two army corps, military canals, twenty-nine cranes, over two miles of quay space, military stores and shedding, coal tips, sidings, and three large harbours. Germany had no opportunity of attacking England during the Boer war" [cp. above, p. *R.F.*, and below, pp. 432, 463, 505], "but she made every attempt to do so by sounding the Great Powers for alliances against Britain. . . . Within the last fortnight I have been in Emden and . . . whatever may be the consequences I shall continue to wake England from her sleep. . . ."

⁷ Concerning which see also below, p. 359.

Compare, again—*s.v.* “New War Port for Germany” (that, namely, at Apenrade in the Baltic, to be known in future as Prinz Heinrich Haven): “Astonishing Activity in all Naval Yards”—*Daily Express*, May 25, 1908, p. 1, col. 7, where it is pointed out (*inter alia*) that “at Wilhelmshaven” [alone] “two Dreadnought docks will be completed this year [1908]”¹; while Great Britain is to wait till 1916 for her first such dock on the East Coast.²

Again:—*cp. Globe*, May 28, 1908, p. 6, col. 5, announcing that over half a million is to be laid out by Germany “during the next year or so” in fortifying Heligoland;—concerning which latter see also (*s.v.* “New German Naval Base”) *Morning Post*, Nov. 26, 1907, p. 7, col. 6; and also *Standard*, May 22, 1908, p. 7, col. 3.

See, lastly, also—concerning Wilhelmshaven, Heligoland, and Brunsbüttel—*Standard* [Dec. 12, 1907], p. 8, col. 4.

(Reference may be made concerning the German North Sea Ports generally—two years ago—to Lieut. Knox’s article, *N.L.J.*, October, 1906, pp. 248 *sqq.*)^{3a 3b}

GERMANY AND CONTROL OF FOREIGN PRESS.

March 28, 1908. “Germany and” (her) “Control of Foreign Press.”
—See *Morning Post* (leading article), March 28, 1908.⁴

GERMAN NAVAL ESTIMATES ADOPTED.

March 31, 1908. German Naval Estimates (1908–9)⁵ adopted:—and Admiral von Tirpitz (Imperial Secretary of the German Navy) summoned by the Kaiser to the Upper House of the Prussian Diet “as a mark of special confidence.”^{6 7}

¹ Three by the present year (1909); *cp.* above, p. 273, n.; and see Mr. H. W. Wilson in *Nat. Rev.*, May, 1907, p. 397.

² See above, pp. 271–3.

³ *Cp.* also, above, pp. 118, 355.

^{3a} *Cp.* also, concerning Kiel, Stettin, and Danzig (which are on the *Baltic Sea*), Lieut. Knox in *N.L.J.*, Nov., 1902, pp. 225 *sq.*

^{3b} For “A Tour round the Imperial and Private Shipbuilding Yards of the German Empire” (in 1909), see *Standard*, May 14, 1909, p. 9, cols. 2 *sq.*

⁴ See above, p. 333, and below, p. 443.

⁵ For the meaning of which see above, pp. 266 *sqq.*

⁶ “Your report of the adoption of the Naval Estimates has pleased me greatly, inasmuch as therewith a most important stage in the building up of the German Navy has been reached.”—The Kaiser’s telegram, March 31, 1908 (published in *Standard*, April 3, 1908, p. 7, col. 4).

⁷ This “New German Navy Bill for the reduction of the age-limit for battleships”—[to quote the *Westminster Gazette*, April 22, 1908—was signed by the Kaiser on or about April 20, 1908, “and will take effect in law from the beginning of the current financial year.” See the *Westminster Gazette* (*l. c.*), quoting the *Times*’ Berlin Correspondent’s quotation from the *Imperial Gazette*.

THE KAISER AND THE BRITISH ADMIRALTY.

April, 1908. "The German Emperor and the British Admiralty"—by Mr. H. W. Wilson, in the *National Review*, April, 1908, pp. 201-213.^{1 2}

April, 1908. "Episodes of the Month" (of March, 1908):—"End of a Scandal; 'Under Which King?'³; A Plea for Publication⁴; Dispassionate Criticism; Pro-German Manœuvres; The Red Herring; In Parliament; 'A Private View'; Lord Rosebery's Outbreak; Collapse of the Opposition; Our Estimates; The Kaiser's Triumph; The New Programme; Attack on Armaments; Mr. Asquith's Answer; Common Sense; Effect of Disarmament; Change of Front; An Interested Critic⁵; Lord Roberts' Warning; Gallios; *Absit Omen*."—Mr. L. J. Maxse, *National Review*, April, 1908, pp. 169-195.

"FOOL GUNNERY" IN THE NAVY.

*Third Article.*⁶

By "St. Barbara";—*Blackwood's Magazine*, April, 1908, pp. 598-610.⁷

April, 1908. "Political Parties and National Defence";—by Mr. L. J. Maxse, in the *National Review*, April, 1908, pp. 303-316.⁸

¹ Referred to below, pp. 373, 394.

² See also—*s.v.* "The German Emperor and Lord Tweedmouth"—Mr. L. J. Maxse, *National Review*, April, 1908, pp. 334-6 (referred to above, p. 356).

³ See above, p. 351, and see further below, pp. 364 *sqq.*

⁴ Cp. above, p. 352.

⁵ The German Emperor—giving Mr. Haldane (for whom see above, p. 355, and below, p. 361) the benefit of his (of course) entirely disinterested views on the Volunteer Force (see *National Review*, April, 1908, p. 191); upon which see, further, the common-sense letter of "Whitehall" (entitled "The Kaiser on British Defence") in *Standard*, January 24, 1908, p. 7, col. 3; and see also *Standard*, Jan. 23, 1908, and March 7, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, col. 5; and "C." in *Times*, March 9, 1908, p. 8, col. 1.

⁶ For "St. Barbara's" First and Second Article, see above, pp. 322, 348.

⁷ See—*s.v.* "Fool Gunnery in the Navy: 'Catapult' Shooting: Night Defence Neglect"—*Standard*, March 31, 1908, p. 9, col. 1, and (leading article), p. 6, col. 6;—and see also *Standard*, April 29, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 6-7.

See further, *Standard*, May 30, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, col. 6:—"The stock reply to all criticism" (of the pre-ent naval administration) "was that the *gunnery* of the Fleet was a marvel of 'efficiency.' It was then discovered that the basis of the official returns upon which that estimate was founded was demonstrably fallacious. The writer signing himself 'St. Barbara' brought an indictment against the whole Admiralty system regulating the gunnery practice of the Fleet, which no one has even attempted to answer." (Cp. also above, pp. 251, text and n. 7; 330, text and n. 4; 341 *sq.*; and Index, *s.v.* "Gunnery" and "Fool-Gunnery.")

See, again, *Morning Post*, May 6, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, col. 6 (below, p. 388); *Standard*, June 25, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, col. 7; June 26, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, col. 5;—and cp., incidentally, *Standard*, July 1, 1908 (leading article), p. 8, col. 5.

Concerning night attack and defence see further below, pp. 386 n., 387 (text and nn. 4, 5).

⁸ Referred to again, below, p. 394.

April 1, 1908. Battleships' Danger from Torpedo Attacks;—In the recent Channel Fleet Manœuvres (ending March 26, 1908) no less than 3 battleships were torpedoed and put out of action, while 2 others only narrowly escaped the same fate.—See *Standard*, April 1, 1908 (s.v. "The Lack of Cruisers"), p. 7, col. 4.¹

THE KAISER AND MR. HALDANE.²

THE OUTLOOK, April 4, 1908, p. 480, col. 2.

To the Editor.

4, Paper Buildings, Temple, E.C.,
April 2, 1908.

SIR,—One question of very great and urgent public importance is waiting to be put by this nation to its Government. It is the question whether the Secretary of State for War has, or has not, been in epistolary communication with the German Emperor?² Has he received any letters, private or otherwise, from that Sovereign? Has he written any letters, private or otherwise, to that Sovereign? Until this question has been put—put and satisfactorily answered—persistent rumour will still hold the field, persistent rumour which asserts that such communication, and frequent communication, has taken place.²

There are methods, in some cases used, by which the Government of the day can prevent notice of inconvenient questions from being accepted in the House of Commons, and since on this point of extreme national interest no question has been asked in that House, the public will draw the inevitable inference that the query is shunned because no reply, save one of a damning character, can be given. But the Press of this country can demand an answer on this point with a force and insistence which will compel response, and we appeal with confidence to *The Outlook* to give the necessary lead.

We are, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,
L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

¹ Cp. also, in regard to the fearful possibilities of torpedo attack—s.v. "Dreadnought Show Day: The Maharajah of Nepal sees Battleship Work"—*Daily Express*, June 20, 1908, p. 1, col. 6; from which we quote the following:—

"The torpedo-nets were lowered, and an attack was made by twelve destroyers and two scouts. Six torpedoes with dummy heads were fired. All struck the netting, and two penetrated it and reached the ship."

See also Mr. F. T. Jane, *E.S. & S.J.G.*, May 18, 1908, p. 4, col. 3, cited below, p. 387 n. 5.

(For the new U.S.A. torpedo netting and its successful trials, see *Globe*, Oct. 15, 1908, p. 4, col. 1.)

² Cp. above, pp. 355, 360 n. 5 (and cp. also *National Review*, April, 1908, p. 191).

THE IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE.

GREAT IMPETUS GIVEN BY LORD ESHER'S LETTER.

DAILY EXPRESS, *April 6, 1908*; STANDARD, *April 7, 1908*.¹

To the Editor.

Telegrams:

"Maritimers, London."

2 Westminster Palace Gardens,

Telephone:

Westminster, London, S.W.,

2810 Victoria.

April 4, 1908.

SIR,—The enclosed list² gives the names of some of those who have joined the Council or the Committee of this League, *in addition to* those whose names were notified to the Press at the time of the League's inception.^{3 4}

It may be mentioned that the full list of the League's Council and Committee now includes, besides a notable group of Members of both Houses of Parliament and other men of eminence, no less than *twenty-one*^{4a} Naval officers of Flag rank.⁵

Lord Esher's carefully elaborated attack upon the League⁶ has had the happy result of making its aims known throughout the land, and of thus giving extraordinary impetus to its growth.

The League, which is daily advancing in weight and influence, has now taken permanent offices at the address from which we write.

The efforts of the Little-Navy Party to cut down the Fleet have already during the last two years achieved deplorable success, and have visibly (and admittedly⁷) affected the programme of new construction for the current year.

We would, therefore, ask all patriotic men and women, who desire to unite in preventing the destruction of our national security, to communicate with us without delay.

We are, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH,

Founders

And Joint Honorary Secretaries.

¹ Cp. also *Manchester Courier*, April 7, 1908; *Yorkshire Herald*, April 8, 1908.

² For the List (the Additional List) in question (which included no less than eight additional Admirals) see the following:—*Times*, April 6, 1908; *Morning Post*, April 7, 1908; *Standard*, April 7, 1908.

Yet later (and additional) Lists will be found published as follows, commencing respectively with:—

(a) The Duke of Newcastle, May 24, 1908, see below, p. 403; (b)—The Earl of Romney, Nov. 2, 1908, see below, p. 466;—(c) The Earl of Kintore, Dec. 5, 1908, see below, p. 512;—(d) The Duke of Sutherland, Jan. 16, 1909, see below, p. 519;—(e) Admiral C. C. Penrose Fitzgerald, Jan. 23, 1909, see below, p. 522;—(f) The Earl of Dundonald and Rear-Admiral C. D. Lucas, V.C., March 5, 1909, below, p. 522, n. 5.

³ January 27, 1908 (above, p. 305).

⁴ See above, p. 314, n. 3.

^{4a} Now Twenty-Four. See below pp. 522 (n. 5), and 523 n. II.

⁵ Hence the title—"LEAGUE OF ADMIRALS"—given to the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE by the *Daily Express*, May 25, 1908 (cp. above, p. 349, n. 1; and see again below, p. 522, text and nn. 2, 5, 6).

⁶ See above, pp. 325 *sqq.*

⁷ See above, p. 349.

WOOLWICH ARSENAL DISCHARGES.

April 4, 1908. "Woolwich Arsenal Discharges";—by Messrs. Gilbert Slater and A. B. Bryceon; in *Daily Telegraph*, April 4, 1908.¹

"SAVED A MILLION AND LOST—AN EMPIRE."

April 5, 1908. "England the Unready";—*Observer*, April 5, 1908, p. 6, cols. 2-3 (leading article), and also p. 7, cols. 1-2² (and see hereon Mr. L. J. Maxse, in the *National Review*, May, 1908, pp. 340 sq.).

THE FINANCIAL STARVATION OF THE NAVY.

PUBLIC MEETING AT HAMPSTEAD.

April 6, 1908.

A public meeting⁴ was held at the Hampstead Conservatoire on April 6, 1908, under the auspices of the Imperial Maritime League—"To protest against the financial starvation of the Navy."⁵

Mr. Walter Reynolds, L.C.C., was in the chair, supported by the Hon. Claude G. D. Hay, M.P., Mr. H. F. Wyatt, Col. Kaye, Mr. K. J. Dougall, Mr. Leopold Farmer, Mr. G. W. Holtzapffel, and Mr. F. O. Smithers. Mr. J. S. Fletcher, M.P., and Mr. L. Graham H. Horton-Smith, who were also to have been present and to have spoken, were unavoidably detained elsewhere on business.

The following Resolution, moved by the Chairman, seconded by Mr. Harold F. Wyatt, and supported by the Hon. Claude G. D. Hay, M.P., was carried with only one dissentient:—

THE RESOLUTION.

"That this Meeting considers that the national insurance is "being invalidated by the financial starvation of the Navy⁵ and "it strongly urges the institution of an inquiry into the state "of the Service, as recommended by the two former First Sea "Lords of the Admiralty, Admiral Sir Frederick Richards and "Admiral Sir R. Vesey Hamilton."⁶

¹ Cp. further below, p. 382 n. 11.

² Entitled:—"As We Were in 1899."

³ Ending:—"History may write the epitaph of Mr. Haldane's tenure of the War Office in these terms:—'He saved a million and lost an Empire!' If he has not given us the army of our ideal, he has given us the British army of German dreams."

⁴ For an account of this Meeting see *Morning Post*, April 7, 1908, p. 9, col. 4; *Standard*, April 7, 1908; *Hampstead Express*, April 11, 1908.

⁵ Cp. above, p. 358 n. 2.

⁶ See above, pp. 264 sq.

END OF THE CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN ADMINISTRATION

RESIGNATION OF THE PREMIER

April 5, 1908¹

NEW PREMIER:—MR. H. H. ASQUITH

April 8, 1908.²

LORD TWEEDMOUTH AND MR. ROBERTSON REMOVED

Resignation of Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman, April 5, 1908;—Followed by the consequent resignation of his colleagues, including Lord Tweedmouth, First Lord of the Admiralty, and Mr. Edmund Robertson, Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty.


The new Premier:—Mr. H. H. Asquith; April 8, 1908.²

Lord Tweedmouth and Mr. Robertson *not* re-appointed to the Admiralty;—The former *removed* to the office of Lord President of the Council³;—The latter *removed* to the much-abused Upper House.⁵

A CURIOUS PEDIGREE.

*Culled from the daily Press.*⁶

Mr. Wyatt and Mr. Horton-Smith



¹ He died April 22, 1908.

² April 8, 1908;—See *Standard*, April 8, 1908, p. 7.

³ And subsequently (May 5, 1908) invested with the insignia of the "Thistle";—*Evening Standard and S.J.G.*, May 5, 1908, p. 1, col. 2.

⁴ His resignation from the office of Lord President of the Council, for reasons of ill-health, was announced September 28, 1908 (see *Standard*, September 29, 1908, p. 5, col. 4).

⁵ Mr. Robertson made a Peer;—See *Morning Post*, April 17, 1908, *Times*, April 17, 1908.

His "elevation to the House of Lords has caused considerable surprise in the Navy, but we may assume that the title of Baron has been conferred for services to his party, since the late Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty is *not known to have advanced our naval efficiency*."—Quotation from the *Naval and Military Record*, April 23, 1908, p. 258, col. 1.


We agree. He had materially assisted his party to starve and cut down the Navy for the purposes of so-called social reform.

As "Lord Lochee of Gowrie" he may escape, perchance, from the recollection of the criticisms poured upon "Mr. Edmund Robertson";—but the ill effects of his secretaryship cannot, unhappily, be so easily overcome.

⁶ See, e.g.:—*Church Times*, March 13, 1908; *Daily Mail*, March 7, 1908 (leading article), and p. 7, col. 7; *Daily Telegraph*, March 9, 1908; *Ev. Stand. and S.J.G.*, March 10, 1908, p. 3, col. 1; *Glasgow Evening News*, March 10, 1908; *Glasgow Evening Times*, March 9, 1908; *Globe*, March 7, 1908, and April 28, 1908, p. 5, col. 4, (below, p. 380, n. 6), and p. 10, col. 3; *Manchester Courier*, March 9, 1908; *Observer*, March 8, 1908 (and cp. also April 19, 1908); *Pall Mall Gazette*, March 7, 1908; *Planet*, March 14, 1908; *Sheffield Telegraph*, March 9, 1908; *Sunday Sun*, March 8, 1908; *Sunday Times*, March 8, 1908; *Vanity Fair*, March 11, 1908; *Western Daily Press*, March 9, 1908; etc., etc.

THE FOREGOING PEDIGREE PARTICULARISED.

THE IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE.



¹ Specifically marked "*Private*," and enclosing a copy of the proposed programme of the Imperial Maritime League, specifically marked:—"Proof: Subject to Revision: No. for Publication." See above, pp. 325 *seq.*

² Not specifically marked "*Private*"—but being so in fact, as in answer to a letter so marked. (See preceding note.)

[For notes 3—10, see next page.]

"The Times," says the *National Review*, April, 1908, p. 169, has "put an end once and for all to what had become an intolerable scandal. This sinister episode is by no means unique. For many years, under successive Governments, this restless, ubiquitous monarch . . . has endeavoured, with more or less success, to interfere in British affairs, to the frequent embarrassment of our Ministers, and to the invariable prejudice of our interests, the chosen instrument and confidant being usually some Minister responsible for our national defences, whom his Imperial Majesty has sought to seduce from the path of duty."¹

THE IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE may well rejoice that its foundation should have led to so specific a revelation.

It is to be hoped that never again will a British Minister of either of the Defensive Forces of the British Crown² be found parleying with "the enemy within the gate"³—parleying with the Ruler and "War-Lord" of a country, which—except diplomatically—is at no pains to hide its hostility to this country and its intention to wrest from us the Supremacy of the Seas. "*That Trident must be in our fist*" has said the Kaiser himself.⁴ And has he not already styled himself "*The Admiral of the Atlantic*"?⁵

Notes to p. 365 continued:—

(3) Unwarrantably so—and, in Lord Esher's own interests, as he now knows, unwisely so. (Care was duly taken that it should be published as widely as possible; see above, p. 325 n. 8).

For our own part, we affect no regret for Lord Esher's indiscretion. We have publicly thanked him: "*Lord Esher's carefully elaborated attack upon the Imperial Maritime League has had the happy result of making its aims known throughout the land, and of thus giving extraordinary impetus to its growth.*" (See above, p. 362.)

We thank, also, the moribund Navy League for its eager and industrious circulation of a document which they fondly hoped would leave them the impotent masters of the situation (see above, p. 325). "*Quem deus,*" etc.!

It is not uninteresting—nor unilluminating—to find Lord Esher now himself also "amongst the prophets." (See below, pp. 380 sq.)

(4) Reprinted above, pp. 326 sqq.

(5) See above, pp. 335, 351. Its publication was refused by the Government. (See above, p. 352, n. 1; and cp. also, p. 360.)

(6) See above, pp. 351, 352, n. 1, and *Outlook*, March 14, 1908, p. 357, col. 2 (above, p. 352, n. 1); and cp. also *Times*, March 10, 1908 (leading article), p. 9, col. 5.

(7) See above, p. 351. Its publication was refused by the Government. (See above, p. 351.)

(8) Reprinted above, p. 351.

(9) See, e.g., the *Times*, March 6, 1908; *National Review*, April, 1908, pp. 169–195 and 334–336; and see above, p. 352.

(10) Being accompanied in his removal by Mr. Edmund Robertson, Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty. (See above, p. 364.)

¹ Cp., also, above, pp. 333, 366 sq.

² With regard to the present Minister for War (Mr. Haldane), see above, pp. 355, 360 (n. 5), 361.

³ "The happiest thing we could hope for, for our land, was that out of the sorrows of the moment, due to the illness of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, there might come a change whereby the First Lord would not be the tool of scheming individuals or of foreign potentates."—The Hon. Claude G. D. Hay, M.P., April 6, 1908, quoted in *Standard*, April 7, 1908.

⁴ April 4, 1897. See above, p. R.F.

⁵ August, 1902. (See above, pp. R.F., 67, and cp. 145 n. 3.) See Mr. Percival A. Hislam, *The Admiralty of the Atlantic*, 1908, pp. i and v.

THE IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE

MR. HORTON-SMITH AND THE OLD NAVY LEAGUE.
ILLUMINATING CORRESPONDENCE.

April 7-8, 1908.

(I.)

The Navy League,
13, Victoria Street, London, S.W.,
April 7, 1908.

SIR,¹—

I should be glad if you would inform me whether you wish your name to be retained on the list of Honorary Vice-Presidents of the Navy League.

I am, Sir,¹ Yours faithfully,¹
WM. CAIUS CRUTCHLEY,²
Secretary.

L. Graham H. Horton-Smith, Esq., F.S.A.Scot.,
53, Queen's Gardens,
Lancaster Gate,
London, W.

(II.)

53, Queen's Gardens,
Lancaster Gate, London, W.,
April 8, 1908.

DEAR CAPTAIN CRUTCHLEY,—

In reply to your courteous letter of yesterday's date,³ asking me whether I wish my name to be retained on the List of Honorary Vice-Presidents of the Navy League, I write to say that my answer is in the affirmative, and that I look forward with confidence to a coming day when the Executive Committee of the Navy League will recognise that those Members of the League who supported Mr. Wyatt, Mr. Maxse, and myself, during the controversy of the past year,⁴ were entirely right in their views not only of the actual facts of the naval situation but also of the policy which in view of those facts should have been followed by the Navy League.

With kind regards to my old colleagues and yourself,

I remain, as always,

Yours very sincerely,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

Capt. Wm. Caius Crutchley, R.N.R.,
Secretary of the Navy League,
13, Victoria Street, Westminster, S.W.⁵

¹ See next note.

² "*Quantum mutatus ab illo!*" And how personal the matter would appear to have become on the part of the Old League's Committee. It was ever wont to be:—"Dear Mr. Horton-Smith"; and "Reciprocating your kind regards," and the like.

There has never been any personal feeling on our part, and we decline even now to allow of any—(as witness the letter of April 8, 1908, next printed in the text).

Our sole object throughout has been, and is, to serve our country in the day of her need.

³ April 7, 1908. Printed above, in the text.

⁴ 1907. See above, *passim*.

⁵ The only comment to be made is that, despite the Correspondence here printed (and which found no place in the *N.L.J.*), the name in question was deleted from the List referred to! (See the N.L.'s monthly pamphlet "*The Navy League*," June 1908.)

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE.

DRAWING-ROOM MEETING.

April 9, 1908.

A Meeting of the Imperial Maritime League was held at 15, Mansfield Street, W., on the 9th April, 1908, Mrs. Henry Allhusen kindly lending her drawing-room for the occasion.¹

Viscount Castlereagh, M.V.O., M.P., presided, and amongst those who also spoke were Mr. H. F. Wyatt, Mr. L. Cope Cornford, Mr. Robert Weatherburn, and Mr. Henry Allhusen. Mr. L. G. H. Horton-Smith was to have spoken, but was detained elsewhere on business.

A letter of considerable import from Mr. H. W. Wilson, late Editor of the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL, was read at the Meeting. We give it, with comment, below :—

RESIGNATION FROM THE NAVY LEAGUE
OF MR. H. W. WILSON.²

Author of *Ironclads in Action*, and until lately and for long years past Editor of the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL.

“1, Carmelite House,
Carmelite Street, E.C.,
April 8th, 1908.

“MR. H. W. Wilson^{2 3} deeply regrets that he is unable to attend the Meeting of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE to-morrow; but he has resigned his membership of the Old NAVY LEAGUE,⁴ and has every sympathy with Mr. Wyatt and every intention of joining the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE.”

In connection with the foregoing, it may be of interest to note that Mr. Wilson,² who has now felt compelled to resign both the Editorship of the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL⁵ (which he has edited throughout from the date of its foundation in 1895⁶) and his seat upon the Executive Committee of the Old LEAGUE⁷—as well as also his membership of that LEAGUE⁴—receives for his past services (so far as we have seen) no word of gratitude, no mention even, in the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL. In the Annual Report of the LEAGUE for 1907 (dated April 6, 1908), the fact of his resignation is not even so much

¹ For an account of the Meeting see the *Standard*, April 10, 1908, p. 8, col. 1; *Morning Post*, April 10, 1908; *Naval and Military Record*, April 16, 1908.

² For whom see above, pp. 60 etc., *passim*, and Index, *s.v.* his name.

³ Concerning the use of “Premier” type in this book see above, p. 52, n. 5.

⁴ March, 1908. See below, nn. 5, 7.

⁵ Feb., 1908 (cp. *N.L.J.*, Feb., 1908, p. 35, with *N.L.J.*, March, 1908, p. 67).

⁶ Cp. above, pp. 295 (n. 1), 317.

⁷ March, 1908 (cp. *N.L.J.*, March, 1908, p. vi, with *N.L.J.*, April, 1908, p. iv).

as hinted. Were this lest his resignation should become known to the members of their LEAGUE?

For our own part, we affect no surprise. We need only place upon record that Mr. Wilson joined both the Executive Committee and the Council of the Imperial Maritime League on April 15, 1908.¹

ADMIRALTY POLICY.

EXTRAORDINARY PLEA.

AN ALLEGED STRATEGICAL PURPOSE.

A "TADPOLE FLEET."

WHAT IS THE NAVY LEAGUE DOING?

NOTHING.

(FROM A CORRESPONDENT.)

STANDARD, April 10, 1908, p. 7, col. 7, p. 8, col. 1.²

The NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL for the current month³ opens with a leading article entitled "What is the NAVY LEAGUE Doing?"⁴ The answer, whose ingenious exposition occupies two columns, is in a word—Nothing. The inquiry would almost seem superfluous were it not that "some of the most useful and energetic members of the NAVY LEAGUE" have received (it seems) "an impression" that "the naval situation calls for energetic action," and have written to the Executive Committee to tell them so.⁵ The Committee very properly "feel that they"—the useful and energetic ones aforesaid—"have a clear claim to as explicit an answer as we can give them."⁵

The relations between the Executive Committee of the NAVY LEAGUE and the subscribers to that body are of no great interest to those outside it. But the plea, excuse, apology, and justification which the NAVY LEAGUE put forward to quiet its useful and energetic members happen to coincide precisely with the statements of the Board of Admiralty, which are of very pressing public interest indeed.

After gracefully referring to what they call a "furious agitation,"⁵ and (as usual) amiably misrepresenting the reasons for that protest, the Committee observe⁵ that "it was alleged on the part of the malcontents that these changes were being made through false economy." The meaning of this remarkable sentence desperately survives the shipwreck of its grammar. The meaning, I would suggest, is that "it was alleged by the malcontents that these changes were the result of a desire to achieve an economy, which

¹ See further below, pp. 376, 393, 396.

² See also hereon—*s.w.*, "Naval Strategy"—*Standard* (leading article), April 10, 1908.

³ *N.L.J.*, April, 1908.

⁴ *N.L.J.*, April, 1908, pp. 103 *sq.*

⁵ See *N.L.J.*, April, 1908, p. 103.

they believed to be a false economy." Assuming this interpretation to be approximately correct, what is the reply?

"The Admiralty replied specifically that their motive was not economy, but strategy."¹ Again translating, I trust I do not misrepresent what was, in effect, the Admiralty statement:—"The Admiralty replied specifically that their motive in making these changes was, not a desire to achieve economy, but a desire to serve a strategical purpose."

This is the important point. It does not matter—except to the subscribers to the NAVY LEAGUE—whether or not the Executive Committee accepts that assurance; as, not without solemnity, they assure their useful and energetic members that they do accept it.² It does not even matter what was the motive of the Admiralty. The public have nothing to do with the motives of their servants. Their only concern is with the resultant actions.

The Admiralty have stated that the recent violent changes and gradual alterations in the organisation of the Fleet have been made in accordance with a strategical purpose. What that purpose is has not been defined. Yet strategy must be directed to some particular end, in relation to some definite possibility, or it ceases to be strategy. As there is at present no naval war in progress the term can only connote a distribution of force in view of a possible emergency.

We may thus attack the problem from two points. We may assume the emergency, and then take account of the distribution of force. Or, we may take the distribution of force, and try to find for what emergency it was devised. Both these methods have the disadvantage of involving references to foreign Powers, which were better avoided. There remains a third method: Take the distribution of force, and try to find any emergency whatsoever whose requirements would be met by such distribution. If none is discoverable then the distribution of force, whatever else it may be, is not strategical.

A SINGULAR PROCESS.

Strategy, which is the art of disposing forces in face of the enemy so that they may be tactically utilised to the greatest advantage,³ is the study of the professional fighting man. It is not, however, a sealed mystery. It is based on common sense. Its elements are readily intelligible.

It is clear, for instance, that in the absence of force, which, in maritime warfare, consists of ships and men, there can be no strategy at all. In 1904 the Board of Admiralty struck off 155 ships from the active list,⁴ and recalled squadrons of cruisers, gunboats, and sloops from distant stations.⁵ In the three following years they reduced the *personnel* by 3,000 men.⁶ These were changes which aroused strong protest. By no possible ingenuity can they be represented as bearing any relation to strategy.

It is strictly relevant to the purpose of our inquiry to recall the fact that by an Order in Council, dated August 10, 1904, the First

¹ *N.L.J.*, April, 1908, p. 103.

² *N.L.J.*, 1908, p. 103. Cp. further below, pp. 375, 396, 485.

³ Cp. our definition above, pp. 306 *sq.*

⁴ Cp. above, pp. 65, 131 *sqq.*, and Index, *s.v.* "Scrapping."

⁵ Cp. above, pp. 61, 65, 131 *sqq.*, and Index, *s.v.* "Scrapping," "Withdrawal."

⁶ See above, p. 61, text, and n. 8.

Sea Lord was given practical control over the whole business of the Board.¹ Hitherto, it had been the office of the First Sea Lord to prepare the Fleet for war. He was, in fact, the "strategical" member of the Board. Under the new arrangement, he became responsible for all departments.² The strategical department, therefore, ceased to be. There is no institution at the Admiralty equivalent to the General Staff, or "thinking war" department.³ The Admiralty have stated that the War Course College at Portsmouth is a strategical department. That is playing with words. The War College is an educational department for the benefit of junior officers, having no executive authority.⁴

The abolition of whole squadrons of valuable ships having been completed⁵—a process described by the Admiralty, by their supporters in the Press, and by the Prime Minister, as strengthening the Navy—the Fleet was redistributed. The redistribution was described as a strategical arrangement. As it has since been entirely altered, it is clear either that the strategy in the first instance was mistaken or that circumstances have altered. But the only known change of circumstance consists in the steady growth of foreign navies.

We now come to the autumn of 1906, when orders were secretly issued to reduce the sea-going squadrons by nearly one-quarter their strength, and to place the battleships and cruisers thus withdrawn in the Reserve, with nucleus crews.⁶ At the same time, a squadron of serviceable battleships and a squadron of cruisers were laid up to rot at ease.⁷ Again it is to be observed that the "strategy" involved reduction of effective force. When the facts were exposed in the columns of the *Standard*, the Admiralty hastened to explain that the reduction of force was really an increase of force, because the Reserve would be called the Home Fleet,⁸ and because the international situation demanded a concentration of force round these coasts. With regard to the change of designation, one may remark that whether you call a man Timothy Thomas John or, with the late Victor Hugo, Tim-Tom-Jack, he remains the same individual.

The Home Fleet was, is, and remains a Reserve Fleet⁹: not ready for war, not trained in squadrons, and in a state of progressive disrepair.

THE SITUATION.

Assuming, what is a perfectly tenable supposition, that the international situation demanded a concentration of force in Home waters, it is pertinent to inquire in what that force consists. It consists in an increased reserve; in a reserve increased at the expense of sea training, of gunnery training, and of material efficiency¹⁰; in a reserve unfit to meet ships in active commission until it has received three to six months' fleet and ship training at sea in full commission; in a reserve which is the Territorial Army of the sea, the "six months' notice" soldiers.

¹ Cp. above, p. 1.

² Cp. above, p. 1.

³ Cp. above, p. 307.

⁴ Cp. above, p. 371.

⁵ Cp. above, p. 370.

⁶ See above, pp. 12, 14, 16, 18 *sqq.*, 23 *sq.*, etc., and Index, s.v. "Redistribution Scheme 1906," and "Nucleus Crews."

⁷ Cp. passages cited in preceding note.

⁸ Cp. above, pp. 13, 41, 219, 223, 227, 247, 302, and below, p. 399.

⁹ Cp. passages cited in preceding note, and see below, p. 399. ¹⁰ Cp. above, *passim*.

The augmented reserve consists, again, of a force which is all head and no body. It is a Tadpole Fleet. For years, the Admiralty have been sinking vast sums of public money in the building of enormous battleships.¹ These big ships may be more formidable than others, or they may not. Naval opinion is divided on that point.² But were they all as big as Noah's Ark, and chock-a-block with the finest artillery in the world, they would be nearly useless without (1) an adequate complement of swift cruisers, "whisker ships"³; (2) an adequate complement of destroyers; (3) adequate docking accommodation available at convenient spots round the coasts of these islands; (4) a highly trained and sufficient complement of men and officers; (5) adequate reserves of guns, stores, and ammunition.

*The provision of every one of these things has been steadily and deliberately neglected.*⁴

Cruisers have been thrown away, and have not been replaced;⁵ two-thirds of the destroyer force is obsolescent,⁶ and in boats fit for North Sea work Germany alone has a superiority;⁷ there are no docks which can accommodate the new ships east of Portsmouth right round the coast to Devonport⁸; the *personnel* has been cut down,⁹ and their sea training and gunnery training have been reduced¹⁰; and the votes for guns, stores, and ammunition have been decreased year by year,¹¹ while stores in stock have been consumed.¹²

Result, the Tadpole Fleet: an aggregation of big ships, to whose construction every other factor of naval power has been sacrificed, and a swollen Reserve, clogging the Home ports, unready for action. The whole witness of naval history shows that no more dangerous state of things could exist in a navy.

Let us now return to the statement of the Admiralty, as packed in the portmanteau-sentence of the NAVY LEAGUE: "The Admiralty replied specifically that their motive was not economy, but strategy."¹³

Having investigated the real nature of the recent changes in the Navy, we are now to inquire:—To what conceivable emergency is the present organisation and distribution "strategically" appropriate? Is there any war, in any quarter of the globe, for which the existing state of preparation could bear any logical relation whatever? As a humble student of naval affairs and international politics, the writer can but own he knows of none, nor can guess at any. In war, armed force must be met by armed force. Weakening force is not strategy.

But if the Fleet is not prepared for a warlike emergency, is it prepared for a peaceful emergency? Does its disposition, in other

¹ Cp. above, p. 302.

² Cp. above, p. 302, and below, p. 404.

³ See Index, *s.v.* "Battle-Fleet," and "Complementary Units."

⁴ Cp. above, *passim*.

⁵ See Index, *s.v.* "Cruisers" and "Scrapping."

⁶ See Index, *s.v.* "Destroyers."

⁷ See above, p. 340.

⁸ See above, p. 272.

⁹ See above, p. 61, text and n. 8.

¹⁰ Cp. above, p. 371, and Index, *s.v.* "Gunnery," and "Sea-Training."

¹¹ Cp. above, pp. 106, 287, and see below, pp. 373, 441, 442.

¹² See Index, *s.v.* "Stores."

¹³ *N.L.J.*, April, 1908, p. 103.

words, conform to a strategy of peace? Here, at least, is a possible solution of the problem. For, concurrently with the recent "strategical" changes, we have the Government submitting proposals for a reduction of armaments to The Hague Conference,¹ together with suggestions to abolish contraband of war.² If, then, the emergency we have been hunting exists at all, its name is Universal Disarmament. For that consummation, and that alone, the Tadpole Fleet is prepared.

You can beat a sword into a ploughshare "through false economy." But can you, with a "motive of strategy," beat a ploughshare back again into a sword?

TO THE MEMBERS OF
THE GLASGOW CHAMBER OF COMMERCE.³

Imperial Maritime League,
2 Westminster Palace Gardens, London, S.W.,
April 11, 1908.

DEAR SIR,—In view of the fact that the annual expenditure on the British Navy is now £7,100,000 less than it was in 1904, while the annual expenditure on the German Navy is £6,400,000 more than it was in that year⁴; in view of the further fact that this country is laying down this year but 38,500 tons of armoured construction against upwards of 80,000 tons laid down by Germany⁵; in view of the circumstance that the vote for ammunition has gone down from £2,082,000 in 1901 to £700,000 now⁶; that the reserve stores of the Navy have been admittedly depleted, without replacement, to the extent of £1,000,000 annually⁷; that the sea training of the Navy has been largely diminished⁸; that many of our battleships, cruisers, and destroyers have been rendered useless to the nation in the event of war by the neglect of repairs⁹; and that almost every branch of the service has suffered from financial starvation¹⁰:—the Imperial Maritime League has ventured to appeal to your Chamber of Commerce at Glasgow (as a body profoundly interested in the security of the shipping of the country) to consider the naval situation, and has offered to send a representative to address it.

A printed copy of the League's letter to your Chamber¹¹ is sent to you, under separate cover, with other papers.

This appeal has been promised the strong support of the late President of your Chamber, Mr. Brock, but we learn that an objection raised in certain quarters is that the question of our naval strength is political.

As the national existence of Britain and the national insurance of all its vast maritime interests depend absolutely on the strength of the Navy, it would seem that it should matter little to the Chamber

¹ See above, pp. 47, 49, 50, etc.

² Cp. above, p. 252, and below, p. 512.

³ This is the letter referred to above, p. 356 n. 4.

⁴ Cp. Mr. H. W. Wilson, "The German Emperor and the British Admiralty," *National Review*, April, 1908, 201-213 (above, p. 360), p. 203.

⁵ Cp. below pp. 395, 449 n. 4.

⁶ Cp. Mr. H. W. Wilson, *Nat. Rev.*, April, 1908, p. 207.

⁷ Cp. also above, p. 246, and below, pp. 377, 391, 437, 451.

⁸ Cp. Mr. H. W. Wilson, *Nat. Rev.*, April, 1908, p. 209.

⁹ Cp. the pertinent comment on this serious fact by Mr. Austen Chamberlain, M.P., House of Commons, May 25, 1908 (*Times*, May 26, 1908), p. 6, col. 4.

¹⁰ See Index, s.v. "Sea-Training."

¹¹ Cp. above, p. 320, text and n. 2.

¹² Cp. above, pp. 60 sq., 139 sq., 339; and Index, s.v. "Financial Starvation."

¹³ Printed above, pp. 355 sq.

whether the question of naval adequacy is "political" or not. In either case, every interest which the Chamber subserves is involved. But, in fact, this question is not "political" in the ordinary sense, seeing that the cleavage on the subject does not follow party lines, but runs right across the Liberal Party itself. The foes of this country, whom every sane man has to fight, are the adherents of the "Little Navy" school. Can there be any doubt on which side of this controversy the Glasgow Chamber should be ranged?

This country is now in the presence of the passing of its naval supremacy, while its population, as though drugged to sleep, lies wrapt in nerveless apathy.

We appeal to you personally to assist in bringing this matter forward at the next meeting of your Chamber, and to do what you can to rouse it to action.

We also appeal to you, if you are in sympathy with the aims of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE, which are fully stated in its programme (sent separately¹), to advance its work by joining it without delay.

The accompanying list² shows something of the support already accorded to it.

In any case we beg you to send a reply, and we enclose a stamped envelope for that purpose.

We are, Sir, Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH,

Honorary Secretaries.

NEEDS OF THE NAVY.—FACT *v.* FICTION.

"A VOICE FROM THE DEAD."

STANDARD, April 17, 1908, p. 7, col. 2; OUTLOOK, April 25, 1908.³

To the Editor.

2, Westminster Palace Gardens,

Westminster, S.W.,

April 15, 1908.

SIR,—In the columns of the daily Press there has appeared a letter from the old NAVY LEAGUE⁴ (a voice, as it were, from the dead), in which occurs this surprising passage:—"The steady pressure exercised by the LEAGUE is largely responsible for the strength of our Fleet at the present moment."⁵

To those who bear in mind not merely the dumb inertia of that LEAGUE, but, whenever it has become vocal, its ceaseless defence of the appalling evils with which the Navy has been afflicted during

¹ Printed above, pp. 305 *seq.*

² A list giving the names of some of the more important of those who (by the date of the letter here printed) had joined either the Council or the Committee (or both) of the I.M.L.—The list included no less than Twenty-One Naval Officers of Flag Rank. (The latter now number Twenty-Four; see below, pp. 522 n. 5, 523, n. 11.)

³ Also *Australasian World*, April 30, 1908; *Birmingham Weekly Post*, April 25, 1908; *Chiswick Express*, April 24, 1908; *Civil Service Gazette*, April 25, 1908; *Eastern Morning News*, April 24, 1908; *Morning Advertiser*, April 25, 1908; *Naval and Military Record*, April 30, 1908; *Sunday Sun*, April 26, 1908; *Sunday Times* April 26, 1908; *Weekly Sun*, April 26, 1908.

⁴ Dated April 14, 1908, and appearing in, *e.g.*, *Standard*, April 17, 1908, p. 7, col. 2. Reprinted *N.L.J.*, May, 1908, p. 140.

⁵ *N.L.J.*, May, 1908, p. 140.

⁶ Cp. incidentally, hereon, below, p. 376 n. 2.

the last two years,¹ this assertion may well seem to deserve the palm for shameless effrontery. To be correct, the sentence² should run thus :—"The steady pressure exercised by the LEAGUE in support of the little-Navy policy of the Liberal Government³ is largely responsible for the weakness of our Fleet at the present moment."

Have fifty-nine cruisers, removed from the Navy List in 1904, failed to be replaced by new vessels?⁴ The NAVY LEAGUE has declared that enormous void to be "strategical."⁵ Has about a fourth of our armoured strength at sea been withdrawn from full service to semi-service?⁶ The NAVY LEAGUE has alleged this great diminution of the training of the officers and men of the Navy to be "strategical" also.⁷ Have British naval bases been dismantled and distant squadrons recalled?⁸ "Strategy," not economy, says the NAVY LEAGUE, is the cause.⁹

Though the *personnel* has been reduced by 3,000 men¹⁰; though numbers of battleships, cruisers, and destroyers have been crippled by neglect of repairs,¹¹ the Executive Committee of the betrayed LEAGUE have no word of reprobation, and have even repudiated the bygone utterances of their own official JOURNAL in which these measures were once condemned.¹²

Actually, in the current number of that JOURNAL, this position of acquiescence in the reduction of naval strength is reaffirmed. It is declared that the assurance of the Board of Admiralty (the Board which, in the grip of the little-Navy party, has been proved to be as clay in the hands of the potter) "must be accepted,"¹³ and the intimation is plainly given that, in the Committee's opinion, "there is at present no case for a special agitation."¹⁴ Yet in their letter just published the Committee admit that, at any rate in regard to the question of new construction—the only point as to which they appear to be in the least concerned—there is need of supplementary estimates¹⁵ and of a new Naval Defence Act.¹⁶ Do the Committee then suppose that such estimates and such an Act can be obtained without "special agitation"? And if the agitation be needful, which of their utterances will they prefer to repudiate—that in their JOURNAL of the 1st April,¹⁴ or that in their letter which has just seen the light?^{17 18}

¹ See above, *passim*.

² Quoted above, p. 374.

³ Cp. above, *passim*, incl. pp. 239 *sq.*, 247, 379, and Index, *s.v.* "Liberals," and "Old N.L."

⁴ Cp. above, pp. 65, 131 *sq.*, 340.

⁵ Cp. above, pp. 375, 398; and see Index, *s.v.* "Old N.L.," "Scrapping," and "Strategy."

⁶ Cp. above, pp. 12, 14, 16, 18 *sq.*, 23 *sq.*, etc., etc.

⁷ See Index, *s.v.* "Old N.L.," "Sea-Training," and "Strategy."

⁸ Cp. above, pp. 61, 131, 140, etc.

⁹ Cp. above, pp. 126, etc., and Index, *s.v.* "Naval Stations," "Old N.L." and "Strategy."

¹⁰ Cp. above, p. 61, text and n. 8.

¹¹ Cp. above, p. 320 text and n. 2.

¹² Cp. above, pp. 64, 88, 117, 120, 130, 139, 151, 158, 161, 167, 175, 186, 191, 201, 207, 208, 210, 231, 290, 294, 296, and below, p. 396.

¹³ *N.L.J.*, April, 1908, p. 103. See further above, p. 370, and below, pp. 396, 485. (And cp. further, above, p. 278.)

¹⁴ *N.L.J.*, April, 1908, p. 103.

¹⁵ "Large Supplementary Estimates";—*N.L.J.*, May, 1908, p. 140; and cp. also *N.L.J.*, April, 1908, p. 103, June, 1908, p. 173. See further below, pp. 383, 396.

¹⁶ *N.L.J.*, May, 1908, p. 140, and also *N.L.J.*, June, 1908, p. 173 (and see below, pp. 388, 396).

¹⁷ Dated April 14, 1908. See above, p. 374, n. 4.

¹⁸ "The conduct of the *Navy League Journal*"—writes the *Naval and Military Record*, April 23, 1908, p. 258—"is not our concern, but it is surprising that the League does not perceive the desirability of insisting upon reasonable conformity between the views of the Editor and those of the League as voiced by the Executive."

Sir, the course pursued by the Committee of the old NAVY LEAGUE would be grotesque if it were not tragic. Sadness and indignation are the inevitable feelings of any one who appreciates the nature of the wreck which they have made.

No wonder that Mr. H. W. Wilson, one of the foremost of living naval writers, and one of the most loyal and devoted adherents whom the old LEAGUE (whose JOURNAL he for long years edited) has ever possessed, should at last have felt constrained by his duty to his country to withdraw his support, and to transfer it to the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE.¹²

We are, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

THE "LIBERAL" BETRAYAL OF THE NAVY.

DAILY EXPRESS, April 17, 1908, p. 4, col. 4.

To the Editor.

The Imperial Maritime League,

2, Westminster Palace Gardens, S.W.,

April 16, 1908.

SIR,—Lord Tweedmouth on Wednesday³ confided to the Royal Naval College at Dartmouth the pleasing fact that he had two and a half "very happy years" at the Admiralty.⁴

Human ideas of enjoyment differ widely, but there are few men whose conceptions of it can coincide with those of the late First Lord. To be the official head of what he terms "the greatest service in the world," and in that capacity to be a consenting party to both the relative and the absolute decline of its strength, would be an experience disagreeable to the average man.

One of Lord Tweedmouth's early excitements at the Admiralty was to witness the sudden change of mind of his Board. In November, 1905 (while Mr. Balfour was in office) that Board thought—and said in the Cawdor memorandum—that eight *Dreadnoughts* must be laid down within the next two years if the country were to preserve its naval supremacy.⁵ In July, 1906⁶ (when the "Liberal" Government had come into power⁷) the Board reached the opinion that six, or possibly even five, of these vessels would suffice to attain this end.⁸ How surprised Lord Tweedmouth must have been!

¹ See above, pp. 368 *sq.*

² For the *Western Mercury's* amusing and poignant comment on the Navy League's letter of April 14, 1908 (above, p. 374 n. 4), see below, pp. 378 *sq.*

³ April 15, 1908.

⁴ See *Daily Express*, April 16, 1908.

⁵ See above, pp. 1, 4, 5, 6, etc.

⁷ See above, p. 4.

⁶ July 27, 1906 (see above, p. 5).

⁸ See above, pp. 5 *sq.*

As a result of this interesting mental revolution on the part of his Board, this country has abandoned in practice (of course, not in theory) the Two-Power standard, laying down in 1907-8 only about seventy thousand tons of vessels of war as against about the same amount laid down by Germany.¹ For this year, 1908-9, the theory² of maintaining the Two-Power standard is more flourishing than ever, having just been re-affirmed by Mr. Asquith.³

But the practice—which, after all, is the only thing that matters—is the utter submergence of that standard and its replacement by a Half-One-Power standard,⁴ framed to suit the requirements of Mr. Murray Macdonald and his Little-Navyites.⁵ For this year we are laying down only 38,750 tons of armoured construction, as against upwards of 80,000 tons of like construction to be laid down by our German rivals.⁶

Lord Tweedmouth was the head of the Board of Admiralty which has agreed to this infamy. He must indeed have completed his two and a half happy years in a blaze of pleasure.

He has, in addition, during his term of office sanctioned the application of a deliberate system of financial starvation to the service the protection of which was his first duty.⁷ The reserve stores of the Navy, as he himself admits, have been depleted to the extent of a million pounds annually.⁸ The *personnel* has been reduced.⁹ The sum of unemployment has been increased by the discharge of thousands of men from the Royal dockyards.¹⁰ Vitally essential repairs have been burked and scamped.¹¹

Mr. Asquith's assurances of good intention for the future must be construed in the light of performance in the past. He has been a party to the wrecking of our naval supremacy. If his repentance be sincere, let him avow at once, while these by-elections are impending, his intention to bring in supplementary Estimates¹² and to institute a Commission of Inquiry into the state of the Fleet.¹³ Failing such a declaration, every vote given to a Liberal at Manchester,¹⁴ or at Dewsbury, or elsewhere, is a vote given for the further destruction of the only force which defends the liberties of this country from final subversion by a foreign foe.

We are, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

1 Cp. above, pp. 62 *sq.* (text and nn.), 140.

2 Cp. Mr. F. T. Jane, below, p. 378.

3 See above, p. 352.

4 See above, pp. 350 *sq.*

5 Cp. above, p. 349.

6 Cp. above, pp. 347 (text and nn.), 373 (text and nn. 6, 7), and below, pp. 391, 437,

451.

7 Cp. above, pp. 339, etc.

8 Cp. above, pp. 320, 373, and below, pp. 382, 389, 391, 395, 398, 399, 491.

9 Cp. above, p. 61, text and n. 8.

10 Cp. above, p. 61, text and n. 7 (and below, p. 382). And this is not the less true, even if (as stated, *Daily Mail*, March 3, 1908) 3,000 were again added in 1908. (See below, p. 382 n. 10).

11 Cp. above, *e.g.*, p. 320, text and n. 2.

12 Cp. again, below, pp. 494, 496, 516, 518.

13 See above, pp. 264 *sq.*, etc.

14 Mr. Winston Churchill (seeking re-election on his appointment as President of the Board of Trade) was defeated at Manchester almost immediately after this letter's publication.

UNDER THE WHITE ENSIGN.

BY MR. F. T. JANE.

EVENING STANDARD AND ST. JAMES'S GAZETTE, *April 20, 1908.*

"Mr. McKenna, as First Lord of the Admiralty, is being looked forward to with considerable curiosity. He has the reputation of being a Little-Navyite¹; and, if this be true, there are lively times ahead. There is not the least doubt in the world that we are deplorably short of destroyers² and small cruisers,³ while our lead in big battleships is nominal rather than actual.

* * *

"The latest manifesto of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE⁴ has hit the right nail on the head. This points out that most of the responsible heads of the present Government are very attached to the Two-Power Standard in *theory*; but that the more they theorise about it, the less indications do they give of *practice*. This exactly expresses the present state of affairs."⁵

"THE SERIOUS NAVY LEAGUE."

WESTERN MERCURY (Plymouth), *April 22, 1908.*

"The NAVY LEAGUE last week⁶ . . . gravely informed the British nation that the present satisfactory condition of its naval defences is mainly due to the steady pressure which the NAVY LEAGUE has exercised upon the Admiralty. The pomposity of this abstract, unofficial body of well-meaning patriots who style themselves the Executive of the NAVY LEAGUE is humorous by virtue of its profound seriousness. Does 'my Committee,' to which the secretary of the LEAGUE refers with all due reverence, really believe that the public will accept this astounding statement at the full significance of the terms in which it is expressed? Frankly, we regret to see such a ludicrous attitude on the part of those who are responsible for the administration of the NAVY LEAGUE . . .

"We suspect that the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE was the real objective of this grandiose assurance, the hidden purpose being to suggest a contrast in achievements. If this be so, however, the attempt has failed. The 'NAVIER LEAGUE' is not going to permit

¹ "The danger" involved "in the appointment of the new First Lord of the Admiralty, who is regarded on all sides as a wrecker," is so referred to in the *Globe*, May 15, 1908, p. 2, col. 1.

Mr. McKenna was the Liberal protagonist against the Cawdor Memorandum of November, 1905, as to which cp. above, pp. 1, 5, etc. (See *Observer*, April 19, 1908, p. 6, col. 4.)

It will be recollected, in passing, that even the Cawdor Memorandum itself, with its eight *Dreadnoughts*, to be laid down within the two succeeding years, was pronounced by the Old Navy League to be entirely inadequate. See *N.L.J.*, Jan., 1906, p. 2.

² See above, pp. 61, 76 *sq.*, 140, 340, etc., and below, p. 449.

³ See above, pp. 10, 36, 41, 67, 77, 78, 107, 121, 268, 291, 302, 309, 312, 322, 324, 340, 341, 342, 347, 361, 372, and below, pp. 385, 407, 418, 426, 447, 457, 460, 471, 491, 496, 498, 518 *sq.*

⁴ April 16, 1908. Reprinted above, pp. 376 *sq.*

⁵ Cp. also below, pp. 435 *sq.*, text and nn.

⁶ April 14, 1908, (*N.L.J.*, May, 1908, p. 140), above pp. 374 n. 4, 376 n. 2.

the older organisation to take credit for such a stupendous accomplishment as it arrogates unto itself. Paper Court¹ has poured a broadside of derision into Victoria Street^{2,3} and . . . we must fain confess that in the present case the NAVY LEAGUE asked for what it has got."

MANŒUVRES THAT ARE NOT SHAM.

TEN WEEKS' NOTICE FOR THE "INSTANTLY READY."

DAILY EXPRESS, April 22, 1908, p. 5, col. 2.

When it is recalled that, a few weeks before the Navy Estimates for this year were published, the Portsmouth and Devonport Divisions of the Home Fleet were "mobilised to war strength" at about ten minutes' notice (according to the Admiralty),⁴ it is difficult to understand why orders to prepare the same ships for four weeks' manœuvres should have been given ten weeks before the date on which they will be required.

This is what has been done, however. The naval manœuvres are to begin on June 25th,⁵ and orders to get the Home Fleet ready for sea were issued last week.

There is, of course, this difference. The mobilisation before the Estimates⁶ was a sham affair. The men were simply paraded, marched on board the ships as they lay alongside the wharves, and marched back to barracks again,⁷ and, as showing the celerity with which the operation was performed, it is stated that the crews of some of the ships were actually on board before the "surprise" order to mobilise was given!

The mobilisation of June⁸ will be for the purpose of carrying out a four weeks' war-footing test in the North Sea under Lord Charles Beresford. If the chain is not to snap, it must be a strong one—not a sham. Hence the ten weeks' notice to the "instantly ready."⁹

April 23, 1908. The North Sea and Baltic Agreements;—For the texts of the Declaration and Memorandum signed at Berlin, April 23, 1908, see the *Times*, April 25, 1908, p. 8, col. 4.¹⁰

¹ "Paper Buildings"—to be strictly accurate.

² No. 13, Victoria Street;—The Head-Quarters (at the time) of the Old Navy League.

³ April 15, 1908. See above pp. 374 *seq.*

⁴ Cp. above, p. 322, and below in the text.

⁵ June 25, 1908. The date for the mobilisation of the Home Fleet for the combined Fleet exercises with the Channel and Atlantic Fleets was subsequently postponed from June 25 to June 30 (1908). See *Standard*, May 19, 1908, p. 7, col. 6, and see below, *s.v.* July 1, 1908, p. 412.

⁶ See above, p. 322.

⁷ Cp. also *Morning Post*, February 4, 1908 ("AZ"), p. 5, col. 3, and (leading article) p. 6, col. 6.

⁸ June, 1908.

⁹ Cp. also *Standard*, June 15, 1908, p. 7, col. 4.

¹⁰ See, as to this, in advance, Mr. L. J. Maxse on "The Northern Question," *National Review*, February, 1908, pp. 843 *sq.* (above, p. 322).

April 23, 1908. "Napoleonic Vision: Meaning of German Overtures to France."—*Daily Express*, April 23, 1908, p. 5, col. 4.¹

April 23 (St. George's Day), 1908. "Our Sleeping Nation";—by Mr. Edward Noble (author of "*The Grain Carriers*")—first of a series of seven articles in the *Morning Post*, April 23, May 7, 13, 19, 26, June 2, 5, 1908.^{2 3}

GERMAN NAVAL MENACE.

VISCOUNT ESHER BECOMES AN "ALARMIST."

PERMANENT "INQUIRY" ADVOCATED.

DAILY EXPRESS, April 28, 1908, p. 5, col. 2.

One of the most significant warnings regarding the German menace to our naval supremacy appears in the current issue of the *National Review*.⁴ The significance of the article lies in the fact that only three months ago⁵ Lord Esher publicly scoffed at the suggestion that the policy of the Admiralty under the present Government was doing anything to weaken the supremacy which is so vital a necessity to this country.^{6 7}

"Ten years ago," he points out, "the flag of England flew supreme over the oceans and seas of the world. To-day we have been forced to abandon our supremacy over the great waterway which separates Canada as well as the United States from the Far East. Although we may flatter ourselves that this abandonment is due to the Japanese Alliance on the one hand and our blood relation to the United States on the other, it is due, in point of fact, to the rise of German sea power."^{8 9}

¹ Cp. "An R. N.," writing in *P.M.G.*, June 3, 1908, of the "Kaiser's Napoleonic programme."

² For interesting comment hereon, see *Morning Post*, June 5, 1908 (leading article: "The British Mercantile Marine"), p. 6, col. 7.

³ See also in *Morning Post*, June 24, 1908.

⁴ "To-Day and To-Morrow";—by Lord Esher, *National Review*, May, 1908, pp. 385-394. See below, p. 386.

⁵ "The peril of the naval position during the next few years can hardly be exaggerated."—Such is the conclusion reached by Lord Esher in the article in question (see *Daily Mail*, April 8, 1908).

It is a conclusion reached long ago by the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE and those who founded it.

⁶ See above, pp. 325 sqq.

⁷ Commenting upon Lord Esher's article—published in the *National Review* (see above, n. 4)—the *Globe*, April 28, 1908, p. 5, col. 4 (referred to above, p. 364, n. 6, writes:—

"In apportioning the significance of the article, it may be recalled that Lord Esher's opinions on naval subjects"—[i.e., as detailed in his letter to ourselves: see above, pp. 325 sqq.]—"formed the text of the Kaiser's famous letter to Lord Tweedmouth."

⁸ The italics in this reprint are ours.

⁹ Cp. further, below, p. 397.

⁹ And it means, in other words, the abandonment by Britannia of her claim to "rule the waves." Alas! for the poet's prayer (for such it is—and not, as generally assumed, a proud assertion of a fact);—Britannia claims to-day to rule but *half* the waves.

"So rapid has been the acquisition of naval strength by Germany, and so formidable are her fleets in being and in preparation, that she has forced upon England a concentration which has thrown the control of the Pacific into other hands."¹

For every ship that our great rival builds we must build two of equal strength, he declares, and then *in words that admit the whole position of the critics of the Government's naval policy he adds*² :—

"The question, therefore, above all other questions vital to the electorate and to every British man and woman, whether resident in these islands or beyond them, is :—Whether the present Board of Admiralty, or any Board of Admiralty which may succeed it, fulfils the primary duty of its existence, that duty being to ensure the supremacy at sea not only to-day, and not only to-morrow, but on the day after to-morrow."

In conclusion, Lord Esher, who, of course, is not a naval expert, suggests the need for the appointment of a Parliamentary Committee on the French system, the duty of which shall be to see *that the votes for naval purposes are spent to the best advantage*³—in other words, a permanent body of "Inquirers."²

THE BY-ELECTION CAMPAIGNS.

EAST WOLVERHAMPTON.

STANDARD, April 30, 1908, p. 7, col. 7.

(From the STANDARD's Special Correspondent.)

Wolverhampton, April 29, 1908.

NAVAL POLICY.

We have heard something to-day also as to the tactics of the Government on matters naval. Mr. Harold F. Wyatt, of the *Imperial Maritime League*, addressed an open-air mass meeting in the division upon this topic.⁴

¹ At this point in Lord Esher's article occurs the following significant passage :—

"Concurrently with this development of sea-power, Germany has shown a determination to compete with Great Britain for the carrying trade of the world. . . . The trade-routes of the world are covered with German shipping, and into every nook and corner of the civilised and half-civilised world German goods rapidly and surely are pushing their way."

"Across the North Sea lies a nation already 60,000,000 strong, with the most highly trained and formidable army ever known in history, a nation highly educated, unspoilt as yet by luxury, proud of its achievements, ambitious for its future, and dependent for its further development upon finding outlets for a population growing and confined, and upon creating markets for its manufactures. A German statesman, or publicist, or merchant, looking abroad and ahead, sees in the immediate foreground—while Russia lies still in half-awakened torpor—the rivalry of England."

"Like other commercial rivalry, the rivalry of nations requires a victim. They look to themselves, and we have to look to ourselves."

² The italics in this reprint are ours.

³ "If it is a function of Parliament to audit expenditure upon which national credit is based, is it not," he asks, "equally its duty to audit the Fleet upon which our national existence depends?"

⁴ Cp. also the *Times*, April 30, 1908, p. 16, col. 1.

He said that he appealed to his audience both to vote and to labour to the utmost in support of Mr. Amery's candidature,¹ not merely on party grounds, not merely for the reasons, however excellent, to which other speakers were giving forcible expression, but because the Liberal party had committed the greatest crime which any British Government could perpetrate. For party purposes, to obtain party votes, to fulfil party pledges, they had laid their deadly and paralysing hands upon the British Fleet²; they had starved its administration³; they had depleted its stores⁴; they had diminished its training⁵; they had cut down our programme of new armoured construction for this year to less than half that of Germany,⁶ and even on that half they were spending only bogus amounts.⁷ It was to save coal that they had lessened training, and accident after accident⁸ seemed to bear witness to the decreased efficiency which decreased training meant. While they prated about their care for the unemployed, their discharges of men from the dockyards⁹ and from Woolwich Arsenal¹⁰ had swelled the army of those unemployed by flinging thousands of men upon the streets¹²—that was the army of the unemployed which had alone flourished under this "Liberal" Government. The real Army, the Army which served the flag, and which had given noble proofs of its devotion on the battlefields of the world, they had cut down by 26,000 men,¹³ while they had legislated more than three hundred thousand Militia and Volunteers out of existence, and had replaced them only by a Territorial Army, which threatened to turn out the most hideous and ghastly failure of which any British Government had ever been the authors.

Having reduced all our military arrangements at home to a state of wreckage, the Government had made our dependence on the Navy more absolute than ever before, and the fighting efficiency of the Navy they had half destroyed. They had converted the strength of the Navy from real strength into paper strength for the sake of party. To win the votes of their Little England and Little Navy followers, they had flung and fooled away the safety of Britain. He stood for a league—the *Imperial Maritime League*—which, without respect to party, would attack and denounce any Government that sinned against this nation, and against the peace of the world, by

¹ Mr. Amery will be found already mentioned above, p. 354.

² Cp. above, *passim*, and Index, *s.v.* "Liberals."

³ Cp. above, *passim*.

⁴ See above, pp. 320, text and n. 4, 377, text and n. 8.

⁵ See above, p. 320, text and n. 5.

⁶ See above, pp. 373, etc.

⁷ See above, pp. 347, 350.

⁸ Cp. below, pp. 384 *sq.*, 391.

⁹ See above, pp. 61 (text and n. 7), 65, 74 *sq.*, 140, etc., and below, p. 391.

¹⁰ "The reduction of 7,000 in the Dockyard workmen between 1904 and 1906 brought misery into thousands of poor homes in Chatham, Devonport, and Portsmouth, which is not removed by the sudden increase this year of 3,000 in the Dockyard staff."—*Daily Mail*, March 3, 1908 (referred to above, p. 377 n. 10).

See further, Index, *s.v.* "Dockyard Workmen."

¹¹ Cp. Messrs. G. Slater and A. B. Bryceson, in *Daily Telegraph*, April 20, 1908, and in *Standard*, April, 21, 1908, p. 3, col. 4; cp. above, p. 363, and further below, p. 361 n. 10.

¹² Further discharges, actual and prospective, announced, *s.v.* "More Naval Economy: Dockyard Reduction Policy," *Standard*, May 26, 1908, p. 8, col. 5; and *s.v.* "Dockyard Discharges: Official Naval Programme seriously Delayed," *Daily Express*, May 26, 1908, p. 1, col. 7.

¹³ 36,000 (see *Observer*, April 5, 1908);—or 23,000 (see *Standard*, June 18, 1908, p. 6, col. 6). Cp. also below, p. 475.

reducing the strength of the British Fleet. Therefore, he appealed to all patriotic men, Liberals and Conservatives alike, to vote for the Unionist candidate. The past two years and the present Navy Estimates proved the fact that every vote given for a Liberal was a vote given for the destruction of the naval supremacy of the British people.

THE BY-ELECTION CAMPAIGNS.

EAST WOLVERHAMPTON.

WHITTLING DOWN THE NAVY.

STANDARD, May 1, 1908, p. 8, col. 1.

(From our Special Correspondent.)

Wolverhampton, April 30, 1908.

The interest which the consideration of the injury inflicted on the Navy by the Liberal Government has the power to excite was again shown to-day at a meeting addressed by Mr. Harold F. Wyatt, who spoke on behalf of the *Imperial Maritime League*.

He pointed out the part played by the Fleets of Britain in building up the maritime and commercial ascendancy of the British people. That ascendancy had not been obtained by an attitude of unlimited reliance upon the forbearance and goodwill of rival nations such as we were now invited to assume by the extraordinary idiots who belonged to the little-England and little-Navy schools of imbecility. It had been won, on the contrary, in days of raging war, when our triumphal squadron swept the mercantile marines of our foes off the face of the sea and gained at the cannon's mouth the commercial hegemony of the world. The carrying trade of mankind was the prize of victory secured by British naval prowess and handed down as a heritage to the generation that was living now; but, as it had been gained by naval supremacy, so must it still be kept.¹ And how long could it be kept if a naval war broke out to-morrow, seeing that we no longer had the number of cruisers requisite to guard the ocean trade routes from attack?

The vast void created by the removal of fifty-nine cruisers from the Navy list in 1904 had never been made good.² No longer could the merchant ships that bore the goods of our people or carried to our shores the food necessary to our subsistence look with confidence to the Navy for help in distant seas.³ To gain votes by saving money, the "Liberals" had scamped the Fleet to please the fools who clamoured for a reduction of naval expenditure.⁴ They had not built new cruisers to take the place of those fifty-nine that were gone,² and when war broke out the vast multitudes of working folk in this country, who earned their bread by converting raw material imported over the waters of the globe into manu-

1 "Whosoever commands the sea commands the trade, and whosoever commands the trade of the world commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself."—Sir Walter Raleigh. (Attributed also to a later writer, James Whiston.)

2 See above, pp. 65, 132, 341, etc.

3 Cp. above, pp. 36 *sq.*, etc., and see Index, *s.v.* "Commerce."

4 See above, *passim*, and Index, *s.v.* "Liberals," "Pledged," and "Appeals."

factured articles, would find themselves flung in their millions starving upon the streets because both that raw material necessary to their labour, and their very food as well, could no longer be protected by our fighting ships. Then they could pour out curses upon the Liberal Government which had betrayed them by leaving cruisers unbuilt; but their curses would be useless then, because no effort made during the swift and fierce impact of naval war could make good the neglect during peace.¹ But if now they showed their hate and their contempt for the Cabinet of canting Pecksniffs who had dared for their miserable party ends to reduce the strength and impair the efficiency of the Royal Navy, then there might, perhaps, still be time to remedy the evil that had been inflicted on the Navy before the hour of trial came.

The most powerful argument that could be presented to the Liberal Government was the loss of votes at a by-election. We might appeal to them in vain on grounds of reason, or duty, or common sense, but if we could once prove to them that neglect of the Navy meant loss of votes, then they would begin to be stirred. Therefore, he adjured every man who loved his country, and desired to see her still great and free amongst the competing nations of the earth, to vote and to work for the return of the Unionist candidate. He said again that every vote given to a Liberal was a vote given towards the destruction of the British Navy.

ESQUIMALT.

"We went to look at a marine junk store which had once been Esquimalt, a station of the British Navy."²—Mr. Rudyard Kipling, *Letters to the Family*, No. VIII.,³ *Morning Post*, April 30, 1908.

DISASTROUS APRIL.

MORNING POST, April 29 and 30, 1908.

"The month of April, 1908, will long be remembered as one fraught with disaster to the Navy. On the 2nd inst.⁴ the torpedo-boat [-destroyer] *Tiger* was cut in two by the cruiser *Berwick* during night manœuvres, 35 lives being lost.⁵ On the 25th⁶ the cruiser *Gladiator* was rammed by the [liner] 'St. Paul,' and 27 persons

¹ Cp. above, p. R.F.

² See above, pp. 61 (text and n. 5), 65 (text and n. 2).

³ For the preceding articles of the series see the *Morning Post* (1908), March 12, 19, and 26, and April 2, 9, 16, 23.

⁴ April 2, 1908.

⁵ The manœuvre which was being executed by the *Tiger*—that of running between warships in line—which (it was stated at the inquest) is always avoided in the British Navy as being "a highly dangerous proceeding," is, be it noted (according to "Gyro," s.v. "Destroyer Tactics," *Standard*, April 9, 1908, p. 7, col. 6), "very frequently carried out by the destroyer flotillas attached to the German Active Battle Fleet, the destroyers steaming through the intervals between the battleships, not singly, but in columns of three or four, which makes the operation much more difficult."

(An admirable photograph given by Mr. Percival A. Hislam, in his *Admiralty of the Atlantic*, Feb., 1908, will help our readers to understand the manœuvres).

⁶ April 25, 1908.

were drowned.¹² To-day³ we have to record yet another accident involving the sinking of one destroyer [the *Gala*] and serious damage to another [the *Ribble*], accompanied by the loss of an officer; while on board the battleship *Britannia* an explosion occurred, injuring 3 men seriously and 2 less severely. . . .”—*Morning Post*, April 29, 1908, p. 7, cols. 6-7.⁴

“The codicil to the whole sad business is that we have in a month lost one cruiser and two destroyers,⁵ ships belonging to classes in which our weakness has become apparent.⁵ . . .”—*Morning Post*, April 30, 1908, p. 7, col. 6.⁶

¹ For the inquiries into the cause of this disaster see:—*Standard*, April 29, 1908 p. 8, col. 2; June 11, 1908; June 12, 1908, p. 6, col. 2; June 13, 1908, p. 7, col. 5; etc.

For the dismissal of the Admiralty's appeal (by the Court of Appeal), see *Globe*, Dec. 18, 1908, p. 4, col. 4 (and see also *Standard*, Dec. 18, 1908, p. 6, col. 5).

² For the endeavours made to refloat the *Gladiator*, see:—*Morning Post*, July 20, 1908, p. 8, col. 5; *Daily Express*, July 21, 1908, p. 7; *Standard*, July 28, 1908, p. 7, col. 3; *E.S. & S.J.G.*, July 28, 1908, p. 7, col. 4; *Daily Express*, August 4, 1908, p. 1, col. 2; August 10, 1908, p. 5, col. 5; *Standard*, August 10, 1908, p. 8, col. 1; *E.S. & S.J.G.*, August 17, 1908, p. 7, col. 3; *Daily Express*, September 9, 1908; p. 5, col. 4, and p. 7; *Standard*, September 29, 1908, p. 5, col. 4; October 2, 1908, p. 7, col. 6; October 3, 1908, p. 6, col. 5; *Daily Express*, October 3, 1908 (*s.v.* “Is the *Gladiator* worth saving?”), p. 5, col. 3; Oct. 5, 1908, p. 5, col. 4 (“The *Gladiator* in port: Great salvage feat accomplished: Is she worth it?”), and p. 5, col. 5 (“The *Gladiator* at Portsmouth: great salvage feat: £50,000 operation”); *E.S. and S.J.G.*, Oct. 7, 1908 (“*Gladiator* docked”).

See also Mr. F. T. Jane, in *E.S. & S.J.G.*, October 5, 1908:—“It is to all intents and purposes settled that she will never revert to the Navy List as an effective cruiser.”

Mr. Jane was right. Her fate was:—to be broken up and sold out of the service;—See *Globe*, Oct. 15, 1908, p. 6, col. 3; *E.S. & S.J.G.*, Oct. 15, 1908, p. 12, col. 3; Mr. Jane in *E.S. & S.J.G.*, Oct. 20, 1908; *Morning Post* (Naval Correspondent), Oct. 21, 1908, p. 4, col. 2; and cp., also, *Standard*, Nov. 25, 1908, p. 9, col. 2, and Mr. McKenna (Dec. 1, 1908), quoted in *E.S. & S.J.G.*, Dec. 1, 1908, p. 14, col. 1:—and see *E.S. & S.J.G.*, Dec. 19, 1908, p. 10, col. 2.

⁴ In the same issue, p. 7, col. 7 and p. 8, col. [7], *s.v.* “The Perils of the Navy: A Record of Five Years”—the *Morning Post* gives a list of naval “accidents which have occurred during the past five years”;—a “formidable list” which, however, “was not complete,” in that “it did not, for instance, include the [t.b.d.] *Ariel*, which was lost at Malta a year ago” [in night manoeuvres, April, 1907: cp. *E.S. & S.J.G.*, April 22, 1907]. See the Naval Correspondent of the *Morning Post* in its issue of April 10, 1908, p. 7, col. 5.

For the official Admiralty return, purporting to give (*int. al.*) the numbers of British vessels of war which have been totally lost (16) or been in accidents (442) between January, 1901, and May 27, 1908, see *Standard*, August 21, 1908 (*s.v.* “Naval Losses: Record of Seven Years”), p. 7, col. 3; *Daily Express*, August 21, 1908 (*s.v.* “Naval Losses in Seven Years”), p. 5, col. 2; and see, also, the severe comment of the *Morning Post's* Naval Correspondent, *Morning Post*, Oct. 21, 1908, p. 4, col. 4.

On the three Home Fleet disasters, April, 1908, referred to in the text (*Tiger*, *Gladiator*, *Gala*), see—*s.v.* “Home Fleet Record: Disastrous Results of ‘Economy’”—*Standard's* Naval Correspondent at Portsmouth, *Standard*, Apr. 23, 1908, p. 7, col. 7, and p. 8, col. 1.

⁵ With, happily, some prospect of two destroyers being bought by the Admiralty to replace the two thus lost. (See Mr. McKenna, quoted in *Globe*, July 15, 1908, p. 10, cols. 1-2; and, later, quoted in *Standard*, Nov. 18, 1908, p. 9, col. 3). Cp., however, in this connection, the common-sense warning of the *Daily Express*, Oct. 27, 1908, p. 1, col. 5.

⁶ It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to state that, because some of the disasters of April 1908 (those to the *Tiger* and *Gala*) took place by night, with “lights out,” the *Daily News* would desire the abolition of such night manoeuvres (*Daily News*, April 29, 1908, leading article, “Night Manœuvres with Masked Lights,” p. 6, cols. 3-4);—though it is difficult to see what guarantee there is that our enemy will be so good as to suit the convenience of the *Daily News* and only fight by and under conditions of daylight.

The *Daily News* had sought and received, and did not relish, the opinion (right or wrong) of Mr. Carlyon Bellairs, M.P. (*Daily News*, April 29, 1908, p. 7, col. 2), that:—“Not less but more night manœuvring ought to be done, but it ought to be done only by properly-manned ships.”

Some interesting statistics for 1907 and 1908 were given by Mr. McKenna (the new

ADMIRALTY AND EMPIRE—BY "ST. BARBARA."

May, 1908. "Admiralty and Empire"; by "St. Barbara";—in the *National Review*, May, 1908, pp. 375-384.¹

LORD ESHER'S CONVERSION.

May, 1908. "To-day and To-morrow"; by Lord Esher;—in the *National Review*, May, 1908, pp. 385-394.²

May, 1908. "Episodes of the Month" (of April, 1908); by Mr. L. J. Maxse, *National Review*, May, 1908, pp. 337-369.

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE.

FIRST LONDON BRANCH.

BANQUET.

May 2, 1908. First Annual Banquet of the Branch³;—Mr. Rowland Hunt, M.P., in the Chair. The speakers included, besides the

First Lord) in the House of Commons, June 1, 1908 (reported, *Times*, June 2, 1908, p. 6, col. 4):—"During 1907 four accidents are known at the Admiralty to have occurred to vessels not carrying lights, involving one injury. During 1908 two accidents have occurred involving the loss of thirty-six lives. *The absence of lights cannot, however, be described as the sole cause of any of these accidents.* . . . Night manœuvres without lights took place on 146 occasions during 1907 and 1908, the total aggregate of the numbers of ships engaged being 2,299. There were also fourteen occasions on which I have not been able to obtain the names of the ships taking part."

Concerning the general incompleteness of the Admiralty's "*Casualties to Ships Returns*," see, however, below, p. 411 text, and nn.

It is, at least, gratifying to know, from the lips of the new First Lord (Mr. McKenna), May 6, 1908, that "in spite of the recent accidents in naval manœuvring at night without lights, it is the intention . . . to continue the practice. . . . The experience gained in recent years has been too valuable to admit of the practice being abandoned; *but*" (he added, somewhat ominously) "for some time past the Board of Admiralty has had under consideration the question of devising rules calculated to reduce the risk" (*Daily Express*, May 7, 1908, p. 8, col. 1).

Whether the new rules will be calculated to increase, to maintain, or to reduce the efficiency of the British Navy, is itself, however, a vital question. For, unless the needs of night are practised in time of peace, the Fleet will not be able to meet those needs in the fateful hour of war.

A hint of what the new regulations themselves may be will be found in the *Daily Express*, May 12, 1908, p. 1, col. 4. And for the grave results involved to Britain in time of war by their introduction, see Mr. F. T. Jane, *E.S. & S.J.G.*, May 18, 1908, p. 4, col. 3.

In the meantime, be it mentioned in passing, *night defence* of our battle-vessels would appear to be a matter with which the Admiralty has but little concerned itself. See "St. Barbara's" Third Article in *Blackwood's Magazine* referred to above, p. 360, and his articles in the *Standard* (below, p. 387). And see also Mr. F. T. Jane—*s.v.* "Under the White Ensign"—*E.S. & S.J.G.*, July 6, 1908, p. 6, col. 1; and further, below, p. 387.

¹ See hereon *Standard*, April 29, 1908, p. 5, cols. 1-2, and (leading article) p. 6, cols. 6-7; and below, pp. 388 *sq.*, 394.

² See—with appropriate comment—above, pp. 380 *sq.*; and see also, below, p. 397.

³ A letter dealing with "The State of the Navy"—issued by this Branch, July 1, 1908 (over the signatures of Councillor Alfred Solomon, Mr. Robert Weatherburn, M.I. Mech E., and Mr. W. H. Hills, President, Vice-President, and Hon. Secretary, respectively—will be found in the *St. Pancras Gazette*, July 3, 1908.

Chairman, Mr. H. F. Wyatt, Mr. L. Cope Cornford, Mr. Robert Weatherburn, Mr. L. G. H. Horton-Smith, Mr. Walter Reynolds, L.C.C., Councillor Alfred Solomon, and Mr. E. N. Gulick.¹

"HANDS ACROSS THE SEAS."

"IF"—BUT ONLY "IF."

May 4, 1908.

"If we hold hands across the seas, we shall preserve for future generations a noble heritage founded upon the highest patriotism and knit together by the ties of race and of mutual sympathy and regard";—H.R.H. the Prince of Wales, as President of the Royal Colonial Institute, May 4, 1908.²

"If";—but only if!

GERMAN SHIPPING SUBSIDIES.

May 4, 1908. German Shipping Subsidies;—*Standard*, May 4, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, col. 7, in connection with "The Bill . . . now" (May 4, 1908) "under consideration by the Reichstag . . . authorising the German Government to grant an additional subsidy of £25,000 to the North German Lloyd Company" (additional, that is, to its "already" existing "subsidy of £279,000").³

NEGLECT OF NIGHT DEFENCE.

May 4 and 5, 1908. "Fleet and Fitness for War;—Neglect of Night Defence; The Naval 'Crinoline'";—by "St. Barbara," in *Standard*:—First Article, May 4, 1908, p. 4, col. 1;—Second, May 5, 1908, p. 5, cols. 1-2.⁴

¹ For an account of the meeting see *Standard*, May 4, 1908, p. 9, col. 3; *Daily Express*, May 4, 1908, p. 5, col. 6; *St. Pancras Gazette*, May 8, 1908, p. 6, cols. 1-2; *St. Pancras Guardian*, May 8, 1908, p. 8, cols. 1-3.

² See *Times*, May 5, 1908, p. 11, cols. 3-4; *Daily Express*, May 5, 1908, p. 1, col. 7; *Standard*, May 5, 1908, p. 7, col. 2.

³ The Reichstag, while rejecting the Bill in question on its second reading, agreed to a proposal that an additional subsidy of £11,500 (instead of £25,000) should be granted;—bringing the total subsidy up to £290,500. See *Morning Post*, May 6, 1908, p. 8, col. 2; *Standard*, May 6, 1908, p. 7, col. 5.

⁴ See also, in this connection, *Standard*, May 5, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, col. 7. And cp. the succeeding note, and above, pp. 360, 386 n.; and cp. also below, p. 428.

⁵ Again—as regards night defence (above, p. 360 n. 7)—cp. Mr. F. T. Jane in *E.S. & S.J.G.*, May 18, 1908, p. 4, col. 3:—"Rather late in the day the tremendous danger of night torpedo attack has begun to be realised. The torpedoing of an entire fleet in manœuvres is an incident so common that nothing is thought of it; but what would anything of that sort mean in real war? Target practice is good for headlines and the making of reputations; but night attack is the real problem of the hour. The strongest fleet in the world will cease to be if caught napping by destroyers. Only out of constant practice and night manœuvres can even an approximation of war safety be secured."

Cp. Mr. Jane, again, in *E.S. & S.J.G.*, Oct. 26, 1908, p. 4, col. 3.

ADMIRALTY POLICY.

DEMAND FOR AUTHORITATIVE INQUIRY.

MORNING POST, May 6, 1908, p. 6, col. 6.

(Extract from Leading Article.)

The [writers of] a letter which we publish this morning¹ suggest that there should be a new Naval Defence Act,² in other words that a shipbuilding programme should once more be determined for several years in advance. It is possible that a return to that mode of procedure would just now be useful. But the House of Commons before giving its assent to such a measure would probably wish for some information showing how it came to pass that in the period between the last Estimates of the late Government and the first of the present Government the Board of Admiralty in a published paper laid down as necessary an annual minimum of ships to be built,³ and that the same Sea Lords⁴ a few months later were agreed in proposing or accepting a yearly output very decidedly smaller than that minimum.⁵ That change of opinion on the part of the present Sea Lords, followed as it has been by changes in the German shipbuilding programme,⁶ has shaken public confidence in the naval advisers of the First Lord, and strengthened the belief that the arrangements existing at the Admiralty⁷ fail to secure the best professional advice for the Government upon the large questions of war and of preparation for war. It may be urgent to increase the output of battle-ships, the construction of docks, and the creation of a base in the North Sea,⁸ but it is still more urgent to restore public confidence in the Board of Admiralty. The Admiral who at Christmas told the nation to sleep soundly⁹ because the Navy was all that it should be will hardly be able to put his name to a demand for greatly enlarged Estimates next year. This is an aspect of the subject which [the writers] seem hardly to have considered. Yet it is the most serious aspect of the subject.

An able writer who, under the title of "St. Barbara," has lately been exposing the flaws in the Admiralty system of naval gunnery,¹¹ has in the *National Review* expressed a strong opinion adverse to the present Board.¹² "During the past three or four years," he says, "we have wasted and destroyed the labours of the whole preceding generation."¹³ This is the indictment made against the present Board of Admiralty by a Naval officer who undoubtedly

¹ *Morning Post*, May 6, 1908, p. 8, col. 5. Letter of the Old Navy League, dated May 5, 1908 (reprinted *N.L.J.*, June, 1908, p. 173).

² See also above, p. 375, and below, p. 396.

⁴ See above, pp. 5 *sq.*, 204, etc.

⁶ See above, pp. 5 *sq.*, 35, etc., 266 *sqq.*, etc.

⁸ Cp. above, p. 272.

⁹ Sir John Fisher (First Sea Lord), at the Guildhall, November 9, 1907. See above, pp. 258 *sq.*, 260, 261, 271, 280, 284, 285.

¹⁰ His words were re-echoed on Nov. 22, 1907, by Lord Tweedmouth (the then First Lord). See above, pp. 260, 261, 271, 280, 285.

¹² *National Review*, May, 1908, pp. 375-384 (above, p. 386, text and n. 1, and below p. 394).

¹³ *National Review*, May, 1908, p. 384.

represents the prevalent judgment of the Service. He condemns the scrap-heap policy on the ground that "cruisers, sloops, and gun-boats, the peace control of the Empire, were swept from all seas."¹ He condemns the nucleus crew system and the two years' commission system. He records with disapproval the reduction of the Channel Fleet from sixty-seven vessels to twenty-one² and the make-believe creation of a Home Fleet.³ His review of the actions of the present Board leads him to the conclusion that no one but a partisan "seriously supposes that the Admiralty have any adequate conception of their responsibilities to the Empire."⁴ There is not a point in the indictment so far as it is here reproduced which is not endorsed by most naval officers of sufficient standing to be entitled to form a judgment on the questions involved. From a Board of Admiralty which has thus lost the confidence of the profession and of the public it is idle to ask for a Naval Defence Act. The first demand should be for a new Admiralty, and for some authoritative, though not public,⁵ inquiry into the actions of the present Board.⁶ The condition upon which a Naval Defence Act would be acceptable to the public would be a statement of the probable war needs of the Navy. But no statement on the subject issued by a Board which announced the creation of the Home Fleet as a combination of economy with increased war efficiency³ would command confidence. A change of the *personnel* of the Board is absolutely necessary before any demands for fresh outlay can be made acceptable to that part of the public which is in touch with the state of the Navy. . . .

THE NAVY AND PARTY.

DAILY EXPRESS, May 7, 1908, p. 4, col. 5.

To the Editor of the EXPRESS.

Imperial Maritime League,
2, Westminster Palace Gardens,
Westminster, S.W.
May, 1908.

SIR,—That the Liberal Government were returned to power in 1906, pledged to reduce expenditure on the Navy, and that they have reduced it, are two indisputable facts. Another fact, of which overwhelming proof has been many times provided, is that this reduction has been effected not simply by cutting down the amounts voted for laying down new ships until this year that amount is actually much less than half the sum voted for the like purpose by Germany,⁷ but also by the financial starvation of the service.⁸ For instance, the reserve stores of the Navy have been depleted, admittedly, to the extent of a million pounds annually.⁹

¹ *Nat. Rev.*, May, 1908, p. 379. Cp. also above, pp. 61, 65, 131 *sq.*; and Index, *s.v.* "Scrapping."

² See above, pp. 44, 132, 141, etc., and Index, *s.v.* "Channel Fleet."

³ See Index, *s.v.* "Home Fleet," "Reserve Fleet," and "Rechristenings."

⁴ *Nat. Rev.*, May, 1908, p. 381.

⁵ "Not public," of course. See above, p. 327, text and n. 1.

⁶ See above, pp. 264 *sqq.*, etc. ⁷ Cp. above, pp. 347, 350, text and n. 6.

⁸ Cp. above, *passim*, and Index, *s.v.* "Financial Starvation" and "Reductions."

⁹ See above, pp. 373, 377, and below, pp. 398, 518.

To save money for political objects at the expense of our naval supremacy is to sacrifice the safety of this nation and this Empire to party ends.

Can any Government conceivably commit a greater crime?

In presence of it, what is the duty of an organisation, whether a non-official society, like the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE, or a great party, like the Unionist Opposition? Is its duty simply to refrain from all action on the ground that to try to avert the danger from the country would be to drag the Navy into the arena of party?¹

Clearly, such a construction of duty would be a violation of elementary common sense.¹ The party and the society which made no effort to expose the infamy which was being perpetrated would become the accomplices by that abstention of the authors of the crime. They would become accessories to the murder of the national safety.

Now, Sir, it is evident that the only really non-party course which can be taken is to resist, to attack, and to denounce, irrespectively of all party ties, any Government² that dares to maltreat the Navy. This is the policy followed by the Imperial Maritime League, which is falsely³ accused of party motive. It is so accused because it openly denounces the Liberal Government for the peril to the world's peace and to our national independence which their political naval reductions are bringing upon Britain, and because it openly seeks to rouse the Unionist party to resist those measures of folly and of shame.

If the Unionist party is not to forfeit for ever its claim to patriotism, is it not time that it should cease to stand by and placidly watch the gradual passing of our supremacy at sea?

We are, Sir, Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.⁴

THE WRECKERS OF THE FLEET.

DUNDEE BY-ELECTION.

DUNDEE COURIER, *May 8, 1908, p. 7, col. 4.*

To the Editor of the COURIER.

The Imperial Maritime League,
2, Westminster Palace Gardens,
London, S.W.,

May 7, 1908.

SIR,—I ask your permission to appeal in the name of the nation's safety to every man in Dundee who may read this letter to vote against the return of Mr. Winston Churchill.⁵

I make this appeal because the Liberal Government of which he is a member have committed the greatest crime which any

¹ Cp. above, pp. 284 *sq.*

² "Any Government." Cp. above, p. 311.

³ Cp. above, pp. 311 *sq.*

⁴ Compare also, in the same sense as this letter, *Daily Express*, May 7, 1908 (leading article), p. 4, cols. 4-5.

⁵ Who had already been defeated at Manchester (see above, p. 377).

British Government can perpetuate. For party purposes, to obtain party votes, to fulfil party pledges, the Liberal Cabinet have laid their deadly and paralysing hands upon the British Fleet.¹ They have starved its administration; ² they have depleted its stores; ³ they have diminished its training.⁴ They have cut down our programme of new armoured construction for this year to less than half that of Germany⁵ (38,500 British tons to over 80,000 German⁶), and even on that half they are spending only trivial amounts.⁷

It is to save money that they have lessened training, and accident after accident bears witness to the decreased efficiency which decreased training means.⁸ While they prate of their solicitude for the unemployed, their discharges of thousands of men from the Royal Dockyards⁹ and from Woolwich Arsenal¹⁰ have swelled the army of those unemployed by flinging thousands of men upon the streets.¹¹ This is the army, and the only army, which flourishes under the present Government.¹²

Having reduced all our military arrangements to a state of chaos, and having destroyed both the militia and the volunteers, the Liberal Government have made our dependence on the Navy more absolute than ever before, and the fighting efficiency of that Navy they have half destroyed. They have converted its strength from real strength to paper strength for the sake of party. To win the votes of their Little Navy followers they have flung and fooled away the safety of Britain.

When war breaks out the vast multitudes of working folk in this country who, like the jute workers of Dundee, earn their bread by converting raw material, imported over the waters of the globe, into manufactured articles, will find themselves thrown in their millions starving upon the streets, because both that raw material necessary to their labour and their very food as well can no longer be protected by our fighting ships.¹³ Then they will pour out curses upon the Liberal Government which has betrayed them by leaving cruisers unbuilt, but those curses will be useless then, because no effort made during the swift and fierce impact of naval war can make good neglect during peace.¹⁴

Therefore I would ask every man in Dundee who loves his country, and wishes to protect his own home against the horrors of starvation, to remember on Saturday that every vote given for Mr. Winston Churchill is a vote given for the destruction of the British Fleet.

I am, Sir, Yours faithfully,
HAROLD F. WYATT.

¹ Cp. above, *passim*, and p. 282. See Index, *s.v.* "Party Ends" and "Liberals."

² Cp. above, *passim*. ³ See above, p. 389 n. 9.

⁴ See Index, *s.v.* "Sea-Training." ⁵ See above, pp. 382 and below, next note.

⁶ Cp. above, pp. 347, 373, 377, and below, pp. 437, 451.

⁷ See above, pp. 346 *sq.*; 348 n. 10; 350 n. 6. ⁸ Cp. above, pp. 382, 384 *sq.*

⁹ Cp. above, pp. 61, 65, 74 *sq.*, 140, etc.

¹⁰ Cp. above pp. 106, 108, 363, 382; and see further the illuminating (and indeed alarming) letter of Mr. Gilbert Slater (Chairman of the Borough of Woolwich Discharges Conference) in *Standard*, March 29, 1909, p. 11, col. 4. And see also Mr. H. W. Wilson in *Nat. Rev.*, May, 1909, p. 400.

¹¹ See above, p. 382, text and n. 12.

¹² Cp. above, p. 382.

¹³ Cp. above, pp. 36 *sq.*, 341, and Index, *s.v.* "Commerce."

¹⁴ Cp. above, pp. *R.F.*, 3, 257, 384.

THE BUDGET AND OLD-AGE PENSIONS.

May 7, 1908.

Annual Budget statement made in the House of Commons (by Mr. Asquith, Premier and late Chancellor of the Exchequer).—*Times*, May 8, 1908, pp. 10–11.

Mr. Asquith **provides** Old-Age Pensions, and leaves his successors to find the millions to **provide** for them.¹²

THE NAVY LEAGUE "SPLIT."

Statement by the Founders of the Imperial Maritime League.

Reprinted from *Canada*, an illustrated weekly journal. (London, Montreal, Toronto.) Vol. X., No. 122; May 9, 1908, p. 130.

We have received from Mr. Pierson, the Secretary of the Victoria and Esquimalt Branch of the Navy League, which is one of the most active of the League's offshoots in the Dominion, the following cablegram, dated May 13:—

"At the annual meeting of the Victoria and Esquimalt Branch of the Navy League, which was held last night, a resolution was passed endorsing the action taken by the Committee with regard to the split which has taken place in the parent body and deploring the schism which resulted in the formation of a separate body. The resolution proceeded to the effect that as the objects of the old and new leagues were identical,⁴

¹ The bearing of the proposal on the Naval and Military defence of the Empire is well considered in the *Standard's* leading article ("Old Age Pensions and National Defence"), May 9, 1908, p. 6, cols. 5–6:—

"Having gone through their premeditated transports over Mr. Asquith's Budget, practical Liberals are beginning to ask themselves how far it will answer its purpose. Will it gain votes for the party? Will it check the rot in the constituencies? . . . Already the demagogues are saying that the allowance should begin at 60, and suggesting that a man or woman is worth at least 10/- a week. . . . We do not see how the Liberals, having admitted the principle, can dispute the extension.

"There is but one limit—the lack of money. If we are to believe the Radicals, we cannot afford to keep up a Navy and Army which will protect our shores from invasion and hold our Empire against foreign aggression. The better informed amongst them confess that our present preparations are insufficient to meet a hostile combination much less formidable than that which we faced and defeated in the days of their grandfathers. But they affect to believe that the age of Peace has dawned, and look to the rising influence of democracy on the Continent to avert an unprovoked war. . . . When that vision has been realised, by all means let us be ready to lay down our armour. Meantime, we must be prepared to buckle it on. Until the statecraft of the world has been remodelled, we are compelled to hold by patriotism as the chief of civic duties, and patriotism means readiness for self-sacrifice.

"Much might be said for a scheme of old age pensions—beginning, if you will, at 60 years of age for all men who had given twelve months in their youth to martial training, and were ready up to 30 or 35, to come up every year for a month's training. It would be a cheap and excellent way of providing us with an Army irresistible for home defence. But there is, we fear, a demoralising tendency in the fashionable Radical or Socialist theory that the State has duties towards the citizen while the citizen has none towards the State. . . ."

² We have ourselves, and with reason, termed the present Government's "Old Age Pensions Act, 1908"—"An Act to facilitate the Conquest of Britain by Germany," (See below, p. 431.)

³ May 1, 1908.

⁴ This, of course, is not accurate. (See, e.g., above, p. 308).

"the members of the Victoria and Esquimalt branch recommended and pressed for such a reunion as would make adhesion to both bodies possible for their members, so doubling instead of dividing strength to fight for the original purpose for which the Navy League was formed.¹ The resolution was proposed by Mr. Clive Phillippus-Wolley, and seconded by Mr. Redfern, ex-Mayor of Victoria."

Upon the receipt of this cablegram a representative of *Canada* called at the offices of the Navy League and was informed by the President, Mr. R. A. Yerburgh, that the only statement he would make on the matter is that as far as the Navy League is concerned it is not the intention to make the slightest overtures to the seceding members for the purpose of reunion.²

He then interviewed Mr. L. Graham H. Horton-Smith and Mr. Harold F. Wyatt, Joint Founders and Honorary Secretaries of the newly formed Imperial Maritime League, who made the following statement to *Canada* :—

"The resolution passed by the Victoria and Esquimalt Branch of the old Navy League, in favour of reunion with the Imperial Maritime League, is most natural and most patriotic. Unfortunately those who adopted it did not, and could not, know that throughout the whole period of controversy, dating from our resignation³ and those of other members of their body, the Executive Committee of the old Navy League have peremptorily rejected all ideas of compromise, and have resolutely adhered to their attitude of blind support of the naval policy of the present Government and of Sir John Fisher. 'We back Sir John Fisher,' were, indeed, the actual words used by the official Secretary of the old Navy League in a recently published interview.⁴

"Briefly, the position is this :—That the Liberal Government are the tool of the Little England and Little Navy section of their supporters, that Sir John Fisher is the tool of the Liberal Government, and that the old Navy League is the tool of Sir John Fisher. In that capacity the Navy League busies itself in stifling criticism, and in condoning, palliating, and defending the financial starvation of the British Navy, with all the deadly evil which such starvation has occasioned.

"The old Navy League has even approved the abandonment by Britain of the attempt to command the Pacific, an abandonment which is and will be denounced to the utmost by the Imperial Maritime League.⁵

"We may mention that Mr. H. W. Wilson, one of the foremost naval writers in the Empire, and for many years Editor of the old Navy League's *Journal*, has just left the Navy League in final disgust, and has transferred his support to the new organisation (the Imperial Maritime League), joining both its Council and its Executive Committee.⁶

¹ The "original purpose for which the Navy League was formed" (see above, pp. 184 *sq.*, 241, 263, 307 *sq.*, 317, and below, pp. 410, 413, etc.) has long since been repudiated by that League (see above, pp. 185, 263, 308, 317, etc.); but it is one of the "specific aims" of the Imperial Maritime League.

² This has been the attitude of the Old Navy League throughout. Cp. above, *passim* and p. 367 nn. 2, 5; and see, further, below in the text (pp. 393 *sq.*).

³ May 13, 1907. See above, pp. 52 *sq.*

⁴ See above, pp. 278, 284, 286, 290, 293, and below, pp. 401, 410, 484.

⁵ Cp. above, p. 380, and below, pp. 397, 399.

⁶ See above, pp. 368 *sq.*

"Inasmuch as the Navy League declines to publish in the *Navy League Journal* communications from us (for that has been the case up to the present¹), it has not been possible for the branches of the old League overseas, or indeed for members and associates of the old League in the Mother-country generally, to ascertain (except in so far as they may have seen letters from us in the public press or elsewhere) the real situation. We cannot but think that, the real situation once grasped, the Navy League adherents would insist upon the Navy League Committee taking a vastly different line to the one which they are in fact taking."

GERMANY AND NO ARBITRATION.

May 13, 1908. Principle of Arbitration rejected by Germany: Arbitrament of War preferred.²

THE MANNING OF THE HOME FLEET.

HOW IT IS DONE.

May 14, 1908. "The Navy's 'Scran-Bag': How the Manning of the Home Fleet is carried out";—*Daily Express*, May 14, 1908, p. 5, col. 6.

THE IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE.

NATIONAL REVIEW, June, 1908, pp. 666-7.

Imperial Maritime League,
2, Westminster Palace Gardens,
Westminster, London, S.W.,
May 15, 1908.

SIR,—The article by Mr. H. W. Wilson in last April's number of the *National Review*,³ and that by "St. Barbara" in the current issue,⁴ with the bright light which you yourself have thrown on Political Parties and National Defence,⁵ display to the lethargic people of this country the real and pressing peril threatening their most vital interests. Hereafter, if—perhaps we should rather say, when—catastrophe comes, none can affirm that it has arrived without warning. As France was warned before 1870, so, but far more loudly and insistently, Britain has been warned now. And as France remained deaf and indifferent in face of a like danger pro-

¹ Cp. above, *e.g.* pp. 53, 54, 229 n. 2, etc.

² See *Morning Post*, May 13, 1908, p. 8 col. 1, and (leading article), p. 6, cols. 5-6, on Germany's refusal to negotiate a Treaty of Arbitration with the U.S.A.

³ *Nat. Rev.*, April, 1908, pp. 201-213. See above, pp. 360, 373.

⁴ *Nat. Rev.*, May, 1908, pp. 375-384. See above, pp. 386, 388.

⁵ *Nat. Rev.*, April, 1908, pp. 303-316. See above, p. 360.

ceeding from the same foe, so, despite all proof of the reality of the menace, Britain refuses now to be roused from her sleep.

Yet the demonstration of peril is based, not on opinions, but on facts. The reduction of our actual expenditure on ships to be laid down this year to much less than half that of Germany is a fact.¹ The void created by the non-replacement² of the fifty-nine cruisers and of many other vessels removed from the Navy List in 1904 is a fact too.³ The unfitness, from inferior steam radius, of most of our destroyers to render service in war in the North Sea is an ascertained certainty.⁴ The immense superiority of Germany in respect of such craft is no longer disputed.⁴ The reduction of the *personnel* by 3,000 men is incapable of denial.⁵ The depletion of the reserve stores of the Navy has been admitted⁶ by the last First Lord himself.⁷ The readiness of the Home Fleet for instant war is no longer asserted even by the Board of Admiralty, which did assert it.⁹ The allegation that the Nore Division of that Fleet is in "a process" of getting ready to be in a state of instant readiness for war has now been substituted by the Admiralty for their former allegation that this division was already in that state of instant readiness. The statement that a large number of our battleships, cruisers, and destroyers have been crippled through the delay of repairs remains undisproved.¹⁰ The diminution in the aggregate sea training of our Fleet has been established beyond cavil.¹¹

It follows that the accumulation of these circumstances has built up an absolutely overwhelming case, strong enough to convince any court of law that during the last two years the naval strength of this country and its preparedness for naval conflict have suffered great and terrible eclipse. Further, it is incontrovertible that this eclipse has been made yet more complete by the Estimates for 1908-9, ¹² which have admittedly been cut down to please the Little-Navy supporters of the Liberal Government.¹³ As Mr. Wilson has pointed out,¹⁴ the total British annual naval expenditure has been reduced since 1904 by £7,100,000, while in the same period the German annual naval expenditure has risen by £6,400,000.¹⁵

From these considerations we deduce the inevitable inference that there is now such need of special, determined, continuous agitation in the country at large, to bring home to its comprehension the infamy of which it is being made the victim, as has seldom, if ever, existed previously in its history. Such agitation cannot successfully be started or maintained without an organisation. For such work, for such purpose, an organisation was founded in 1895, and has been supported by voluntary subscription ever since. The name

¹ Cp. above, pp. 373, 377.

² By new ships.

³ See above, pp. 65, 131, *sg.*, 297, etc., and Index, *s.v.* "Scrapping."

⁴ See above, p. 340.

⁵ See above, p. 61, text and n. 8.

⁶ See above, p. 377, text and n. 8.

⁷ Lord Tweedmouth.

⁸ Cp. also below, p. 442.

⁹ Cp. above, pp. 219, 221, etc.

¹⁰ See above, p. 320, text and n. 2.

¹¹ See above, p. 320, text and n. 5.

¹² See above, pp. 346 *sgg.*, 350, etc.

¹³ See above, pp. 349, 351.

¹⁴ Mr. H. W. Wilson, *National Review*, April, 1908, p. 203 (above, p. 373).

¹⁵ Cp. above, p. 373, and below, p. 449, n. 4.

¹⁶ Even Mr. Hurd, the well-known Admiralty apologist, has to admit that "economies on the" British "Fleet have already been effected to the extent of 26½ millions in 4 years," and that it is "in danger." (See Mr. Hurd, September, 1908 quoted by the *Standard*, September 2, 1908 (leading article), p. 4, col. 5.)

of this organisation is the NAVY LEAGUE.¹ Upon that LEAGUE, therefore, lay an immense obligation, a national duty of such magnitude and such imperious necessity as has never before been laid upon any non-official body.

It was bound by the law of its being to defy the Liberal Government, to stand out as the champion of the inarticulate and careless multitude, to denounce naval reduction as national treason, to strive by every exertion, at any sacrifice, to prevent the passing of the supremacy-at-sea of the British people.

But in all the multifarious history of leagues and societies, no betrayal of bounden duty quite so gross as that perpetrated by the NAVY LEAGUE can be shown. For a year past it has resisted every voice that called it to action.² It has literally made itself the champion, not of the safety of Britain, but of the financial starvation of Britain's Fleet. Every naval reduction it has declared to be "strategic."³ Every former utterance in its own official organ, which condemned such reduction, it has ridiculed and repudiated.⁴ Even in the recent April number of that organ (the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL)⁵ it asseverates that the assurances given by authority must be accepted,⁶ that there exists no case for agitation,⁷ and that the Committee regard that agitation "as flagitious and detrimental to the national interest on any plea, however specious"⁸—and this though even they admit the need of supplementary estimates⁹ and of a new Naval Defence Act.¹⁰

The old Navy League having therefore abandoned the purpose for which it was formed, and betrayed its cause, a new organisation to take its place has become a national necessity. That organisation has arisen in the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE. The measure of the support accorded to it shows the wide recognition of its need. Founded little more than three months ago,¹¹ its General Council already comprises no less than 21 naval officers of Flag rank,^{11a} and a large number of distinguished men, including notable groups of members of both Houses of Parliament, and many writers of national fame.¹² One of its latest accessions is Mr. H. W. Wilson himself, long the Editor of the NAVY LEAGUE JOURNAL, and the devoted adherent of that society, but whom a sense of public duty has compelled, however reluctantly, to transfer his allegiance to the new body.¹³ That transfer was inevitable, for the older organisation, in the sacred name of "no-party," has made itself the very handmaid of the Liberal Party.¹⁴ The criticism which it repeatedly levelled at Admiralty administration in the days of Unionist Governments it has practically withheld altogether during the last two

¹ Founded January, 1895. (See above, pp. 295, 317, 368.)

² Cp. above, *passim*.

³ Cp. above, pp. 152, 158, 167, 180, 188, 191, 211, 215, 370, 375, and below, pp. 398, 410, 433.

⁴ See above, pp. 64, 88, 117, 120, 130, 139, 151, 161, 167, 175, 186, 191, 201, 207, 208, 210, 231, 290, 294, 296, 375.

⁵ *N.L.J.*, April, 1908, p. 103 (above, p. 375, and below, p. 485).

⁶ See above, p. 370, text and n. 2.

⁷ See above, p. 375, text and n. 14.

⁸ *N.L.J.*, April, 1908, p. 103.

⁹ *N.L.J.*, April, 1908, p. 103; May, 1908, p. 140 (above, p. 375); and June, 1908, p. 173 (above, p. 388).

¹⁰ *N.L.J.*, May, 1908, p. 140 (above, pp. 375, 388), and June, 1908, p. 173.

¹¹ January 27, 1908 (above, p. 305).

^{11a} Now Twenty-Four. See below, pp. 522 n. 5, 523 n. 11.

¹² Cp. above, pp. 314 n. 3, 362, text and n. 2, and below, pp. 400, etc.

¹³ See above, pp. 368 *sq.* ¹⁴ Cp. above, *passim*, and pp. 89, 108, 291, etc., etc.

and a half years. It could see the mote in the eye of the Unionist Cabinet, but it will not even attempt to remove the beam from the naval vision of that Cabinet's successor. Nay—worse than this—it is the historic and amazing fact that the abandonment of our naval position in the Pacific,¹ to which Lord Esher (receding entirely from his previous attitude²) has drawn public attention in your *Review*,³ was actually approved by the NAVY LEAGUE of Britain.

That abandonment, unless remedied, means that Australia and New Zealand must look to the United States for protection against the coming peril from Japan, and in later time from China, of the existence of which Colonial statesmen have now become conscious. Yet against this naval retreat, and the disruption of the Empire in days not far removed, which it implied, no voice was raised on behalf of the old NAVY LEAGUE, save at such of its meetings as were addressed by ourselves.

Sir, the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE challenges the decision by any Government of this country to withdraw the predominance of the British Flag from the waters of half the globe.⁴ The LEAGUE seeks by every means to waken the nation from its sleep. Already it has communicated, not without effect, with nearly every Chamber of Commerce in the United Kingdom.⁵ It wants only yet wider support to speak with a voice that shall compel attention. It appeals now and here to every reader of this *Review*, as it appeals to every man and woman in the land who still have blood in their veins, to combine with it in the effort to rescue the Navy from the cauldron of Party, to loosen the Fleet from the grip of those who compass its destruction, and to increase the relative naval strength of the British Empire.

We are, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

(Joint Founders and Honorary Secretaries,
Imperial Maritime League.)

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE.

May 16, 1908.

May 16, 1908. Drawing-Room Meeting⁶ in support of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE, held by kind permission of Mrs. Barry at her residence, Dilkhoosh, Sydenham Hill;—Col. the Hon. Hubert E. V. Duncombe, D.S.O., late M.P., in the Chair; the speakers including Mr. H. F. Wyatt, Mr. L. G. H. Horton-Smith, and Dr. Sidney Turner.

¹ See above, pp. 380, 386.

² See above, pp. 326 *sqq.*

³ *Nat. Rev.*, May, 1908, pp. 387 *sq.* See above, p. 386.

⁴ Cp. above, p. 393, text and n. 5.

⁵ Cp. above, pp. 344, etc.

⁶ For an account see *Morning Post*, May 18, 1908, p. 5, col. 5; *Standard*, May 18, 1908 (*s.v.* "Impotence for Defence"), p. 8, col. 2; *Daily Express*, May 18, 1908, p. 5, col. 4; *Lady's Pictorial*, June 13, 1908.

QUESTIONS FOR THE OLD NAVY LEAGUE.

STANDARD, May 20, 1908, p. 7, col. 4; DAILY EXPRESS, May 20, 1908; etc.¹

Imperial Maritime League,
2, Westminster Palace Gardens,
Westminster,
London,
May 19, 1908.

SIR,—The annual meeting of the Old Navy League, to be held to-morrow, will afford admirable opportunity to its Executive Committee to answer the following questions, which we ask your kind permission now publicly to put² :—

(1) Do they (the Committee) still think that the reduction of the Navy Estimates from £36,800,000 for the year 1904-5 to £30,400,000 for the year 1907-8 was justified, and are they still of opinion that this reduction has had no unfavourable influence on the fighting efficiency of the service?³

(2) Do they still consider these two twin facts: (a) the removal from the Navy List of 155 vessels in 1904,⁴ and (b) the all but complete failure to build other ships to take their place,⁵ to have been both due, not to economy, but to "strategy"?⁶

(3) Do they still defend the reduction of the personnel of the Navy by 3,000 men⁷ as being a laudable result of the above "strategical" elimination of 155 men-of-war?⁸

(4) Do they still approve, as "strategical,"⁹ the reduction of the sea-going fleets by one-fourth of their armoured strength,¹⁰ and the bestowal of the ships so withdrawn in the reserve with nucleus crews?¹¹ 12

¹ Also :—*Eastern Morning News*, May 22, 1908; *Evening News*, May 20, 1908; (cp. also) *Manchester Courier*, May 22, 1908; *Montrose Standard*, May 22, 1908; *Naval and Military Record*, May 28, 1908; *Sunday Sun*, May 24, 1908; etc.

² This first paragraph, as altered for publication in newspapers subsequently to May 20, 1908, read :—"The annual meeting of the Old Navy League, to be held to-day" (May 20, 1908), "will have afforded admirable opportunity to its Executive Committee to answer the following questions, which we ask your kind permission, since the points involved have terrible bearing on our waning national safety, to bring to the notice of your readers."

³ Cp. above, pp. 60 *sq.* (text and nn.), 139 *sq.* (text and nn.).

⁴ Cp. above, pp. 65, 131, 541, etc.

⁵ Cp. above, pp. 65, 131, and Index, *s.v.* "Scrapping."

⁶ Cp. above, pp. 131 *sq.*, 375, etc.

⁷ Cp. above, pp. 61 (text and n. 8), 375, etc.

⁸ Cp. above, pp. 114, 131.

⁹ Cp. above, pp. 375, text and n. 7, etc.

¹⁰ Cp. above, pp. 12 *sqq.*, 14, 16, 18 *sqq.*, 132, 141, etc., etc. ¹¹ Cp. preceding note.

¹² "The plan of keeping ships 'in commission in reserve' with nucleus crews was a perfectly sound one as long as it took the form of bringing ships out of complete reserve and giving them a partial mobility. When, however, it took the opposite form of retiring ships from full commission and reducing their full readiness to half readiness, it became a matter of extreme peril. Now, it was the latter plan that was adopted in the autumn" [of 1906 : see above, pp. 13, 16, 19, etc.]—"a plan which was first revealed by the *Standard*" [see above, pp. 12, etc.]; "and then admitted by a semi-official communication to the Press."—Mr. J. St. Loe Strachey, Editor of the *Spectator*, in his "Introduction" (Jan., 1907) to "*The State of the Navy in 1907*" (by "Civis"), p. 4 (Cp. also *Morning Post*, March 20, 1909, p. 7 col. 3).

(5) Do they still take the view that the re-christening of the Reserve as "The Home Fleet" has materially altered its character?¹

(6) Do they still consider that ships in reserve with nucleus crews which are frequently being changed, are equally efficient with ships with full crews, retained for the period of their commission and belonging to sea-going squadrons?²

(7) If not, do they think that this is a matter with which the old Navy League has no concern?

(8) Has that League, in the estimation of its Committee, no concern with the state of repair of the components of the Fleet? (If it has such concern, why has it not shown it, in face of the circumstance that owing to the stinting of money on repairs the strength of the British Navy on paper stands now in no relation to its strength in fact?)³

(9) Do the Committee approve the depletion of the reserve stores of the Navy to the extent of a million pounds annually for the last two years,⁴ and do they attribute this measure also to "strategy"?

(10) Are they satisfied to go on watching, without protest, the abandonment (apparent to the world, and admitted by Lord Esher in the *National Review* of this month⁵) of all attempt by the British Navy to secure naval predominance in the Pacific?

(11) Do they disagree with the two former First Sea Lords, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Frederick Richards and Admiral Sir Richard Vesey Hamilton, who deem desirable the appointment of a commission of enquiry (not, of course, a "public" enquiry⁶) into the state of the Navy?⁷

(12) Do they intend in the future to pass by every point herein enumerated, and to devote attention solely to the need of additional battleships?⁸

Sir, these questions demand answers which the Committee of the old Navy League are bound to give. If the reply to them be in the negative, then that Committee are also bound in honour to resign their office at once, since they will then have confessed their own enormous error during the past twelve months, throughout which, in opposition to ourselves and others, they have palliated and sustained every species of naval reduction, save in regard to new construction only.

But if they still maintain their former attitude on all these points, then the news that, at the instigation of Mr. Bellairs, M.P., a number of members of the House of Commons, including supporters of the present Government, have joined their body, marks the consummation of the Committee's work in stifling criticism upon the naval default of the Liberal Cabinet. For this adherence means, if it means anything, that these members must henceforth adopt the position of the Committee which controls the League.⁹

¹ See Index, *s.v.* "Home Fleet," "Rechristening," and "Old N.L."

² Cp. above, pp. 375, text and nn. ; 398, text and nn. 11, 12 ; etc.

³ Cp. above, pp. 300, 316, 342, 382, 391, etc.

⁴ Cp. above, pp. 373, 377, 382, 389, 391, 395, 398, and below, pp. 491, 518.

⁵ *National Review*, May, 1908, pp. 385-394. (See above, pp. 380, 386, 397.)

⁶ See above, p. 327, text and n. 1.

⁷ See above, pp. 264 *sq.*

⁸ See above, pp. 299, 303

⁹ Cp. below, pp. 401, 409, 413.

It is a strange fact that hitherto the sole meetings of protest held in this country against the reduction of the Navy Estimates have been those called by the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE.

We are, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

(Honorary Secretaries,
Imperial Maritime League.)

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE.

STANDARD WEEKLY SUPPLEMENT OF EMPIRE, May 28, 1908, p. 9, col. 3 ;

STANDARD OF EMPIRE, No. 2, May 30, 1908, p. 9, col. 3.

To the Editor.

2, Westminster Palace Gardens,

Westminster, S.W.

May 20, 1908.

SIR,—On behalf of our committee, we venture to ask you to grant us so much of your space as will enable us briefly to put before your readers throughout the British Empire the object for which the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE was founded. It is:—

To ensure the adequate maintenance of British supremacy at sea, both as regards the Royal Navy and the mercantile marine; for it is upon both of these services, "under the good providence of God, that our wealth, prosperity, and peace depend."¹

To effect this purpose the League is engaged in the work of placing within the cognisance of every British subject:—(a) what are our Imperial needs:—(b) how they are at present provided;—and (c) the measures which, according to unquestioned naval authority, are required in order to make that provision adequate.

In the view of our Committee, of the large and daily increasing number of our members, which includes many retired naval officers of flag rank,^{2,3} and distinguished men in every sphere of public and private life,⁴ the existing situation, in certain respects, is gravely unsatisfactory.

As the whole fabric of the power of Great Britain and of her daughter States is conditioned by retention of the command of the sea, we appeal to British subjects throughout the Empire to assist the common cause by becoming members of the League.

The terms of membership are:—

Hon. Vice-Presidents (ladies and gentlemen), £25 life payment; £5 ss. annually.
Members (ladies and gentlemen), £10 10s. life; £1 1s. annually. Associate-Members (ladies and gentlemen), 10s. 6d. annually. Associates (ladies and gentlemen), 5s. annually. Supporters (working men and women), 1s. annually.

We are, Sir, Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

(Hon. Secs. Imperial Maritime League.)

¹ The words within inverted commas are borrowed from (to quote the expression of the *Standard*, March 29, 1909, p. 4, col. 2) "The Immortal Preamble to our Articles of War."

² Cp. above, pp. 314 n. 3, 331, 349, 362, 374, 396, and below, pp. 522 sq.

³ Now Twenty-Four; see below, pp. 522 n. 5, 523 n. 11.

⁴ Cp. above, pp. 314 n. 3, 362, 396, and below, pp. 403, 466, 512, 519, 522, text and n. 5.

THE "LITTLE NAVY" LEAGUE.

M.P. RECRUITS TO FORM AN ADMIRALTY CHORUS.

May 21, 1908.

DAILY EXPRESS, May 22, 1908, p. 2, col. 6.

The Navy League, which was once the watch-dog of Empire, has now become an Admiralty chorus.¹

Its leading spirits broke away a year ago,² and formed the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE,³ which is now carrying on the work which the Navy League was formed to do, but which the Navy League has abandoned.

By way of assuring the country that it is still a body of some value, the old Navy League proclaimed at its meeting on Wednesday⁴ the "accession" of seventy-five M.P.'s who have joined⁵ on condition that a certain number of them should be elected on the executive committee, which was done.

The Navy League is now tied to the Liberal M.P.s, who will naturally see that the Admiralty is taken up tenderly and treated with care.

"The important question is on what terms have these M.P.s been induced to join,"⁶ said Mr. H. F. Wyatt, one of the Founders of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE, to an *Express* representative yesterday.⁷

"The crucial test is whether they are for or against the appointments of the commission of inquiry into the state of the Navy recommended by the two former First Sea Lords, Admiral Sir F. Richards and Admiral Sir R. Vesey Hamilton."⁸

"The attitude of the Navy League on the point is clear, for the committee have announced that they 'back Sir John Fisher.'⁹ The late Prime Minister stated that Sir John Fisher would resign if the inquiry were granted."¹⁰

"If the state of the Navy is perfect, as alleged by Sir John Fisher and his inspired supporters¹¹ in part of the Press, the result of the inquiry could only be to reassure the country. Why, then, should the First Sea Lord fear and shun it?

"Has the committee of the Navy League recanted its opinion on this question? If it maintains its opposition to an Inquiry,⁶ the accession to the league of those M.P.s who take a real interest in naval affairs means that they have passed under the stifling influence of the old league's ideas, and henceforth their value as critics is *nil*."

THE NAVY LEAGUE'S ANNUAL MEETING.

STANDARD, May 22, 1908, p. 6, col. 7.

(Leading Article.)

The annual general meeting of the Navy League, held on Wednesday afternoon,⁴ was anticipated with interest by those who have

¹ Cp. above, p. 396, text and n. 14.² See above (May, 1907), pp. 52 *sqq.*, etc. (July, 1907) 232 *sqq.*, etc.³ See above, p. 305. ⁴ May 20, 1908.⁵ Cp. above, p. 399, and below, p. 409.⁶ Cp. below, pp. 409, 413.⁷ May 21, 1908.⁸ See above, pp. 264 *sq.* ⁹ See above, p. 278. ¹⁰ See above, p. 253.¹¹ "Inspired." See above, p. 256, text and n. 2.

followed the course of Admiralty policy during the last few years. It may be said, without offence, that all who are acquainted with the facts of the naval situation to-day hoped that the League might take the opportunity to resume its proper function of impartially presenting the truth with regard to naval affairs, while those members of the League who are committed to the support of Admiralty policy, as such, dreaded lest the Executive Committee should have the courage to acknowledge that it had fallen into a mistaken view of its responsibilities. It appears that the Whitehall party need have been under no such apprehension. We observe that the Executive Committee as reconstituted still includes some among the most inveterate supporters of the present naval administration. They are, of course, entitled to the expression of their opinions; but their presence upon the executive body of a professedly impartial organisation would seem to be inappropriate. It will be remembered that last year the dissatisfaction of certain members of the Committee became so acute that, after strenuous efforts to induce the League to take action, which, in their view—and in ours—was its plain duty, they resigned,¹ and subsequently started a new organisation, the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE.² Mr. H. Seymour Trower, the Chairman of the Executive Committee, took occasion on Wednesday³ to refer to the seceders in terms which were hardly courteous. If the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE has discovered how to perform a piece of public service which the Navy League has declared itself unable to perform, surely the Navy League ought to be grateful for being relieved of a disagreeable responsibility? There is plenty of room in this country for two such societies; and as the Navy League (contrary to the terms of its articles of association) has declared itself to be a merely *educative* body,⁴ it might without prejudice help in a friendly way to forward the interests of the new League. We feel sure that the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE would welcome any such suggestion. But so long as the Chairman of the Navy League persists in what really seems a gratuitously vindictive attitude, both associations must suffer from the disadvantages incidental to the conduct of rival bodies. *So far*, it must in fairness be said, *the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE has been the only patriotic association which has fearlessly placed the facts of the present naval situation before the public.*⁵ Not one of them can be disputed. Indeed, at Wednesday's meeting of the Navy League,⁶ one of its most distinguished members, Admiral Sir Edmund Fremantle, practically endorsed the whole case of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE.⁶ As we have more than once affirmed, we are glad to support impartially the claims of any patriotic society. But, while recognising the excellent work done by the Navy League in the past, we confess we are unable to comprehend its present attitude. Nor can we understand how it is intellectually or morally possible that the President of an organisation whose object is to educate the nation to the requirements of national defence should commit himself to the statement that "it may be possible for us, without

¹ May, 1907. See above, pp. 52 *sqq.*

² Jan. 27, 1908. See above, p. 305.

³ May 20, 1908. See above, p. 401 n. 4.

⁴ Cp. above, pp. 79, 81, 83, 132 *sqq.*, 138, 158, 199, 225, 229, 241, 257, 285 *sq.*, 289, 297, etc., and below, p. 410, text and n. 10.

⁵ The italics are ours.

⁶ This was no surprise to us. See above, p. 254.

danger, to gamble on the Army,"¹ even though he added that "we can never afford, as an Empire, to gamble with the Navy."² Yet that is precisely what the present Board of Admiralty, supported by the Navy League, are doing.

EMPIRE DAY CELEBRATIONS.

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE.

May 22-25, 1908.

The Union Jack flown from the Offices of the Imperial Maritime League from 3.30 p.m. on May 22 (over Empire Day, Sunday, May 24) until sunset on May 25, 1908.

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE.

FURTHER ACCESSIONS TO GENERAL COUNCIL.

A further Additional³ list—dated May 24, 1908—and commencing with the Duke of Newcastle—was published on May 25, 1908.⁴

YET FURTHER REDUCTIONS ON FIGHTING SERVICES PROMISED BY MR. LLOYD GEORGE.

May 25, 1908. See *Standard*, May 28, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, col. 5, referring to "Mr. Lloyd George's flourish on Monday,"⁵ when, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, he set out⁶ his expectation of making further retrenchments during the coming year in the fighting services."⁷

DOCKYARD DISCHARGES;—AND PROGRAMME DELAYED.

May 26, 1908. "Dockyard Discharges": ("Curtailment in Construction Departments of the Royal Dockyards"): "Official Naval Programme Seriously Delayed."—*Daily Express*, May 26, 1908, p. 1, col. 7.⁸

¹ Adopting and accepting Lord Tweedmouth's words of May 18, 1908 (see *Daily Express*, May 19, 1908, p. 1, col. 2), that Mr. Haldane's "Territorial Scheme was a gamble."

² Mr. Verburgh did not apparently like to find himself so accurately reported. See his complaint in *Standard*, May 30, 1908, p. 9, col. 2. Why, then, did he speak as (undoubtedly) he did?—See the report of his speech in *Standard*, May 21, 1908, p. 9, col. 2; and the Editorial note (to his complaint) in *Standard*, May 30, 1908, p. 9, col. 2. (Cp. also *N.L.J.*, June, 1908, p. 163.)

³ Cp. above, pp. 314 n. 3, 362, and below, pp. 466, 512, 519, 522 (text and n. 5).

⁴ See *Standard*, May 25, 1908, p. 9, col. 2, etc.

⁵ May 25, 1908.

⁶ In the course of the debate in the House of Commons.

⁷ For comment see *Standard*, May 28, 1908 (*loc. cit.*), and *Daily Express*, June 3, 1908 (leading article), p. 4, cols. 4-5. And see also below, p. 414.

⁸ See also—*s.v.* "More Naval Economy: Dockyard Reduction Policy"—*Standard*, May 26, 1908, p. 8, col. 5.

Concerning the delay in the case of the *St. Vincent* (at Portsmouth) and the *Collingwood* (at Devonport), cp. further, *s.v.* "Battleship Building Delay," *Standard*, June 4, 1908, p. 9, col. 1.

THE COASTGUARD

May 29, 1908. Report of Inter-Departmental Conference on the future of the Coastguard Service—issued May 29, 1908¹—after an unaccountable delay of 14 months,² during which the vote for the Coastguard has been decreased by £14,095.³

May 29, 1908. The Kaiser's War Utterance,⁴ telegraphed to the *Standard* by its Berlin Correspondent, June 14, 1908, and printed in *Standard*, June 15, 1908, p. 7, col. 6.⁵

CULT OF THE MONSTER WARSHIP.
INQUIRY DEMANDED.

June, 1908. "The Cult of the Monster Warship": Sir William White's criticisms of *Dreadnought* type; Demand for Impartial Inquiry;—by Sir William White;⁷ *Nineteenth Century and After*, June, 1908, pp. 903-925.⁸

¹ See *Standard*, May 30, 1908, p. 9, col. 4, and *Daily Express*, May 30, 1908, p. 5, col. 6. See also *Daily Express*, June 1, 1908, p. 4, col. 7.

² Having been signed as long ago as March 28, 1907;—and having been asked for by Major Seely, M.P., in the House of Commons on June 17, 1907 (see *Standard*, June 18, 1907). The latter again put a question in regard thereto on July 23, 1907, when Mr. Lambert replied that he "must have notice of that question" !—(see *Standard*, July 24, 1907).

³ Upon the Report see, especially:—(in anticipation) *Standard*, December 14, 1907, leading article, "The Reduction in the Coastguards," p. 6, col. 7, and the *Standard*, June 1, 1908 (leading article: "The Future of the Coastguards"), p. 6, col. 7, etc.

See also *Daily Express*, June 3, 1908, p. 8, col. 1; saying (*int. alia*) that:—"Opinion among naval men at Plymouth unanimously condemns the proposed change. The authorities do not appear to realise the value of the coastline link in the chain of communications, but it is asserted that the experience of warfare would speedily bring it home. Without reference to their work as life-savers or as a preventive force, service men insist that the Coastguard is sufficiently useful as a purely naval unit to justify its retention. They say that, notwithstanding all that may be said to the contrary, the passing of the Coastguard will ultimately mean the reduction of our *personnel* by 4,000 ratings."

The *Morning Post*, June 3, 1908, p. 4, cols. 1-2, has an interesting article by its Naval Correspondent on "The Coastguard," "the cost of" which "reaches . . . something like a quarter of a million annually under existing conditions. . . . It costs more per head," he writes, "than the active service force employed afloat, and, leaving its undoubted merits on one side, it is obvious that the Navy would be better off *if*" (our italics) "it devoted the same sum to the provision of extra *personnel* afloat." *If*. But how much may turn upon an "*If*!"

⁴ At the Döberitz Cavalry Manœuvres, May 29, 1908.

⁵ See (also) *Daily Express*, June 15, 1908.

⁶ For comments see *Globe*, June 16, 1908, p. 8, col. 1; *Standard*, June 16, 1908, p. 7, col. 7; June 17, 1908, p. 9, col. 3; June 20, 1908, p. 7, col. 1; etc.

⁷ Late Director of Naval Construction.

⁸ See further hereon *Standard*, May 30, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 5-6; in the course of which we read:—"Sir William White affirms that the case demands an impartial inquiry. We believe his contention to be absolutely justified. . . . It is . . . essential to the national interest that . . . a strict inquiry should be instituted into the naval administration of the past three or four years."

See, also, *Standard*, June 15, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, col. 6; June 21, 1908 (Sir Wm. White himself, *s.v.* "The Big Ship"), p. 9, col. 4; July 13, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, col. 4; July 14, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, col. 4; *Morning Post*, July 9, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, col. 5.

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE.
THE WEAKENED NAVY.

June 2, 1908.

By kind permission of Lady St. Helier, a Drawing-Room Meeting¹ in support of the Imperial Maritime League was held on June 2, 1908, at her residence, 52, Portland Place, W. The Earl Winterton, M.P., presided; the speakers, in addition to the Chairman, being Mr. H. F. Wyatt, Mr. L. G. H. Horton-Smith, and Mr. Robert Weatherburn, M.I.Mech.E.

June 8,¹ 1908. "The Home Fleet: Shortage of Men for Manœuvres";—from the *Standard's* Plymouth Correspondent, *Standard*, June 9, 1908, p. 5, col. 3.²³

DANGER OF SUCCESSFUL INVASION.

June 12, 1908. "Danger of Successful Invasion⁴: The Reduction of Armaments: A Warning Note";—A Letter by Mr. Rowland Hunt, M.P. (to which we would draw the earnest attention of every man and woman in the land),—*Standard*, June 12, 1908, p. 10, col. 1.⁵

HOME WATERS DEFENCE.

EXTRAORDINARY STATE OF THE ATLANTIC FLEET.

(FROM OUR NAVAL CORRESPONDENT.)

STANDARD, June 13, 1908, p. 7, col. 4.

When the British Navy was subjected, in 1905, to the first of the many "strategical redistributions" which have occurred in the last three years, the Admiralty issued a number of statements designed to give the impression that the efficiency of the Navy was to be improved, not only by these redistributions, but also by sundry

¹ For an account of this Meeting see *Morning Post*, June 3, 1908 (s.v. "Importance of the Navy"), p. 5, col. 6; *Standard*, June 3, 1908 (s.v. "Naval Deficiency: Imperial Maritime League Criticism"), p. 8, col. 7; and *Times*, June 3, 1908, p. 15, col. 6.

² Cp. also—s.v. "Instantly Ready!"—*Daily Express*, June 3, 1908, p. 5, col. 7.

³ See further *Standard*, June 15, 1908, p. 7, col. 4, s.v. "Naval Manœuvres: Combined Operations in the North Sea: The Manning Problem." Cp. also *Standard*, June 30, 1908, p. 8, col. 4, s.v. "The Naval Manœuvres":—"About 1000 coast-guards and shore-billet men have been pressed into the *personnel* for the time being;" and, from the *Standard's* Portsmouth Correspondent, *ibid.*, s.v. "Marines as Bluejackets": "There is a shortage of seamen at Portsmouth, and marines are being told off to do bluejackets' duties . . . the need of this transfer causing comment upon the reduction of the *personnel*." Compare also *Daily Express*, June 9, 1908.

⁴ Concerning Invasion see also above, pp. *R.F.*, 17, 30, 47, 110, etc., etc. See Index, s.v. "Invasion."

⁵ Reprinted (in the main), as a leaflet, by the Surrey Branch of the Imperial Maritime League.

other changes in organisation, which were—or were promised to be—introduced at the same time. The true causes of the redistribution we know, and their actual effects on the efficiency of the Navy have been detailed over and over again in these columns;¹ but there is one of the promised minor revolutions to which it is opportune at the present moment to draw attention. The promise, as given in Command-paper No. 2430, dated March 15, 1905, is as follows:—

“Orders have further been given that, as a rule, not more than one large vessel of a Fleet or squadron is to be under repair in dockyard hands at the same time, so as to ensure the various Fleets and squadrons being kept always at their effective strength and ready for instant service.”²

The necessity for making such a provision as this had been urged upon the Admiralty for some considerable time prior to its adoption, and its ultimate promulgation was consequently received with gratification. The manner in which it is being worked out in practice, however, is, if anything, worse than the condition of things which preceded it. The condition of the Atlantic Fleet at the present moment affords a striking illustration. The importance of this Fleet is very great, for without its assistance the Channel Fleet—the only other really efficient and fully manned Fleet in home waters—is inferior to the German Active Battle Fleet,³ besides being based upon a port nearly three hundred miles from the North Sea. The Atlantic Fleet is, further, the only naval force (other than the Four Cruiser Squadron, which is a training Fleet for youths) which we maintain west of the Bay of Biscay. According to the current issue of the official Navy List the composition of the Atlantic Fleet is as follows:—

BATTLESHIPS.

Albemarle, Albion, Cornwallis, Duncan, Exmouth, Russell.

CRUISERS ATTACHED TO BATTLE SQUADRON.

Arrogant, Venus.

SECOND CRUISER SQUADRON.

Antrim, Carnarvon, Devonshire, Drake.

It will be seen that there are nominally six battleships in the Fleet. At the present moment the only one instantly available for sea is the *Duncan*. Of the other five, the *Exmouth* (flagship of the Commander-in-Chief) and the *Albion* are both at Portsmouth undergoing refit or repair; the *Russell* and *Cornwallis* are at Devonport in like condition; while the *Albemarle*, flagship of the rear-admiral, is at Chatham. The dates on which the ships went into dockyard hands are as follows:—

<i>Russell</i>	April 13 ⁴
<i>Exmouth</i>	April 30 ⁴
<i>Cornwallis</i>	April 30 ⁴
<i>Albion</i>	May 24 ⁴
<i>Albemarle</i>	May 29 ⁴

¹ See the *Standard*, *passim* (frequently also quoted in this work).

² See also above, p. 275, and below, pp. 452 *sq.*

³ As to which, cp. above, pp. 145 *sq.*, etc.

⁴ 1908.

Of the four vessels composing the Second Cruiser Squadron, one, the *Antrim*, is undergoing refit at Gibraltar, while both of the attached cruisers¹ are *hors de combat*, the *Arrogant* being at Devonport and the *Venus* at Gibraltar, refitting. At the best the Atlantic Fleet is most inadequately served by scouts, for these cruisers, the only vessels available for the purpose, have speeds of only 20 and 19 knots respectively; but the necessity for scouts is, of course, largely discounted when one is considering a battle squadron consisting of only one ship. The actual condition of the Atlantic Fleet at the present moment is, therefore, as follows:—

	Nominal.	Actual.
Battleships	6	1
Protected Cruisers	2	0
Armoured Cruisers ²	4	3
Total	12	4

It would be interesting to know how the Admiralty reconcile this condition of things with their declaration of 1905.³ On previous occasions, when the number of vessels belonging to one Fleet in dockyard hands at the same time has only slightly exceeded that laid down three years ago, the transgression of the 1905 Order has been allowed to pass without much notice; but when it is found that advantage is taken of this silence to reduce one of our most important Fleets to exactly one-third of its nominal strength, it is surely time that someone should take the Admiralty to task.

It may be pointed out, in addition, that four battleships of the Channel Fleet are in dockyard hands—the *Dominion*, *Commonwealth*, *Implacable*, and *London*⁴—reducing the total strength of that Fleet in armoured ships from 20⁴ to 16. Instead of the nominal 30 armoured ships in home waters (excluding the Home Fleet), there are actually at this moment but 20.⁵

¹ Protected cruisers.

² The Second Cruiser Squadron;—See Mr. McKenna in the House of Commons, quoted *Morning Post*, June 24, 1908.

³ Printed above, pp. 275, 406.

⁴ Cp., in this connection, below, pp. 452 n. 3, 453 n. 1.

⁵ For further comment upon the facts detailed see the *Standard* (leading article), June 15, 1908, p. 6, cols. 6-7 (already referred to above, p. 330 n. 4), with its excellent 'summarised record of the present naval administration':—

A "Board of Admiralty, which for the past four years has pursued a course of 'hazardous experiment' in every department of naval administration, while avowedly ignoring the opinion of any naval officer outside Whitehall. The results of these 'great reforms,' in so far as it is at present possible, with a due regard to the public interest, to make them known, have been set forth in these columns from time to time.

"Briefly stated, they are:—the disorganisation and demoralisation of the service from top to bottom, whose full extent is known only to those who are bound to silence by the King's Regulations; a consistent omission to provide the complementary units of the Fleet—medium cruisers, destroyers, fleet colliers, and the like; the postponement of the construction of new docks; the neglect of repairs; the reduction of the *personnel*, and the decrease in sea-training; and the failure to promulgate a scheme of gunnery education and practice which would enable the commanders of the sea-going fleets to approximate their training to war conditions."

See further, again, *Standard*, June 19, 1908, p. 7, col. 5, and June 27, 1908, p. 6, col. 7.

STATE OF THE NAVY.

UNREADY HOME FLEET.

June 19, 1908. "Unready Home Fleet";—by one of the *Standard's* Naval Correspondents, *Standard*, June 19, 1908, p. 7, col. 5, showing that:—

The (late) First Lord's Statement Explanatory, that the armoured division of the Home Fleet at the Nore was to consist "this spring" (1908) of 12 of the most modern ships in the Navy, including, amongst the battleships, the *Lord Nelson* and *Agamemnon*, has not in fact been carried into effect:—Neither the *Lord Nelson* (which the First Lord stated would be ready by April 1, 1908) nor the *Agamemnon* (both of the 1904-5 programme) being even yet ready for commissioning, or even (despite a definite statement to the contrary in the Estimates) completed¹;—and the battleship squadron of the Nore Division at this moment consisting of the *Dreadnought*, *Bulwark* (which is overdue for transference to the Channel Fleet), *Magnificent*, *Majestic*, *Victorious*, and *Jupiter* (the latter specially commissioned temporarily from the Portsmouth Division), of which the four last-named are all over 13 years old;—"and this" (as he writes) "in the summer² following the spring³ which was to have seen the Nore Division composed of 12 modern armoured ships."⁴

After a reference to the facts that "the *Bulwark* and *London*, lately of the Nore Division, have been or are about to be transferred to the Channel Fleet, and the vessels of the *Majestic* class are to join the Channel Ports Divisions of the Home Fleet" (thus reducing the Nore battle squadron from 6 ships to 1, which the *Lord Nelson* and *Agamemnon* will only increase again, even when ready, by 2), he points to the real difficulty of the Admiralty, namely, that caused by the actual "*shortage of battleships at their disposal*," a result of

¹ "The *Lord Nelson* and the *Agamemnon* were laid down in May, 1905, and have been over 3 years under construction. The *Agamemnon* is" only now (*i.e.*, June 27, 1908), "about to be commissioned" (*Standard*, June 27, 1908, p. 6, col. 7).

² Summer of 1908.

³ Spring of 1908. In this connection see also above, *s.v.* November 18, 1907, p. 266.

⁴ There is, perhaps, some ground for the hope that *by the spring of 1909 (i.e., twelve months after the time appointed)* the Nore Division of the Home Fleet may at last realise some part of the anticipation held out to the country by the late First Lord. See *Daily Express*, August 10, 1908 (*s.v.* "Home Fleet in 1909: Britain's Fighting Force in the North Sea: A Comparison"), p. 1, col. 5, where the hopeful anticipation is expressed that:—

"The Nore Division of the Home Fleet, which comprises at present" (August 10, 1908) "the *Dreadnought* and *Agamemnon* and four old vessels of the *Majestic* class, will be reinforced by all the new battleships" (*i.e.*, the *Lord Nelson*, *Bellerophon*, *Téméraire*, and *Superb*)—"the four latter taking the place of the four old vessels of the *Majestic* class"—"so that by the end of next March" (*i.e.*, March, 1909) "it will consist of four *Dreadnoughts* and two *Lord Nelsons*" (with which will be associated, according to the *Express*, *ibid.*, the six "armoured cruisers, *Minotaur*, *Shannon*, *Achilles*, *Cochrane*, *Natal*, and *Warrior*").

Meantime:—"The three *Invincibles*—'Cruiser-Dreadnoughts'—will, it is understood" (continues the *Express*, August 10, 1908, *ibid.*), "join the Nore Battle Division temporarily, until the three new *Dreadnoughts* are delivered."

In the spring of 1908 we have seen what we have seen (see text). For the state of affairs in September, 1908, see below, p. 453. In March, 1909, we shall see:—what we shall see.

(According to the *Express*, further, *ibid.*, some six battleships are, in March, 1909, to be detached from the Channel Fleet—thus enormously reducing that Fleet—for the purpose of forming a small new squadron called the "North Sea Squadron"—to consist of the battleships so to be taken from the Channel Fleet together with the three cruiser-battleship *Invincibles*, and to operate in the neighbourhood of the Shetland and Orkney Islands.)

(For what we are now officially told to expect in March, 1909:—see, in advance, the Official Admiralty Communication of February, 1909, printed in *Standard*, February 15, 1909, p. 7, col. 2.)

"the attenuated battleship programmes of recent years," and, after outlining the course which they now apparently lay before themselves to make up for the actual deficiency in battleships,¹ he justly concludes as follows:—

"It is at least humiliating for the greatest Naval Power to be driven to the necessity of *botching up the battle squadron of one of her most important fleets with armoured cruisers.*"¹"

M.P.'S AND THE NAVY.

MORNING POST, June 25, 1908, etc.²

Imperial Maritime League,
2, Westminster Palace Gardens,
Westminster, S.W.
June 23, 1908.

DEAR MR. BELLAIRS,—We gather from what has appeared in the public Press³ that a number of members of the House of Commons, including many supporters of the present Government, whose adhesion you had secured to the Nelson Club which you had intended to form, have at your request transferred their allegiance to the Old Navy League. This adhesion, if not merely nominal but real, must imply that these Members of Parliament will in future adopt the same attitude towards naval questions as that adopted by the League named. To know what that attitude is to be becomes, therefore, now a matter of urgent public importance,⁴ and as you must evidently have arrived at a definite understanding with that League on this crucial subject before you took the great responsibility of strengthening its powers for good or ill, we venture to ask you publicly three questions.

The *First* is:—Have the committee now recanted their repudiation of the various points embodied in the Resolution⁵ which we respectively moved and seconded at the Annual Meeting of the Old Navy League on May 15 of last year,⁶ and which we repeated in the Resolution brought forward by us at the Extraordinary General Meeting on July 19 following?⁷

Those points comprised the reduction of the Navy estimates from £36,800,000 for the year 1904-5 to £30,400,000 for the year 1907-8, the concomitant dismantling of specified naval stations, the withdrawal of naval force from large areas of the world's seas, the reduction of the number of workmen in the dockyards, the reduction

¹ See also above, p. 408, note 4, para. 3.

² Also:—*Accrington Gazette*, June 27, 1908; *Civil Service Magazine*, June 27, 1908, *Gosport Journal*, July 2, 1908; *Lynn Advertiser*, June 27, 1908; *Naval and Military Record*, June 25, 1908; *Sunday Sun*, June 28, 1908; etc.; etc.

³ See above, pp. 399, 401, and below, p. 413.

⁴ Cp. above, p. 401.

⁵ Strictly an "Amendment" to the Annual Report of the Navy League for 1906. See above, p. 50.

⁶ May 15, 1907. See above, pp. 60 *sqq.*

⁷ July 19, 1907. See above, pp. 139 *sqq.*

of the *personnel* of the Navy, the decline of our torpedo flotilla relatively to that of Germany, the reduction of our programme of new construction, the application of the principle of short service to the fleet, and the consequent need of every kind of legitimate agitation.¹

The committee on May 15² traversed all these points. They declared their approval of all these reductions. They affirmed that they all made for increase of efficiency. They asserted the motives for them to be, not desire of economy, but "strategy" and desire for that increase of efficiency.

We now ask you whether the existing committee, principally composed of the same members as before, confess their complete error on these points, or still maintain the same position.

Our **Second** question is whether the Old Navy League now also recants its former repudiation of the object with which it was originally started³ (as explained in the writings of the real founder, Mr. Spenser Wilkinson⁴). That object was to procure the creation of a Strategy Department within the Admiralty, having authority in matters strategical.⁵

The committee of the League speedily repudiated this object,⁵ not through conviction that it was erroneous, but through timidity caused by the opposition to it which they encountered.

We now ask you if the League reassumes this original object or still repudiates it?

Our **Third** question is whether the League now endorses the recommendation, made by the two former First Sea Lords, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Frederick Richards and Admiral Sir R. Vesey Hamilton, of the appointment of a Commission of Enquiry into the scope and effects of recent changes in the Navy?⁶ Or does the League still adhere to the simple position defined in their published words, "We back Sir John Fisher,"⁷ who, the late Prime Minister informed the House of Commons, would resign if this inquiry were granted?⁸

We would add that we have read with deep regret the account of a speech by the president when taking the chair at a Navy League meeting on the 17th inst.⁹ In this speech Mr. Yerburch is stated to have repeated the dreary and superfluous platitude that the Navy League were not "Jingoes" (the last charge likely to be brought against them), nor alarmists crying "Wolf," but merely persons engaged in (vague) general educational work as to the importance of the Navy.¹⁰ At the present time, when the fighting efficiency of that service is being ruthlessly destroyed by the Government of Britain, no more deplorable utterance than this by the president of the League which you have strengthened could easily be conceived. And of the two evils, of crying "Wolf" when there is no "Wolf," and of failing to give the alarm when the marauder is actually present, is not the latter incomparably the greater? Miserably indeed does such a declaration by the president of the Old Navy

¹ See above, pp. 60 *sqq.*, 139 *sqq.*

² May 15, 1907. See above, pp. 60 *sqq.*; and Index, *s.v.* "Strategy" and "Old N.L."

³ See above, p. 307.

⁴ See above, pp. 307, etc.

⁵ See above, pp. 308, etc.

⁶ See above, pp. 264 *sq.*

⁷ See above, p. 278.

⁸ Cp. above, pp. 253, etc.

⁹ June 17, 1908.

¹⁰ Cp. also above, p. 402, text and n. 4.

League in this country contrast with the activity and the definite policy of the Navy League of Germany.¹

We propose to send this letter to the public Press.²

We are, Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH,

Joint Honorary Secretaries, Imperial Maritime League.

Lieut. Carlyon Bellairs, R.N., M.P.

THE "CASUALTIES TO SHIPS" RETURNS.³

MISLEADING RETURN FOR 1906.⁴

June 24, 1908.

June 24, 1908. Admiralty decline in future to grant "Casualties to Ships" Returns. For facts and comment see notes hereto.⁵ 678
"It is a remarkable coincidence," writes the *Standard*, June 26,

¹ Concerning the latter see above, pp. *R.F.*, 46, 67, 117, 127, 169, 208, 289, and below, pp. 434, 443, 453.

² We had despaired of securing a reply to questions couched in similar form and included in a letter written to Lieut. Bellairs some four weeks previously, and hence we adopted the course here indicated.

³ Cp., hereon, above, p. 385 n. 6 (p. 386).

⁴ "Doctored Casualty Returns," *Daily Express*, July 4, 1908 (leading article), p. 4, col. 5.

⁵ For facts and comment reference should be made to the following:—

(1) The letters of Lieut. Bellairs, M.P., on the Admiralty's "*Casualties to Ships*" *Return* for 1906, addressed to Mr. Robertson and Lord Tweedmouth personally, and reprinted in the *Standard*, October 19, 1907, p. 9, col. 3.

(2) The subsequent correspondence between Mr. Bellairs and the Admiralty—published (*s.v.* "Casualties to Ships": Admiralty's Weak Defence of Inaccurate List"), *Morning Post*, December 2, 1907, p. 4, col. 3; and (*s.v.* "Casualties to Warships: The Incomplete Return"), *Standard*, December 3, 1907, p. 5, col. 5—whence we quote Mr. Bellairs as follows:—

"It is only since the introduction of the huge experiment of placing 19,000 men in nucleus crews for ships which seldom train at sea that fault has been found with the accuracy of a return" ["which, originally moved for by a member of the Cabinet, Mr. Herbert Gladstone, and subsequently by another member of the Government, Mr. T. Lough, has been issued for a number of years," and] "which is the only available test as to whether the seamanship of the Navy is being deteriorated by Admiralty policy."

(3) The letter from Lieut. Carlyon Bellairs, M.P., to Mr. McKenna, dated June 24, 1908, and reprinted *Standard*, June 25, 1908, p. 8, cols. 1-2, and *Morning Post*, June 25, 1908;—And the *Standard* itself, June 25, 1908 (*s.v.* "The Admiralty and Parliament: Official Evasions: Mr. McKenna and List of Casualties"), p. 7, col. 7, and p. 8, col. 1, and (leading article), p. 6, col. 7; and June 26, 1908 (leading article: "Mr. McKenna's Evasions"), p. 6, cols. 5-6 (and see also *ibid.*, p. 8).

To cite here but a single glaring instance of grave omission from the Return for 1906:—Witness: The accident to the *Terrible* referred to above, p. 242 n. 5 (on p. 243).

The Admiralty have now decided to discontinue in future the publication of a Return of Casualties to Warships (see Lieut. Bellairs' letter last referred to; and *Standard*, June 26, 1908, p. 8, col. 4).

This is but another endeavour on the part of the Government to keep "Parliament and the Nation in ignorance of the real state of affairs in the Navy" (*Standard*, June 25, 1908, leading article, p. 6, col. 7). Cp. also next note.

⁶ Cp. also the appropriate comment of the *Daily Express*, June 27, 1908, p. 4, col. 6, *s.v.* "Things Done this Week":—

"Government declared intention to draw the veil in future over public knowledge of the number of lame ducks in the instantly-ready Navy."

⁷ See also, further, *Standard*, July 1, 1908 (leading article), p. 8, col. 5.

⁸ A Return (of 1908) dealing with the years 1901 to 1907 (both inclusive), will be found considered, (*s.v.*, "A Misleading Return") by the *Morning Post's* Naval Correspondent, *Morning Post*, Oct. 21, 1908, p. 4, col. 2.

1908 (leading article), p. 6, col. 6 (and cp. also p. 8), "that all the casualties omitted from the return (except two cases of engine-room accidents) occurred in vessels belonging to the Home Fleet."

"THE CASE AGAINST THE ADMIRALTY."¹

July, 1908. "Naval Training and Administration" (or "The Case against the Admiralty"¹); Sir Rowland Blennerhassett's Article, *National Review*, July, 1908, pp. 720-733.

THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE OPPOSITION.

THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE.

July 1, 1908. "The Admiralty and the Nation"; and the Opposition;—*Standard*, July 1, 1908 (leading article), p. 8, cols. 4-5 :—

"It used to be triumphantly urged by the Admiralty apologists that because the Opposition refrained from comment all must be well. That pleasing theory was rudely destroyed during the debates upon the Estimates, when the Opposition did for once rise to their responsibilities. . . . They made it very clear that they fully recognised the existence of serious evils and of a considerable menace to the national security; confirming, in every particular, the points which for two years we had been urging in these columns. But such isolated protests are comparatively futile. . . . The Opposition must be held, conjointly with the Government, responsible to the country in this matter. It is perfectly useless for Mr. Balfour and Mr. Austen Chamberlain to bewail the fact that when, or if, they return to office, they will be confronted with the necessity of spending millions to repair the Radical 'retrenchments,' if, in the meantime, they acquiesce in a vicious policy of administration, and the progressive destruction of military and naval strength."

July 1-22, 1908. The Naval Manœuvres (1908) in the North Sea.²³

¹ The phrase is that of the *Morning Post*, July 9, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, col. 6.

² Apparently so designed as to ensure (if possible) the victory of the so-called "Home Fleet." See *Daily Express*, July 4, 1908 (leading article), p. 4, cols. 4-5, and (*s.v.* "Victory before the Battle") July 15, 1908, p. 1, col. 2.

³ For the utterly unworthy and equally unjustifiable use made of the opportunity afforded by Lord Charles Beresford's absence, on the manœuvres, to vilify and injure his professional reputation, see below, pp. 415 *seqq.*, etc.

July 2, 1908. Mr. Bellairs' Reply¹ (to our letter of June 23, 1908), *Morning Post*, July 2, 1908, p. 3, col. 5.^{2,3}

MR. BELLAIRS, M.P., AND THE NAVY.

MORNING POST, July 6, 1908, etc.⁴

The Imperial Maritime League has addressed the following letter to Mr. Carlyon Bellairs, M.P. :—

Imperial Maritime League,
2, Westminster Palace Gardens,
Westminster, S.W.

July 4, 1908.

DEAR MR. BELLAIRS,—I have to thank you for your reply to the letter from my colleague Mr. Horton-Smith (now absent on circuit) and myself of the 23rd ult.⁵ In that letter we pointed out that the attitude towards naval questions of all those members of the House of Commons whose adhesion you had secured to the old Navy League⁶ must presumably be in line with that of the League which they had joined. We therefore asked you what that League's position now is in regard to, *inter alia*, the dismantling of naval stations, the withdrawal of naval force from large areas of the world's seas, the reduction of the number of workmen in the dockyards, the reduction of the *personnel* of the Navy, the decline of our torpedo flotilla relatively to that of Germany, the application of the principle of short service to the Fleet, and the consequent need of agitation to induce the remedy of these defects.⁷

On these points your only answer is to the effect that they are matters of past history. How can the present attitude of the old Navy League and of members of Parliament belonging to it towards these questions be a matter of past history? Clearly it is a matter of history in the making. Since, however, you are unable to give any response on these subjects of vital importance to the Navy, I will venture to repeat two other questions which you ignore. These are :—

(1) Does the Navy League now recant its former repudiation of the object with which it was founded, namely, the creation of a Strategy Department within the Admiralty, having authority in matters strategical?⁸

(2) Does the Navy League endorse or oppose the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry (not, of course, an inquiry conducted in public) "into the scope and effects of recent changes in the Navy," as recommended by the two former First Sea Lords, Admiral of

¹ Of date July 29, 1908.

² *Naval and Military Record*, July 9, 1908, p. 443.

³ For our Reply hereto, see text below.

⁴ Also :—*Cambridge Express*, July 10, 1908; *Naval and Military Record*, July 9, 1908, p. 443.

⁵ June 23, 1908, printed above, pp. 409 *seq.*

⁶ See above, pp. 399, 401.

⁷ See above, pp. 409 *seq.*

⁸ See above, p. 410, text and nn.

the Fleet Sir Frederick Richards and Admiral Sir Richard Vesey Hamilton?¹

Of these two questions, the first has reference to the right disposition of our Naval Forces during and before war, while the second is the true touchstone of the reality of desire to secure naval efficiency. For the real condition of the Navy and the real result of the revolutionary changes introduced during the last few years can manifestly be ascertained only by such inquiry, while amendment, where needed, is impossible without knowledge.

The actual situation is that the present Government are actively engaged in carrying out ideas incompatible not only with the maintenance of Empire but with our national existence. Returned to office pledged to reduce expenditure on both Services, they have reduced it accordingly,² and still intend further reduction.³ Not believing seriously in the possibility of war⁴ they neglect and despise preparation for it. They have cut down the Army,⁵ wrecked our Auxiliary Forces,⁶ lowered our outlay on new naval construction to far below that of Germany,⁷ and starved the administration of the Fleet.⁸ Briefly, to obtain money for social reform⁹ they have betrayed the safety of the country. Clearly, therefore, the duty of any League which exists to further national defence is to strive to excite resistance to the present Government in Parliament, since only there can it be effective.

Are, then, the Liberal members whom you have persuaded to join the old Navy League prepared to join in such resistance? Are they willing to disobey their party whips, to oppose the policy of their own Government, and to vote against their own side?

But if they are not prepared to forfeit their seats for the sake of their cause (and, so far, has your own admirable example of independence had any imitators amongst Liberal members?) their adhesion to the old Navy League can only mean the final abandonment by that organisation of all real attempt to resist the fatal action of the present Cabinet.

I am, Sir, Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,
Joint Honorary Secretary,
Imperial Maritime League.

UNEXPLAINED ACTION OF THE KAISER.

July 7, 1908. The Kaiser's Mysterious Surprise Visit to the British Fleet¹⁰ in Aalbeck Bay, Denmark.^{11 12 13}

¹ See above, pp. 264 *sq.*, 410.

² See above, *passim*; and Index, *s.v.* "Appeals," "Liberals," "Pledged," "Reductions," etc.

³ See above, pp. 403, etc.

⁴ Cp. above, pp. 247, 257, 296.

⁵ Cp. above, p. 382, and below, pp. 450, 475. See Index, *s.v.* "Army."

⁶ Cp. above, pp. 382, 391, and below, p. 445.

⁷ Cp. above, pp. 377, etc.

⁸ Cp. above *passim*; and Index, *s.v.* "Financial Starvation," "Liberals," and "Navy."

⁹ See above, pp. 315, 450, etc.; and Index, *s.v.* "Social Reform."

¹⁰ Under the command of Lord Charles Beresford.

¹¹ See *Daily Express*, July 11, 1908, p. 1, col. 3.

¹² See, further, below, p. 421 n. 3 (p. 422).

¹³ For German "spying" see below, pp. 421 *sq.*

UNFAIR AND UNWORTHY ACTION OF
THE TIMES.¹

"VINDICTIVE INDISCRETION."¹

July 7, 1908. Under the heading of "A Strange Occurrence in the Channel Fleet," the *Times* published, on July 7, 1908, what it called an "account from a correspondent of an occurrence which took place last week in the Cruiser Squadron attached to the Channel Fleet."

In view of the real facts of the case, as now given to the world by the First Lord on July 30, 1908, we think that all right-minded men will agree with the "Correspondent" of the *Globe* (July 31, 1908, p. 5, col. 2), that:—

"The answer given by Mr. McKenna yesterday² . . . emphasises in a remarkable manner the unfairness of the *Times* in publishing the signal as it did without taking the trouble to ascertain the real facts of the case beforehand. . . . The paper had thus been guilty of a wretched piece of sensation-mongering utterly unworthy of the leading journal, and it is monstrous that the professional reputation of any officer, especially one of the most distinguished in the Fleet" [Admiral Lord Charles Beresford], "should be reflected upon in such a manner. Would to Heaven the name of the *Times'* informant could be discovered!"³ 4

¹ "The Vindictive Indiscretion of the *Times*": see *Evening Standard and S.J.G.*, July 31, 1908, p. 3, col. 2.

² July 30, 1908.

³ Further admirable comment—including strong approval of Sir John Colomb's letter of rebuke to a former Civil Lord of the Admiralty (*Times*, July 7, 1908, p. 10, col. 1)—will be found in the *Morning Post*, July 8, 1908 (leading article), p. 8, cols. 5-6. See also *Morning Post*, July 10, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 5-6.

Of course, the whole thing was an organised attack on Lord Charles Beresford—and one which (in passing, be it said) has most signally failed. Cp. *Daily Express*, July 7, 1908 (s.v., "Navy Scandal Exposed: Full Story of the Anti-Beresford Intrigue"), p. 1, cols. 2-3; and also July 8, 1908, p. 1, cols. 2-3. See also *Standard*, July 8, 1908, p. 7, col. 1;—and we would commend to our readers the broad, impartial and impersonal line taken by the *Standard*, July 8, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 5-6.

See further, generally:—*Daily Express*, July 9, 1908, p. 1, cols. 2-3; *Morning Post*, July 9, 1908 (Mr. H. F. Wyatt, and also "Admiral"), p. 5, col. 6 (see below, p. 417), and p. 7, col. 5; *Evening Standard and S.J.G.*, July 9, 1908, p. 1, col. 1, and (leading article), p. 3, col. 1;—*Daily Express*, July 10, 1908 (s.v., "Navy Intrigue Fizzling Out"), p. 1, col. 3; "A Retired Naval Officer," in the *Morning Post*, July 10, 1908, p. 4, col. 7; *Standard*, July 10, 1908, p. 7, col. 3;—*Evening Standard and S.J.G.*, July 11, 1908, p. 10, cols. 3-4; *Globe*, July 11, 1908, p. 4, col. 2; *Standard*, July 11, 1908, p. 7, col. 2;—*Morning Post* (leading article), July 13, 1908, p. 6, cols. 4-6, reprinted below, pp. 422 sqq.;—*Standard*, July 23, 1908, p. 5, col. 3 (Resolution of the Imperial Maritime League, printed below, p. 429);—*Morning Post* quoted in *Evening Standard and S.J.G.*, July 24, 1908, p. 13, col. 2; *London Opinion*, July 25, 1908 ("The Anti-Beresford Cabal," by Mr. Percival A. Hislani), pp. 172-3; *Standard*, July 28, 1908 (Questions in the House), p. 9, col. 3;—Lord Winterton (s.v., "Name Wanted"), *Daily Express*, July 30, 1908, p. 1, col. 3; *Standard*, July 30, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, col. 4; Mr. H. W. Wilson, in *National Review* (August), 1908, quoted in *Daily Express*, August 1, 1908, p. 4, col. 5;—and the Duke of Portland, quoted in the *Daily Express*, August 5, 1908, p. 1, col. 5, and *Standard*, August 5, 1908, p. 6, col. 5, and August 6, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, col. 6. See further below, pp. 416 sq., 429, 433.

Needless to say, Lord Charles Beresford was later on triumphantly and publicly vindicated: see the text, and further below, under July 30, 1908, p. 433.

⁴ Some assistance in answering the question—"Who was the *Times'* Informant?"—may perhaps be derived from the following statement definitely made by the *Saturday*

DISCIPLINE AND THE PRESS.

July 8, 1908. "Discipline in the Navy and the Traditions of the Press";—*Morning Post*, July 8, 1908 (leading article), p. 8, cols. 5-6.

ADMINISTRATION OF THE NAVY.

THE ATTACK ON LORD CHARLES BERESFORD.

MORNING POST, July 9, 1908, p. 5, col. 6.

Extract from Letter to the Editor of the MORNING POST,

July [7], 1908.

Mr. Harold F. Wyatt, Joint Founder and Joint Hon. Secretary of the Imperial Maritime League, in the course of a letter, says:—

"Here we have one of our greatest Admirals, our Commander-in-Chief at sea,¹ engaged in work calculated to strain all the powers of body and mind, and yet exposed to the most deadly imputation of professional incompetence, which imputation is published in the London newspapers² at a moment when explanation or reply from himself is obviously impossible. Moreover, since no Press correspondents have been allowed to be in the Fleet, this imputation can only have been communicated to the Press by one of three kinds of betrayal. Either an officer in the Fleet must have made that communication himself, directly, in defiance of all decency and all regulations, or a private letter or telegram has been so communicated, or else—which would be the worst of these three treacheries—a communication made officially or otherwise from someone in high command under Lord Charles Beresford to the Admiralty has been sent by the Admiralty on to the Press. . . . Suspicion, therefore, is inevitable, but on the other hand it may be baseless, and therefore for the honour of the Navy it is clearly necessary that an immediate *investigation* by independent investigators should be demanded in order to ascertain and make known to the world the name or names of those who gave this information to the journals which first published it. It is earnestly hoped that Unionist members will press at once for this *special inquiry*. This point is entirely distinct from the question whether the signal was in fact made as stated, or whether it would, if executed, have involved disaster. That question

Review, Feb. 20, 1909 (leading article), p. 230, which, so far as we are aware, has never yet been challenged:—

"The charge" against Lord Charles Beresford "was communicated to the Admiralty by a subordinate of Lord Charles Beresford, and it appeared in an influential paper."

"The charge itself," adds the *Saturday Review* (*ibid.*), "was a trumped-up lie, and so acknowledged by the Admiralty . . . It appeared in the paper at a time when Lord Charles Beresford was away on arduous work in the North Sea. If true, it would deservedly have blasted his reputation as a great tactician. It was absolutely untrue, yet the Admiralty with evidence in their possession as to the source from which the accounts emanated did nothing to protect their gallant subordinate," Lord Charles Beresford, "or to maintain his prestige beyond a long-delayed and perfunctory statement in Parliament. No mention was made of the communication from Lord Charles Beresford's subordinate, though, as a matter of discipline, we should have thought that the Commander-in-Chief should be the exclusive channel for such communications to the Admiralty."

¹ Admiral Lord Charles Beresford.

² Cp. above, pp. 412 n. 3, 415.

is manifestly purely professional. It cannot possibly be decided by the Press or the public. When, or if, it be determined by competent and unprejudiced naval authority, Lord Charles Beresford may be vindicated, as appears probable from his record, or he may be condemned,¹ but in either case it is equally intolerable that while conducting operations which, next to those of actual war, are of supreme importance to the country he should be exposed to the publication of such a charge in English newspapers. The choice of time and the method of attack seem, under all the circumstances, to be Asiatic rather than European, and they are certainly the very last to have been expected from any English gentleman."

THE BOARD OF ADMIRALTY AND SIR JOHN FISHER.

"A ONE MAN JOB."

DISCIPLINE.

MORNING POST, July 9, 1908, p. 5, col. 6.

To the Editor.

July 8, 1908.

SIR,—As a naval officer I should like to endorse every word you say in your excellent and able article in to-day's issue.² As you clearly point out, the advertising element is much now in evidence, and I am fully convinced the majority of naval officers are much opposed and disgusted that this should be so, and, what is still worse, the administration of the Navy, instead of being governed by a Board, is fast becoming in the opinion of so many of us what may be called "*a one man job*."³ However able one man may be, the Board of Admiralty has met the requirements of the Empire as a successful governing body until these advertising and other elements have crept in. This is the root of the present unpleasant state of things, and the sooner it is put a stop to the better.

Many of the senior officers in the Navy were astonished that Sir Percy Scott was not either tried by a Court Martial, a Court of Inquiry, or ordered by the Admiralty to haul his flag down.⁴ As neither of these courses took place it gave the public, and not only the public but the Naval Service in general, an impression that the Admiralty did not take a serious view of the matter. Such a course as this cannot be conducive to discipline, and gives the very worst impression throughout the Service.

Yours, &c.,

"ADMIRAL."⁵

¹ He was, of course, as the world now knows, triumphantly and publicly vindicated by the First Lord himself. See above, p. 415, text and n. 3, and below, p. 433.

² *Morning Post*, July 8, 1908, referred to above, p. 416.

³ It was bound so to become under the new *régime*, mentioned above, pp. 1, etc.

⁴ Cp. above, p. 255.

⁵ See above, p. 415, n. 3.

QUESTION OF A NATIONAL GUARANTEE FOR THE WAR RISKS OF SHIPPING.¹

July 8, 1908. Report of the Treasury Committee appointed to consider this question issued July 8, 1908.

For an account of the Report, which—upon the assumption (a large one nowadays) of the maintenance of an adequate British Navy²—was answered in the negative,³ see *E.S. & S.J.G.*, July 8, 1908, p. 13, col. 2; *Standard*, July 9, 1908, p. 4, col. 5.

And for comment upon the Report see the *Daily Express*, July 9, 1908 (leading article), p. 4, col. 4; *Morning Post*, July 9, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 5-6; and see especially the "Very definite protest against the acceptance of this report by the Committee of Defence," with the reasons for such protest, contained in the *Standard*, July 10, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 6-7.

For Sir Charles Ottley's "Weighty reservation,"⁴ and the highly valuable suggestion of Sir George Clarke⁵ in regard to the question, see the *E.S. & S.J.G.*, July 8, 1908, p. 13, col. 2; *Standard*, July 10, 1908, p. 6, col. 7.

THE WORLD'S "DREADNOUGHTS."

July 8, 1908. "*Dreadnoughts of the World*," by Mr. P. A. Hislam, *Daily Express*, July 8, 1908, p. 4, col. 6;—in which he observes:—

"To those who are constantly talking about the immense superiority of the *Dreadnought* to every other battleship in existence, it may be of interest to state that of all the battleships now on the stocks for the Great Naval Powers,⁶ the *Dreadnought* and her successors⁷ are, with the single exception of the French ships of the *Danton* class, the weakest."⁸

¹ In connection herewith, cp. the articles entitled "*If Britain were at War*," by Mr. F. Leverton Harris, M.P., in *Standard*, December (11, 12, 14, 15, 16), 1908; and *Standard* (leading article thereon), December 16, 1908. See, also, the correspondence thereon in *Standard* as follows:—(a) December, 1908:—(Sir John Colomb (17, p. 9); Mr. Douglas Owen and Mr. L. Cope Cornford (18, p. 9); Sir Thomas Sutherland and Admiral W. H. Henderson (19, p. 9); Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge (21, p. 9); Sir John Colomb (29, p. 3); Mr. R. B. Marston (30, p. 8); Mr. John J. Robson (31, p. 8): "Power of Maritime Seizure: The Declaration of Paris," 1856);—and (b) Mr. F. Leverton Harris, M.P., in conclusion, *Standard*, January 1, 1909, p. 10, col. 1; and *Standard*, January 11, 1909 (leading article, "Private Property and Naval Warfare"), p. 6, cols. 6 sq.

² On the "adequacy," or otherwise, of the British Navy for the purposes of Commerce-protection, cp. (*inter alia*) the highly pertinent question put by Mr. H. S. Staveley-Hill, M.P., to the First Lord of the Admiralty, in the House of Commons, July 28, 1908 (*Times*, July 29, 1908, s.v. "Protection of Merchant Shipping"), wherein he pointed to the salient "fact:—that the *Navy List* showed that we had but 67 unarmoured cruisers, most, if not all, of which would be required for service with our battle fleets, with which our armoured cruisers were also mainly intended to serve."

³ The Committee found itself "unable to recommend the adoption of any form of national guarantee against the war risks of shipping and maritime trade *except that which is provided by the maintenance of a powerful navy*." (See *Morning Post*, July 9, 1908, leading article, p. 6, cols. 5-6.)

⁴ *Standard*, July 10, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, col. 7.

⁵ Who definitely expressed disagreement with the conclusions of the Committee (see *Standard*, July 10, 1908, p. 6, col. 7; and cp. *Standard*, July 9, 1908, p. 4, col. 5).

⁶ For the German battleships cp. below, n. 8, and (s.v. Aug. 1, 1908), pp. 436 sq.

⁷ Enumerated below (s.v. Aug. 1, 1908), pp. 436 sq. (See also Index, s.v. "*Dreadnoughts*," "*Dreadnought-Cruisers*," etc.)

⁸ Mr. Hislam explains how and why this is, and he closes his article as follows:—"In the vital matter of broadside fire, the *Dreadnought* is beaten by the ships building for

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE AND THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

STANDING COMMITTEE FORMED

Mr. H. F. Wyatt, Hon. Sec. *pro tem.*¹

July 8, 1908

July 8, 1908.—“A special meeting of Unionist members interested in matters bearing upon the present state of the Navy was held last evening at the House of Commons—Mr. Staveley-Hill, M.P., presiding. Mr. H. F. Wyatt was present on behalf of the Imperial Maritime League. It was resolved to form a Standing Committee to watch Navy questions, and to resist further Navy re-

Germany, America, Japan, and Brazil; and, compared with the German ship[s], she is even further behind in ahead fire.”

For a comparison of the “armament” of “the third *German Dreadnought*,” the *Rheinland* (launched at Stettin, September 26, 1908, and then so christened, having theretofore been known as the *Ersatz Württemberg*”: see *Standard*, September 28, 1908, p. 7, col. 6, and below, p. 436)—as also of “her predecessors, the *Nassau* and *Westphalen*” (than which “she is slightly larger,” though “similar to them in essential details,” and which were respectively launched in February and July, 1908: *Standard*, *ibid.*)—with “the armament of the *St. Vincent*,” the latest *British Dreadnought* (launched September 10, 1908, cp. next paragraph)”—see the *Standard* (September 28, 1908, p. 7, col. 6), shewing in detail the all-round superiority of the German over the British vessel, (a) in weight of metal discharged per round, (b) in broadside fire, and (c) in fire ahead. (Cp., further, *Daily Express*, September 28, 1908, p. 1, col. 7).

Concerning the 3 monster-battleships “building for Brazil”—the *Minas Geraes* (launched September 10, 1908, at Elswick: the same day as our *St. Vincent* at Portsmouth), the *Sao Paulo* (building at Barrow, the launch of which is expected to take place before the end of 1908), and the *Rio de Janeiro* (to be laid down at Elswick, on the slip vacated by the first-named)—(for an account of which see *Standard*, November 15, 1907, p. 13, col. 2, and September 9, 1908, p. 5, col. 3; and cp. also *Standard*, September 11, 1908, p. 7, col. 3, and *Daily Express*, September 11, 1908, p. 1, col. 2)—the question of the hour is:—“Which Power is going to buy them?” See *Daily Express*, June 29, 1908, p. 1, col. 5; June 27, 1908, p. 1, col. 7; July 8, 1908 (Mr. Hislam), p. 4, col. 6; July 17, 1908, p. 1, col. 2, and (leading article) p. 4, col. 4; and September 11, 1908, p. 1, col. 2; *E.S. & S.J.G.*, July 17, 1908, p. 12, col. 2; *Daily Express*, July 20, 1908, p. 8, col. 2; *Spectator*, July 18, 1908, p. 78. See also “Question” and “Answer” in the House of Commons, May 11, 1908 (*Times*, May 12, 1908, p. 4, col. 4).

The only answer possible, if the British Two-Power Standard is to be maintained is:—*Britain*.

Just as in the past (in 1903) we bought the *Triumph* and *Swiftsure* from the Chilians (and splendid ships they have proved themselves to be), so too now must the 3 Brazilian monster-battleships fly the white ensign of the British Navy.

“The Brazilian programme, to which these “three “vessels belong” (viz. “the Navy Act adopted by the Brazilian Government on December 14, 1904”: see *Standard*, September 9, 1908, p. 5, col. 3), “also includes” (according to the *Standard*, *ibid.*) “three armoured cruisers, which, however, have not yet been begun; two 3,500-ton scout cruisers, building at Elswick, and named the *Rio Grande* and the *Bahia*” [the latter launched January 20, 1909, see *Standard*, January 21, 1909, p. 9, col. 2]; “ten 700-ton destroyers, ten 150-ton sea-going torpedo-boats, and five submarines.”

¹ Concerning the use of “Premier” type in this book, see above, p. 52, n. 5.

ductions."—*Standard*, July 9, 1908; *Morning Post*, July 9, 1908.¹

For further information concerning this Committee—of which Mr. H. F. Wyatt was subsequently appointed Honorary Secretary *pro tem*.²—see the letter of Mr. H. S. Staveley-Hill, M.P., in the *Standard*, July 23, 1908, p. 6, col. 6; and see further ³ below, p. 466.

INQUIRY AGAIN REFUSED.

July 8, 1908. "At St. Stephen's: Training of Naval Officers";—"The demand for an Inquiry was refused by" Mr. McKenna, July 8, 1908, "on the ground that it would involve a vote of censure of the Board of Admiralty."⁴ 5

Which is the more important?—the Board of Admiralty or the Safety of the Nation? The question has, obviously, only to be asked to be answered.

BRITISH NAVAL DEFEAT BEING PREPARED BY THE ADMIRALTY

July 9, 1908. "The State of the Navy";—Strong indictment by the *Morning Post* (leading article), July 9, 1908:—showing that the "Defeat" of the British Navy "can come about in two ways . . ." and that "the present Board of Admiralty has done a great deal to pave the way for both kinds of defeat. . . . The Board, whose business is to prepare for war, has prepared for war by laying sure foundations, not for victory, but for defeat. Its strategy and its shipbuilding policy have been alike disastrous. . . ."

July 9, 1908. "Coast Defenceless: Naval Bases Endangered";—from "A Military Correspondent" in the *Morning Post*, July 9, 1908, p. 5, col. 5.

¹ Cp. also *Daily Express*, July 9, 1908; *Daily News*, July 9, 1908; *Daily Mail*, July 9, 1908; *Times*, July 9, 1908, and November 3, 1908, p. 10, col. 2 (cited in *Army and Navy Gazette*, November 7, 1908, p. 1070, col. 2).

² See *Morning Post*, July 25, 1908, p. 7, col. 5; *Daily Express*, July 25, 1908; *Civil Service Gazette*, August 1, 1908.

³ See, also, *Daily Express*, November 13, 1908, p. 1, col. 2.

⁴ Referred to again, below, p. 485 n. 2.

⁵ For pertinent comment on this attitude, see *Standard*, July 9, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 4-5.

GERMAN ESPIONAGE IN BRITAIN: GERMAN SPIES.

DAILY EXPRESS, July 14, 1908, p. 5, col. 1.

To the Editor.

Athenæum Club, Pall Mall, S.W.,

July 12, 1908.

SIR,¹—Only a few weeks ago a cousin of mine was boating with her husband on the Fal (in Cornwall), when to their surprise they found themselves met by two boatloads of German naval officers and men coming up the river in full German naval uniform.

My late friend, Mr. George Browne, of Maidenwell, who farmed at Louth, in Lincolnshire, never tired of telling how year by year Germans would come round the countryside with maps, and mark upon the latter every haystack which they found. One year he built a stack in a different field to that in which he had been wont to build it. The different position of the stack was duly noted by these Germans on their maps.

From far-away Shetland the same tale. Before me as I write is a letter from a Volunteer friend in Lerwick, dated March 25, 1905.² This is what he wrote: "Did you know that this port was visited last summer³ by the whole of the German North Sea Fleet? It is brought back to my mind by seeing again a question in Parliament about it. They came down here and took possession for a day or two, in the most perfect weather on record. And you should have seen the activity with which sketch-book and kodak were plied, also the industry with which parties of officers surveyed the locality. There was more than a mere picnic going on. Perhaps Shetland may seem an unimportant place to Britain, seeing that till the other day the Navy was concentrated in the Channel. But it would do grandly for Germany as the base of a North Sea fleet, as the Norsemen of old found it."⁴

I am, Sir, Yours faithfully,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

¹ This letter was prompted by the action of Col. Lockwood, M.P., in the House of Commons in relation to the subject in question.

² The Rev. A. J. Campbell (then Acting Chaplain, 7th V.B. Gordon Highlanders).

³ Summer, 1904.

⁴ For many another illustration besides those given in the text, see:—*Daily Telegraph* (as quoted by the *National Review*, Feb., 1908, pp. 842-3); *Nat. Rev.*, *ibid.* (see above, p. 322), *Standard*, June 12, 1908, p. 10, col. 1; July 14, 1908, p. 7, col. 6; July 15, 1908, p. 9, col. 3; July 16, 1908, p. 9, cols. 1-2; July 18, 1908, p. 3, col. 4; July 21, 1908, p. 9, col. 6; July 22, 1908, p. 8, col. 6; July 25, 1908, p. 8, col. 3; Aug. 7, 1908 ("English Patriot"), p. 7, col. 3 (below, p. 443); *Daily Express*, July 10, 1908, p. 5, col. 5; July 14, 1908, p. 5, col. 1 (including the letter in the text); *E.S. & S.J.G.*, July 13, 1908, p. 1, col. 2; *Globe*, July 18, 1908, p. 8, col. 2. See also *Morning Post*, Jan. 15, 1908 (Admiral de Horsey), p. 4, col. 4; *Daily Express*, Jan. 18, 1908, p. 5, col. 2; and *cp.*, further, *Daily Express*, Aug. 4, 1908 (leading article), p. 4, col. 4, and *Standard*, Aug. 6, 1908 (letter of Mr. J. Stanley Little), p. 10, col. 5, *ad fin.* (referred to below, p. 443); Aug. 10, 1908 (Mr. Rowland Thirlmere), p. 9, col. 4; Aug. 21, 1908 (Mr. B. Simmons), p. 5, col. 5; Aug. 25, 1908 ("Lieutenant-Colonel"), p. 7, col. 2 (referred to above, p. 261, n. 3, and below p. 443 n. 3); Sept. 8, 1908 (Mr. W. Frewen Lord), p. 6, col. 3; Oct. 1, 1908 ("Soldier"), p. 5, col. 5.

Mr. Haldane, Gallio-like, treated the matter with unconcern. See, for instance, *Daily*

THE "GENIUS," THE "AUTOCRAT," AND THE "ORIGINAL." ONE VIEW OF ADMIRALTY POLICY.

MORNING POST, July 13, 1908 (*Leading Article*), p. 6, cols. 4-6.

A writer in the *Observer*¹ who professes to know and to state the views of the responsible strategist of the Board of Admiralty has volunteered to expound to the public "the exact position" of what he calls "the controversy" about the Navy. This writer has the misfortune to be careless. The only person at the Admiralty responsible for strategy and naval policy is the First Sea Lord, at present and since 1904² Sir John Fisher. If this writer really knows the Admiralty view the source of his knowledge must be Sir John Fisher. If his information comes from any other source it must be worthless as a disclosure of the Admiralty's policy. This account, therefore, given with an air of authority, of "the exact position" is worth examining. According to this writer it is necessary that "discipline in the Navy should be restored, the authority of the Admiralty maintained, and the Admiralty's policy executed without question by Admirals afloat." These may very well be Sir John Fisher's ideas. The writer from whom we quote them implies that they are, though so soon as the question of his inspiration is raised he must deny that he is inspired except by his own inner consciousness and perhaps by Lord Esher, from whom he quotes, and will assert that he is merely an impartial onlooker.³ We have given his premises or fundamental principles. It is true that discipline in the Navy ought to be restored. The chief breach is that for which Sir Percy Scott is answerable,⁴ and the inspired⁵ writer now gently drops that officer. He says, "the case of Sir Percy Scott needs no discussion; that officer's methods, it is admitted, have not been too fortunate."⁶ He wants to concentrate his attacks upon Lord Charles Beresford. He states a case against that Admiral, a case

Express, July 14, 1908, p. 5, col. 1; and "Soldier," in *Standard*, October 1, 1908, p. 5, col. 5.

It is interesting to record also the fact that the *espionage* is not confined to land—a Jarée German yacht having throughout the July manœuvres (1908) followed the movements of the Fleet in the Forth waters, *Globe*, July 22, 1908, p. 7, col. 2; *Daily Express*, July 24, 1908; and see, further, *E.S. & S.J.G.*, July 22, 1908, p. 13, col. 3.

Compare also the sudden appearance (of course duly "explained"!) of a German torpedo-boat in the Tyne (Shield's Harbour), August 28, 1908, during British Naval Manœuvres off that river;—see *Daily Express*, August 31, 1908, p. 5, col. 7; *Scotsman*, August 31, 1908, p. 7, col. 3; *Standard*, August 31, 1908, p. 7, col. 3.

And:—What, by the way, was the explanation of the German Emperor's own mysterious visit to the British Fleet in Aalbeck Bay, July 7, 1908 (referred to above, p. 414)?

See further, generally (1909):—(I) Rosyth Secrets said to have been sold to Germany," *Daily Express*, January 16, 1909, p. 1, col. 5;—(II) "Army of German Spies" (two classes, *a*, fixed agents or "Letter-Boxes," *b*, Travelling Agents) in Scotland and England, *Daily Express*, January 27, 1909, p. 5, col. 5; *E.S. & S.J.G.*, January 27, 1909, p. 7, col. 2; *Standard*, January 27, 1909, p. 7, col. 5; and, further, *Daily Express*, January 28, 1909, p. 5, col. 2;—(III) "Possibilities of Invasion: German Expert Views: How Spies on Shore could Pave the Way," *Marine Rundschau*, quoted in *United Service Magazine*, Feb., 1909, and in *Standard*, Feb. 2, 1909, p. 5, col. 3 (below, p. 517 n. 1).

¹ *Observer*, July 12, 1908.

² See above, p. 1.

³ Compare the similarly ludicrous position perforce adopted by the *Observer* itself in February, 1908. Above, p. 323.

⁴ Cp. above, pp. 255, 278, n. 1, 417.

⁵ Cp. above, p. 256, text and n. 2.

⁶ It may perhaps here be mentioned, in passing, that on or about July 28, 1908, the Admiralty decided that Sir Percy Scott should take a cruiser-squadron to South Africa (see *Daily Express*, July 29, 1908, p. 1, col. 4; *Morning Post*, July 29, 1908; p. 7, col. 2; *Standard*, July 29, 1908, p. 7, col. 5)—the *Daily Express* (*l.c.*) observing that "the appointment of Sir Percy Scott to the special squadron is not regarded in the light of promotion," while the *Daily Chronicle*, July 29, 1908, p. 1, col. 3 (apparently quoting the *Central News*) added that "in some quarters it is suggested that the Admiralty's action is equivalent to a censure."

which we shall examine in detail. "The Commander-in-Chief of the Channel Fleet is definitely in disagreement with his superiors upon a fundamental issue of naval policy." This is the announcement made in behalf of Sir John Fisher. Sir John Fisher, says his apostle, is a "genius," and, he adds, an autocrat. Then follow the proofs of the First Sea Lord's genius. The first is that he told Lord Esher in 1903 how he was going to increase the efficiency of the Fleet (by scrapping ships¹ and building monsters²), to redistribute it,³ and to make a complete change of the *personnel*.⁴ The second is that since 1904 he has done just what he told Lord Esher in 1903 that he would do.⁵ These are sufficient proofs that the First Sea Lord is an autocrat.⁵ Whether they show him a genius entirely depends on whether his plan of scrapping ships¹ and building monsters² was a good preparation for the next war, whether his distribution of fleets³ was suited to the needs of that war, and whether his "complete change in the *personnel*"⁴ was to be a change for the better. Just now he wants to change Lord Charles Beresford for someone else, though why he should be in such a hurry, if Lord Charles Beresford's command comes to an end in March,^{6,7} is not clear. These proofs of Sir John Fisher's genius will satisfy those who assume it; they would hardly satisfy a common jury. Now to the "fundamental issue of naval policy," on which the Admiral commanding the Channel Fleet is said to disagree with the First Sea Lord. When Lord Charles Beresford was offered the command of the Channel Fleet "that Fleet had been weakened⁸ in pursuit of the Admiralty's great design," that is, of Sir John Fisher's design expounded by him in 1903 to Lord Esher.⁹ Lord Charles Beresford, according to the story, declined the command unless the Fleet under his command were strengthened.¹⁰ Some ships were thereupon returned to it; he took the command, "but has continued to maintain that he is not in sufficient strength." This is in the eyes of the admirer of the autocrat a grave offence. He generalises it by saying that Lord Charles Beresford "regards himself as Admiral-in-Chief with a view to the conduct of a naval campaign."

This is the whole case so far as it concerns Lord Charles Beresford. The disciple of the autocratic genius has taken it as complete from his master. If he had taken his inspiration from his own heart it would not have betrayed him; but the "sheer genius" has stuffed him with nonsense. It sounds tremendous to say that "the Commander-in-Chief of the Channel Fleet regards himself as Admiral-in-Chief, with a view to the conduct of a naval

1 Cp., *e.g.*, above, pp. 65, 131 *sq.*, 340 *sq.*; and Index, *s.v.* "Scrapping."

2 Cp. above, pp. 299, 302, 303, 372, 404, etc.

3 Cp. above, pp. 12 *sq.*

4 See Index, *s.v.* "Manning," "Nucleus Crews," and "Personnel."

5 Cp. above, *passim*.

6 March, 1909.

7 The rumour referred to—and industriously propagated in the *Fisherite* Press—should have been totally devoid of foundation, since all the great commands (whether of Fleets or at Ports) are always three-year appointments, though of course held at His Majesty's pleasure. See *P.M.G.*, Feb. 12, 1900, p. 1, col. 4, and Feb. 15, 1900 (Mr. H. F. Wyatt), p. 1, col. 2; *Daily Express*, Feb. 15, 1900, p. 1, col. 2, and p. 4, col. 4; *Standard*, Feb. 15, 1900 (leading article), p. 6, col. 6, and Feb. 17, 1900 (Mr. C. Bellairs), p. 7, col. 6; *Morning Post*, Feb. 17, 1900 (leading article), p. 6, col. 4; and see especially the *Standard's* Naval Correspondent, *Standard*, Feb. 23, 1909, p. 8, col. 1.

Lord Charles Beresford's sacrifice by the Radical Government, in ordering him (on February 15, 1900) to haul down his flag on March 24, 1900, was a deliberate infringement of the regular rule.

Concerning the "sacrifice" itself, see (*int. al.*) the interview with Mr. H. F. Wyatt, in *P.M.G.*, Feb. 15, 1909 (Extra Late Edition), p. 1, col. 2.

8 Cp. above, pp. 44, 48.

9 See above, in the text.

10 Cp. above, p. 48, n. 2.

campaign." The statement has taken away the breath of the inspired writer or impartial onlooker. But if he had kept his breath and his head he would have said: "Indeed. In what terms are the Admiralty's instructions to the Commander-in-Chief of the Channel Fleet? Presumably he has been told what rôle he is expected to play in a possible war?" It is a pity he forgot to obtain and give to the world this information, because no sensible man can tell whether an Admiral exaggerates the importance of the duties assigned to him until he knows what those duties are. We can only regret that on this all-important point genius was silent, and left its apostle and us in the dark. The only fact alleged behind the tremendous charge against an Admiral of thinking that if war comes he will have to handle his Fleet against the enemy is that Lord Charles Beresford "maintains that he is not in sufficient strength." Here again the essential part of the story has been omitted. Not in sufficient strength for what? Presumably for the purpose of fighting some fleet of a possible enemy? Autocratic genius did not vouchsafe to enlighten its mouthpiece, or the onlooker has omitted to consider the point. Yet it would have been so easy to have given the strength in battleships, cruisers, and torpedo craft of, say, the German High Sea Fleet¹ and of the Fleet under Lord Charles Beresford's immediate orders.² But no evidence is given to show that Lord Charles Beresford's judgment of the strength of his force to deal with a given hostile force is wrong and that Sir John Fisher's judgment is better. The only point made is that Lord Charles Beresford has a judgment on the subject and that it differs from Sir John Fisher's. No reason is given for supposing Sir John Fisher to be a better judge than, or as good a judge as, Lord Charles Beresford on a matter of war, which consists in fighting. Nor is it alleged that Lord Charles Beresford has published any opinions of his own or done anything inconsistent with his duty. On the contrary, the only knowledge the public has of Lord Charles Beresford's having taken the liberty to think for himself comes from these denunciations. The inference is that Lord Charles Beresford has expressed his views to the Admiralty Board, which is just what it was his duty to do. The fundamental principle as regards the duty of a Commander-in-Chief is to express to those who have appointed him his judgment as to the sufficiency or insufficiency of the means placed at his disposal for the performance of the task assigned to him in case of war. This is the principle laid down with great force by Napoleon. He inherited it from the earlier French masters of war. One of the greatest of them, Bourcet, to whom Napoleon was much indebted for his ideas of war, wrote in 1775: "It is for the General of whom the King has made choice to make to the Minister the necessary observations on the facilities or difficulties which may be found in the execution of his task; but if he undertakes it he becomes responsible for success and ought not to set out without having *carte blanche* as to all the means which he may wish to employ." Thus the whole case made out is that Lord Charles Beresford has done his duty.

The First Sea Lord, according to his trumpeter, is not only a genius and an autocrat, but an original. On the point of originality the evidence is conclusive. "An apparatus for wireless telegraphy has been fitted upon the top of the Admiralty. . . . By this invisible

bove, pp. 145 sq., etc.

² See Index, s.v. "Channel Fleet."

agency every ship can be manipulated from Whitehall like a piece on the chess-board." This is a grand new discovery. It will delight the Germans, whose one hope is to fight against a nation that ties its Admirals or Generals to a telegraph wire or a telephone. This new discovery of genius goes beyond their dreams. The Germans are disciples of old Bourcet, from whom we may continue the quotation written under Louis XV.¹: "If at each different circumstance the General is obliged to inform the Court, and to await its decision, it is not possible that he should be able to be assured of anything, the more so as circumstances may vary several times during the interval between the departure of a courier and the arrival of the answer." The telegraph has, of course, shortened the interval. Yes, and the Germans think that the great advantage of Moltke's method over Napoleon's consisted in the later commander's practice, in spite of the telegraph, of relying upon the initiative of the Generals under him.² The new invention apparently is to make all Admirals superfluous except the one at Whitehall. But if that is a part of the plans revealed to Lord Esher in 1903, why are these far-fetched attacks made on Lord Charles Beresford? It would be simpler to wait till March,³ when the autocrat could abolish the Command-in-Chief of the Channel Fleet³ and substitute wireless telegraphy, which, after all, if it is to work in war time, should be set going in peace. Surely in this last wonderful disclosure the oracle must have been obscure and the interpreter must have used his own imagination. Even original autocratic genius must be supposed to be sane.

BRITISH SHIPBUILDING VOTE.

"SAVING" MONEY AND RISKING THE EMPIRE.

July 13, 1908. "The British Navy: Shipbuilding Vote which shows our Decline: Alarming Apathy: 'Saving' Money and Endangering the Empire";—A powerful article in the *Daily Express*, July 13, 1908, p. 1, col. 2, to which we would draw especial attention, as it deals closely and in detail with the relative strength of Britain and Germany in vessels capable of operating in the North Sea, with especial consideration of the torpedo-craft built and building by the two nations.

The "striking disadvantage" on the British side in regard to small craft is at once apparent.

"And" (to quote the *Express* further, *ibid.*), "when we add to these facts the equally disquieting one that in the same year (1911) Germany will have 10 *Dreadnoughts* to our 12⁴ it will be seen that the position for Great Britain is one of the gravest moment."

¹ In 1775. See above.

² "There is no gainsaying the fact"—writes the *Western Mercury* (Plymouth), April 22, 1908—"that Naval men are viewing this latest Admiralty innovation with some degree of misgiving. . . . The fear is that advantage will be taken of the wireless equipment to interfere with the initiative of fleet commanders in war-time. . . ."

Cp. further, and below, p. 454 n. 6 (p. 455).

³ March, 1909. As to this, see above, p. 423, nn. 6, 7.

⁴ See further, above, p. 352, n. 9, and below, pp. 455, n. 4, 461 *sq.*, 462, nn. 1, 2, 478 *sq.*

ESPECIAL DEFICIENCY IN CRUISERS AND DESTROYERS. IMMEDIATE NEED.

CONSTRUCTION POSTPONED TO SAVE MONEY.

July 13, 1908. Shipbuilding Vote for the Navy discussed in Committee of Supply in the House of Commons.¹ For report, see *Standard*, July 14, 1908, p. 4, cols. 3-5.²

GERMAN FLEET OUT IN THE ATLANTIC.

July 13, 1908. The German High Sea Fleet commences³ its four or five weeks' cruise in the Atlantic.⁴⁵

July 17, 1908. "Torpedo in the Air: By Land or Sea: Germany purchases a formidable Weapon";—See *Daily Express*, July 17, 1908, p. 1, col. 3. See also, hereon, *Evening Standard and S.J.G.*, July 17, 1908, p. 9, col. 2, and *Standard*, July 17, 1908, p. 7, col. 6.

RENEWED DEMAND FOR INQUIRY.

July 18, 1908. "Half-Truths and the Navy";—*Spectator*, July 18, 1908, pp. 80-81; wherefrom we would quote the conclusion:—

"As the Command of the Sea is absolutely vital to our interests, and as it is of supreme importance to attain that end at the least possible price, our immediate business is to take action which will tend to put an end to the ruinous competition into which the latest developments of German naval policy have forced us. But there is only one way likely to put an end to that competition, and that is action which will convince our rivals of the uselessness of further challenging our position.⁶ Remember, however, that action to keep

¹ See the detailed anticipatory leading article in the *Standard*, July 13, 1908, p. 6, col. 5-6.

² For comment on the Debate itself see *Daily Express*, July 14, 1908, p. 1, col. 2, *Globe*, July 14, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 3-4, and especially *Standard*, July 14, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 4-5, which (had space allowed) we should have been glad to reprint here. "What is the use," the *Standard* pertinently asks, "of adding to the number of battleships while the Fleet accessories, without which they are useless, are not provided?"—and this altogether "apart from the consideration of the neglect of repairs. . . . At this moment, we are confronted by a deficiency of at least 40 cruisers, and of at least as many destroyers. . . . The Admiralty are laying down 6 cruisers and 16 destroyers, but as the Government will not provide enough money for their construction" (cp. above, p. 347), "they will not be completed for two years." (Cp. also below, p. 437, n.).

³ See *Daily Press*, s.v. (*circa*) July 13 and 24, 1908.

⁴ Cruise to the Azores.

⁵ It would hardly seem to be realised that, in the event of a war between Germany and Britain, one of the first objects of the German High Sea Fleet may (in certain circumstances) be to *get out of the North Sea*;—and Germany will, in such case, see to it that she manages to effect this under the name and guise of "*manœuvres*" before she brings the crisis to a head.

⁶ "The reductions in the" British "Navy . . . have encouraged the pace of other countries in the matter of building, and so have endangered the peace of Europe. I believe that by winter there will be a naval crisis in this country, and a great naval agitation."—Lieut. C. Bellairs, M.P., *Daily Express*, June 18, 1908, p. 5, col. 7.

the command of the sea and to put an end to competition does not necessarily mean the building of more *Dreadnoughts*, or indeed of any particular type of battleship. As to what is the best type we offer no opinion, but we still hold that further inquiry^{1 2} is needed into the difficult problem of how to obtain the best value for the money we spend on the Fleet."²

COMMAND OF THE AIR. THE FUTURE.

July 18, 1908. Command of the Air.³ Upon this subject—big with the fate of the future—see, for instance, "The Conquest of the Air," *Spectator*, July 18, 1908, p. 85.⁴

¹ The italicisation is ours.

² Cp. above, pp. 381, 404, etc.

³ In an early proof of the Programme of the Imperial Maritime League (printed above pp. 305 *sqq.*) we inserted—as an asterisked note to the words (occurring in the "Summary" of the objects of the League), "*To secure that the primary object of the National Policy shall be to win and hold Command of the Sea*"—the words following:—"*To win and hold Command of the Air may be in coming time perforce the substituted aim.*"

In the Programme, as finally published on January 27, 1908 (see above, pp. 305 *sqq.*), the latter words were omitted to avoid complicating the issues and because the time was not yet ripe for substituting "*Command of the Air*" for "*Command of the Sea*."

This note is printed to record that the matter did not pass unconsidered by the Founders of the new League. (Cp., further, below, p. 521, n. 2).

⁴ See also:—"Flying Warships: Germany's Aerial Supremacy of the Future: Amazing Prophecies" (of Regierungsrat Rudolf Martin), quoted *Standard*, January 18, 1907;—"Warships in the Air: Views of Comte de la Vaulx: Practical Obstacles," *Standard*, January 22, 1907;—"The French War Balloon: German Tactics," *Times*, July 18, 1907, p. 5, col. 3;—"Germany's Airship: Wonderful Evolutions over Berlin: Rival of the 'Patrie,'" *Standard*, July 30, 1907, p. 7, col. 3;—"Service Questions in the House of Commons: Aerial Flight," *Standard*, August 6, 1907, p. 3, col. 4;—"The Air (Views of the Powers, at the Hague Conference)," *Standard*, August 8, 1907, p. 6, col. 1;—"Wreck of the British 'Nulli Secundus,'" October, 1907 (see above, p. 260, and below, p. 441);—"Loss of the [French] Airship 'La Patrie,'" *Morning Post*, December 2, 1907, p. 8, col. 3;—"How I learned to fly" (by Mr. Hy. Farman), *Daily Express*, January 14, 1908, p. 4, col. 5 (and cp. p. 5, cols. 1-2);—"British 'Nulli Secundus' Ready: Military Airship to be Tried in 3 Weeks," *Daily Express*, May 8, 1908, p. 5, col. 4;—"The Wright Brothers' Airship," *Standard*, May 13, 1908, p. 10, col. 5;—"The Air Age," *Globe*, June 17, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 3-4;—"Liners in the Air: The New Era. Britain Lagging Behind," *Daily Express*, July 10, 1908, p. 1, col. 2;—"The Power of the Air," *Daily Express*, July 11, 1908 (leading article), p. 4, cols. 4-5, and also (*sc.*), "Warfare in the Air: Germany's Flying Fleet and its Future: Is Britain Safe? Influence of Aerial Power on History" p. 1, cols. 2-3;—"The Conquest of the Air," *Globe*, July 11, 1908, p. 1, col. 2;—"Germany's Aerial War Fleet: 'Aerial Navy League,'" *Observer*, July 12, 1908, p. 7, col. 3;—"Airships Under War Conditions," *Standard*, July 14, 1908, p. 8, col. 5;—"Airships," *Standard*, July 15, 1908 (leading article), p. 8, cols. 5-6;—"Question in the House, *Globe*, July 21, 1908, p. 10, col. 1;—"The British Dirigible, No. 2 (First Trip)," *Daily Express*, July 25, 1908, p. 5, col. 3, *Daily Graphic*, July 25, 1908, p. 7, col. 3, *Standard*, July 25, 1908, p. 9, col. 4;—"German Aerial Navy League" (founded), *Times*, July 28, 1908, p. 7, col. 5 (below, p. 430);—"Lord Rosebery in the House of Lords, July 28, 1908, *Daily Express*, July 29, 1908, p. 1, col. 2;—"British Government's Aerial Parsimony 'Absurd' (Major Baden-Powell), *E. S. & S. J. G.*, August 6, 1908; *Standard*, August 7, 1908, p. 5, col. 4 (quoted below, p. 441). See further below, pp. 441 *sq.*

Concerning the French airships building see the article in *Standard*, August 6, 1908, p. 7, col. 2.

For the success, and alike the fate, of the German "*Zeppelin II.*" (as also for the immediate commencement of "*Zeppelin V.*" and German ambition and intention to "Command the Air"), see below, *s.v.* August 5, 1908, p. 441.

WARSHIPS OF THE FUTURE.

July 19, 1908. "Warships of the Future: Divided for Day and Night Work: Colonel Cuniberti's Views";—*Standard*, July 19, 1908, p. 7, col. 7, p. 8, col. 1, and *Daily Express*, July 20, 1908, p. 1, col. 6, and p. 8, col. 2; extracting from Mr. F. T. Jane's "Fighting Ships," 1908 (publ. July 20, 1908).¹

THE GERMAN CHALLENGE—AND A WARNING.

July 19, 1908. "Germany's Challenge; Admiral FitzGerald's Grave Warning to Britain";—Speech at Appleton Hall, Cheshire; *Daily Express*, July 20, 1908, p. 1, col. 6.²

COMPARATIVE NAVAL POSITION OF THE GREAT POWERS

RISE OF GERMANY AND FALL OF FRANCE

July, 1908.

July 20, 1908. "One significant feature of the new edition of" Mr. F. T. Jane's 'Fighting Ships' is the changed positions of the principal navies of the world:—

"France has now sunk to 5th place, while Germany and Japan tie for 3rd; Russia, once the third Naval Power, is now the 8th."³

LORD CROMER'S FEARS FOR THE EMPIRE.

July 20, 1908.

"What was the main duty of the Government at this moment? He had no hesitation in answering that question himself. Its main duty was to prepare in every way possible for a European conflict, which might, and would not improbably, be forced upon us before many years had elapsed. He thought that the [Old Age Pensions] Bill crippled our resources under three heads, financial, naval, and military."—Lord Cromer in the House of Lords, July 20, 1908;—*Standard*, July 21, 1908, p. 4, col. 1.

THE KRUPP DEBENTURE ISSUE.

July, 1908. The famous Krupp Debenture Issue—"a loan" of £2,000,000 "for the construction of new workshops for armaments"—floated in Berlin, July, 1908, significantly reported in *Times*, July 23, 1908, p. 18, col. 4, but which apparently passed unnoticed or unheeded by the British Admiralty.⁴

¹ Concerning "Night Defence" of battleships see above, pp. 360, 386, 387.

² On "Invasion" see above, pp. *R.F.*, 7, 30, 47, 110, etc. (and Index, *s.v.* "Germany" and "Invasion.")

³ *Daily Express*, July 20, 1908, p. 8, col. 2.

⁴ Cp. further below, p. 461 n. 4.

THE REAL ISSUE.

RESOLUTION OF THE IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE

*Passed on July 22, 1908.*¹

"That the Executive Committee of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE record their emphatic protest against the recent attempt to obscure the real and vital question of naval policy by the introduction of personal issues regarding the alleged relations subsisting between particular naval officers, and by anonymous and irresponsible statements respecting professional technicalities."^{2 3}

MEMORIAL FOR YET FURTHER REDUCTIONS.

APPEAL OF 144 M.P.'S TO PREMIER.

July, [24], 1908.

July [24], 1908. For an exposure of the extraordinary nature of the arguments upon which the appeal of these 144 Liberal and Labour M.P.'s (with Sir John Brunner and Mr. Murray Macdonald at their head) is based,^{4 5} see, *e.g.*, the *Standard*, July 31, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 4-5; *Globe*, July 30, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 2-3; the latter concluding:—

"The peace of the world is fairly well assured so long as the Naval strength of Great Britain is unchallengeable, *but not an hour beyond that date.*"

OLD AGE PENSIONS DEFENDED AS AN EXPRESS MEANS FOR CUTTING DOWN THE FLEET.

July 27, 1908. "As a bid for popularity Mr. Asquith has landed the country in an extravagant project without counting the cost; and one of the main *defences* which his supporters make of the plan is that so much money will be required by the ever-growing cost of Old Age Pensions, that it will be *necessary* to cut down the *defences* of the country."—*Globe*, July 27, 1908, p. 1, col. 1.

¹ Concerning the use of "Premier" type in this book see above, p. 52, n. 5.

² Printed, *Standard*, July 23, 1908, p. 5, col. 3; *Morning Post*, July 23, 1908; etc.

³ The necessity for the passing of such Resolution will be apparent from pp. 415 *seq.*, etc., above.

⁴ Part of this astounding document was printed in the *Standard*, July 30, 1908, p. 7, col. 6; and the gist of the rest of it may be inferred from the *Globe's* leading article (July 30, 1908), referred to in the text.

⁵ For earlier appeals see Index, *s.v.* "Appeals."

GERMAN "AERIAL NAVY" LEAGUE FOUNDED.

July [27], 1908. German Aerial Navy League Founded;—see *Times*, July 28, 1908, p. 7, col. 5 (see above, pp. 427 n. 4, and below p. 441 n. 7).

THE TWO-POWER STANDARD.

WHAT IT INVOLVES BESIDES BATTLESHIPS.

July 28, 1908. "The Two-Power Standard" and its Collateral Requirements; What it involves besides Battleships;—*Standard*, July 28, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 5-6.¹

July 28, 1908. Mr. Lloyd George's "Amazing Speech" ² dealing with the Navy (a Speech addressed to the *soi-disant* "Universal Congress of Peace," at the Queen's Hall, London, July 28, 1908; reported in *Times*, July 29, 1908, p. 10, cols. 2-3; and characterised by the *Times*, July 29, 1908, leading article, p. 11, col. 4, as "an attack . . . upon the Two-Power Standard . . . singularly reckless and inopportune");—for which see below.³

MR. LLOYD GEORGE *versus* NATIONAL DEFENCE.

STANDARD, July 31, 1908, p. 4, col. 7, etc.⁴

To the Editor.

The Imperial Maritime League,
2 Westminster Palace Gardens,
Westminster, London, S.W.,
July 30, 1908.

SIR,—That Mr. Lloyd George would be unable to find the money necessary for the cost of Old Age Pensions, unless he cut down the Navy and the Army to a point even below that to which they had already been reduced,⁵ was a fact widely recognised even before his speech on the 28th instant.⁶ But very few persons can have supposed it to be possible that the present Chancellor of the Exchequer would be compelled at once to declare war against the

¹ See also Mr. Wyndham's strong speech on the Needs of the Navy, *Standard*, July 24, 1908, p. 8, col. 2;—and see further below, pp. 435 sq., 454, 513, 518 sq., etc.

² *Daily Express*, July 29, 1908. See below, p. 431, n. 2.

³ This page sqq.

⁴ Also:—*Belfast News Letter*, August 1, 1908; *Bristol Times and Mirror*, August 1, 1908; *Britannia*, August, 1908, p. 368; *Civil Service Gazette*, August 8, 1908; *Dublin Express*, August 1, 1908; *Dundee Courier*, August 1, 1908; *Jackson's Oxford Journal*, August 15, 1908 (with misprint, "made" for "unable," in line 1); *Leeds and Yorkshire Mercury*, August 1, 1908; *Liverpool Courier*, August 3, 1908; *Morning Advertiser*, August 3, 1908; *Naval and Military Record*, August 6, 1908, p. 502; *Newcastle Journal*, August 3, 1908; *Oxford Times*, August 22, 1908 (with misprint, "made" for "unable," in the first line); *Sheffield Daily Telegraph*, August 1, 1908; *Yorkshire Herald*, August 1 [or 4], 1908.

⁵ Cp. further, below, pp. 450 sqq.

⁶ July 28, 1908. See text above on this page.

armaments of this country, towards the reduction of which (despite his feeble disclaimer, published this morning¹) his entire oration² was undoubtedly directed.

Such language as his is of the type to have been expected from any specimen of the malignant-little-England-Welsh-political-Radical Nonconformist Minister. From such men we expect nothing but manifestation of their profound ignorance of the real nature of the world, into which, to its misfortune, they have been born. But that such extraordinary drivel as that talked by Mr. Lloyd-George yesterday should have issued from the mouth of a Minister of the Crown, and more especially from that of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, is nothing less than a portent in the history of England. Keen indeed must be the saturnine joy with which the German Emperor and the German General Staff have perused the utterance of this astonishing son of unhappy Britain.³

The Old Age Pensions Act must in future be known as "*An Act to facilitate the Conquest of Britain by Germany.*"^{4 5}

The Radical Party have often been accused of profound want both of Imperial feeling and of national patriotism, and also of incapacity to safeguard British interests. But no such accusation has ever reached the height, the breadth, and the depth of the actual utterance of this Cabinet Minister.

Of all the deadly foes, at once of the peace of the world and of his own country, Mr. Lloyd George must henceforth be admitted to be the chief.

His arguments, moreover, are even more fatuous than his conclusions. He says that Germany depends on her Army as we on our Navy, and yet that she is content with a One-Power Military Standard. The crushing answer to the perilous folly of this contention is, first, that Germany actually has the Two-Power Military Standard, so far as fighting efficiency is concerned,⁶ and, next, that she makes the attainment of national safety the first object of her national life. If we only dealt as faithfully with our Navy as Germany deals with her Army, we should not be in the national peril in which we are, as a fact, living.

The gist of Mr. Lloyd George's wondrous argument is comprised in the question why, as we live on good terms with the United States (unhappily a condition of doubtful permanence) we should not also live on equally good terms with Germany.⁷ These are a

¹ *Times*, July 30, 1908 (s.v. "Mr. Lloyd George and the Two-Power Standard"), p. 10, col. 4.

² Of July 28, 1908. See *Daily Express*, July 29, 1908 (s.v. "Little England: Amazing Speech by Mr. Lloyd-George"), p. 1, col. 5; *Standard*, etc. See *Standard's* leading articles thereon July 30, 1908, p. 6, col. 5; August 3, 1908, p. 6, col. 5; and *Daily Express*, August 4, 1908 (leading article, "The Empire's Peril"), p. 4, col. 4.

³ And so it was. "The speech . . . has been received in Germany with an outburst of enthusiasm. . . . The attack on the Two-Power Standard excites especial enthusiasm, and the Chancellor's criticism of British Naval policy is quite after the heart of the most rabid German naval expansionists." See *Standard's* Berlin Correspondent in *Standard* July 30, 1908, p. 7, col. 6. (And see also Mr. W. Kennedy in *Standard*, August 11, 1908, p. 5, col. 7.)

⁴ See above, p. 392 n. 2.

⁵ "Conquest"—Cp. Sir Edward Grey quoted above, p. *R.F.*, and below p. 460; and cp. further below, pp. 474 sqq.

⁶ Upon the comparative value of which—on sea as on land—cp. General von der Goltz, quoted above, p. *R.F.*, and below, p. 434, n. 8 (p. 435).

⁷ In other words:—the Two-Power Standard in jeopardy again. Cp. also Mr. Haldane's attitude (above, pp. 277, 298, 346).

few of the trivial circumstances which constitute a reply to his query:—

(1) The distance to German ports is about 300 miles (e.g., the distance from Hull to Emden¹ is only 278²), and to those of the United States about 3,000 miles.

(2) Germany is the greatest Military Power in the world, and the United States are not a Military Power at all.

(3) The United States have a population of about 80 millions occupying about 3,000,000 square miles, while Germany has a population of 62 millions, occupying only some 200,000 square miles.

(4) The United States have no wish for more territory at present, while Germany is bursting with passionate desire, arising from actual need,³ to extend her dominions. "Our future lies on the water," is now the motto of her people,⁴ as "The watch on the Rhine" was her battle-cry in 1870. To wrest from us command of the sea, to tear from us the carrying trade of the world, to annex large portions of the British Empire,^{5 6} and

¹ Concerning Emden itself cp. above, pp. . . . 358, and below, pp. 444, 477.

² See the admirable map given in Mr. P. A. Hisslam's *Admiralty of the Atlantic*, February, 1908.

³ Cp. also Mr. W. Kennedy in *Standard*, August 11, 1908, p. 5, col. 7; writing of Germany as:—"a country whose borders are bursting with a population full of energy, thoroughly trained and organised, with a patriotism sufficient to make members of every party willing and proud to fight for their country, and, for driving force, the absolute necessity of expansion and the practical impossibility of expanding except at the cost of the British Empire," and therefore "bound to come to blows—and apparently" (for reasons which he gives) "with success"—with that Empire. ⁴ Cp. above, p. R.F.

⁵ "You cannot be in the presence of a German for five minutes without his talking of war—war with England—yes, they wish for it. It is the trade and the Colonies of England that they want."—See the German quoted by "Englishman Resident in Germany," *Standard*, September 5, 1908, p. 6, col. 3.

Cp. also the writer of the article entitled "The German Peril" in the *Quarterly Review*, September, 1908 (as quoted in *Standard*, September 14, 1908, p. 4, col. 5, referred to below, p. 450):—"Germany must have colonies, as they (the Germans) believe, or they must sink, in the end, to the second rank among nations. . . . Either in South America or in the vast unfilled regions now under the British flag, the colonial destiny of the German race must be fulfilled. . . . To challenge the Monroe doctrine would be unsafe—at least, just now. There remains the British Empire. Its dissolution is believed to be inevitable."

Compare, again, "Anglo-German" in *Standard*, September 16, 1908, p. 4, col. 4 (referred to below, p. 443, n. 3):—"Unfortunately, her" [Germany's] "national ideals and aspirations—although perfectly legitimate from her own point of view—are strongly antagonistic to our own. She requires expansion in Europe, colonies and coaling stations overseas, for her fast-growing population and commerce. Unless we are prepared to admit these aspirations of hers, and resign ourselves to our fate, we have only two ways open to us. . . ."

See, further, above, pp. R.F., 269, and, below, pp. 443, 450, 456, 504.

⁶ The fact that subscriptions flow to the German Navy League from the Boers (see above, p. 67, and below, p. 505) is but one of the many indications of a not unlikely struggle of the future:—

When the Boers are again ready to throw off the mask, as they threw it off on October 9, 1899 (the date of President Krüger's Ultimatum to the British Empire), the German Navy will be ready and prepared to prevent the relief of British South Africa by sea; and Germany will receive a part of the British South African Dominions from the Boers as the price of her assistance in ousting Great Britain therefrom.

The Kaiser himself—to do him justice—made no secret of his regret in 1899 that the German Navy was not then strong enough to enable him to take advantage of Great Britain's South African difficulties in the interests of Germany. (See above, p. R.F., and below, pp. 463, 505, and cp., further, the revelations as to Germany's official attitude at the time, 1899, given by the Boer *Volksstem*, Nov., 1908, and quoted thence in *Daily Express*, Nov. 11, 1908, p. 1, col. 2, s.v. "Why Germany did not help the Boers: Because Britain was Mistress of the Seas: Secret History," and in *Standard*, Nov. 7,

to make us pay the price for our present cowardly helplessness, these are the manifest, the inevitable,¹ and, from their point of view, the legitimate objects of German ambition.² 3

Mr. Lloyd-George thinks it is sad that it should be so, but the main point is that, sad or not, so it is.

His real quarrel is with the poor, erring Author of this Universe, who made competition the law of life on this planet, instead of first taking counsel with Mr. Lloyd-George and some of his pious pseudo-religious friends.

We are, Sir, Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH,

*Honorary Secretaries.*⁴

ENTIRE VINDICATION OF LORD CHARLES BERESFORD.⁵ FAILURE OF THE INTRIGUE⁶ AGAINST HIM.

July 30, 1908. Lord Charles Beresford publicly and triumphantly vindicated by the First Lord of the Admiralty.

See, with appropriate comment, *Daily Express*, July 31, 1908, p. 1, col. 2; *Globe*, July 31, 1908, p. 5, col. 2; *Evening Standard and S.J.G.*, July 31, 1908, p. 3, cols. 1-2; *Standard*, July 31, 1908, p. 7, col. 4, and (leading article), p. 6, cols. 4-5; Aug. 6, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, col. 5; *Morning Post*, July 31, 1908, p. 7, col. 2, and (leading article) p. 6, col. 4, from which last we quote:—

"In other words, the statement sent from the Fleet and published⁷ made insinuations which were entirely unfounded against the professional skill of the Commander-in-Chief. That having been made clear, it is now proved that the communication from the Fleet, which was engaged in confidential manœuvres, was contrary to discipline, besides being a dastardly attack on the Commander-in-Chief. . . . The public wants to know whether Mr. McKenna is going to find out who" sent the communication, "and to punish him so as to make it probable that the like offence will not be committed again. The public wants the cur dragged to light and whipped."⁸ 9

1908, p. 7, col. 7, *s.v.* "Dutch Revelations." And in this connection, again, his fateful telegram to President Krüger in the winter of 1895—as to which see the joint-letter, "The Krüger Telegram," by Mr. H. F. Wyatt and Mr. L. G. H. Horton-Smith in *Standard*, Feb. 4, 1909, p. 4, col. 3—should always be borne in mind.

And it will not be forgotten that (as pointed out by Mr. Rowland Thirlmere, *Standard*, Aug. 28, 1908, p. 4, col. 4) "Germany is" already "entrenched in S.-West Africa."

"South Africa," writes Mr. Thirlmere (*ibid.*), "is the corner-stone, the pivot, the pillar, the lever of the Empire! If South Africa goes—everything in the way of Oversea possessions must inevitably follow."

The Cape is, in fact—though the fact is too often overlooked—the most important point in the strategic communications of the British Empire.

¹ Cp. above, pp. *R.F.*, 269, 432 (nn. 3, 5), and below, pp. 443 (text and nn. 3, 4), 504.

² Cp. also Mr. Blatchford, quoted below, pp. 443 *sq.* ³ See above, p. 432, nn. 3, 5.

⁴ Concerning this letter see further below, pp. 450 *sq.* ⁵ Cp. above, p. 415 n. 3.

⁶ Intrigue. See above, p. 415, n. 3, and cp. *Standard*, July 31, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, col. 4; *Morning Post*, July 31, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, col. 4; and *Standard*, August 6, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, col. 5.

⁷ *Times*, July 7, 1908. See above, p. 415.

⁸ Upon Mr. McKenna's subsequent attitude of "*non possum*," see the trenchant criticism of the *Morning Post*, August 1, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 3-4.

⁹ Cp. further, *Saturday Review*, Feb. 20, 1909 (leading art.), p. 230, quoted above, p. 415, n. 4.

BOLT FROM THE BLUE.¹

July, 1908. "A Bolt from the Blue"²; by Lieut.-Col. Alsager Pollock;—*National Review*, August, 1908; the alarming conclusion at which he arrives being that:—

"It is in my opinion certain that if Germany could at the present time secure command of the North Sea for 3 days, she could invade and conquer the United Kingdom without any serious difficulty."^{2a}

NEW GERMAN NAVY LEAGUE FOUNDED.

July 30, 1908. New German Navy League Founded:—the "Deutscher Flottenbund";—the Old German Navy League, the "Deutscher Flottenverein,"³ having become *too moderate*!^{4 5 6}

BRITISH DISTRIBUTION—GERMAN CONCENTRATION.
BRITAIN'S ESSENTIAL NAVAL WEAKNESS.

August, 1908. Striking Article by Col. Lonsdale Hade, in the *Nineteenth Century*, Aug., 1908,⁷ from which we quote the following:—

"In these days of nations topographically far apart, yet, owing to the practical annihilation of space, actually jostling against each other in their rivalries, the political barometer is liable to great and sudden fluctuations, and may at any moment fall to 'Stormy.'

"The East may make large demands on our small force of well-trained troops at home; the Admiralissimo may have to show the mobility of his fleets far away from our shores⁸ against living, bitter, and determined enemies, and then, it may be in a month's time, how about the defence of the heart and vitals of the Empire?"

¹ The title calls to mind a golden observation from the wonderful pages of Bacon (*Essay 21*):—"When things are once come to the execution, there is no secrecy comparable to celerity."

² Cp. above, p. 47.

^{2a} See *s.v.* "If we lost the Command of the Sea: Helpless before a Foreign Invasion: Expert's Warning."—*Daily Express*, August 3, 1908, p. 3, cols. 1-2.

See also, upon "Invasion," above, pp. *R.F.*, 47, 254, 445, 462, 468, 514, etc. (and see Index, *s.v.* "Invasion.")

³ For which see above p. 67.

⁴ See *Standard*, August 1, 1908, p. 8, col. 4.

⁵ If only the Old Navy League of Britain had even *approximated* to the German Navy League's so-called "moderation"!

⁶ If the Old Navy League of Germany has since, under the leadership of its new President, Admiral von Koester (for whom see above, p. 67, n. 2, and below, p. 453, text and n. 3), acquired a semi-official position in association with the German Admiralty (see *Daily Express*, September 29, 1908, p. 1, col. 8, and *Standard*, September 29, 1908, p. 5, col. 2, and September 30, 1908, leading article, p. 6, cols. 5-6), that League has at least the satisfaction (unknown to the Old Navy League of Britain: see above, *passim*) that it is seconding the efforts of an Admiralty whose aim is to increase, and not to decrease, its country's relative strength at sea. (Cp. above, p. 67, n. 2, and *passim*.)

⁷ See *s.v.* "Gambling with the Empire: Hazarding Britain's Safety on an 'If': Time-Serving."—*Daily Express*, August 3, 1908, p. 5, col. 1.

⁸ Cp. in this connection a letter by "Petty Officer, R.N." in *Daily Express*, August 3 1908, p. 4, col. 5, recalling the vital but oft-forgotten fact that:—

"The German (naval) force is always concentrated, while ours must, of necessity, be scattered."

Compare, also, in this connection, the remarks of Mr. Cochrane, M.P., at Largs, N.B.,

THE TWO-POWER STANDARD.

DAILY EXPRESS, Aug. 4, 1908, p. 1, col. 3; MORNING POST, Aug. 4, 1908, p. 2, col. 1; STANDARD, Aug. 4, 1908, p. 2, col. 3.

The Imperial Maritime League,
2 Westminster Palace Gardens, S.W.
August 1, 1908.

SIR,—As in these days, if we see little,¹ we yet hear much¹ of the "Two-Power Standard" of naval strength, the accurate definition of that standard is evidently a matter of national concern. Therefore we think it of public importance to draw attention to the following definition of it given by Lord Cawdor, who was first Lord of the Admiralty up to the end of 1905.

Lord Cawdor said on November 3, 1906² :—

"The test the Admiralty applied to naval efficiency and the standard they had set up for years past as that which must be maintained was that we must be strong enough in battleships alone³ to defeat any combination of any two Powers, and that we should have a margin over and above this, for contingencies, of some 10 per cent. . This was the minimum which they had

August 29, 1908 (reported in *Glasgow Herald*, August 31, 1908, p. 7, col. 3):—"Whereas our battleships might be called to defend our possessions at the uttermost ends of the world, the whole of the German Fleet might be concentrated . . . in the North Sea."

This is a fact which has long been recognised in Germany. Compare, e.g., the following, "written not many years ago" [apparently at the close of 1900: see Mr. L. J. Maxse, *Nat. Rev.*, Oct., 1907, pp. 175 sq.] "by one of Germany's most competent and respected soldiers, General von der Goltz," as quoted in a valuable letter from Mr. Glendower C. Ottley of Bruges, dated July 31, 1908, appearing in the *Standard* Aug. 3, 1908 (s.v. "Germany's Naval Policy: A Menace to England"), p. 4, col. 4, and cp. also above p. R.F.):—

"We must contradict the opinion which has so frequently been expressed that a war between Germany and Great Britain is impossible. *Great Britain is compelled to distribute her fleets over many seas in peace as well as in war. In the necessary distribution of her strength lies Great Britain's weakness.* Germany is in a better position. Her navy is small, but it can be kept together in Europe. For the moment" [this was "not many years ago"] "Great Britain's superiority over us is striking; but when the projected increase of our fleet has been effected the outlook for us will be bright. The British fleet will no longer be an irresistible opponent to us. Numbers decide as little on the sea as they do on land. Numerical inferiority can be compensated for by greater efficiency. Besides, as places are not wanting where England's defences are weak, it is a mistake to consider a landing in England a chimera. The material basis of our power is large enough to destroy the present superiority of Great Britain, but Germany must prepare beforehand for the coming struggle, and must arm in time without losing a day, for victories on the sea cannot be improvised."

¹ Cp. also Mr. F. T. Jane, above, p. 378.

² See above, pp. 308 sq., and *fol. of R. U.S.I.*, Feb. 1907, p. 152.

³ Including, of course, their complementary units and accessories. See *Standard*, Dec. 16, 1907 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 5-6; Feb. 19, 1908 (leading article); June 15, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 6-7 (part of which is quoted above, p. 407, n. 5); July 14, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 4-5 (quoted above, p. 426); July 28, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 5-6 (referred to above, p. 430, and see also on that page, n. 1); and Aug. 24, 1908 (leading article), p. 4, col. 4; and "Ignotus," in *National Review*, Oct., 1908 (quoted below, p. 454); Mr. H. W. Wilson, in *Daily Mail*, Jan. 8, 1908; etc.; and cp. also Lord Charles Beresford, quoted above, s.v. Aug. 7, 1907, p. 244. (See further below, pp. 471 n. 3, and 513 nn. 8, 9).

"The Two-Power Standard is too commonly regarded as applicable only to battleships and armoured cruisers. These capital ships are no more than the nucleus of a fighting fleet. Under modern fighting conditions, they are of very restricted value indeed without their full complement of lesser units—medium and small cruisers, scouts, destroyers, and torpedo-boats. Unless, therefore, it can be shown that the battle squadrons (in which must be included the great armoured cruisers) are each complete in all arms, the Two-Power Standard is not secured. And over and above the smaller craft required to work

"considered safe. With respect to our cruiser power, we needed
"and must maintain far more."¹

It will be observed that this definition by one who could state authoritatively the rule by which the Admiralty had been guided differs essentially from that usually quoted. For, clearly, broad difference exists between a *standard of equality*, plus a margin, and a *standard of strength adequate to inflict defeat* plus that margin.

Has not the country a right to be informed whether² the present Government accept Lord Cawdor's definition, or repudiate it?

We are, Sir, Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH,

Joint Honorary Secretaries.

with the battle fleets, we need a larger number of cruisers for the purpose of commerce-protection."—*Standard*, December 16, 1907 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 5-6.

The correctness of this view was admitted by Lord Cawdor himself, in the House of Lords, Nov. 23, 1908, (see *Standard*, Nov. 25, 1908, p. 6, col. 7), and again at the R.U.S.I., Dec. 9, 1908 (see *Daily Express*, *Daily Mail*, *Morning Post*, and *Times*, Dec. 10, 1908, *fol. of R.U.S.I.*, Feb. 1909, pp. 159 sq., and below, p. 513, n. 5).

¹ See further, above, pp. 308 sq., below, pp. 471 n. 5 (p. 472), 513.

² Pertinent comment upon this question will be found in the *Daily Express*, August 4, 1908 (leading article, "The Empire's Peril"), p. 4, col. 4—as also in an admirably detailed article (entitled "Supremacy at Sea: Light on the Waning Two-Power Standard: Danger Ahead"), *ibid.*, p. 1, col. 3, pointing out that:—"It is not the words of Ministers that makes a naval standard, but *ships*,"—and showing that, notwithstanding the Admiralty's own statement in the Cawdor Memorandum, of November, 1905 (above, pp. 1, 5, 72), that Great Britain should in future lay down *at least* four large armoured ships annually, the Liberal Government's armoured programmes, as compared with those of Germany *alone*, have been as follows (p. 1, col. 3):—

Liberal Government.			German Government.		
Year.	Programme.	Tons.		Programme.	Tons.
1906-7	<i>Bellerophon</i>	18,600	$\left. \begin{array}{l} \textit{Nassau} \dots\dots\dots \\ \textit{Sachsen} \text{ [now christened} \\ \textit{Westfalen}] \dots\dots\dots \\ \textit{Blücher} \dots\dots\dots \end{array} \right\}$		$\left. \begin{array}{l} 17,710 \\ 17,710 \\ 14,760 \end{array} \right\}$
	<i>Temeraire</i>	18,600			
	<i>Superb</i>	18,600			
		55,800			50,180

Balance of 5,620 tons in favour of Great Britain.

$\left. \begin{array}{l} 1907-8 \text{ } \textit{Collingwood} \text{ [for which} \\ \text{see above, p. 403]} 19,250 \\ \textit{St. Vincent} \text{ [for which} \\ \text{see above, pp. 272,} \\ \text{347, 403, 418 sq.]} 19,250 \\ \textit{Vanguard} \text{ [for which} \\ \text{see above, pp. 6, 47,} \\ \text{50, 249]} \dots\dots\dots 19,250 \end{array} \right\}$	$\left. \begin{array}{l} \textit{Baden} \text{ [now christened} \\ \textit{Posen}] \dots\dots\dots 19,000 \\ \textit{Württemberg} \text{ [now christened} \\ \textit{Rheinland}; \text{—and for which see above, pp.} \\ \text{418, 419, and also this} \\ \text{note (below)]} \dots\dots\dots 19,000 \\ \textit{Ar'd Cruiser} \dots\dots\dots 19,000 \end{array} \right\}$

Balance of 750 tons in favour of Great Britain.

$\left. \begin{array}{l} 1908-9 \text{ } \textit{New Battleship} \\ \text{(\textit{Foudroyant})} \\ \text{[since christened} \\ \textit{Neptune}] \dots\dots\dots 19,250 \\ \textit{New [Ar'd]} \\ \textit{Cruiser [Indefatigable]} \dots\dots\dots 18,000 \end{array} \right\}$	$\left. \begin{array}{l} \textit{Hildebrand} \dots\dots\dots 19,000 \\ \textit{Heimdall} \dots\dots\dots 19,000 \\ \textit{Fritzof} \dots\dots\dots 19,000 \\ \textit{Ar'd Cruiser} \dots\dots\dots 19,000 \end{array} \right\}$

Balance of no less than 38,750 tons in favour of Germany.

150,800 German total 183,180

(Continued next page).

DILKE RETURN FOR 1908.

BRITAIN BELOW THE TWO-POWER STANDARD
ON THE ADMIRALTY'S OWN BASIS OF CALCULATION.

August 2, 1908.

Aug. 2, 1908. The "Dilke Return" for 1908 issued—"showing the Fleets of Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany, Italy,

Note (2) to p. 436 continued:—

Liberal Government (<i>continued</i>).	German Government (<i>continued</i>).
Deduct the lost <i>Montagu</i> (see above, pp. 4, 6)	[<i>German total carried forward</i>]
14,000	183,180
British total	Deduct British total.....
136,200	136,800
	46,380

**Total Balance, for the three years, in favour of Germany:—
46,380 tons.**

(Even the Old Navy League will hardly cavil at the figures, unless it be for their moderation;—seeing that, by giving the new British Cruiser of 1908-9 as only "17,250 (?) tons" instead of 18,000, the old League brings out the total balance for the 3 years as even more in favour of Germany, namely, as "**47,130 tons.**" See *N.L.J.* Aug., 1908, p. 249.)

If, as a matter of fact, the *Rheinland's* (ex-*Württemberg's*) "predecessors, the *Nassau* and [*Westphalen*]" should each now be credited with 17,760 tons instead of only 17,710 (the programme figure), and the *Rheinland* herself with 17,900 only instead of (the programme figure) 19,000 (see *Standard*, September 28, 1908, p. 7, col. 6; and cp. also *Daily Express*, September 28, 1908, p. 1, col. 7), the total balance, for the three years—all other figures standing—would yet remain as high as **45,380 tons in favour of Germany.**

What the Powers, other than Great Britain and Germany, have been doing meanwhile (for the British Standard is not intended to be a *One-Power* Standard—whatever Mr. Asquith may say or do to the contrary: cp. above, p. 352) will also be found detailed in the article from which we quote. (Cp., further, below, pp. 438 *sqq.*)

The figures showing the number of t.b.d.'s provided for by Britain and Germany are also given in the article from which we quote (*and cp. above, p. 347 text and nn. 4, 7, and below, p. 449 nn.*). They are as follows:—

	Liberal Government.	Germany.
1906-7	3.....	12
1907-8	5.....	12
1908-9	16.....	12
	24	36

Balance of 12 in favour of Germany.

Moreover, to quote further, the *Daily Express* (*ibid.* p. 1, col. 3):—"The 16 vessels provided for in the British Estimates for this year" (1908-9: see above, p. 347) "will not be laid down until 1909, while the 12 German vessels were all begun in April (1908)" ;—and so, "by the time we begin this year's ships Germany will be laying down her destroyers of the 1909-10 programme." (Cp. further *Daily Express*, Oct. 27, 1908).

A serious question subsequently arose as to the speed of these sixteen British destroyers of the 1908-9 programme (above, p. 347). Lord Tweedmouth had categorically stated in the House of Lords on March 18, 1908 (see *Standard*, Nov. 19, 1908, p. 8, col. 4, and cp. Mr. H. H. Marks, M.P., quoted in *Daily Mail*, Nov. 20, 1908, and *Standard*, Nov. 20, 1908, p. 9, col. 2) that their speed would be thirty-three knots (see *Standard*, Nov. 17, 1908). On Oct. 27, 1908, the *Daily Express* wrote:—"It is now stated that they are to be vessels of 650 tons with a trial speed of twenty-seven knots" (while "the German destroyers building under the present year's programme are of 730 tons and thirty-three knots"). The information of the *Daily Express* was correct. The speed of the British vessels was reduced to twenty-seven knots (see *Standard*, Nov. 17, 1908). Mr. McKenna (on Nov. 16, 1908) refused to state why:—He "did not understand that the Admiralty had committed itself" (see *Standard*, Nov. 19, 1908). The matter was again brought up and discussed in the House of Commons, Nov. 23, 1908, and (according to the *Daily Express*,

U.S.A., and Japan," and giving comparative tables of these Fleets (inclusive of all classes built and building) on March 31, 1908.

After mentioning that "on July 3, 1907, when the Dilke Return for 1907 was issued,¹ 2 we had occasion to point out that it contained some highly misleading figures" (see above, p. 153³); and that "an examination of the Return for 1908 shows that, again, in the case of British ships, no information is given as to their actual condition with regard to readiness for service"; and, further, that "the *Anson*, *Camperdown*, *Benbow*, *Howe*, and *Rodney*, which it was officially stated on Nov. 8, 1906, were to be placed on the sale list in 1907,⁴ are still numbered among the battleships in the Return," five ships which "are, of course, of no fighting value, nor are the *Edinburgh* and *Thunderer*" (though "it is true that the same remark applies to the ships of the same date belonging to foreign Powers"); the *Standard*, Aug. 3, 1908, p. 7, col. 4, continues:—

"Taking the Return as it stands, including all warships in existence, irrespective of their condition and their fighting value, we find that in battleships the British Fleet is below the Two-Power Standard" (for the Cawdor definition of which see above, pp. 308 sq., 435 sq., and cp. also below, p. 513):—

Nov. 24, 1908, p. 1, col. 6) "the impression left on the House was that the Admiralty had broken faith with Parliament over the question of the speed of these destroyers."

"The difference in speed" (according to Mr. H. H. Marks, M.P., quoted in *Standard*, Nov. 20, 1908) "meant a saving on each vessel of £20,000, or a total" saving "of £320,000."

[The total cost of each (apparently, after deduction of the saving just referred to) is likely to be about £125,000; the total cost of the sixteen, about £2,000,000:—see *Morning Post*, February 2, 1909, p. 6, col. 7, where names and details will be found.]

¹ July 2, 1907. Above, p. 153.

² To quote the somewhat crude language of "A.H.B." (Mr. Alan H. Burgoyne: for whom see above, pp. 81, 85) in *N.L.L.*, September, 1908 (*ser.* "Information Columns"), p. 288, col. 2:—"What utter rot is the Dilke Return! We are glad to see the *Rodney*, *Edinburgh*, *Redoubtable*, and *Petr Veliki* (launched forty years ago) still classed with *Dreadnoughts*, but why leave out the old *Victory*? She 'retains her armament' and is 'not for sale,' and certainly she is a 'battleship.'"

And yet, be it known, one of the excuses made by the Old Navy League for its inaction of 1907 was the alleged necessity of waiting for just such another Return, the Dilke Return of 1907 (upon which adequate comment has already been given above, pp. 153 sqq.)! It is thus that (under date July 3, 1907) the secretary of the Old Navy League wrote to one of our supporters, the late Mr. W. B. Bromley, M.Inst.C.E. (cp. above, p. 153, n. 1):—

"I would further state that the Return" (the Dilke Return of 1907) "from which we judge of the Naval Strength, was only placed in our hands yesterday" (July 2, 1907), "and until that authentic statement was made, it was not possible for the Committee to move."

Upon examination it was found in the eyes of the Old N.L. to be "worthless" (see above, p. 153 n. 1), but still—the Committee did not move.

³ Cp., further, *Standard*, December 16, 1907 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 5-6:—

"It is sometimes forgotten that when a new ship is 'substituted,' as in the German Navy, for an old one, the vessel replaced remains a useful military asset for some time. This consideration naturally affects the basis of calculation, when comparisons of the total strength of the various navies of the world are instituted. It does not, however, excuse the remarkable inaccuracies of the last Dilke Return" (1907), "in which obsolete and useless ships—some even on the sale list—were included, in order to swell the total number of British battleships. The First Lord, speaking in the House of Lords on July 4" (1907: above, pp. 153 n. 2, 154, 156, and cp. below, p. 448 n. 6), "himself made substantial corrections of the Dilke Return whose accuracy the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty was on the same day defending in the Commons."

⁴ Cp. *Standard*, Oct. 25, 1906, p. 7, col. 2, and Nov. 9, 1906, *E.S. & S.J.G.* Oct. 25, 1906 (and cp. also Mr. H. W. Wilson, *Nat. Rev.* Dec. 1906, abstracted in *Standard*, Dec. 1, 1906), to the effect that:—these vessels were actually "pronounced unfit for service and omitted by the Admiralty from the Navy List of" (as far back as) "January, 1905."

"BATTLESHIPS."

BUILT.

Great Britain.....	59	Germany	34	} = 59
		United States...	25	

BUILDING.

Great Britain	8	Germany.....	9	} = 14. ^{1 2}
		United States...	5	
	(67)		(73)	

It is to be observed that the issue of the Return has this year

¹ "Even on the Admiralty basis of calculation" (writes the *Daily Express*, August 3, 1908, p. 1, col. 7) "the Return shows that in battleships we are below the Two-Power Standard, as the following figures indicate:—

	Built.	Building.
"Great Britain	59	8
France	31	7
Germany	34	9
U.S.A.	25	5
Russia	10	5
Italy	16	3
Japan	15	4

"Taking the total number of battleships, it can be seen that we have only 59 built to the 65 of France and Germany and the 59 of Germany and the United States. We have 8 building to the 16 of France and Germany and the 14 of Germany and the United States."

² Writing in connection with the Government's rumoured intention to raise a Naval loan of £100,000,000 (see below, *s.v.* August 17, 1908, p. 446)—and entitling its article: "The Naval Loan: Inadequate Building Programmes of Late Years: Two-Power Test: Necessity for Great Outlay"—and speaking of "the supreme necessity for maintaining the superiority of the 'British' Navy," the *Daily Express*, August 18, 1908, justly terms the latter necessity:—

"A necessity that has been neglected or the last few years, as the following programmes (*armoured ships only*) of the chief naval Powers for the last five years show:—

	Gr. Britain.	Germany.	U.S.A.	France.	Japan.
1904-5	5	3	2	0	3
1905-6	4	3	3	1	3
1906-7	3	3	2	3	0
1907-8	3	3	2	4	4
1908-9	2	4	2	0	5
	17	16	11	8	15

"It will be seen that in no year since 1904 has the country" (Great Britain) "been presented with a programme equal to that of the next Two Powers. Our deficiency has progressed with time, as the following analysis will show:—

1904-5:—We were inferior to	Germany and Japan	by ...	1 ship
	to { Germany and the U.S.A.	,, ...	2 ships
1905-6:—We were inferior to	to { Germany and the U.S.A.	,, ...	2 ships
	to { the U.S.A. and Japan ...	,, ...	2 ships
1906-7:—We were inferior to	Germany and France ...	,, ...	3 ships
1907-8:—We were inferior to	Germany and Japan	,, ...	4 ships
	{ Germany and the U.S.A.	,, ...	4 ships
[1908-9:—We were inferior to	{ Germany and Japan	,, ...	7 ships]

* * *

"It is worthy of note that the German Navy Acts provide at once for the automatic replacement of old ships by modern units. To such an extent is this carried that Germany is now building 20,000-ton" [? 19,000-ton: see above, pp. 437 sq.] "*Dreadnoughts* to replace vessels of 4,000 tons laid down twenty years ago.

"Great Britain, on the other hand, has failed even to keep pace with ordinary wastage, although we were responsible for the design of the *Dreadnought*, which will make older vessels obsolete far more rapidly than was previously the case.

"Under the age limit of twenty years adhered to for battleships in the German navy" (under the new German Navy Act, 1908, for which see above, pp. 266 sqq.), "no fewer than 20 British battleships would be due to be struck off the Navy List" (*i.e.*, due to be

been delayed until Parliament has risen, and that, therefore, no questions can be raised with regard to it until the autumn."^{1 2}

WARSHIPS' SPEED—AND A WARNING.

Aug. 5, 1908. "Superiority in Speed: Where Great Britain Leads at Sea: Fastest Warships."—An interesting and detailed article³ in the *Daily Express*, Aug. 5, 1908, p. 5, col. 1—inspired by "the magnificent performance of the battleship-cruiser *Indomitable* which crossed the Atlantic in 5½ days⁴ at the more or less even speed of 26 knots⁵—concluding with a highly pertinent warning:—

"Valuable as speed undoubtedly is, it is only an auxiliary, the purpose of which is to convey the fighting power—ships and guns—to the point where they are required.

"When the *Dreadnought* has been outclassed—as she has been by ships carrying twelve and fourteen heavy guns against her ten⁶—and when the Two-Power Standard has been abandoned—as the

replaced). "The recent Dilke Return of fleets includes ships laid down in 1877" (31 years ago).

"Between now and 1912 these 20 ships and another 9 besides should be removed from the effective list" (*i.e.*, should be replaced), "so that, *even to make 10 for wastage* we should have to complete new battleships at the rate of 7 a year. For the last five years, as the above table shows, we have laid them down at the rate of 3½ a year.

"It used to be a cry of the Admiralty organs in the Press that foreign Governments had been paralysed by the production of the *Dreadnought*. It seems more reasonable to say that that was the effect produced on our own rulers. They were so fully occupied in the contemplation of their own magnificence after the *Dreadnought* was completed that they utterly failed to realise what was going on abroad."

¹ Cf. also *Daily Express*, August 3, 1908, p. 1, col. 7. It will be recollected that a, similar device was practised in relation to the giving up of the *Montagu* for a total loss in August, 1906 (see above, p. 6 n. 8).

² A subsequent Return (the "Cawdor" Return), issued by the Admiralty, August 28, 1908, will be found dealt with below, pp. 448 *sq.*

³ Dealing with the speeds of British war-vessels—Battleships, Armoured Cruisers, Protected Cruisers ["the only class of warship in which Great Britain is not well ahead" in speed]. T.B.D.s [in which class the new destroyer *Swift*, displacing 1,800 tons, did 38.3 knots on her first trials only a few weeks earlier], and Submarines—in comparison with those of foreign Powers.

⁴ "At a greater speed than the '*Lusitania*,'" see the *Standard's* Glasgow Correspondent, *Standard*, August 5, 1908, p. 5, col. 5.

A few days later—it may be of interest to note—"the *Lusitania*, on a voyage to New York, created a new"—24 hours—"record" for herself, "by steaming 650 nautical miles between noon on Sunday (August 16) and noon on Monday (August 17), her average speed" being "25.66 knots"—see *Daily Express*, August 20, 1908, p. 1, col. 5;—"her average speed" for the entire voyage, however, working out at the lower figure of "25.23 knots per hour" (see *Times*, August 22, 1908, p. 10, col. 6). [The *Mauretania* in Feb., 1909, eclipsed the *Lusitania's* average entire-voyage speed, just mentioned, with an average entire-voyage speed of 25.55 knots, see *E. S. & S. J. C.*, Feb. 19, 1909, p. 1, col. 4. For the *Mauretania's* later Atlantic record (in May, 1909) see *Standard*, May 11, 1909, p. 7, col. 5.]

⁵ The *Indomitable's* actual speed for the voyage from Belle Isle is thus given by the *Standard*, August 5, 1908, p. 5, col. 5:—"From the time that she left Belle Isle until she passed Land's End she steamed at an average speed of 24.8 knots, the highest speed that she touched" being "26.4 knots." Fog, on the second day and night of the voyage from Quebec, had necessitated reduction of speed whilst it lasted (see *Standard*, *l.c.*).

Her speed on her trials (2 months earlier) had been even greater, namely, 28 knots (or about 32 land miles) per hour. See *Daily Express*, August 5, 1908, p. 5, col. 1.

⁶ Concerning "The World's *Dreadnoughts*" see above, p. 418

recently-issued Dilke Return shows¹—speed becomes an expensive luxury and an invitation to disaster.²

"The cost of high speed is enormous. It has been estimated that if the *Dreadnought* had been designed for 18.5 knots instead of 21, she would have cost close upon £500,000 less than the £1,800,000 actually paid for her."

COMMAND OF THE AIR^{2a}; GERMAN AMBITIONS.

Aug. 5, 1908. Count Zeppelin's latest Airship—"Zeppelin IV."³ 4 accidentally and completely wrecked by explosion. See *Daily Express*, Aug. 6, 1908, p. 1, cols. 2-4; *Standard*, Aug. 6, 1908, p. 7, cols. 1-2.⁵

German ambition, and German intention, to "Command the air"—manifested on all hands. Over £100,000 subscribed within 24 hours. No other nations to "be allowed to go ahead of Germany in the race for the mastery of the air."⁶ 7 8

"Zeppelin V." to be begun at once⁹—and, in fact, already begun by Aug. 7, 1908.¹⁰ 11

¹ See above, pp. 438 sqq.

² Cp. also the *Morning Post*, October 31, 1906 (leading article), speaking of:—"the consensus of the best strategists and tacticians of England and America that excessive importance has been attached to speed in the latest" (British) "battleship design."

^{2a} Cp. above, p. 427 (text and nn. 3, 4).

³ "Zeppelin IV."—see *D.E.*, Aug. 7, 1908, p. 1, col. 2; *Standard*, Aug. 7, 1908, p. 5, col. 4.

⁴ For accounts of their successful sailing powers (12 hours on end at 26 miles an hour) see *Daily Express*, Aug. 5, 1908, p. 1, col. 4; *Standard*, Aug. 5, 1908, p. 5, col. 2.

⁵ Compare the fate of the French military airship "*La Patrie*" in Nov., 1907 (above, p. 427 n. 4), and that of the British "*Nulli Secundus*" in Oct., 1907 (for which latter cp. above, pp. 260, 441), referred to by the *Daily Express*, August 5, 1908, p. 1, col. 4.

⁶ The words of the *Daily Express's* Berlin Correspondent, *D.E.*, Aug. 7, 1908, p. 1, col. 2.

⁷ For the foundation of the German Aerial Navy League see above, pp. 427, 430 (and cp. also *Standard*, August 14, 1908, leading article, "Airships," p. 4, col. 4).

⁸ The case of Britain:—"In the matter of aerial navigation it was time that England awoke, in view of the progress which was being made by other countries in this science. Britannia must rule the winds as she has done the waves in the past; but at present much too little is being done to ensure that supremacy . . . It is difficult to ascertain definitely what the British Government are doing, but their grants for aeronautics are growing smaller. A few years ago they set apart £23,000, while the latest estimate is only £16,000. This sum, moreover, has to cover the expenses connected with the old ballooning establishment, as well as the experiments which are being carried out with airships. It is absurd, of course. Not less, but more, should be set apart each year. The French are building not one, but many airships, and they are spending very much more than we are in experiments. So are the Germans." Major Baden-Powell, *E.S. & S.J.G.* (interview), Aug. 6, 1908; quoted in *Standard*, Aug. 7, 1908, p. 5, col. 4.

⁹ See *Daily Express*, August 7, 1908, p. 1, col. 2, and (leading article: "Love of Country") p. 4, col. 4; *Standard*, August 7, 1908, p. 5, col. 4.

¹⁰ See *Standard*, August 8, 1908, p. 8, col. 3. (Nearly ready by October 15, 1908; see *Globe*, October 15, 1908, p. 4, col. 1.)

¹¹ Concerning "Command of the Air" see (generally) above, p. 427; and to the references there given may here be added the following:—

"Flying like a Bird: Marvellous Feat of the Wright Aeroplane: Mile a Minute," *Daily Express*, August 10, 1908, p. 1, col. 3;—"Three Miles on an Aeroplane: Mr. Wright's Mastery of the Flying Machine," *Daily Express*, August 12, 1908, p. 1, col. 6;—"Wright Aeroplane Triumph: French Hero Worship," *Standard*, August 12, 1908, p. 6, col. 4;—"Wright Aeroplane: Brilliant Trial: Flight of nearly a Mile a Minute," *Standard*, August 13, 1908, p. 5, col. 7;—"New Air Records: Mr. Wilbur Wright damages his Aeroplane," *Daily Express*, August 14, 1908, p. 1, Oct. 7;—"Flying like a Bird: Denver Scotsman (Mr. G. L. O. Davidson) claims to have solved the problem," *Daily Express*, August 14, 1908, p. 5, col. 2;—"Airships," *Standard*, August 14, 1908 (leading article), p. 4, cols. 4-5;—"British Airship's Success: 'Dirigible No. 1' makes a splendid flight," *Daily Express*, August 15, 1908, p. 1, col. 7;—"Army Airship: Successful Flight at Aldershot," *Standard*, August 15, 1908, p. 5, col. 5;—"Dirigible No. 1' Flies

"LIBERAL" REDUCTIONS ON GUNS, &c.

Aug. 5, 1908. "In the two years prior to the General Election £1,606,000 was voted under Army Estimates and £5,270,000 under Navy Estimates for guns,¹ projectiles, ammunition, torpedoes, and gun-cotton.

"In the last two years, 1907-8 and 1908-9, £897,000 under Army Estimates and £3,351,000 under Navy Estimates have been voted in each case;—reductions of 44% for the Army and 36% in the case of the Navy in the amount voted for these war stores."²

again: Successful Trial at Farnborough: Too-Hurried Descent," *Daily Express*, August 17, 1908, p. 5, col. 3;—"The Military Airship" (Dirigible No. 1), *Standard*, August 17, 1908, p. 8, col. 6;—"The Art of Flying: Sir Hiram Maxim makes a Notable Prophecy," *E.S. & S.J.G.*, August 18, 1908, p. 10, col. 1;—"Airships of the Future: Sir H. Maxim criticises the 'Zeppelin': Coming Industry," *Daily Express*, August 19, 1908, p. 5, col. 3;—"German Airship Trial," *Morning Post*, August 19, 1908, p. 5, col. 5;—"Flying from France to England: Attempt to Conquer the Channel by the Air," *Daily Express*, August 26, 1908, p. 5, col. 5;—"The Wright Aeroplane: Suggested Channel Flight," *Standard*, August 26, 1908, p. 5, col. 2;—"Wright Aeroplane: German Government's Invitation," also "Count Zeppelin's New Airship," *Standard*, August 29, 1908, p. 5, col. 2;—"New" (British) "Dirigible to be Built," *Standard*, September 3, 1908, p. 5, col. 5;—"World's Aeroplaning Record: Mr. Orville Wright flies for over an Hour," *Daily Express*, September 10, 1908, p. 1, col. 6;—"German Airship's Record: Flight of 187 Miles," also "Another Wright Record," *Standard*, September 14, 1908, p. 9, col. 3;—"German Airship Flights," *Standard*, September 16, 1908, p. 2, col. 1;—"Airships in Germany: Disappointment of the Emperor," *Standard*, September 17, 1908, p. 5, col. 2;—"Cause of the 'Wright' Aeroplane Disaster" (in Virginia, U.S.A.): "Unable to sustain the Weight of Two Men," *Daily Express*, September 19, 1908, p. 1, col. 2;—"Wright Aeroplane Disaster" (in Virginia, U.S.A.): "Cause of the Accident," *Standard*, September 19, 1908, p. 8, col. 5;—"Forty-one miles by Aeroplane: World's Record made by Mr. Wilbur Wright: 91 Minutes in Mid-Air," *Daily Express*, September 22, 1908, p. 1, col. 7 (and leading article: "A Step Forward," p. 4, cols. 4-5);—"New Aeroplane Record: Mr. Wilbur Wright's Flight: World's Record, both as regards distance and time," *Standard*, September 22, 1908, p. 5, col. 4;—"Mr. Wilbur Wright's Flight of an Hour and a Half: The Aeronaut's Experiences," *Standard*, September 23, 1908, p. 5, col. 5;—"Safety in High-flying: Fleet of Aeroplanes on the Way to Paris," *Daily Express*, September 23, 1908, p. 1, col. 5;—"New British Aero-'Plain': Level Ground secured (by the Aeronautical Society of Great Britain) for Aerial Experiments," *Daily Express*, September 24, 1908, p. 8, col. 1;—"Mr. Wilbur Wright: Further Successful Flights," *Standard*, September 29, 1908, p. 6, col. 4;—"Mr. W. Wright's Four 'World's Records,'" *Ev. Stand. and S.J.G.*, October 1, 1908, p. 11, col. 2;—"Mr. Wilbur Wright at Le Mans: A Magnificent Flight," *Times*, October 5, 1908, p. 6, cols. 2-3.—*Cp. further, Daily Express*, October 12, 1908 ("French Aero-League founded some weeks ago"); December 18, 1908: January 9 and 11 ("Twenty Yards Flight: New" British "Army Aeroplane proves tail-heavy"), 1909; February 25, 1909 ("Airships in War: How Great Britain is being left behind: Progress of Rivals");—*E.S. & S.J.G.*, January 5, 9, and 30, and February 5, 1909;—*Globe*, December 18, 1908 (Mr. Wilbur Wright's "Record Aeroplane Flight": 61½ miles in 114 minutes); and January 20, 1909;—*Morning Post*, December 29, 1908; January 26, and February 18, 1909;—*P.M.G.*, February 12, 1909; *Standard*, October 5, December 1, 11, 15, 18, 19, 30, 1908; and January 7, 21 (below, p. 521), 30, and February 5, 1909. (*Cp. further, below, p. 520.*)

The following, extracted from the Official Return issued April 20, 1909, shews (according to *Standard*, April, 21, 1909, p. 7, col. 6) "the amount spent upon experiments in aerial navigation for military purposes during last year" (*i.e.* 1908) by the "Chief European Countries":—Great Britain, £5,270;—Austria-Hungary, £6,500;—France, £47,700;—Germany, £308,731 (made up of £133,731 from public funds, plus £265,000 by private subscription, collected by the National Zeppelin Airship Fund).

¹ Mr. McKenna, in the House of Commons, November 2, 1908, refused "in the public interest to make any statement in regard to the reserve of naval guns" (see *Standard*, November 3, 1908, p. 11, col. 1; November 4, 1908, below, p. 468; and November 19, 1908);—in regard to which it was alleged by Mr. Du Cros, M.P., that in the British Navy only one is held in reserve for every four afloat, as against two for every four afloat in other navies (see below, p. 468).

² The figures are those of Mr. Bellairs (Question for the Premier to answer on Oct. 12, 1908, quoted in the *Standard*, Aug. 5, 1908, p. 5, col. 4), as altered and accepted by Mr. McKenna himself in the House of Commons, Oct. 12, 1908. (See *Daily Express*, Oct. 13, 1908, p. 5, col. 3, and *Standard*, Oct. 15, 1908, leading article, p. 6, cols. 4-5.)

THE GERMAN MENACE AND THE ENGLISH PRESS.

Aug. 7, 1908. "German Menace: Opinions in Europe," Strong Evidence gathered from Influential Quarters;—by an "English Patriot" in the *Standard*, Aug. 7, 1908, p. 7, col. 3.¹

See also—s.v. "German Naval Policy: European Opinion";—Mr. J. Stanley Little (a resident on the Continent),² *Standard*, Aug. 6, 1908, p. 10, col. 5.³

THE DANGER OF WAR. PLAIN SPEAKING BY MR. BLATCHFORD.

Aug. 7, 1908. "The Danger of War: A Challenge to Labour Leaders"—A Socialist's Warning;—Mr. Robert Blatchford in the current number of the *Clarion*—[quoted in *Standard*, Aug. 7, 1908, p. 7, col. 3;—see also *Daily Express*, Aug. 7, 1908, leading article, "Love of Country," p. 4, col. 4, referred to below, p. 444]—from which we quote salient extracts in the note.⁴

¹ (Referred to above, p. 421, n.3). One passage in this article—which, *if true*, explains much—runs as follows:—"In Berlin I was told by Germans that the English Press was the most corrupt in the world—that with money they could do anything with a great many English papers" (cp. also above, p. 333);—"And they also said that Germany by various means controlled a large number of British M.P.'s."

² For Mr. Stanley Little cp. also above, p. 421, n. 3.

³ See further:—*Standard*, August 10, 1908, p. 9, col. 4 ("German Menace: A French Onlooker's View," by Mr. Rowland Thirlmere);—August 11, 1908, p. 5, col. 7 ("Duty of Patriotism": The German Menace, by Mr. W. Kennedy);—August 12, 1908, p. 7, col. 4 ("England and Germany": Germany's Intention to "Bring England to her knees"; by "Old Volunteer," "an Ordinary British Workman" in Vienna);—August 13, 1908, p. 4, col. 6, referred to above, p. 358 ("England and Germany": Criticism of "General Sir A. Turner's Views": German Intention to Attack Britain, by Mr. Arnold White);—August 18, 1908, p. 5, col. 6 ("A Peril to the Empire," by Mr. John J. Jackson, for whom see above, pp. 31, etc.);—August 19, 1908, p. 5, cols. 4-5 (The German Menace; by "United Empire Loyalist");—August 25, 1908, p. 7, col. 2, referred to above, pp. 261 n. 3, 421, n. 3; ("England and Germany," by "Lieutenant-Colonel");—August 25, 1908 *ibid* ("The German Menace," by James Creagh, late Captain 1st Royals);—August 28, 1908, p. 4, col. 3 ("Great Britain and Germany: Position of the Oversea States," by Mr. Rowland Thirlmere);—September 5, 1908, p. 6, col. 3 ("England and Germany: The Naval Question," by Mr. F. Marsden Burnett);—September 8, 1908, p. 6, col. 3 ("Great Britain and Germany: State of Our Defences," by Mr. W. Frewen Lord, Member of the Executive Committee of the I.M.L.);—September 16, 1908, p. 4, col. 4 ("England and Germany: Our Naval Position," by:—(a) "Anglo-German," a Resident "in Germany for a great many years" (quoted above, p. 432, n. 5); (b) "An Overseas Briton"; and (c), Mr. Arnold Capleton, of Prague, Bohemia);—September 16, 1908, p. 7, col. 3 ("Great Britain and Germany: Race, Trade, Defence," by Mr. W. Frewen Lord, a letter admirably referred to by Mr. Robert E. Baker, s.v. "The Future of Unionism," *Standard*, Oct. 6, 1908, p. 4, cols. 4-5);—September 18, 1908, p. 7, col. 2 ("Sea Interests": Germany and Great Britain Compared," by "A Correspondent");—September 19, 1908, p. 7, col. 1 ("England and Germany: A Criticism of Prince Bülow's Contentions": article in *Saturday Review*, abstracted);—September 10, 1908, p. 8, col. 2 ("Germany and England: The Teaching of History," by (a) Mr. Arnold White; (b) Mr. Robert Grun);—October 1, 1908, p. 5, col. 7 ("Naval Supremacy and Peace: Anglo-German Rivalry: Key of the Situation"; article by "Ignotus" in *National Review*, October, 1908, below, p. 454, abstracted);—Oct. 31, 1908, p. 7, col. 3 (Mr. Robert Grun on: "German Friendship: 'Cave Canem,'").—Cp. also above, pp. 421, 432, etc., and below, pp. 450, 456, etc.

Further, cp. now the German Navy League's fresh demands, as to which see below, s.v. September 28, 1908, pp. 453 sq., and also Mr. F. Francis, *Daily Express*, September 30, 1908, p. 4, col. 5.

⁴ "I do not believe"—writes Mr. Blatchford—"that any person can accuse Great Britain of provocative action," All the threats [are] German threats

UNIONISTS AND THE NAVY.

DAILY EXPRESS, Aug. 8, 1908, p. 4, col. 5.

To the Editor.

United University Club, S.W.

Aug. 7, 1908.

SIR,—All the sane portion of this nation will be grateful to you for the admirable leader in your issue of to-day.¹ No man possessed of reason and knowledge of the facts can doubt that the danger of invasion and subjugation by Germany, which now confronts this country, is far greater even than the peril which faced it in the days when the white tents of Napoleon's army, gathered for the conquest

Note to p. 443 continued.

Germany wants an outlet for her growing population. We have much that Germany desires, much that would enrich her. And if Germany can once pass or defeat our Navy, we are entirely at the mercy of her enormous armies If the Executive Council of the Labour Party suppose that those of us who regard the present relations between Britain and Germany as critical are being led astray by alarmist articles in the British or German Press, they are making a very great mistake. *It is not mere words, it is acts, that have convinced us.* Germany has increased, and is increasing, her fleet. Germany has made, and is still making the fullest preparations for the embarkation of an army. *These are facts* I submit that in face of the known facts it is absurd to describe the warnings given by hundreds of experienced men as an idle 'scare.' All the evidence goes to prove that *Germany is preparing to make war upon our country.* If certain journalists are accused of inventing dangers, I suppose no one will accuse them of *inventing the German fleet*, or the long quays at Emsen" (*sic*) "or the flotilla of transports, or the millions of German troops. . . . The Labour Party hate war, therefore they will not hear of any danger of war. I hate and dread war, therefore I point out what to me appears an impending danger of war, which demands immediate action from the British people. . . . There is another thing the Labour Party hate and dread. They call it 'militarism'! They do not hate and dread it more than I do. And I want to point out that their present policy, or lack of policy, is helping the development and growth of that danger. Towards conscription, as towards war, we are drifting. . . . I repeat my statement: (1) *There is grave and present danger of a German attack upon this country.* (2) This danger exists because *we are not prepared for war.* (3) We are not prepared for war because the ruling classes do not trust the people, and because the people do not trust the ruling classes." Again, "*the German people are an army. The British people are an unarmed, untrained mob. I think it is a time for plain speaking.*"

(The italics in the foregoing extract are ours.)

These highly pertinent remarks of Mr. Blatchford—as also the similar views recently expressed by another prominent Socialist, Mr. H. M. Hyndman ("The Coming German War against Great Britain"; printed in the *Clarion*, and cited *Standard*, August 10, 1908, p. 9, col. 4)—(men who, to quote the *Standard*, August 31, 1908, leading article, p. 4, col. 4, "are not afraid, in discussing a national danger, to declare themselves to be Englishmen first and Socialists afterwards")—are, unhappily, however, in exact opposition to those of the vast mass of Socialists; and they have, in fact, provoked a furious excommunication on the part of the latter. See Mr. Keir Hardie's recent article in the *Labour Leader*,—endorsed by the *Star* on August 14, 1908, in its leading article, "Jingo Socialism," p. 1, col. 4.

Nothing daunted, "Mr. Blatchford has, in the current issue of the *Clarion*" (see abstract in *Standard*, August 21, 1908, p. 5, col. 5), "an article in which he repeats his assertion that Germany is preparing for an attack on Great Britain." (See *Standard*, *l.c.*)

¹ August 7, 1908, "Love of Country" p. 4, col. 4;—referred to above, p. 441, n. 9.

of England, were visible from the cliffs of Dover. Then England was awake to her risk. Now she is asleep.¹

Cannot the country be roused before it is too late? Only if the Unionist party makes that awakening the chief object of its endeavour. For the Unionist party alone has the means, the organisation, the number of speakers, and the prestige needed to arrest the attention of Britain and to penetrate the cloud of apathy and indifference.

Therefore, to induce that party to undertake that work is the object of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE, and some steps towards that end have already been achieved. I appeal to every man and woman, who feels stirred by your words to attempt something for the land which gave them birth, to write to the offices of this League (2 Westminster Palace Gardens, London, S.W.) and give it their support.

I am, Sir,
Yours faithfully,
HAROLD F. WYATT,
Joint Hon. Secretary, Imperial Maritime League.

Aug. 7, 1908. The Channel Fleet, under Admiral Lord Charles Beresford, reviewed in Portland Bay by the King.²

BRITAIN'S APATHY.

DISINTEGRATING THE ARMY AND NAVY

DAILY EXPRESS, August 13, 1908, p. 5, col. 4.

Mr. L. J. Maxse, the Editor of the *National Review*, speaking on the Army and Navy at a Unionist demonstration at Deepdene, Dorking, yesterday afternoon,³ said:—

"What is the British Government doing—what is the British nation doing to guard against a danger which is visible to every one except itself? Ministers divide their time between playing ducks and drakes with the British Navy and running amok in the British

¹ "When Parliament rose at the beginning of August" (1908)—writes the *Abingdon Herald*, August 15, 1908—"... the real reproach against the Government was ... the state in which they left the National defences. With the Territorial Army lamentably inadequate and admittedly below the proper standard, and the Naval programme less than Germany's, the economists are clamouring for still greater reductions in both forces!" [Cp. above, p. 429.] "It makes one wish that there were ... a dozen ... Leagues, to rouse the public to a sense of danger and a knowledge of the real state of the case. ... The" *Imperial Maritime League* ... are stigmatised as alarmists, but with Germany knocking at the door of our trade, and bent on the capture of the seas, the *Maritime* or any other league that cries warning is helping the country more than those peaceable citizens who reckon upon nothing but their trade returns. A week would starve out London once a hostile fleet could hamper our merchant service and stop the arrival of supplies. As to the new danger of Germany actually landing an army in England, the horrors of war that would follow will hardly bear contemplation. We have not reckoned upon internal warfare since the time of the Stuarts, and Mr. Haldane's skeleton armies are certainly not adequate defences even of the 'Little England' so much talked of by the Radicals."

Cp. also above, p. 434 text and nn.

² See *Daily Express*, August 8, 1908, p. 1, col. 4.

³ August 12, 1908.

Army. For every pound Germany adds to her naval expenditure we knock a pound off ours, and while Germany keeps her battle fleet compact and concentrated under a single command, we break up ours into insignificant fragments, each of which is inferior to the German High Sea Fleet, because, forsooth, the Admiralty on shore are too jealous of the Admirals afloat to allow any of them to have a decent command. A similar process of disintegration is at work in the Army.

"This is not a party question—it is a national question, it is a people's question, it is the greatest question before the people."¹

RUMOURED NAVAL LOAN OF A HUNDRED MILLIONS.

VIEWS OF IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE.

"BAD FINANCE BETTER THAN NATIONAL DANGER."

August 17, 1908.

August 17, 1908. Government's rumoured intention to raise a Naval Loan of £100,000,000. See *Daily Express*, August 17, 1908, p. 1, cols. 2-3; and also—*s.v.* "The Naval Loan: Inadequate Building Programme of Late Years: Two-Power Test: Necessity for Great Outlay"—August 18, 1908, p. 1, cols. 2-3 (referred to above, pp. 438 sq.).²

The views of the Imperial Maritime League may be sufficiently gathered from the following (which is reprinted from the *Evening Standard and S.J.G.*, August 17, 1908, p. 1, col. 2, etc.):³—

NEEDS OF THE NAVY.—HEAVY ARREARS.

"Bad finance is better than National Danger," said Mr. Harold F. Wyatt, one of the two Joint Honorary Secretaries of the Imperial Maritime League, in the course of an interview [yesterday].⁴ "If the Government intends to raise a loan for naval purposes, it has at least the justification that there are heavy outstanding arrears."⁵

"We ought to have 70 more cruisers than we possess,⁷ many

¹ Cp. Mr. L. J. Maxse, again, speaking at an open-air Demonstration, held at Thorpe Hall, Louth, under the auspices of the Louth Working Men's Conservative Club, August 13, 1908 (reported in *Standard*, August 14, 1908, *s.v.* "National Defences: Mr. Maxse's Condemnation of the Government," p. 4, col. 6):—

"Apart from" Sir Edward Grey, Viscount Morley, Mr. Burns, and Mr. Buxton, "the (present) Government was a Government of would-be gamblers. They were gambling with our finances, and would ultimately wreck our fiscal system, but their capital and unpardonable crime was a contemned" (*sic*) "and deliberate gamble with the national defences at one of the most critical moments of British history."

² Whether the rumour referred to was founded on fact, or not, may yet remain an undecided question (cp. *E.S. & S.J.G.*, August 19, 1908, leading article, p. 3, col. 1).

³ Also:—*Daily Express*, August 18, 1908; *Manchester Courier*, August 18, 1908; *Naval and Military Record*, August 20, 1908.

⁴ Cp. also *Standard*, October 3, 1908 (leading article: "The Need for" British "Naval Expansion"), p. 4, cols. 4-5.

⁵ Cp. also the admirable leading article of the *Standard*, August 24, 1908, p. 4, cols. 3-4 (see text below).

⁶ In support of the need for a 100 million loan, see further:—*Standard* (leading articles):—Aug. 24, 1908 (below, p. 447), Oct. 3 (above, n. 4), 7 (below, p. 456, n. 7), 9 (below, p. 456, n. 9), 10, 15, and Nov. 13, 1908 (below, p. 471 n. 4), and Jan. 19, 30, 1909;—*Daily Express*, Nov. 13, 1908 (leading article);—*Nat. Rev.* Feb. 1909, pp. 872 sq.; etc.; etc.

⁷ Cp. Index, *s.v.* "Cruisers."

more destroyers,¹ and with Germany building four *Dreadnoughts* each year,² we are behind in battleships.²

"The *personnel* also needs increasing. At present we are 3,000 men short,³ and as new ships are built more men will be wanted.

"Far more sea training—the first essential of an efficient fleet⁴—is another great need.⁵ Most of our fleet spend most of their time in port.

AMERICAN SUPREMACY OF THE SEAS DEMANDED BY ADMIRAL EVANS.

August 18, 1908. Demand by Admiral Evans (Senior Officer in the United States Navy) "that America should definitely make up her mind to gain and maintain the supremacy of the seas, which," he said, "she might easily do by the organisation of fleets of 24 battleships in each ocean."—See *P.M.G.*, August 19, 1908, p. 10, col. 3.

THE NAVY AND THE NATION. FULL AND IMPARTIAL INQUIRY AGAIN⁹ DEMANDED.

August 24, 1908. Writing with reference to the proposed Naval Loan (referred to above, p. 446), the *Standard*, in an admirable and detailed leading article, "The Navy and the Nation" (August 24, 1908, p. 4, cols. 3-4)—after alluding to "the harm done by an unhappy combination of Radical economists and an experimental naval administration,"—and pointing out that "We are now face to face with the beginnings of the inevitable reaction and the symptoms of incipient panic,"—and showing that "More money for the Navy is required in excess of the funds already voted: of course it is required: there are the deficiencies of years to be made good" (deficiencies severally detailed);—and affirming "once more, as we have repeatedly affirmed for some time past, that the expenditure is absolutely required in the interests of the national security";—goes straight to the root of the whole matter in the following words:—

"But *there is something else, which is even more essential*, and that is *the reorganisation of the naval administration*. . . ." After outlining, briefly, "the history of the present administration," the *Standard* concludes as follows:—"An acquaintance with the true condition of naval affairs leads inevitably to the conclusion that *no additional funds ought to be granted without a full and an impartial inquiry into the whole situation*. There is no reason why the Admiralty, alone among Departments of State, should be held exempt from investigation. . . . In its present temper, the country is evidently in no mind either to acquiesce in further procrastination or to throw good money after bad."

¹ Cp. above, pp. 340, etc.

² Cp. above, pp. 266, 437, 439, etc. (Cp. further below, p. 461.)

³ Cp. above, pp. 61 (text and n. 8), 140, 320 (text and n. 3), etc.

⁴ Cp. above, pp. 16, 18, 19 *seq.*, 23, 320, etc.; and Index, *s.v.* "Nucleus Crews," "Sea-Training."

⁵ Cp. preceding note, and above, pp. 320 (text and n. 5), 398 (text and nn. 10, 11, 12).

"WARSHIPS OF THE WORLD
MORE ADMIRALTY JUGGLERY WITH FIGURES
SUPREME ON PAPER."¹

NEW ADMIRALTY RETURN: THE "CAWDOR RETURN."²

August 28, 1908. "The Navies of the World: Expenditure of Britain and Germany: Inefficient Ships."—*Standard*, August 29, 1908, p. 5, col. 4:—

"The 'Cawdor Return,'² designed to show the comparative strength in first-class battleships less than 25 years old, armoured cruisers less than 20 years old, and destroyers built and building of Great Britain, the United States, Germany, and Japan, on April 1 [1908], was issued by the Admiralty last night.³

"It will be observed that the Return,² like the Dilke Return,⁴ merely gives the number of ships actually in existence, irrespective of their condition and utility.⁴

"Under British battleships, for instance, we find included the whole of the *Royal Sovereign* class, the *Renown*, *Centurion*, *Barfleur*, *Trafalgar*, *Nile*, and the *Admiral* class. The *Royal Sovereign* class, with the exception of two vessels, which are used for instructional purposes, are laid up, and could not be made fit for sea until after several weeks. The *Renown* has been transformed into a Royal yacht. The *Centurion*, *Barfleur*, *Trafalgar*, and *Nile* are also unfit for service; and the *Admiral* class have been long obsolete and useless.

"Deducting these vessels, the total of British battleships is not 57,⁵ but 39.⁶

"On the other hand, none of the 22 German battleships"⁷—(to speak of Germany alone)—"is laid up.

"With regard to destroyers, it should be noted that their official life is ten to twelve years,⁸ yet the list gives all boats built since 1893. At least 18 boats⁹ should, therefore, be deducted from the official [British] "figure of 142"¹⁰ [141] (destroyers completed), "in estimating the actual strength of the flotilla."¹¹ None of the 61

¹ Heading from *Daily Express*, August 29, 1908, p. 1, col. 5.

² (Referred to above, pp. 203, 440.) Official number:—190. See *Times*, August 29, 1908, p. 5, col. 2.

³ As also a return of comparative naval expenditure in the last ten years; official number:—281. See *Times*, Aug. 29, 1908, p. 5, col. 2; *Standard*, Aug. 29, 1908, p. 5, col. 4 (and below, p. 449, n. 4).

⁴ Cp. above, pp. 438, 599.

⁵ The total number of battleships (built) credited to Great Britain in the Dilke Return, 1908, was 59 (see above, p. 438).

⁶ Thirty-nine. Cp. also above, pp. 153 n. 2, 154, 156, 438 n. 3; and *ibid.* for Lord Tweedmouth's admission to the similar effect.

⁷ The total number of battleships (built) credited to Germany in the Dilke Return, 1908, was 34 (see above, p. 439).

⁸ As to this cp. above, pp. 77 text and nn., etc.

⁹ Obviously a great many more, upon the basis of a 10 years' lease of life. See the notes which follow.

¹⁰ This should be 141: see the Return itself giving the number as "142" less "lost since date of return, 1";—thus, total 141.

¹¹ According to the Admiralty table quoted by Mr. Bellairs at R.U.S.I. Dec. 6, 1906 (*Jol. R.U.S.I.*, Feb., 1907, p. 147), "the number of destroyers laid down" by Britain "since 1899, inclusive of those laid down under the 1906-7 programme," was (exclusive of "coastal destroyers," which are now officially admitted not to be destroyers at all, see above, pp. 76, 115, 116, 127, 202, 203) only "forty-four."

The total number of destroyers laid down by Great Britain from 1889 to 1906 (both inclusive), as given by Mr. Robertson in the House of Commons, April, 1907 (*N.L.J.* May, 1907, p. 144), was 155 (less 6, which were struck off during the period 1901-6, leaving a total of 149), laid down, as follows:—

In the *Three* years 1889 to 1891 (both inclusive):—*None*.

In the *Five* years 1892 to 1896 (both inclusive):—*Eighty-Nine* (of which 32 were laid down in 1894, 12 in 1895, 35 in 1896).

In the *One* year 1897:—*One*.

In the *Nine* years 1898 to 1906 (both inclusive):—*Sixty-Five*—of which two only

German destroyers is older than 1898,¹² and only four are older than 1900.¹³

"With regard to expenditure, the amounts voted for new construction in this country have steadily declined since 1905-6, while in the same period those of Germany have largely increased.⁴

"The Board of Admiralty has once more failed to issue a return of the comparative strength of the navies of the Great Powers which is not misleading to the uninstructed reader."⁵

were laid down in 1905, and four only in 1906—and during the years 1901 to 1906, both inclusive, occurring during the period last mentioned, 6 destroyers were given as "struck off" from the list of efficient ships, as follows:—2 in 1901, 3 in 1904, and 1 in 1906).

The later figures given by Mr. Lambert, in the House of Commons, July 23, 1907 (for the period commencing with 1897-8) will be found quoted above, p. 77, n. 3, and are most instructive, as showing clearly the balance (in modern destroyers) already then in favour of Germany.

For the total number of destroyers *in fact* laid down by Great Britain and Germany, respectively, between 1898 and 1907 (both inclusive)—namely, Great Britain 64, and Germany 72—see above, pp. 76, 115 *sq.*, 140, 202, etc.

For the number of destroyers provided by Great Britain and Germany respectively for 1906-7 to 1908-9 (both inclusive), see above, p. 437, n.

Concerning the 16 British destroyers of the 1908-9 programme, see above, pp. 347 (text and nn. 4, 7), 437, n.

On April 7, 1909, Mr. McKenna admitted in the House that "in the years 1905-6 to 1909-10" only *forty-nine* British destroyers had been provided for as compared with the German *fifty-four*; and, further, "that only *four* of the British total had been completed for sea as compared with the German total of *thirty*." (British "so-called coastal t.b.ds., now termed first class torpedo-boats"—of which he stated that "during the period" in question "36 were ordered, of which 30 had been delivered"—he rightly so excluded from the British totals specified in this admission.) See *Daily Express*, April 8, 1909, p. 1, col. 3, and (leading article) p. 4, col. 4; and *Standard*, April 8, 1909, p. 4, col. 2.

On May 4, 1909, Mr. McKenna further stated in the House that of "completed destroyers on the effective lists of the British and German navies, respectively, launched during and after the year 1899," there were only *fifty-nine* British "as against *seventy-two* German." ("Thirty-one vessels originally termed coastal t.b.ds., but now classed as torpedo-boats," he rightly so excluded from the British total specified in this admission.) See *Times*, May 5, 1909, p. 7, col. 1.

On the same occasion (May 4, 1909) Mr. McKenna yet further stated that "the 12 destroyers of the German 1907-8 programme were already completed for sea and in commission," and that "of the 5 British destroyers of the same year's programme, three are expected to be delivered in October next" (Oct. 1909), while "it is expected" that the remaining two "will not be delivered at the earliest till January next" (Jan. 1910). See *Times*, May 5, 1909, p. 7, col. 1.

Mr. McKenna finally, in the House of Commons, May 25, 1909, made the abject admission that, of "completed destroyers in the British and German navies respectively" having "a fuel capacity of 100 tons or over," Britain has only "*forty*" to the "German *seventy-two*." (See *Daily Express* and *Times*, May 26, 1909.)

¹² For British destroyers laid down from (a) 1889 to 1906;—(b) 1897 to 1907;—(c) 1898 to 1906;—(d) 1898 to 1907;—(e) 1899 to 1906;—(f) 1906 to 1908;—(g) in 1908, cp. the preceding note, and also above, pp. 76, 77 n. 3, 115 *sq.*, 140, 202, etc.

¹³ In view of the figures as to completed destroyers not more than 10 years old given in these notes, the statement in the Cawdor Return (above, p. 448 text and n. 2) in regard to destroyers building should also be given. Twelve are assigned to both Britain and Germany, but, although it is there stated that 2 of the British 12 have been "since delivered" (*i.e.*, between April 1, 1908 and Aug. 28, 1908), it is also definitely there stated that 5 of the 12 are not yet (*i.e.*, by April 1, 1908) laid down, but are only "*preparing to build*."

⁴ See, *e.g.*, the return "281," referred to above, p. 448 n. 3 (as quoted in *Standard*, August 29, 1908, p. 5, col. 4), showing AMOUNT VOTED FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION AND ARMAMENTS as follows:—

	Great Britain.	Germany.
1906-7	£10,859,500*	£5,342,466
1907-8	9,227,000†	6,285,225
1908-9	8,660,202	8,366,438

* Expended £373,103 less;—namely, £10,486,397.

† Expended £60,124 less;—namely, £9,166,876.

For the total British naval reduction since 1904, and the total German naval increase

THE GERMAN PERIL.

September, 1908. "The German Peril"; "Striking Article" ¹ in the *Quarterly Review*, September, 1908 (from which lengthy quotations will be found in the *Standard*, September 14, 1908, p. 4, cols. 5, 6²).³

NAVAL AND MILITARY EXPENDITURE.

NAVAL AND MILITARY RECORD, *September 17, 1908.*

2 Westminster Palace Gardens, Westminster, S.W.,

September 8, 1908.

SIR,—The letter from Mr. Risborough, in your issue of the 27th ult.,⁴ to which my attention has been drawn, resolves itself into three questions:—(1) Whence comes the information "that Mr. Lloyd George could not find the money for old-age pensions except by reducing naval and military expenditure?" (2) In what sense the word "reduced" was used in the communication⁵ which you published⁶ from my colleagues, Mr. Horton-Smith (now absent from London), and myself; and (3) whence the additional money needed for national defence should be obtained.

I will, with your permission, deal with the first two points:—

(2) The information was supplied by the present Prime Minister⁷ in a speech made to the House of Commons on the 2nd of last June.⁸ He then said:—"We have deliberately postponed dealing with this matter (*i.e.* old-age pensions) until we had laid what we conceived to be a solid financial foundation for the future. How have we laid it? In the first place we have effected, I am glad to say, large economies during the last three years in the spending services of the country . . . very substantial economies. . . . That is the way in which we have sought to lay the foundations for the necessary expenses of social reform."

It will hardly, I presume, be disputed that the Admiralty and the War Office are "the spending services" to which principal reference is here made.⁹ It follows that Mr. Asquith's declaration is an absolutely definite admission, made as a boast, that the Government of which he was a member, and is now the head, has laid party hands for party ends on the defences of the country, and has cut down expenditure on both Navy and Army for the purpose of providing money for a system of non-contributory old-age

during the same period, see above, pp. 60 *sq.* (text and nn.), 74, 139 *sq.*, 373, 395, etc.

⁵ Cp. also—*s.v.* "Warships of the World: More Admiralty Jugglery with Figures—Supreme on Paper"—*Daily Express*, August 29, 1908, p. 1, col. 5.

¹ *Daily Express*, September 14, 1908, p. 1, col. 8.

² Referred to above, *s.v.* July 30, 1908, p. 432 n. 5. See also above, p. R.F.

³ Needless to say that Prince Bülow did his very utmost to explain away the facts, and to lull the British peoples into a false sense of security; see the Interview with him published in the *Standard*, September 14, 1908, p. 7, col. 6 (abstracted in *Daily Express*, September 14, 1908, p. 1, col. 8, and p. 8, col. 2), and cp. thereon *Standard*, September 14, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 4-5;—and that will be the German cue until "the great day" (referred to above, p. R.F., and below, p. 517) at last arrives. (See further below, pp. 454, 456.)

⁴ August 27, 1908.

⁵ Reprinted above, pp. 430 *sqq.*

⁶ See above, p. 430, n. 4.

⁷ Mr. Asquith.

⁸ June 2, 1908. See above, p. 315 n. 1.

⁹ Cp. also Mr. Asquith's further admissions of Oct. 10, 1908 (at Leeds), referred to above, pp. 105 n. 1, 349 n. 4.

pensions. Therefore, whether Mr. Lloyd George and his colleagues in the Cabinet could have found the money which they needed for the object in view in any other way or not, it is the plain fact that they did not so find it.

(2) The word "reduced" was used in its simplest and most obvious sense. With regard to the Army, it is not necessary even to look at the diminution of expenditure, since the actual numbers have been lessened by Mr. Haldane by upwards of twenty thousand men.¹

In the case of the Navy the reduction has taken the form, *inter alia*, of an immense decrease in the sea training, and therefore in the efficiency of the Fleet, and also of a prodigious falling-off in the aggregate tonnage of new ships laid down. Thus in the years 1897-1900 England laid down 430,000 tons of armoured vessels. In 1901-4, 361,000 tons; in 1905-8, 222,000 tons; while in the same period Germany laid down 337,000 tons of armoured shipping. This year we are laying down two battleships aggregating less than 40,000 tons,² while Germany is laying down four battleships, aggregating upwards of 80,000 tons.³

In regard to ocean-going destroyers, our decline in sea power is even greater, since in this respect we have absolutely lost the hegemony of the world to Germany.⁵ It is hardly an exaggeration to say that if the country realised what the present Government have effected in this vital particular it would hurl them into the street, and send the present Board of Admiralty to keep them company for having consented to be made their tools. As if to insult the nation in its danger, we have this year sixteen destroyers voted, upon each of which the lordly sum of £4,000 is to be expended up to the 31st of March next.⁶ If these facts do not constitute a record of reduction, it would be hard to say what facts could establish it. Yet the only point in this connection which appeals to your correspondent is the statement made by the 144 anti-British members of the House of Commons⁸ that the cost of the Navy had risen by 9½ millions in ten years. They might, with equal sense, lay stress on the fact that the Navy Estimates at the beginning of this century were enormously greater than they were in the days of Queen Elizabeth. For the competition between nations, first in trade, then in war, is secular in its nature. It continues from generation to generation, and from age to age. And as the wealth of nations increases, so also increase its burdens, of which the effort necessary to secure the power to win success in that supreme form of

¹ Cp. above, p. 382, and below p. 475.

² The battleship which was to have been called *Foudroyant* [but which has since been christened *Neptune*, see above p. 436] (19,250 tons), and one *large armoured cruiser*, or "cruiser-battleship" [since christened *Indefatigable*, see above, p. 437] (18,000 tons); British armoured total:—37,250 tons. See above, p. 437.

³ The *Hildebrand*, *Heimdall*, *Fritzof*, and one *large armoured cruiser*, or "cruiser-battleship" (each of 19,000 tons); German armoured total:—76,000 tons. See above, p. 437.

⁴ Cp. above, pp. 347, 373, 377, 437.

⁵ Cp. above, pp. 61, 76 sq., 115 sq., 140, 339 sq., 437, 449.

⁶ March 31, 1908. Concerning these 16 destroyers, see above, pp. 347 (text and nn. 4, 7), 437 (n.), 449 (n.).

⁷ Concerning the rapidity with which the destroyers of the corresponding German programme are already being built, cp. above, pp. 347 (n. 7), 437 n.

⁸ Cp. above, pp. 429, 445, and below, pp. 452, 494 sq.

competition, called war, is the chief. But while a given nation is growing, not decaying, it can both bear that increasing burden and yet prosper more and more. If your correspondent were to inquire, he would find that during the same period of ten years in which occurred the rise in the cost of our armaments, of which the 144 Radical Solomons complain,¹ the aggregate national income of Britain increased by hundreds of millions.² It is their senseless persistency in ignoring fundamental facts such as this which stamps their party and themselves with the brand of unutterable folly.

I have not space to follow your correspondent into the question of the best means by which to raise the revenue required to sustain the British Navy and make good the deadly injury which the present Cabinet have already inflicted upon it. Apparently—though he does not say so precisely—his method would be to tax capital yet more highly, and thus drive out of the country, even more quickly than it is flying already, the wage fund of the British people.

I am, Sir, Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,

Joint Hon. Secretary, Imperial Maritime League.

THE CHANNEL FLEET.

SEVEN BATTLESHIPS IN DOCKYARD HANDS.

September 9, 1908.

September 9, 1908. "Channel Fleet Strength: Seven Battleships in Dockyard Hands"; from a Naval Correspondent of the *Standard* (*Standard*, September 9, 1908, p. 5, col. 3), who writes (*inter alia*) that:—

"These dispositions may be noted in conjunction with the assurance of 1905,³ that 'not more than one large ship of a fleet or squadron shall be absent at one time in dockyard hands for purposes of repair or refit.'

¹ Cp. above, p. 451, text and n. 8.

² It is not uninteresting to compare, in this connection, the article entitled "Navy as an Insurance," which appears (from the pen of "Numericus") in the *Standard* September 16, 1908, p. 7, cols. 2-3, referred to above, p. 7.

Dealing with "the subject of naval expenditure as an insurance premium," and dealing solely with "the value of British commerce and shipping" (including "bullion and specie") "afloat, or 'at risk,' as insurance people describe it," during the year (1907), the writer compares the figures of the year 1907 with those of 10 years ago, and proves that:—"large as has been the" total "increase of British naval expenditure" during the period in question, "this increase is completely justified by the growth of our overseas trade in the same period"; and that, "assuming the entire" naval "expenditure to be justified" solely "as an insurance premium" (on the value of British commerce and shipping, including bullion and specie, afloat or "at risk"), "it further appears that the premium rate has remained absolutely the same in that period"—namely, 2 per cent.;—a figure, by the way, which he further shows to be less than that paid in the year last mentioned, 1907, by Germany (or that paid by either France or the United States).

(With regard to the latter point:—"If we assume, for the moment, that the whole of the naval "expenditure on both sides"—i.e., on the side of both Britain and Germany—"for 1908, is devoted to the defence of merchant shipping"—i.e., "mercantile marine"—"it will be found that the British insurance rate works out at £2. 10s. 6d. per ton, and the German rate to £6. 12s. per ton." See the *Standard's* Correspondent, *Standard*, September 18, 1908, p. 7, col. 2.)

"Numericus" incidentally calls attention to the increased naval cost to Britain entailed by the absence of conscription, as contrasted with the contrary state of affairs in Germany.

³ March, 1905. See above, pp. 275, 406; and cp. below, p. 453, n. 1.

"The total battleship strength of the Channel Fleet is, nominally, 14 ships; at the present moment it is 7¹ . . .

"The Nore Division of the Home Fleet still includes only two modern battleships."²

GERMAN NAVY LEAGUE'S FRESH DEMANDS. UNOFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF FURTHER INCREASE OF GERMAN OFFICIAL PROGRAMME.

September 28, 1908. Fresh Programme of the German Navy League issued (under leadership of its new President, Admiral von Koester³), September 28, 1908.⁴

"It disposes once for all of the view held by misguided optimists who believed that Germany's strenuous efforts to create a great Navy would be suspended after the Supplementary Navy Acts of 1906 and 1908 had become law. A further projected increase of the " [German] "Fleet may be expected next year (1909)."⁵

For the convincing reasons given by the *Standard's* Berlin Correspondent, it seems clear that, as in fact he writes⁶ :—"The Manifesto in which the " [German Navy] "League proclaims its new shipbuilding programme may be regarded as an *unofficial announcement of the next development of the official naval programme.*"⁶

The most important point of the new programme is to secure that for six of the existing German *protected cruisers*⁷ there shall be substituted as rapidly as possible six so-called "*armoured cruisers*" of the largest and most powerful type—in reality (and, by implication⁸ admittedly) "*fast battleships.*"

The case is well and concisely put by the *Standard*, September 30, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, col. 4 :—"The Naval Acts of 1900 and 1906" (the effect of which has been already enormously increased by the amending Act of 1908⁹) "provide for the construction of a

¹ The Regulations of the Admiralty, dated November 30, 1905, as to the number (*not more than three*) of battleships (then 17) of the Channel Fleet to be allowed absence at any one time—printed in *Standard*, October 10, 1908, p. 9, col. 3—manifestly, of course, held good no longer when (as stated in *Standard*, *ibid.*), by the circular letter of October 23, 1906 (above, pp. 12 *sq.*), the number of battleships of that Fleet had been reduced. Yet here, in September, 1908, with a reduced number of battleships (14), we find *no less than seven* absent from the Fleet at one and the same time.

² Cp. above, pp. 408 *sq.*

³ For whom—and for the inner meaning of whose Presidency of the German Navy League—see above, pp. 67, n. 2, 434, n. 6, and the Berlin Correspondents referred to below nn. 5, 7, 8.

Admiral von Koester was described on October 17, 1908 (by Rear-Admiral Weber, Managing-President of the German Navy League), as "the greatest living authority on the German Navy." See *Times*, October 21, 1908, p. 7.

⁴ For an account of the League's proposals see the *Standard* and *Express*, cited in the notes hereto, and see also the *Times*, October 5, 1908, p. 6, cols. 1-2.

⁵ *Daily Express'* Berlin Correspondent, *Daily Express*, Sept. 29, 1908, p. 1, col. 8; cp. also *Standard's* Berlin Correspondent, *Standard*, Sept. 29, 1908, p. 5, col. 2.

⁶ *Standard*, September 29, 1908, p. 5, col. 2.

⁷ Classified according to, and for, the purposes of the German Navy Acts, 1900 and 1906 as "*armoured cruisers*" (see *Standard's* Berlin Correspondent in *Standard*, Sept. 29, 1908, p. 5, col. 2).

⁸ See the Berlin Correspondents referred to above in nn. 3, 5, 7. See also the *Standard's* Berlin correspondent, *Standard*, October 2, 1908, p. 7, col. 5, pointing out, on the authority of "Colonel Gädke, the well-known [German] military expert," that, "as explained in my despatch of Monday last" (*Standard*, September 29, 1908, p. 5, col. 2), "*these proposed new cruisers are merely fast battleships in disguise.*"

⁹ For which see above, pp. 266 *sqq.*

most powerful " German " naval force by 1917, and the new proposal is to build, with all possible expedition, *an additional six vessels of the largest and most powerful type*—that is to say, *six battleship-cruisers*, at least equal and more probably superior to the three *Indomitables* of the British Navy."

"It invariably happens," writes the *Standard* (*ibid.*), "that after each fresh outburst of pacifist energy there comes an announcement—generally from the same quarter—that armaments are to be increased." Only "a week ago, in felicitous phrases, Prince Bülow was telling the members of the Inter-Parliamentary Congress how much he sympathised with their horror of war and their desire to reduce wasteful expenditure on armaments." And "yesterday an announcement, which our Berlin Correspondent shows to be equivalent to an expression of official policy,¹ was made of a proposed important extension of the German shipbuilding programme."²

And yet Prince Bülow would have us believe that the German Navy is not being built for a war of aggression upon ourselves.³

NAVAL SUPREMACY AND PEACE.

ANGLO-GERMAN RIVALRY.

KEY OF THE SITUATION.

October, 1908. "The Key of European Peace";—by "Ignotus," *National Review*, October, 1908, pp. 198–204, abstracted in the *Standard*, October 1, 1908, p. 5, col. 7,⁴ from which we quote the following salient passage:—

"'Ignotus' thus sums up the present position as between England and Germany:—'Peace depends first and foremost on the incontestable superiority of the British Navy. And the incontestable superiority of the British Navy depends on three points—(1) The laying down of two keels in each class of ship⁵ for the German one;—(2) the correct disposition of those keels when completed and commissioned;—and (3) sound strategy at headquarters.'⁶

"He adds that 'only an overwhelming preponderance of British force can now maintain the peace.'"

¹ See above, p. 453, text and n. 6.

² The reception of the proposed new Programme in Germany was one with which "the leaders of the German Navy League have no reason to be dissatisfied" (*Daily Express's* Berlin Correspondent, *Daily Express*, September 30, 1908, p. 1, col. 3). See also the *Standard's* Berlin Correspondent, *Standard*, September 30, 1908, p. 7, col. 7; and, especially, the *Times's* Berlin Correspondent, *Times*, October 5, 1908, p. 6, cols. 2–3.

³ See above, p. 450, n. 3, and below, p. 456.

⁴ Above, p. 443, n. 3.

⁵ The italics are ours. Cp. above, p. 435 n. 1, etc.

⁶ "He takes these points in detail," continues the *Standard*, *ibid.*—"and, comparing the British Fleet with the German programme, points out that 'the British Navy is hardly being maintained upon a One-Power-Standard.'"

"As to the disposition of the British ships, he remarks that the British Navy is scattered in 'little packets,' while the German is concentrated to the highest possible degree."

"As to the strategy at headquarters, he makes the following remarkable statement:—

"'In our manœuvres of the present year the fleet representing the German fleet was left unmolested in command of the sea, while that representing the British never

CRITICISM OF MR. McKENNA'S SPEECH OF

October 1, 1908.

October 1, 1908. First Lord's Speech at Pontypool, October 1, 1908 (reported in *Standard*, October 2, 1908, p. 8, col. 3¹)—a speech the real gist of which would appear to be that:—"More ships means more scrapping; *ergo* build as little as you dare."

For exceedingly pertinent comment upon the speech in question—and upon the "misconception" on which "the First Lord's argument against increasing the" British "Navy would appear to be based"²—see *Standard*, October 3, 1908 (leading article: "The Need for" British "Naval Expansion"), p. 4, cols. 4 sq.^{3 4}

M. LAUBEUF ON THE COMING STRUGGLE
BETWEEN BRITAIN AND GERMANY.

October 3, 1908. Germany's Expenditure on Submarines⁵ and Submersibles;—"The Key of the Future German Tactics against Great Britain." See the pamphlet⁶ by M. Laubeuf,⁷ "on the coming naval struggles which he regards as inevitable, between England and Germany, and between America and Japan⁸;" abstracted in *Daily Express*, October 3, 1908, p. 4, col. 5.⁹

Note 6 of p. 454 continued.

ventured 50 miles from harbour, and played a purely defensive part. . . . The responsibility for this demoralising strategy must be ascribed to the new Admiralty idea of conducting campaigns by wireless telegraphy from Whitehall." [For which cp. above, p. 425 text and n. 2.] "The first results of that experiment have been disastrous, and if the true facts could be published, which unfortunately for many reasons they cannot, a tremendous shock would be dealt to public confidence in the administration of the Navy, and in the Admiralty's plans for war."

¹ See also *Daily Express*, October 2, 1908, p. 1, col. 7.

² *Standard*, October 3, 1908 (leading article), p. 4, col. 4.

³ See also *Daily Express*, October 2, 1908 (leading article), "Britannia Must Rule the Waves", p. 4, col. 4.

⁴ "No impartial observer of international politics" (writes the *Standard*, *ibid.*) "but is now convinced that Germany has determined to challenge the sea supremacy of Great Britain. . . . By the beginning of 1912, Germany has arranged to complete 13 ships of the *Dreadnought* type, as against 12 projected in this country."—[Cp. also, in this connection, above, pp. 352 n. 9, 425, and below, pp. 461 sq., 462 n. 1, 478 sq.] "We mention the fact as an indubitable indication of a settled policy."

⁵ Cp. *Globe*, November 26, 1908, p. 4, col. 3:—"German Submarines:—Twenty to be built by 1920."

⁶ Entitled "Navy Supremacy: Who?—England or Germany?—America or Japan?"—and dated "March 1908." English edition (with introduction by Mr. F. T. Jane) published October, 1908.

⁷ Of the Corps of French Naval Constructors, and formerly Chief Engineer of the French Navy.

⁸ *Daily Express*, October 3, 1908, p. 4, col. 5.

⁹ In the course of this pamphlet occurs a passage which it may be well here to leave on record:—"Considering that the German armoured ships are satisfied with a radius for action very much more limited than that of the English or French armoured ships (5,500 miles, instead of 8,000 miles), I come to the conclusion that the German Navy looks forward to a contest restricted to the European seas, *i.e.*, a contest with England."

THE GERMAN PERIL.

October, 1908.

October, 1908:—(a) "The German Peril: A Rejoinder to Prince Bülow¹" (by the author of "The German Peril" referred to above, p. 450, text and note),^{2 3 4};—and (b) "Our Endangered Sea-Supremacy";—both in *Quarterly Review*, October, 1908.⁴

TREATY OF BERLIN TORN UP.⁵

October 5, 1908.

October 5, 1908. Prince Ferdinand, Vassal of the Sultan of Turkey, proclaiming the Independence of Bulgaria at Tirnovo, its ancient Capital.^{6 7 8 9}

October 5, 1908. Proclamation by Austria of her Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Royal Decree of the Emperor Francis Joseph;—dated from Budapest, October 5, 1908.^{10 7 9}

October 7, 1908. Secession of Crete from Turkey;—Union with Greece formally proclaimed.^{11 9}

October 9, 1908. Reported Declaration of Independence by Albania.¹²

¹ Cp. above, pp. 450 n. 3, 454.

² See *Standard*, October 17, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, col. 4.

³ Concerning (a) cp. *Globe*, October 17, 1908, p. 5, col. 2.

⁴ For long extracts of both (a) and (b) see *Standard*, October 17, 1908, p. 4, cols. 4-5 (cp. above, p. 267, n. 3); and upon both (a) and (b) see *Standard*, October 17, 1908, p. 6 (leading article "Germany and Naval Supremacy") cols. 4 sq.; and *Daily Express*, October 19, 1908 (leading article: "Trafalgar Week"), p. 4, cols. 4-5.

⁵ For details of the material portion of the Treaty see *Times*, October 8, 1908, p. 4, cols. 1 sq.

⁶ See *Daily Express*, October 6, 1908, p. 1, cols. 2 sqq. ("Czar of the Bulgarians: Proclamation of Prince Ferdinand at Tirnovo: British Protest: Rupture of Berlin Treaty: Attitude of the Powers"), and leading article ("Czar Ferdinand!") p. 4, cols. 3-4, commencing:—"Treaties, like piecrusts, are made to be broken. That is the moral of this week's events in the [Near] East."

⁷ See further, *Standard*, October 7, 1908, p. 6, cols. 4 sq. and 5 sq. (leading articles: "The Balkan Crisis" and "The Value of Treaties:" the latter referred to above, p. 446 n. 6); and October 8, 1908, p. 4, cols. 4 sq., leading article ("The Near Eastern Crisis") with its salient phrase:—"Within the last few days a grievous blow has been struck at International morality."

⁸ See *Standard*, October 7, 1908, p. 4, col. 5 ("The Treaty of Berlin: Articles Violated by Bulgaria").

⁹ See further, *Daily Express*, October 9, 1908, p. 4, cols. 4-5 (leading article: "The Spoliation of Turkey"); and see also, *Globe*, October 9, 1908, p. 6, cols. 2 sq., leading article ("The Rising Storm"), concluding:—"Once more is the lesson brought home to the British Empire that she can only rely for her existence upon the maintenance in unimpaired efficiency both of her Navy and Army."

For the History of the Crisis in the Near East, see *Daily Express*, October 15, 1908, p. 1, col. 2.

See further, generally, *Standard*, October 9, 1908, leading article, p. 6, cols. 5-6 ("Treaty-Breaking as it affects Great Britain"; above, p. 446 n. 6).

¹⁰ See *Standard*, October 6, 1908, p. 7, cols. 1 sqq.; and *Daily Express*, October 7, 1908, p. 1, col. 4, and (leading article: "Another Conference") p. 4, col. 4.

¹¹ See *Standard*, October 8, 1908, p. 5, cols. 1 and 6; and *Daily Express*, October 8, 1908, p. 1, cols. 5 and 6.

¹² On which see *Daily Express*, October 9, 1908, p. 4, cols. 4-5 (leading article: "The Spoliation of Turkey"); and *Globe*, October 9, 1908, p. 1, col. 3 (leaderette, "Albanian Independence").

NAVAL INQUIRIES OF THE PAST

1800 to 1908.

October 12, 1908.

October 12, 1908. "Navy and Army (Inquiries)":—Official Return (to an Order of the House of Commons dated July 30, 1908) "giving . . . a List of all Inquiries into Naval and Military Affairs which have been held since the year 1800, the Reports of which have been published as Parliamentary Papers." Ordered to be printed October 12, 1908.¹

TWO-POWER STANDARD IN 1912.

October 13, 1908. "In order that the Two-Power Standard may be maintained in 1912, we must lay down seven vessels" (*i.e.*, seven of the *Dreadnought* type), "next year, and as a corollary, a proportionate force of cruisers and torpedo craft, together with the provision of docking accommodation. Does Mr. Asquith deny this proposition, or does he not? No conventional assurances about 'measures of security' will any longer avail."—*Standard*, October 13, 1908, leading article, p. 6 ("Mr. Asquith on Naval Needs"), col. 6.²

THE OLD NAVY LEAGUE'S COMMITTEE³
AT ISSUE WITH ITSELF.³

DIVIDED COUNSELS.

The Old Navy League's Divided Counsels:—See:—

(a) "Naval Standard: Policy of the Navy League";—*Standard*, October 10, 1908, p. 9, col. 3⁴, followed by:—

(b) "The Policy of the Navy League"; by Mr. Gerard Fiennes;—*Standard*, October 13, 1908, p. 8, col. 6, wherein, as a member of the Executive Committee of the Old Navy League, (a) is, by himself at least, repudiated.

¹ Official number:—297.

² Cf. also *Standard*, October 15, 1908 (leading article: "The Government and the Navy"), p. 6, cols. 4 *sq.*

³ Not for the first time since the Great Split of 1907 (for which see above, *passim*);—cp., *e.g.* above, p. 299. (Cp. also above, p. 375 n. 18.)

⁴ Item (a). Commented on by *Daily Express*, October 10, 1908, p. 1, col. 7:—"N.L. wakes up: Complete Reversal of its Policy," and by Mr. Percival A. Hism in *Daily Express*, October 12, 1908, p. 4, col. 7 (*scilicet*, "Hoodwinking the Nation; the Admiralty's Idol of Economy.")

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE AND THE NAVY.

October 14, 1908.

By kind permission of Mr. and Mrs. John A. Scrimgeour, a Drawing-room Meeting in support of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE was held on Oct. 24, 1908, at their residence, Gatton, Reigate, Surrey. Mr. Scrimgeour was in the Chair, and the principal speakers for the LEAGUE were its Founders and Joint Honorary Secretaries, Mr. Harold F. Wyatt and Mr. L. Graham H. Horton-Smith.

CHANNEL FLEET AGAIN!

October 15, 1908.

October 15, 1908. "At this moment there are available for service in the Channel Fleet only 5 battleships out of 14. The rest are either under repair or are in harbour. The regulation framed by the Admiralty ordaining that every ship withdrawn from a sea-going fleet should be at once replaced has been consistently disregarded."—*Standard*, October 15, 1908, leading article, p. 6 ("The Government and the Navy"), cols. 4-6.¹

¹ Cf. *Standard*, October 26, 1908 (leading article: "Mr. McKenna's Replies") p. 6, cols. 6 sq. :—"With regard to the Channel Fleet, the position is even more scandalous. Eight, and, at one time, nine battleships have been absent from the Channel Fleet during its recent cruise."

Nine battleships were absent from the Channel Fleet at one time between September 28 and October 20 (1908) according to the statement on October 26, 1908, of the First Lord of the Admiralty himself.—See *Daily Mail*, October 27, 1908, p. 5, col. 5.

Mr. Bellairs, quoted in the *Standard*, November 2, 1908, p. 9, col. 3, pointed out that "eight battleships and two armoured cruisers" were "absent from the Channel Fleet during the height of the recent crisis," and that, "for a period of nine days, only five battleships and four armoured cruisers were at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief."

Cp. further, *Standard*, November 2, 1908, p. 6, col. 6 (leading article: "Mr. McKenna and a Naval Programme") :—"As we have already pointed out, the Channel Fleet has been recently deprived of eight battleships, which have not been replaced during their absence, although the Admiralty regulation ordains that substitute ships should be provided."

It is noteworthy that the leading article last referred to goes on to say that "on Tuesday last" (October 27, 1908) "the First Lord stated that the Commander-in-Chief of the Channel Fleet had been informed so long ago as August last" (August, 1908) "that the Admiralty attached 'less importance than previously' to the regulation in question . . . in view of the great strength of the naval forces always now in Home waters." The utter baselessness of the argument is well exposed by the *Standard*, *ibid.* :—

"Presumably the First Lord was referring to the Home Fleet, a reserve force manned by nucleus crews, distributed in separate divisions, and never trained at sea with the sea-going fleets. We published on Friday" (October 30, 1908) "an analysis of the 'great strength' of the reserve squadrons. During the recent cruise of the Home Fleet, when, for the first time, the three divisions were assembled together for training purposes, *nine* battleships out of *twenty-four*, and *eight* cruisers out of *twenty-two*, were available—or just over 36 *per cent.* of the whole force. During the time, therefore, when the Channel Fleet was deprived of *eight* battleships, the Home Fleet elsewhere mustered *nine* all told. These vessels, however useful as a reserve to be brought into the first line a month or six weeks after the outbreak of war, have neither the ship-training nor the fleet-training to fit them for service on emergency with a sea-going squadron. The Channel Fleet, reduced to a mutilated squadron, represented all the naval power in Home waters ready for service during the crisis in the Near East. According to the official reports of movements of ships, the Channel Fleet at this moment consists of only *seven* battleships, *four* armoured cruisers, *two* small cruisers, and *ten* destroyers."

HOME DEFENCE.

October 15, 1908. "Home Defence," and why Admirals are to be found in the National Service League ;—by Admiral C. C. Penrose FitzGerald¹:—*Standard*, October 16, 1908, p. 9, col. 2.

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE.
PUBLIC MEETING AT EAST HAM.

October 15, 1908.

A Public Meeting² was held in the Town Hall, East Ham, on Oct. 15, 1908, under the auspices of the Central Conservative Council of the Romford Division (of Essex), to consider the question of the Navy and the duty of Unionists in regard thereto.

Mr. Rowland Hunt, M.P., was in the Chair; and the following Resolution, moved by Mr. H. F. Wyatt and seconded by Mr. W. Frewen Lord (both of the Executive Committee of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE), was carried with but four dissentients in an audience of no less than 1,000 :—

THE RESOLUTION

"That this Meeting views with indignation and regrets the action of "the present Government in having sacrificed the safety of the nation "to their party ends by cutting down naval expenditure, and that it "expresses the earnest hope that the Unionist Party, and its leaders, "may denounce this conduct throughout the country."

TRAFALGAR DAY 1908

PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE.

MORNING POST, *October 21, 1908, p. 4, col. 3*; STANDARD, *October 21, 1908, p. 8, cols. 1 sq.*³

The Imperial Maritime League,
2, Westminster Palace Gardens, London, S.W.
October 20, 1908.

To the Editor.

SIR,—We desire to ask your permission to state briefly two violently contrasted problems of national defence—the unreal and the real.

The unreal problem is whether, if all British armoured ships were gathered together and matched against all German armoured ships, the victory would go to the former or to the latter. All the points

¹ For whom see above, pp. 335, 362, 428, and below, p. 522.

² For an account of this Meeting see *Standard*, October 16, 1908 (*s.v.* "Unionists and the Navy: Great Britain's Vanishing Supremacy"), p. 4, col. 6.

³ Also *Accrington Gazette*, October 24, 1908; *Bedfordshire Standard*, October 23, 1908; *Birmingham Weekly Post*, October 26, 1908; *Bristol Times and Mirror*, October 22, 1908; *Eastern Morning News* (Hull), October, 1908; *Liverpool Courier*, October 24, 1908; *Manchester Courier*, October 22, 1908; *Naval and Military Record*, October 29, 1908; *Outlook* (in brief), October 24, 1908; *Sunday Times*, October 25, 1908; *Yorkshire Herald*, October 22, 1908; etc.; etc.

which determine the issue between great Fleets are habitually excluded from this inquiry. No comparison is made in regard to ocean-going destroyers (in which Germany now far surpasses Britain), medium cruisers, dock accommodation, amount of fleet training at sea (in which vital respect the German High Sea Fleet has a prodigious advantage over our Home Fleet), reserves of projectiles, ammunition, and other stores, states of repair, and readiness for service. Tonnage and guns of armoured ships are commonly the only factors given, and upon that comparison our naval condition is declared to be one of overwhelming superiority. Other points of the nature just referred to were dismissed by Mr. McKenna last Friday¹ in a single sentence.

But the real problem is profoundly different. The real problem is whether Germany, by a surprise attack, could obtain command of the North Sea for three days. If she could, then our history closes, or rather a new volume entitled "England as a Province of Germany"² begins. For, given three days, Germany could land troops enough to capture London and shatter any resistance which we could offer, our military arrangements being, in the opinion of nearly all military men, in a condition rendering effective opposition impossible.

What, then, is the force which, in the probable event of sudden attack, could alone be made available for instant defence? It consists only of the Channel Fleet and the Nore Division of the Home Fleet. Of the rest of the Home Fleet Lord Tweedmouth stated, on May 1, 1907, that it was "in a state of development,"³ and the "state of development" which still exists is not a state of readiness for war. The Channel Fleet comprises 14 battleships, 4 armoured cruisers, and 3 third-class cruisers.⁴ The Nore Division contains nominally 6 battleships, 5 armoured cruisers, and 4 medium cruisers. Acting with the Channel Fleet and the Nore Division would be some 70 destroyers, many of which, however, have only nucleus crews.

Over against this force is the German High Sea Fleet, in a condition of magnificent efficiency, and consisting of 18 battleships, 5 armoured cruisers, 7 medium cruisers, and between 80 and 90 ocean-going destroyers.

Now it has been published to the world without denial that last week 9 out of the 14 battleships of the Channel Fleet were absent from it, in harbour or in dock. As the Puritans thought that they could govern England with a "Rump Parliament" so the present Government think they can protect it with a "Rump" Fleet. In plain words, it is as certain as anything human can be that had Germany attacked us last week our position would have been that of the defeated belligerent.

The reasons why the present Government must continue to cut down naval expenditure are three. They are: (1) Their election pledges; (2) the active desire of the great mass of their supporters both inside and outside the House of Commons; and (3)—last but not least—their desperate financial needs.

¹ Friday, October 16, 1908.

² "The Conscript Appanage of some Stronger Power";—to quote the words used by Sir Edward Grey, M.P., in the House of Commons, March 29, 1909 (printed above, p. R.F.; and cp. further above, p. 431).

³ See above, p. 220. Cp. also his statement of July 4, 1907, above, pp. 221 n. 3, 224.

⁴ Cp. (*inter alia*) *Navy List*, July, 1903.

How, then, can this strong compulsion be overcome? Only by an agitation so wide and so powerful as at last to awaken the country to the deadly peril in which it stands. With the object of promoting that movement Lord Amphill has consented to preside over a Meeting to be held in the Cannon Street Hotel at 3 p.m. on Thursday, the 19th of next month.¹ Lord Amphill's former experience as Acting Viceroy of India enables him to speak with high authority on the results to the whole Empire likely to follow from defeat at sea.

Many members of both Houses of Parliament have already signified their intention to support this Meeting, and we would appeal earnestly to all your readers to bear it in mind.

We are, Sir, Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH,

Joint Hon. Secretaries, Imperial Maritime League.

THE DUKE OF SOMERSET AND THE CALL FOR INQUIRY. ATTITUDE OF OLD NAVY LEAGUE.

October 21, 1908.

October 21, 1908. "The Duke of Somerset" (as Chairman of the Banquet of the Old Navy League) . . . "endorsed the demand for an Impartial Inquiry."—See *Standard*, Oct. 23, 1908 (leading article, "The Navy and Government by Party"), p. 6, cols. 5 sq.

But the endorsement raised cries of doubting *dissent* from his Old Navy League audience. (See *N.L.J.*, Nov., 1908, p. 329, col. 2.)²

A *Résumé* of the Old Navy League's attitude towards the proposed Inquiry, from Jan. 23, 1907, to Nov. 26, 1908, will be found below, pp. 484 sq.

GERMANY BUILDING A YEAR AHEAD OF BRITAIN ACCELERATION OF GERMAN PROGRAMME

Oct. 24, 1908. "Germany's Naval Challenge: Building her ships a year ahead of Britain: New Activity: 14 *Dreadnoughts* to our 12 in 1911"³;—*Daily Express*, Oct. 24, 1908, p. 1, col. 2, commencing:—

"The German Government has decided to begin work at once on "the battleships of the 1909 programme,"⁴ which will be laid down

¹ Nov. 19, 1908. See below, pp. 473 sqq., 486 sqq.

² See further below, p. 485.

³ Cp. above, pp. 352 n. 9, 425, 455, and below, pp. 478 sq.

⁴ In close and intimate connection herewith, it is well to recollect the famous Krupp Debenture Issue of July, 1908—"a loan" of two millions "for the construction of new workshops for armaments"—floated in Berlin in that month, reported in *Times*, July 23, 1908, p. 18, col. 4, and yet apparently passing unnoticed or unheeded by the British Admiralty. (See above, p. 428.)

Significant reference to the attitude of scepticism alleged to have been adopted by Sir John Fisher, when so far back as "over 12 months ago" the Board of Admiralty was expressly warned by our naval representative in Berlin that the German authorities were preparing to accelerate their construction programme and that *Krupps were to increase their works to a vast extent*—a "document still in existence," which "could be produced if necessary to those with authority to call for it"—will be found from the pen of "An Observer," in *John Bull*, April 24, 1909, p. 470, col. 2 (s.v. "Admiral Fisher Must Go: How he has Abused his Position." (*The italics in this paragraph are ours.*)

"about the same time as the British ships of the 1908 programme. This means that at the end of 1911 Germany will have 14 vessels of the *Dreadnought* type to our 12."¹

The German Government lost no time in acting upon the decision so come to.²

OUR MILITARY POLICY AND NEEDS.

October 22-28, 1908.

"Our Military Policy and Needs," by Mr. H. O. Arnold-Forster, M.P., in the *Standard*:—Oct. 22, 1908, p. 9, cols. 1 sq. (No. I., "How Europe is Preparing for War");—Oct. 23, 1908, pp. 7 sq. (No. II., "The Limitations of the Territorial Force");—Oct. 24, 1908, p. 7, col. 7 (No. III., "Contingencies that must be faced");—Oct. 26, 1908, p. 7, col. 7 (No. IV., "Provision against Raids")³;—Oct. 27, 1908, pp. 7, col. 7, and 8, col. 1 (No. V., "The Regular Army");—Oct. 28, 1908, pp. 7 sq. (No. VI., "A Dangerous Sham").⁴

THE "INTERVIEW" WITH THE KAISER

Publication in *The Daily Telegraph*^{5 6}

October, 1908

The famous interview with the Kaiser;—in the course of which he alleged that he had sent to the late Queen Victoria, during the dark days of the South African War, a plan of campaign, worked out for

¹ For facts and details—as also for an account of the armoured vessels which "Germany already has under construction" (October 24, 1908)—see *Daily Express*, *l. c.*, an article closing with the words:—

"The enormous fighting inferiority of the British *Dreadnought* fleet to the German three years hence can thus be clearly seen."

See also the pregnant leading article of the *Daily Express*, October 24, 1908, p. 4, cols. 4 sq., entitled "1911," and ending:—

"In 1911, we shall be inferior to One Power in modern ships of the line; how much more shall we be inferior to Two Powers?"

² See Mr. H. W. Wilson in *National Review*, Nov., 1908 (referred to again below, p. 465), cited by Admiral Fremantle at the R.U.S.I. Dec. 9, 1908 (*Jol. of R.U.S.I.*, Feb., 1909, p. 176); *Globe*, February 8, 1909 (leading article "The Naval Crisis"), p. 6, col. 3; *Graphic*, Feb. 27, 1909, Supplement, p. 1; and Mr. W. T. Stead in *Sunday Times*, March 14, 1909, p. 7, col. 2, and in *Standard*, March 15, 1909, p. 4, col. 3.

³ Long extracts in *E. S. & S.J.G.*, October, 26, 1908, p. 12, cols. 1 sq.

⁴ See, upon this series of articles, *Standard*, October 28, 1908 (leading article: "Our Military Needs"), p. 6, cols. 5-6.

And see, also, Mr. Rowland Hunt, M.P., in *Standard*, October 31, 1908, p. 8, col. 3, pointing out that Mr. Arnold-Forster would seem to disbelieve in the possibility of invasion through the accidental absence of a sufficient force of the British Navy or a temporary reverse to part of it. A dangerous disbelief, assuredly!

⁵ In this work the *Daily Telegraph* is only quoted when necessary. The reason may be inferred from what has been written above, p. 328, n. 1. An organ which publishes an attack and yet refuses to publish the reply thereto would hardly seem a safe guide to those who condescend to read its pages.

⁶ See *Morning Post*, October 29, 1908 (leading article: "The Interview with the German Emperor"), p. 6, cols. 4 sq.; and *Standard*, October 29, 1908 (leading article: "The Kaiser and England"), p. 6, cols. 5 sq.

him by the German General Staff, and followed by Lord Roberts. See *E.S. & S.J.G.*, Oct. 28, 1908, p. 8, col. 4.¹

The truth of the Kaiser's allegation was practically denied in the House of Commons (on Nov. 2, 1908) by Mr. Haldane himself. See *E.S. & S.J.G.*, Nov. 2, 1908, p. 11, col. 1.

It was subsequently, also, denied by or on behalf of the German General Staff, that any plan had been worked out by such Staff.

The allegation, moreover, is entirely inconsistent with the Kaiser's own published utterances within a week of the outbreak of the War itself.²

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE AND THE NAVY.

October 28, 1908.

Mr. Harold F. Wyatt, on behalf of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE, was the principal speaker at a Meeting held at Watford, on Oct. 28, 1908, in connection with:—*The State of the Navy*.

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE AND EALING UNIONISTS ANTI-PATRIOTISM OF OLD NAVY LEAGUE.

EALING GAZETTE, *Oct. 31, 1908*; COUNTY OF MIDDLESEX
INDEPENDENT *Nov. 4, 1908*, p. 1, col. 6.

The Imperial Maritime League,
2, Westminster Palace Gardens,
Westminster, London, S.W.
October 29, 1908.

To the Editor.

SIR,—Only so recently as the 21st inst., Trafalgar Day,³ appeared in the Press a manifesto from the Navy League, reciting some of the deficiencies in naval materials created by the policy of the present Government, saying, inter alia, that they looked to Mr.

¹ On the interview itself, and on the Kaiser's utterances quoted by the Interviewer see *Daily Express*, October 30, 1908, p. 4, cols. 3-4 (leading article: "The Kaiser's Warning"), and p. 1, col. 4 ("Germany's Great Navy: British Opinion on the Interview," "the Comment of the London Press"); *E.S. & S.J.G.*, October 29, 1908 (leading article: "William the Talkative"), p. 3, cols. 1-2; *Morning Post*, October 29, 1908, leading article, p. 6, cols. 4 sq. (above, p. 462, n. 6), October 30, 1908 (leading article: "Anglo-German Relations"), p. 4, cols. 4 sq.; *Standard*, October 29, 1908, leading article, p. 6, cols. 5 sq. (above, p. 462, n. 6); October 30, 1908, p. 11, cols. 1-2 ("The Kaiser and Great Britain: Imperial Goodwill: Opinion in London:" "Comment of the London Press"), and p. 6, cols. 4-6 (leading article: "The German Emperor's Statement").

² For which see above, pp. *R.F.*, 432, and below, p. 505.

³ October 21, 1908.

Balfour to do his duty in the matter. This declaration, though it conspicuously omitted reference to by far the greatest need at the present time, namely, that of an Inquiry into the state of the Navy,¹ must yet have been a source of surprised satisfaction to those members of that League, and to other patriotic men in the country, who had been filled with disgust and despair at the prolonged spectacle of its supine indifference, in face of the progressive destruction of our Naval power by the Radical Cabinet.

We also rejoiced, and, with many others, we hoped that the Navy League was at last intending to come into line, to some extent at least, with the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE, in its efforts to induce the Unionist party to wake from its apathy and step between the forces of Little England and the Fleet.

Unhappily, it is now our painful duty, a duty owed to the nation, to inform your readers that the deeds of the Navy League are the exact negative of its words, and that its action is betraying its cause.

Amongst other Meetings, designed to rouse the nation to a sense of its present peril, the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE is organising a great Demonstration in the Victoria Hall, at Ealing, on November 12th,² at 8.30 p.m., over which Earl Winterton, M.P., will preside. We had naturally invited, and were beginning actually to receive the co-operation of the Unionist Association of Ealing in this effort to direct public attention to the state of naval defence.

Now, to our unspeakable amazement, we have received a letter from the official secretary of the Unionist organisation in the locality, to the effect that he and his association are deterred from giving further aid by the resentment and opposition of the Navy League's members.³ These appear to desire, with a furious malignity, that the patriotic gathering fixed for November 12th should not be held.

Sir, comment on the situation thus created is almost superfluous. We have been compelled to say hard things of the policy of the Navy League in the past, but we have never supposed that it would have descended to quite such a depth as this. We have them here as the friends, the allies, the supporters of the Radical Government. We find them actually endeavouring, to the utmost of their power, to prevent a Unionist demonstration against the Naval policy of that Government.

Even though the majority of the Executive Committee of the Navy League entertain hate for the new society, because the latter has gone forward while they have gone back, and has led the way into the path which they ought to have trodden, still common decency and rudimentary patriotism might surely have deterred them from such action as this.

There have been those who have deprecated the existence of two leagues of the sea, and have talked of fusion between them. Here, in this instance, is the answer to all such criticism.

We can tell the Executive Committee of the Navy League, that

¹ See further below, p. 485.

² November 12, 1908. (See below, pp. 470 *sq.*)

³ An interesting letter upon the situation from the pen of Mr. W. Frewen Lord (Hon. V.-P. Imperial Maritime League) was published in the *County of Middlesex Independent*, November 4, 1908, p. 3, col. 5, and *Ealing Gazette*, November 7, 1908.

the Meeting which they seek to avert will be held in their despite,¹ and that should emissaries of theirs attempt to break up the proceedings—as we have reason to anticipate, and as occurred in the case of a Meeting at Wandsworth Common last year² very adequate arrangements will exist to deal with them.

We are, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

HAROLD F. WYATT,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH,

Joint Honorary Secretaries.

"ON THE EVE."

BY MR. H. W. WILSON.

October, 1908.

"On the Eve," by Mr. H. W. Wilson, in the *National Review*, November, 1908, pp. 373-386.³—A "comprehensive and lucid review of the present naval situation"⁴—the "warning note" selected from which, by the *Army and Navy Gazette*, Nov. 7, 1908, p. 1070, col. 1, is as follows:—

"The most critical moment in the history of the British nation is drawing near. In the next few weeks and months it will be determined whether the British Navy—the only force which stands between the Empire and destruction—is to be sacrificed once more to the foolish and short-sighted demands of the pacifists. The Command of the Sea is trembling in the balance."

THE BRITISH NAVY.

GREAT NEED OF MORE DESTROYERS.

November, 1908.

"We are in immediate need of at least 50 new destroyers to replace boats that are practically worn out and hopelessly done for."—Mr. F. T. Jane, in *E.S. & S.J.G.*, Nov. 2, 1908, p. 4, col. 3.

¹ See below, pp. 470 *sq.*

² November 20, 1907.

³ Referred to above, pp. 462 n. 2.

⁴ To quote the description by the *Standard*, November 2, 1908, p. 6, col. 7 (leading article: "Mr. McKenna and a Naval Programme").

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE.

UNIONIST STANDING COMMITTEE IN HOUSE OF COMMONS
TO BE JOINT UNIONIST COMMITTEE OF
BOTH LORDS AND COMMONS.¹

November 2, 1908.

"The Committee of Unionist Members on Naval matters" (formed in connection with the Imperial Maritime League on July 8, 1908²) "met yesterday" (November 2, 1908). "Mr. Staveley-Hill presided, and it was resolved to form a Joint Unionist Committee of Lords and Commons to watch over Naval questions in Parliament, Mr. H. F. Wyatt being appointed Hon. Secretary."—*Morning Post*, November 3, 1908 (*s.v.* "Parliamentary Notes"), p. 7, col. 5.^{3 4 5}

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE.

FURTHER ACCESSIONS TO GENERAL COUNCIL.

November 2, 1908.

A further Additional⁶ List—dated November 2, 1908, and commencing with the Earl of Romney—was published on Nov. 3, 1908.⁷

"MR. McKENNA'S NEW REGULATIONS."

STANDARD, November 4, 1908, p. 6, cols. 6-7.

Leading Article.

Two extremely important statements, both indicating a sudden and a totally unexplained reversal of naval policy, were elicited by Mr. Arnold-Forster from the First Lord of the Admiralty, in the

¹ Concerning the use of "Premier" type in this book, see above, p. 52, n. 5.

² See above, pp. 419 *sq.*

³ Cp. also *Times*, November 3, 1908 (*s.v.* "Political Notes"), p. 10, col. 2.

⁴ Lord Amphil attended "on behalf of the Unionist Peers";—see *Daily Express*, November 3, 1908 (*s.v.* "Safeguarding the Navy"), p. 1, col. 3.

⁵ Mr. Staveley-Hill was appointed Chairman of such Joint Standing Unionist Committee;—cp. *Daily Express*, November 18, 1908, p. 5, col. 4; *Daily Mail*, November 18, 1908.

⁶ Cp. above, pp. 314 n. 3, 362, 403, and below, pp. 512, 519, 522 (text and n. 5).

⁷ See *Morning Post*, November 3, 1908, p. 9, col. 5; and *Standard*, November 3, 1908, p. 8 col. 1, etc.

House of Commons, yesterday afternoon.¹ Mr. McKenna announced that the regulation laid down in the Admiralty Memorandum of February 23 of last year,² under which the Commander-in-Chief in Home waters was empowered to carry out peace exercises with the Channel, Atlantic, and Home Fleets in combination, no longer holds good.³ The First Lord also stated that the only occasion upon which such combined manœuvres have been executed, was in October of last year.⁴ He further announced⁵ that the rule laid down in the Admiralty Memorandum of December, 1904, ordaining that not more than two battleships should be absent, for the purpose of refitting, from any Fleet at the same time⁶, had been abrogated^{3, 7}, and that no new regulation had been formulated. The result of these extraordinary changes is, of course, that squadrons which must necessarily act in combination during war, are deprived of all opportunity of essential Fleet training in time of peace; and that the country has no assurance that at any moment, half the battleships of a squadron may not be in dockyard hands. There could be no more complete exposure of the state of demoralisation into which the organisation of the Fleet has fallen. It has been common knowledge that the three squadrons have never been assembled for Fleet training, except in part,⁸ upon the single occasion to which Mr. McKenna referred,^{4, 8} and that during the last few weeks, 8 and 9 battleships out of 14 have been withdrawn from the Channel Fleet. The country is now informed⁷ that the Admiralty have deliberately reversed their own decisions upon these most vital matters, without any change of circumstances which might justify their action, and without a word of explanation.³ The situation demands the most serious attention on the part of all those who take the slightest interest in the security of the national defences. Fleets which are not trained together in peace cannot act together in war; and ships in dock cannot fight, nor can they, as Mr. McKenna has asserted, he got to sea in twelve hours.

And hardly less disquieting than these official statements are the official silences. Ministers who refuse to give to Parliament information on subjects which intimately affect the public interest, alleging as a reason for their refusal that the public interest would be endangered by any statement, must expect that a policy which involves this kind of secrecy should be viewed with a profound suspicion. Mr. Arnold-Forster, who knows what he is talking about, affirmed on Monday that the landward forts which formerly protected the three Home Ports, had been deprived of guns and ammunition. The Secretary for War would not admit the truth of the statement, nor would he

¹ November 3, 1908.

² February 23, 1907.

³ Cp. further, below, p. 494.

⁴ October, 1907.

⁵ November 3, 1908 (see *Globe*, November 4, 1908, p. 2, col. 3). Cp. also Mr. McKenna's earlier statement to the same effect in the House of Commons (in reply to Mr. Mitchell-Thomson, M.P.), October 27, 1908, quoted in *Morning Post*, October 28, 1908, p. 5, col. 2; and in *Daily Express*, October 23, 1908, p. 1, col. 8.

⁶ See further, below, p. 494.

⁷ Mr. McKenna had already (on November 2, 1908) informed Mr. Mitchell-Thomson, M.P., in the House of Commons, that the Admiralty did not propose to prescribe *any* limitation in the number of battleships absent simultaneously from the Channel Fleet for repairs; adding, further, that the supersession of the Memoranda regulating absence from the Fleet on repairs applied also to cruisers, and that no numerical limit had been fixed in their case.—See *Standard*, November 3, 1908 (*s.v.* "The Channel Fleet"), p. 11, col. 1.

⁸ Cp. Mr. Bellairs in *Daily Express*, Feb. 16, 1909, p. 1, col. 5.

deny it. He further declined to say what troops were detailed to serve in the landward forts, on the ground that it was "not to the public interest." But, either the guns have been removed, or they have not. If they have not, what injury to the public interest is involved in stating the nature of the force told off to man them? If they have been removed, how can the public interest suffer if it is known that, in consequence, no force is required? What is it that Mr. Haldane is anxious to conceal? He has definitely refused to inform the House of Commons concerning facts which, whatever they may be, are undoubtedly the property of the intelligence departments of foreign Powers. Upon the same afternoon, the First Lord of the Admiralty declined to make any statement with regard to the reserves of naval guns. Mr. Du Cros affirmed that in the British Navy only one gun was held in reserve for every four guns afloat, whereas in other navies two guns were held in reserve for every four afloat.¹ The question is of vital importance. But again, the House of Commons is denied information.

The admissions of the First Lord, together with his evasions, and the inexplicable replies of the Secretary for War, indicate a state of things which we cannot but regard with the gravest apprehension.²

LORD ROBERTS' WARNING TO THE NATION NATIONAL UNPREPAREDNESS DANGER OF INVASION

Nov. 4, 1908. Lord Roberts' intention to propose a Resolution in the House of Lords, on the subject of the National Unpreparedness and the Danger of Invasion, announced.—See *Daily Express*, Nov. 4, 1908 (leading article: "If Invasion should come"), p. 4, col. 4.

The terms of Lord Roberts' proposed Resolution were printed in the *Daily Express*, Nov. 20, 1908, p. 1, col. 8.³

The Debate took place in the House of Lords on Nov. 23, 1908, and the Motion as finally put to the House was in the following terms:—

"That in the opinion of this House the defence of these Islands "necessitates the immediate attention of His Majesty's Government "to the provision (in addition to a powerful Navy) of an Army so "strong in numbers and so efficient in quality that the most formidable foreign nation would hesitate to attempt a landing on these "shores and thus give practical effect to the Resolution unanimously "agreed to by the House on the 10th of July, 1905."⁴

¹ See above, p. 442 n. 1. (For Mr. H. W. Wilson's figures hereon, see *National Review*, May, 1909, p. 400.)

² Cp. above, p. 442 text and nn. 1, 2.

³ Upon the proposed Resolution see, in advance, *Daily Express*, November 4, 1908, l. c., November 20, 1908, p. 1, col. 8 ("If Invasion came"); *Standard*, November 23, 1908 (leading article: "Lord Roberts and the National Danger").

⁴ For a report of the Debate see *Daily Express*, November 24, 1908 (s.v. "Warning to the Nation: Lord Roberts on the Dangers of Invasion: Defenceless: Notable Speeches by Peers: Government's Plea for 'Reticence'"), p. 1, cols. 1-3, and p. 5;—*E.S. & S.J.G.*, November 24, 1908 (s.v. "A Grave Warning: Lord Roberts and Dangers of Invasion");—*Morning Post*, November 24, 1908 (s.v. "Home Defence:

The Motion so put was (on a division) carried by a majority of more than 2 to 1.¹²

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE AND THE NAVY.

November 5, 1908.

By kind permission of Sir Edmund C. Cox, Bart., and Lady Cox, a Drawing-room Meeting in furtherance of the aims of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE was held on Nov. 5, 1908, at their residence in Ealing, when the Chair was taken by Sir Edmund Cox, supported by Mr. W. Frewen Lord, Mr. G. L. Borradaile, Mr. L. Graham H. Horton-Smith, Miss G. E. Wyatt, etc., etc.

ADMIRALTY COUNTING THE INFLEXIBLES TWICE OVER TO MAKE A BIG "PAPER" FLEET.

November 5, 1908.

Nov. 5, 1908. In the House of Commons³ :—

MR. BELLAIRS asked if it was proposed to increase the strength of the Navy by counting the *Inflexible* and the *Indomitable* both as battleships and [as] armoured cruisers.

MR. MCKENNA.—There is a clerical error in the Navy List which will be corrected, but the suggestion that this is a method of increasing the paper strength is without foundation.

MR. BELLAIRS.—Is it not the practice of the Admiralty to count them as battleships when talking of battleships, and to count them as cruisers when talking of cruisers?

MR. MCKENNA.—The alleged practice is a pure fiction on the part of the hon. gentleman (loud cries of "Order").^{4 5}

Note 4 from p. 468 continued :—

Important Speech by Lord Roberts : Danger of Invasion : Problem of Home Defence : Earl Roberts' Solemn Warnings"), and p. 7, cols. 4 sq. (s.v. "Defence against Invasion : Lord Roberts' Impressive Warning"); etc.

And upon the Debate itself see *Daily Express*, November 24, 1908, p. 4, col. 4 (leading article : "Personal Service"); *Morning Post*, November 24, 1908, p. 6, cols. 4 sq. (leading article : "Defence before Opulence"); etc.

¹ See *Morning Post*, November 24, 1908.

² Lord Esher—*Alone of the Unionist Peers*—voted against the Resolution. See *Daily Express*, November 25, 1908, p. 5, col. 5.

³ See *Standard*, November 6, 1908, p. 10, col. 2 (s.v. "Error in the Navy List"); and *Daily Express*, November 6, 1908, p. 1, col. 4.

⁴ See preceding note.

⁵ See further, hereon, below, p. 498.

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE AND THE NAVY

November 7, 1908.

By kind permission of Miss Goodhart, a Drawing-room Meeting in furtherance of the aims of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE was held on Nov. 7, 1908, at her residence, Wandsworth Common, when Mr. H. F. Wyatt addressed the audience on the subject of :—"The Navy."

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE AND THE NAVY

November 9, 1908

Mr. H. F. Wyatt, on behalf of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE, addressed a Meeting on Nov. 9, 1908, at Hoskin's Arms, Oxted, Surrey, on the subject of :—"Our Passing Naval Supremacy."

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE. PUBLIC MEETING AT EALING.

November 12, 1908.

A Public Meeting¹²³ was held⁴ in the Victoria Hall, Uxbridge Road, Ealing, on Nov. 12, 1908, under the auspices of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE :—"To Protest against the Destructive Naval Policy of the Present Government, and the Resulting Peril in which the Country is now Placed."

The Earl Winterton, M.P., was in the Chair, supported by Sir Edmund C. Cox, Bart.,⁵ Mr. Robert McKirdy, and many others, and the speakers included (besides the Chairman) Mr. W. Frewen Lord, Mr. H. F. Wyatt, Mr. L. Graham H. Horton-Smith, and Mr. G. L. Borradaile.

The following Resolution, moved by Mr. Lord, seconded by Mr. Wyatt, and supported by Mr. Horton-Smith and Mr. Borradaile, was carried with but one dissident in an audience of 600 :—

¹ "A Great Unionist Demonstration."

² See in advance, *Daily Express*, October 30, 1908 (s.v. "Naval Protest Meeting") p. 5, col. 4, and *Standard*, October 31, 1908, p. 9, col. 2.

³ For an account of this Meeting see *Ealing Gazette*, November 14, 1908; *Middlesex County Times and Ealing and Hanwell Post*, November 14, 1908, p. 7, col. 8; *Morning Advertiser*, November 12, 1908; *Morning Post*, November 13, 1908, p. 8, col. 5.

⁴ The Old Navy League's efforts to avert the holding of this Meeting (see above, pp. 464 sq.) were marked only by signal failure.

⁵ Sir Edmund Cox subsequently accepted the Presidency of the Ealing Branch of the Imperial Maritime League. See *Daily Express*, November 3, 1908, p. 5, col. 2; *Morning Post*, November 3, 1908, p. 7, col. 1; *Standard*, November 3, 1908.

THE RESOLUTION

"That this meeting views with indignation and alarm the action of the present Government in having sacrificed the safety of the nation to their party ends by the reduction of the naval expenditure, and expresses the earnest hope that the Unionist party and its leaders may denounce this conduct throughout the country."

TWO-POWER STANDARD AND MR. ASQUITH

DEFINITE STATEMENT AT LAST

DEFINITE ALTHOUGH INADEQUATE

WORDS NOT WORKS

DEMAND FOR INQUIRY¹

November 12, 1908.

Nov. 12, 1908. Mr. Asquith, Prime Minister, in the House of Commons on Nov. 12, 1908, made at last a definite statement to the effect that:—The present Government "accepts the Two-Power Standard of Naval Strength as meaning a preponderance of 10 *per cent.* over the combined strengths, in capital ships, of the Two Next Strongest Powers."^{2 3 4 5}

¹ See below, note 4.

² See *Daily Express*, November 13, 1908, p. 1, col. 2; *Standard*, November 13, 1908, p. 7, col. 7; *Times*, November 13, 1908, p. 8.

³ "It means, first of all, that 7 *Dreadnoughts* must be laid down next year. But that is not all. A fleet does not consist merely of battleships, and the *Dreadnoughts* must be supported by a number of cruisers and auxiliaries in the proportion accepted by naval authorities. Moreover, the *personnel* must be maintained at the full strength, and new docks must be provided for building and speedy repairs" (*Daily Express*, November 13, 1908, leading article).

See further, *Standard*, November 13, 1908, p. 6, cols. 5-6 (leading article: "The Government and the Navy"):

"It cannot be too clearly understood that the Prime Minister's pledge must involve a very large expenditure. The country will not, in the first place, any longer tolerate the calculation of the strength of the British Navy, as compared with foreign navies, on the basis of such a document as the Dilke Return. The phrase 'capital ship,' for instance, cannot be taken to include old vessels on the sale list, which figure as effective in official calculations. An even more essential condition is that 'capital ships,' whether battleships or large armoured cruisers be denoted, are useless without their auxiliaries. For every battleship laid down, there must be a proportionate force of cruisers and destroyers provided, together with proper dock accommodation. And it is merely suicidal to continue the construction of ships, while those vessels we have are not kept in adequate repair. If the unit of comparison is to be ships of the *Dreadnought* class" (cp. below, p. 518 n. 8), "then 7 of these vessels must be laid down next year, together with their Fleet auxiliaries and accessories and the required increase in the *personnel*. At present, the ships of this class already launched have none of these things. No scouting force has been provided, nor has the torpedo flotilla been proportionately augmented. The new docks at Rosyth have not yet been begun; and by the time they are complete, the ships now completing may be half obsolete."

See further, next note.

⁴ Commenting hereon, in its leading article: "The Government and the Navy," November 13, 1908, p. 6, cols. 5-6, the *Standard* wrote:—There "is an immense accumulation of unfulfilled responsibilities. Mr. Asquith has now stated that they are to be discharged. But it is useless to suppose for a moment that the needs of the situation can be met otherwise than by a substantial loan. From that reflection arises a

Efforts¹ were at once made by and on behalf of the Little Navy Party to protest against and whittle down the Standard so (in word) accepted by Mr. Asquith—(a) by the *Westminster Gazette*,² protesting against the inclusion of the United States, and apparently³ also of Japan—and (b) by the Little Navy Party itself, as represented by “the members of the group known as the Reduction of Armaments Committee,” a Deputation of which (with Sir John Brunner and Mr. Murray Macdonald at its head) was to have waited on Mr. Asquith on Nov. 19, 1908, to protest against the inclusion of the U.S.A.⁴ This Deputation was postponed,⁵ but its object was meantime proceeded with in another way, namely, by a question put to Mr. Asquith by Mr. Murray Macdonald in the House of Commons, Nov. 23, 1908, for which and for its result see *Daily Express*, Nov. [24], 1908, p. 1, col. 6.⁶

But, in reply to a question put to him by Mr. A. Lee, M.P.—as to whether by the words “the Two Next Strongest Powers,” he had meant the Two Next Strongest Powers *whichever they might be and wherever they might be situated*—Mr. Asquith stated, in the House of Commons, Nov. 23, 1908, as follows:—

“Under all existing and foreseeable conditions, I think that is so. The dominating consideration is that we are to maintain our superiority at sea. As has often been explained on both sides of the House, we regard the Two-Power Standard as a workable formula to attain that end.”⁷ 8

Notes from p. 471 continued:—

very grave question: Is a naval administration which has brought things to such a desperate pass, to be entrusted with further vast sums of money? It is time to speak quite plainly: and we affirm, with the fullest sense of responsibility, that the Government would not be justified in embarking upon the large schemes to which Mr. Asquith has pledged them, without a *thorough Inquiry into the whole question of naval administration*.”

⁵ The Two-Power Standard so defined was largely treated by the Press as the same as that defined by Lord Cawdor (when First Lord of the Admiralty), November 3, 1906.

It was by no means the same. Mr. Asquith's was and is essentially and vitally less. See above, pp. 308 *sq.*, 435 *sqq.*, and below, pp. 513, etc.—Speaking on “The Standard of Naval Strength,” at the Royal United Service Institution, on December 9, 1908, Mr. L. Graham H. Horton-Smith challenged Lord Cawdor (who was presiding upon the occasion) to deny that this was so; and Lord Cawdor made no effort to, and did not, deny it. See below, p. 513, and *Jol. of R.U.S.I.* (February), 1909, p. 180.

¹ See as to and upon such efforts, *Outlook*, November 21, 1908; *Spectator* (*s.v.* “News of the Week”), November 21, 1908.

² As quoted in *Army and Navy Gazette*, November 21, 1908, p. 1118.

³ According to the *Westminster Gazette*, as referred to in *Spectator*, November 21, 1908.

⁴ See *Morning Post*, November 19, 1908, p. 5, col. 4.

⁵ See *Daily Mail*, November 20, 1908, p. 4, col. 3.

⁶ The Deputation itself *did* apparently have an interview with Mr. Asquith on the subject of the Two-Power Standard (see *Standard*, December 4, 1908, p. 8, col. 3).

⁷ See *Daily Express*, November 24, 1908, p. 1, col. 6, *s.v.* “Nailed to the Mast: Premier's Explicit Definition of the Two-Power Standard.”—See also *Morning Post*, November 24, 1908, p. 7, col. 4.

⁸ Not satisfied with this, the Little-Navy M.P.s met on December 16, 1908, and passed the “Remarkable Resolution minimising the Premier's recent declaration on the Two-Power Standard”; see *Daily Express*, December 17, 1908, p. 1, col. 3 (so describing the Resolution); *Globe*, December 17, 1908, p. 8, col. 3 (which described it, on December 17, 1908, p. 6, col. 4, as “an amazing statement”); *Standard*, December 17, 1908, p. 7, col. 6, where it was stated that “it is said that the Prime Minister has privately approved of this Resolution, and that he intends to make a public statement in harmony with the corrected

To have forced the Prime Minister of the present Liberal Party to make any definite statement at all (inadequate though it be¹) in regard to the principle of a Two-Power Standard, may well be claimed as a success for the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE. There can be no doubt whatever that Mr. Asquith timed his statement so as to endeavour to take the wind out of the LEAGUE's sails and to prevent the holding of its Great City Meeting of Nov. 19, 1908.² Mr. Asquith failed;—where many a greater than he would have failed likewise. He little gauged the temper of the LEAGUE with which he had to deal.

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE AND THE NAVY.

November 13, 1908.

Mr. Harold F. Wyatt, on behalf of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE, addressed a Meeting at Faversham, upon the subject of :—
"The Navy."

THE IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE

2 Westminster Palace Gardens,
Westminster, London, S.W.

November 14th, 1908.

OUR PASSING NAVAL SUPREMACY

DEAR SIR OR MADAM,³

A meeting to consider what steps can be taken to avert the rapid passing of our Naval supremacy will be held in the City of London, on Thursday, the 19th instant,² at 3 p.m., at the Cannon Street Hotel.

Note 3 from p. 472 continued :—

definition of the Two-Power Standard which is contained in it";—but on December 17, 1908, Mr. Asquith denied in the House of Commons that he had any intention of modifying the statements which he had made to the House, though he added that he intended to make "a fuller statement" to the House "at the proper time," see *Daily Express*, December 18, 1908, p. 1, col. 5; *Standard*, December 18, 1908, p. 7, col. 6, and leading article, p. 6, col. 7.—Mr. Asquith's latter observation being regarded as one "unsatisfactory to learn" (*E.S. & S.J.G.*, December 18, 1908, p. 3, col. 2).

It is perhaps needless to add, with the present Government in power, that on April 27, 1909, Mr. McKenna (speaking as First Lord of the Admiralty) definitely threw the Two-Power Standard overboard by the exclusion of the U.S.A. (See *Standard*, April 28, 1909.) And on May 26, 1909, the Premier himself followed suit on the same lines, (See *Standard*, May 27, 1909, p. 4, and leading article, p. 8, cols. 5-7, and May 28, 1909, leading article, p. 8, col. 6.) So much for Mr. Asquith and his pledge.

¹ See above, p. 471 n. 5 (p. 472).

² November 19, 1908. See below, pp. 486 *sqq.*

³ Concerning the use of "Premier" type in this book, see above, p. 52 n. 5.

Lord Ampthill, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., late Acting-Viceroy of India, will be in the chair, and much support is promised by members of both Houses of Parliament.

The place of meeting will be the Cannon Street Hotel, which has previously been the scene of more than one historic gathering in reference to the Navy.

Almost all those who are best acquainted with the facts of the present naval and military situation of this country agree that those facts constitute a condition of actual national peril.

Some of these facts are stated in this pamphlet, and **if any considerations could rouse the attention of British men and women**, these are calculated to achieve that difficult task.

Two Contrasted Problems.

What we desire to put before you is the existence of two violently contrasted problems—one very popular and completely unreal; the other, seldom stated, but actual.

The first, and unreal, problem is whether if the whole British Navy in home waters were collected in one place, and if it were assumed to be fully manned, efficiently trained, and in a state of adequate repair, it could defeat the whole German fleet similarly gathered together.

This is the problem constantly set forth in the Radical, and also, we regret to add, in a large part of the Unionist Press, and which is alone contemplated when Cabinet Ministers address the country.

But the real problem is whether Germany could, by a surprise attack, obtain command of the North Sea for three days.

If she could, she would be able to land, within that time, a hundred, or a hundred and fifty, thousand picked troops, and it is the known opinion of almost all our principal military authorities, from Lord Roberts downwards, that such a force could easily overcome any opposition which the present chaotic condition of our military defences would allow us to offer,

Our Military Weakness.

The War Office "White Paper," issued on the 6th instant,¹ reveals the fact that the policy of the present Government has reduced our small regular army by 18,653 officers and men, the Militia by 23,349 men, and the Volunteers—now the Territorials—by 73,726 non-commissioned officers and men.

It is also known that our finest arm, the horse and field artillery, of the regular army, would be almost useless in the event of invasion, owing to insufficiency of horses.

Has any case ever occurred in history of the reduction of a great nation, having fighting blood in its veins, to such a state of military impotence as ours?

It results that, at the present time, **our sole dependence as against invasion, outrage, and subjugation, is upon naval force.**

Our Available Naval Force.

What, then, is the naval force which in the event of a sudden attempt by Germany to effect a landing on the east coast of England, would be actually available for instant war?

That force consists of (1) the Channel Fleet and (2) the Nore division of the Home Fleet.

The other divisions of the Home Fleet have been officially admitted to be in a state of development, and a state of development is not a state of instant readiness for war.

Those divisions are, moreover, manned (for economy) by nucleus crews. The members of those crews (under a system of economy) are being constantly shifted from ship to ship. All the sailor's love for his own ship is being therefore (for economy) constantly killed, and all the motive force which proceeds from *esprit de corps* is being, therefore (for economy), constantly destroyed.

It is considered in the Navy that in order to reach a state of full fighting efficiency, a ship must have been in

full commission for, at the very least, two years. The fighting efficiency of the kaleidoscopic crews of the Home Fleet may, therefore, be guessed.

In addition (for economy) insufficient men are provided to man this fleet, unless by the mobilisation of the Reserves, and this mobilisation would certainly take several days. (*It has never yet been effected without several weeks' secret notice.*)

Moreover (for economy) the divisions of the Home Fleet, other than the Nore division, have scarcely ever been united for combined Fleet training (though, without such training, "a Fleet," so-called, must admittedly be unfit for war), and on the very rare occasions when so combined, their lack of training has actually rendered it dangerous to keep them in movement at night. It has, indeed, been asserted that during the last two years these divisions have had but one night as a combined fleet at sea.

On the other hand, the Channel Fleet is a fleet in full sea-going commission, and the Nore Division of the Home Fleet at Sheerness, whatever its other defects or deficiencies, is at least kept fully manned.

Even theoretically, therefore, only these two forces are **immediately available in event of a surprise attack from Germany**, and upon them rest absolutely the independence of Britain, the entire fabric of empire, and the liberties of the British people.

Of the Channel Fleet, the nominal strength varies from thirteen to fourteen battleships, with six armoured cruisers (of which four are usually present), three protected cruisers, and but twenty-four destroyers with full crews.

The Nore division comprises nominally six battleships, six armoured, and three second-class cruisers, and twenty-four destroyers with full crews.

Over against these two defensive forces is the German High Sea Fleet,¹ in a state of high efficiency and genuine readiness for instant war, and comprising sixteen, or more

¹ For which see also above, pp. 145 etc.

recently, eighteen battleships, five armoured, and seven medium cruisers, and between eighty and ninety ocean-going destroyers.

At Emden¹ enormous wharves have been built for the rapid embarkation of troops.

From Emden to Hull the distance is but 278 miles.²

It must be apparent to the least reflective that if our only two ready fleets in home waters were always combined (instead of being usually far apart), and always maintained at their full nominal strength, they would not be more than sufficient (having regard to our immense inferiority in ocean-going destroyers) to give us assurance of victory over the German High Sea Fleet.

It is, however, actually the fact—which has already been made matter of public comment—that a short time ago **the number of battleships comprised in the Channel Fleet was not thirteen, nor fourteen, but six,**³ all the others being absent, un-replaced, in harbour, or in dock.

So far as anything can be certain in war, it is a matter of obvious certainty that in the event of a sudden attack by the German Fleet, this remnant of the principal force which guards Britain **must have suffered defeat.**

Other facts which affect the present safety of this country are the neglect or postponement (for economy) of vitally necessary repairs, and the officially acknowledged expenditure during three years, without replacement, of the reserve stores of the Navy, by an amount equivalent to one million pounds for each year.

Of the neglect of repairs, a striking proof was supplied to the nation quite recently, when, the Mediterranean Fleet being ordered to the Levant, a large part of it had, instead, at once to go into dock.

The only possible conclusion from these considerations is that, in the existing naval situation, the present safety of Britain is not secured.

¹ For which see above, pp. 358, 432, 444.

² Cp. above, p. 432.

³ Indeed, at one time only *five*. See above (*s.v.*, October 15, 1903), p. 458.

Question of Future Safety.

The danger threatening our future naval supremacy can be estimated by anyone capable of simple arithmetic. The new type of armoured ship introduced by the *Dreadnought* (whether that ship is herself a failure, or not) tended to render older types obsolete.¹

Germany is now laying down four vessels of that type every year, and at the present relative rate of construction, she will have fourteen completed ships of that nature by the end of the year 1911, against twelve which we shall then possess.²

¹ In view of an incorrect statement made by "Vanoc" in the *Referee*, November 29, 1908 (in that Organ's well-known column entitled "Handbook"), we think it well to reprint here, as a footnote, the following letter which was published in the *Referee*, December 6, 1908, p. 1, col. 4 :—

THE IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE AND THE DREADNOUGHT
TO THE EDITOR OF THE "REFeree."

2 Westminster Palace Gardens, S.W.
December 3, 1908.

"Sir,—We appeal with the utmost confidence to your sense of justice to allow us to correct an unintentional mis-statement in regard to this League, made in your 'Handbook' of Sunday last," November 29, 1908.

"'Vanoc' stated that 'The *Dreadnought* design is condemned by those who inspire the policy of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE,' and then proceeded to animadvert upon that alleged condemnation. May we say that this LEAGUE is totally innocent of the offence which 'Vanoc' attributes to it? You will be convinced of this fact if you will kindly read the paragraph in a pamphlet issued by the LEAGUE on the 14th ult. (a copy of which we enclose), in which we said: 'The new type of armoured ship introduced by the *Dreadnought* (whether that ship is herself a failure or not) tended to render older types obsolete.' This is the only pronouncement by the LEAGUE on the subject, and it merely refers to the undoubted fact that much controversy has taken place on the point mentioned.

"This LEAGUE is occupied at the present time with the attempt to rouse the country to a sense of the peril of which Lord Roberts has warned it, and to incite the Unionist Party to stand between the Navy and the desire of the 'Little England' Radicals to cut that service down.

"In such work we have the strongest belief that we shall be secure of your sympathy, and we think that nothing short of wilful misrepresentation can have availed to turn that sympathy from us. There are, however, certain quarters from which wilful calumnies have been sent out to the Press against this LEAGUE; and, knowing the high honour of the *Referee*, we are fully confident that you will give to this letter precisely the same publicity which you gave to the paragraph attacking it.

"We are, Sir,

"Yours faithfully,

"W. F. LORD,

Vice-chairman, Executive Committee;

"HAROLD F. WYATT,

"L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

"Joint Honorary Secretaries."

Upon reading and publishing this letter, the Editor of the *Referee* (with that fairness and courtesy which have always characterised his actions) appended in print the following Editorial note:—

"'Vanoc' regrets if he has misconstrued the meaning of the allusion to the *Dreadnought*, and heartily supports any movement that has for its end the strengthening of the Navy.—EDITOR."

² Cp. above, pp. 352 n. 9, 425, 455, 461, 462 n. 1.

In the last three years, 1906, 7, and 8, we have laid down eight battleships and armoured cruisers, while Germany has laid down ten. This year she is laying down four to our two.

The German Navy League, whose demands are usually forecasts of Government action, is urging that the annual four should be increased to six.

If any attempt is to be made to save our vanishing "Two-Power Standard," it is clear that we should next year lay down, not two armoured ships, but eight.¹

Causes.

Only blind folly or mental weakness can refuse to recognise that the causes of the decrease of our strength at sea are to be found in the tone and temper of the electorate which returned the present Government to power in 1906. The mass of their supporters are political Nonconformists, **who habitually call our sailors and soldiers "butchers," and habitually, from the pulpit, denounce preparation for war as sin against the Almighty.**

The present Government came into office deeply pledged to cut down expenditure on both services—and it has done it.

It is still the strong, animating desire of the great bulk of its followers that that process shall be continued, and not many weeks ago 144 Liberal members of the House of Commons petitioned the Prime Minister further to reduce the Navy estimates.

Desperate financial needs constitute yet another tremendous motive-force driving the Government upon this course.

Nothing, it is true, can be more satisfactory than the verbal assurances which Ministers continue to give to the country, but their acts, for three years past, have denied their words.

In this position, it would seem to be the obvious duty of the Unionist party to stand between the country and the threatened loss of its supremacy at sea.

But such interposition involves party action on the sub-

¹ Cp. hereon, below, p. 5:8 n. 8.

ject of the Navy, and the Unionist party has hitherto magnanimously declined to follow such a course.

The situation, therefore, is that one great party in the State is destroying our naval supremacy, and that the other great party is quietly watching them do it. Is this quiescence based on reason, or is it another instance of the enslavement of men by a phrase?

To "keep the Navy out of the party-arena" is an admirable formula, provided that each party, when in power, does its duty by the Navy, but if the party in power (as in the actual case) grievously fails in that duty, what hope remains of saving the Fleet but through the action of the Opposition?

A vivid illustration of the working of the "non-party" method is supplied by the association in the Navy League of a small number of Liberal members of the House of Commons, with a larger number of Unionist members of that House.¹ The result of this association necessarily tends to restrain the latter from attacking the naval policy of the Government on the only effective lines, namely, party lines.

At the same time, their association with Unionists cannot increase by one iota the weight which the small minority of Liberal members carry with their own party.

Their only really effective course would be to resign their seats and seek re-election as opponents of their present leaders, on the ground that the naval policy of the latter involves national danger.

The present effort of the Imperial Maritime League is to rouse the Unionist Party to take action in defence of the British Navy.

In like manner, if the case were reversed, and the Unionist Party could be conceived to be destroying our naval strength, this League would strive, however vainly, to rouse the Radical Opposition against that party.

This is, we submit, the only kind of "non-party" action which is based on common sense.²

¹ Cp. above, pp. 399, 401, 413.

² Cp. above, pp. 390, etc.

We appeal very urgently to you who read this, whether man or woman, to attend, if you can, the meeting in the City of London, on the 19th instant,¹ and in any case to make it known amongst your friends. The object of that meeting is to urge the expediency of instituting an inquiry into the state of the Navy, as the best way of allaying public apprehension, and to seek to prevent further weakening of the Navy.

And we appeal to you also, with much earnestness, to help those who are already doing their utmost in this great cause, by joining—(if you have not joined it already)—the Imperial Maritime League. (Should you chance to be a member of the Navy League, that circumstance need be no deterrent, since, as a matter of fact, many belong to both organisations.)

Those engaged in this work are already giving, and have given unstintedly, their time, their labour, and their substance to it. More they cannot do. But since that work is in the common cause of all the British people, they may well ask for help.

We are, yours faithfully,

W. F. LORD,

Vice-Chairman Executive Committee.

HAROLD F. WYATT,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH,

Joint Honorary Secretaries.

P.S.—We venture earnestly to beg you to be kind enough to inform us whether—

- (1) We may hope for your presence at the meeting in the Cannon Street Hotel on the 19th inst. (3 p.m.),¹ and,
- (2) Whether this League may be granted your support if that be not already accorded.

The League's papers, with a form of enrolment, are enclosed for your perusal, and we also send a *stamped envelope for reply*.²

¹ November 19, 1908. See below, pp. 486 *sqq.*

² For an illuminating tribute to the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE from the leading Branch of the Old Navy League in Canada, consequent upon this letter, see below, pp. 524 *sq.*

THE NAVY AND INQUIRY

WHAT A COMMISSION OF INQUIRY MIGHT DO

THE IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE

AND THE GREAT CITY MEETING OF NOV. 19, 1908.

MORNING POST, Nov. 17, 1908; STANDARD, Nov. 17, 1908, p. 10, col. 7.¹

To the Editor.

Milton Ernest Hall,
Bedford,

Nov. 14, 1908.

SIR,—Nobody who is giving any thought to the Navy at the present time will deny the existence in many quarters of an abnormal feeling of doubt and anxiety. Alike in the journals of the day, in periodical literature, on the platform, and in Parliament, experts of every grade, both lay and professional, have warned, and continue to warn, the British public that all is not right with the Service upon which the preservation of our national life depends. Whether or not these warnings are fully justified by facts, they have their effect in producing political unrest, shaking confidence, and restraining commercial development.

The Ministers of the Crown have one after another assured us that there is no need for criticism; but it is, unfortunately, in the very nature of things that such assurance should be of small avail to restore public confidence, seeing that the object of the criticism is the naval policy of those same Ministers.

Now, it must be the first aim of every Government to remove misapprehension, when such exists, and to restore confidence, and there seems to be only one method by which this result could be attained in the present circumstances. That is the institution of an authoritative commission of inquiry (whose proceedings would, of course, not be conducted in public²) into the state of the Navy.

If that state be what we are assured it is, the finding of the commission would be a source of satisfaction to all concerned, and would be as the lifting of a heavy burden from the minds of many thinking men.

But if, unhappily, it should not be so, then it is unquestionably right that the nation should know what is amiss in order that defects may be remedied before it becomes too late.

A meeting called to put these considerations before the City of London is being organised by the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE, and will be held on Thursday next, the 19th inst.,³ in the Great Hall of the Cannon Street Hotel at 3 p.m.

As chairman-designate of the meeting, I venture to express the hope that many of those connected with the vast financial interests which

¹ Also:—*Birmingham Post*, November 16, 1908; *Daily Express*, November 17, 1908 (in brief), p. 1, col. 7; *Daily Graphic*, November 17, 1908 (in brief); *Daily Mail*, November 17, 1908; *Morning Advertiser*, November 23, 1908; *Naval and Military Record*, November 19, 1908; *Nottingham Guardian*, November 17, 1908 (in brief); *Pall Mall Gazette*, November 10, 1908; *Worcestershire Echo*, November 17, 1908 (in brief), etc., etc., etc.

² Cp. above, p. 327 (text and n. 1), and below, p. 506 (text and n. 1).

³ November 19, 1908. See below, pp. 486 *seqq.*

are all based on the foundation of our sea power may be present on the occasion. The meeting is open to all who may desire to take a sober and serious interest in this all-important question.

The institution of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE was due to a belief entertained by certain members of the Executive Committee of the Navy League that various important naval reductions which they specified (as, e.g., the dismantling of naval stations in distant seas) were prompted rather by the exigencies of finance than by those of strategy. The course of subsequent events seems to have justified that view, and the recent utterances of the Navy League appear to indicate that they accept it themselves and admit that their former attitude was mistaken.

The foremost aim of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE is the advocacy of an inquiry similar to those which have been held in the past with satisfactory results in respect both of naval and military administration.

I am, Sir, Your obedient servant,
AMPTHILL.

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE

AND THE GREAT CITY MEETING OF NOV. 19, 1908.

THE DEMAND FOR INQUIRY

ANTI-PATRIOTIC ACTION OF THE OLD NAVY LEAGUE THE LATTER'S CHAOTIC INCONSISTENCY

On the morning of the Great City Meeting, held under the auspices of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE, on Nov. 19, 1908,¹² there was published a letter to the Press from the Old Navy League,^{3 4 5}

¹ Concerning this Great City Meeting and its supporters see notices in advance in:—*Birmingham Dispatch*, Nov. 18, 1908; *Birmingham Gazette*, Nov. 18, 1908; *Broad Arrow*, Nov. 14, 1908; *City Press*, Nov. 14, 1908; *Daily Express*, Nov. 3, 1908, p. 1, col. 3; Nov. 18, 1908, p. 5, col. 4, and Nov. 19, 1908, p. 5, col. 3; *Daily Mail*, Nov. 18, 1908; *E.S. and S.J.G.*, Nov. 16, 1908, and Nov. 18, 1908, p. 9, col. 4; *Newcastle Daily Chronicle*, Nov. 19, 1908; *Standard*, Oct. 31, 1908, p. 9, col. 2, Nov. 12, 1908, and Nov. 19, 1908 ("Great City Meeting"), p. 8, col. 4, and (leading article) p. 6, col. 6 (quoted in part below, p. 506 n. 3); *Times*, Oct. 22, 1908, Nov. 18, 1908, p. 14, col. 3; etc.; and see also above (s.v., Lord Ampthill's Public letter), p. 482, n. 1.

² For the Meeting itself, see below, pp. 486 sqq.

³ Under date, Nov. 18, 1908.

⁴ *Daily Express*, Nov. 19, 1908, p. 5, col. 3; *Daily Graphic*, Nov. 19, 1908; *Daily Mail*, Nov. 19, 1908; *Daily Telegraph*, Nov. 19, 1908; *Morning Advertiser*, Nov. 23, 1908; *Morning Post*, Nov. 19, 1908, p. 3, col. 3; *P.M.G.*, Nov. 19, 1908; *Standard*, Nov. 19, 1908, p. 8, col. 4, and Nov. 26, 1908, p. 9, col. 2; *Sunday Times*, Nov. 22, 1908; *Times*, Nov. 19, 1908, p. 16, col. 3. Reprinted *N.L.J.*, Dec. 1908, p. 368.

⁵ Upon the Old Navy League's letter in question, see *Standard*, Nov. 20, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 5-6 (referred to again, below, p. 506 n. 3):—"The important meeting held in the City yesterday" (Nov. 19, 1908) "by the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE, under the presidency of Lord Ampthill, affords some hope that the country is beginning to realise the true state of the case. The Meeting demanded an impartial Inquiry into Naval administration; and it is characteristic of the methods by means of which public alarm has been neutralised, that the" Old "Navy League, a body ostensibly" (*sic*) "patriotic and independent, should on the same day issue a manifesto deprecating any such course of action, as tending to 'discredit distinguished public servants.' If an impartial Inquiry would discredit public servants, as the" Old "Navy League asserts, it would seem that the sooner such an investigation is held, the better."

a letter of such character that Lord Ampthill at once demanded an apology from that League and from its President. An absolute apology was given by the latter, and Lord Ampthill accordingly felt at liberty to allow the latter to see to it that the public apology of his League was as absolute. The public apology of the Old Navy League was not, however, such as it should have been,¹ and Mr. Yerburch, its President, at once (and rightly) telegraphed to Lord Ampthill to say that he (Lord Ampthill) was at liberty, accordingly, to make such use as he might desire of the apology already given to Lord Ampthill by himself.

The disingenuous action of the Old Navy League, even in its public apology,¹ is well illustrated by the terms of the Resolution therein given and stated to have been passed by its Committee on Nov. 25, 1908, namely:—

"That the Navy League, as at present advised, maintains an attitude of neutrality in relation to the proposal for an Inquiry into the 'present administration of the Navy.'"

"Maintains" forsooth!—In what way is it possible to maintain that which has never been held?

The following is a brief *Résumé* of the Old Navy League's so-called "Attitude of Neutrality" in relation to the proposed Inquiry:—

RÉSUMÉ

OF OLD NAVY LEAGUE'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS INQUIRY

January 23, 1907, to November 25, 1908

January 23, 1907:—

Definitely calling for the Inquiry in Public Letter to the Press, dated Jan. 23, 1907, entitled "Wanted the True 'Truth about the Navy,'" and reprinted in *N.L.J.*, Feb., 1907, p. 34; (cp. also Official Lecturer in *N.L.J.*, March, 1907, p. 80); see above, p. 79, and below, p. 525 n. 7.² But:—

Later, in the same year (1907):—

Opposing any Inquiry whatsoever—(on finding that they would meet with opposition from Sir John Fisher; see above, pp. 79, 253, and below, p. 525 n. 7). Culmination:—

(a) "We accept" Sir John Fisher's "assurance" "*without demur*."—Public Letter to the Press, dated December 9, 1907, and reprinted in *N.L.J.*, January, 1908, p. 6 (above, pp. 278, 286, etc.).

(b) "*We back Sir John Fisher*."—December 23, 1907. See *Daily Mail*, December 24, 1907, and above, pp. 278, 284, 286, 290, 293, etc.).

January 27, 1908, onwards:—

Opposing the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE in its Demand for Inquiry (above pp. 313 sq., etc.) (see above, *passim*).

¹ Such as it was, it was in the form of a letter dated Nov. 25, 1908, and published in the *Daily Express*, Nov. 26, 1908, p. 4 col. 5 (*ser.* "The Navy League Explains"); *Morning Post*, Nov. 26, 1908, p. 5, col. 6; *Standard*, Nov. 26, 1908, p. 9 col. 2; and reprinted in *N.L.J.*, Dec. 1908, p. 368.

² It is significant that in Jan. 1907, *we* were still members of the Executive Committee of the Old N.L. We resigned on May 13, 1907 (above, pp. 52 sq.), because the Old N.L. refused any longer to do its duty.

April, 1908 :—

Declaring :—"The assurance of the Admiralty *must be accepted*."¹ See *N.L.J.*, April, 1908, p. 103 (above, pp. 278, 370, 375, 396²).

October 21, 1908 :—

Conspicuous omission of all reference to the Inquiry in Public Letter to the Press, dated Oct. 21, 1908, specifying the League's views in regard to naval needs, reprinted in *N.L.J.* Nov., 1908, p. 325. (See above, p. 464.)

October 21, 1908 :—

The call for Inquiry made by the Duke of Somerset (as Chairman of Old Navy League's Banquet) meeting with cries of doubting *dissent*. See *N.L.J.*, November, 1908, p. 329, col. 2, *ad fin* (and above, p. 461).

November 18, 1908 :—

Resisting the demand for what they were pleased to term "A 'Fishing' Inquiry into the State of the Navy." See their Public Letter of Nov. 18, 1908 (which appeared in the Press on Nov. 19, 1908³), referred to above, pp. 483 sq., and reprinted in *N.L.J.*, December, 1908, p. 368.

November 25, 1908 :—

"*Maintaining*" their—"Attitude of Neutrality!"⁴

It is not unamusing, nor indeed uninstrusive, to add that at the very time when the Executive Committee of the Old Navy League were openly *opposing* Inquiry (and, at the same time, of course, *maintaining* an "attitude of *neutrality*"⁵), the Bristol Branch of that League was issuing and circulating a letter (over the signature of its Hon. Sec., Mr. Ernest G. Mardon, and under date "November, 1908") in which the following paragraph occurs, categorically endorsing the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE's demand for Inquiry :—

"*The need of Inquiry into the methods of Naval Administration is pressing, and the Country should be assured by independent report that it is efficient*"⁶ in order to secure willingly the money necessary for Naval Defence."

Could Chaos in the counsels of any Organisation further go?—The Bristol Branch should transfer its allegiance from the body whose views it repudiates to the body whose views it adopts.

¹ "The Navy League held" ("in the autumn of 1906"), "and still holds, that the assurance of the Admiralty must be accepted."—*N.L.J.*, April, 1908, p. 103.

² Cp. further, incidentally, above (*s.v.* July 8, 1908), p. 420.

³ The very day of the Great City Meeting held under the auspices of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE—the date of publication being, no doubt, carefully designed to that end.

⁴ See above, p. 484, text and n. 1.

⁵ The real fact, of course, was, that :—After the Great City Meeting of November 19, 1908, held under the auspices of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE, the Old Navy League no longer dared *openly* to oppose the Call for Inquiry.

⁶ The italics are ours.

THE
IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE

Founded to secure the Maintenance of
British Sea-Power
January 27th
1908

THE FOLLOWING IS THE
OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS
AT
THE GREAT PUBLIC MEETING
HELD IN THE CITY

November 19th
1908

THE IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE

Founded to secure the Maintenance of
British Sea Power
January 27th
1908

GREAT CITY MEETING

November 19th, 1908

MINUTES OF THE PROCEEDINGS¹

at a PUBLIC MEETING, organised by THE IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE, and held in The Great Hall of the Cannon Street Hotel, London, E.C., on Thursday, November 19th, 1908, at 3 p.m., Lord Ampthill, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., late Acting-Viceroy of India, presiding, to consider :—

THE STATE OF THE NAVY.

Amongst those who had promised their support, and of whom many were present and on the platform, were :—

The Duke of Abercorn, K.G., P.C., C.B., Lord Aldenham, Mr. W. H. Allen, M.I.Mech.E., Lord Auckland, Viscount Barrington, The Earl Bathurst, C.M.G., Sir Arthur Bignold, M.P., Lord Burton, K.C.V.O., The Rt. Hon. James H. Campbell, K.C., M.P., Admiral J. Halliday Cave, C.B., Lord Robert Cecil, K.C., M.P., The Earl of Clarendon, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., Lord Clinton, The Rt. Hon. Sir John Colomb, K.C.M.G., Mr. G. L. Courthope, M.P., The Earl of Denbigh, C.V.O., Lord Ebury, Sir John Whittaker Ellis, Bart., late Lord Mayor of

¹ Concerning the use of "Premier" type in this Book, see above, p. 52. n. 5.

London, Mr. G. D. Faber, M.P., Captain W. V. Faber, M.P., Admiral Sir Charles Fane, K.C.B., Mr. Arthur Fell, M.P., Mr. G. Fetherstonhaugh, K.C., M.P., Rear-Admiral Sir Adolphus A. F. FitzGeorge, K.C.V.O., Admiral C. C. Penrose FitzGerald, Mr. George Gibbs, M.P., Mr. H. C. Gooch, M.P., Mr. J. S. Harmood-Banner, M.P., Mr. Leverton Harris, M.P., The Hon. Claude Hay, M.P., Viscount Hill, Mr. J. W. Hills, M.P., Lord Hindlip, Mr. L. Graham H. Horton-Smith, F.S.A.Scot., Mr. R. H. Horton-Smith, K.C., Mr. Rowland Hunt, M.P., Admiral Sir Walter J. Hunt-Grubbe, G.C.B., Mr. W. Joynson-Hicks, M.P., Sir Henry Kimber, Bart., M.P., Mr. G. R. Lane-Fox, M.P., Lord Leconfield, The Duke of Leeds, Lord Leith of Fyvie, late R.N., Viscount Llandaff, P.C., Mr. W. Frewen Lord, Lord Lovat, C.B., D.S.O., C.V.O., The Earl of Lovelace, Sir Francis Lowe, M.P., Mr. Wm. Lund (of Lund's Blue Anchor Line), Mr. Charles McArthur, M.P., Colonel J. M. McCalmont, M.P., The Earl of Mar, Mr. H. H. Marks, M.P., Sir Spencer Maryon-Wilson, Bt., of Eastborne, Mr. E. C. Meysey-Thompson, M.P., The Duke of Newcastle, Mr. J. J. Oddy, M.P., The Marquis of Ormonde, K.P., P.C., Sir Gilbert Parker, D.C.L., M.P., Mr. J. Spencer Phillips (Chairman of Lloyd's Bank), General Sir Harry Prendergast, V.C., G.C.B., Admiral J. H. Rainier, Sir John S. Randles, M.P., The Earl of Romney, Lord Sherborne, Viscount Sidmouth, late R.N., The Hon. W. F. D. Smith, M.P., The Earl Sondes, Mr. B. Stanier, M.P., Mr. H. S. Staveley-Hill, M.P., The Duke of Sutherland, K.G., Lord Waleran, P.C., Colonel W. Hall Walker, M.P., Colonel C. E. Warde, M.P., The Marquis of Waterford, K.P., Major W. Bridges Webb (Chairman of the Baltic Exchange), The Earl of Westmorland, The Earl Winterton, M.P., Admiral H. T. Wratislaw, Mr. Harold F. Wyatt, Mr. George Younger, M.P.; etc., etc., etc.¹

¹ Cp. above, p. 483, n. 1.

THE PROCEEDINGS.^{1 2}

THE CHAIRMAN—(who on rising to speak was received with cheers):—My Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is my duty as Chairman to explain the object of this meeting, but I think you will also wish to know why that duty has been assigned to and accepted by me. You will wonder why one who is neither an expert on naval questions, nor one of the leaders of any political party, should have this duty. Well, it is just because I am neither a naval expert nor a political leader that I am here. (Cheers.) I am here as a spokesman of the "man in the street." (Cheers.) It is as an ordinary citizen that I address myself to you as my fellow citizens.

Well, now, Ladies and Gentlemen, the defence of this country is the business, not of the Government or of any particular department, but of the people themselves, so that the question which we have to discuss is one which ought to be discussed by all patriotic citizens (Hear, hear), and it is one on which every citizen is not only capable of forming an opinion, but is bound to form an opinion.

With those few words I will go straight to the point, for I realise very well that all of you here present are busy people, and have not time to listen to anything redundant in the way of speeches. The point is this. You are all aware that during the last three or four years there has been a great deal of criticism on the subject of naval administration, criticism which we cannot ignore, because it has proceeded from well-known, able, and trustworthy writers, from responsible journalists, from eminent politicians—indeed from every quarter to which we look for criticism; and that criticism has without doubt caused a great deal of anxiety, uncertainty, and discontent in regard to the Navy throughout the country. (Cheers.)

The reason why we have met together to-day to consider

¹ The present is the full Report of the Proceedings at the Great City Meeting of November 19, 1908.

² For general reports of the Meeting, see (*inter alia*):—

Aberdeen Daily Journal, November 20, 1908; *Bedford Standard*, November 27, 1908; *Birmingham Gazette*, November 20, 1908; *Birmingham Post*, November 20, 1908; *Daily Express*, November 20, 1908, p. 1, col. 7; *Daily Graphic*, November 20, 1908, p. 10, col. 4; *Daily Mail*, November 20, 1908, p. 4, col. 3; *Dundee Courier*, November 20, 1908; *E.S. and S.J.G.*, November 19, 1908, p. 14, col. 3; *Globe*, November 19, 1908, p. 7, col. 2; *Liverpool Daily Post and Liverpool Mercury*, November 20, 1908; *Manchester Courier*, November 20, 1908; *Morning Advertiser*, November 20, 1908; *Morning Leader*, November 20, 1908; *Morning Post*, November 20, 1908, p. 5, cols. 6-7; *Newcastle Daily Chronicle*, November 20, 1908; *Northern Whig*, November 20, 1908; *Nottingham Guardian*, November 20, 1908; *Standard*, November 20, 1908, p. 9, cols. 1-2; *Sussex Daily News*, November 20, 1908; *Western Daily Press*, November 20, 1908; *Yorkshire Herald*, November 20, 1908; *Yorkshire Observer*, November 20, 1908; and see also the letter of Mrs. Benjamin Norman in the *Bath Chronicle*, December 31, 1908.

this question is because we think there should be an impartial investigation, an inquiry into this criticism, in order that everybody may know whether it is well founded or not. (Cheers.)

I think you will agree with me that, whether we agree with the criticism or not, whether we consider ourselves capable or not of understanding or appreciating it, every one of us must feel that there is no smoke without a fire, and as citizens we want to know where that fire exists; and all the more so because the criticism to which I have referred has not been on the ordinary political party lines. Nobody can say that the brilliant writers in the Press to whom I have referred, the writers in periodicals, or men of undoubted impartiality like Mr. Bellairs in Parliament, or men like those who have sacrificed much and suffered much to found the Imperial Maritime League, have been doing the work of the ordinary party wire-puller, or that the wire-pullers of any party have profited by or taken up their work. The question then amounts to this: that we want to know, and we have a right to know, whether the criticism of naval administration is just or otherwise.

Now, let me remind you what the nature of that criticism has been. But first let me say that nobody doubts that our sailors and our ships are as good as ever they have been. (Hear, hear.) Nobody whose opinion is worth listening to wishes to urge that the Government are unpatriotic, or that they are not animated by the best of intentions; but even the most patriotic people are capable sometimes of mistakes and errors of judgment, and we cannot assume that, because the members of Government as Englishmen are necessarily patriotic and necessarily have the highest interests of the country in view, they are, therefore, any more infallible in the matter of naval administration than they are in any other branch of government.

I will tell you now what the critics have been saying. I do not doubt that most of you have followed these criticisms, and you will therefore forgive me if I only give you a bare list. Limitations of time make it quite impossible that I should repeat to you either the arguments or the illustrations which have been given by the critics.

Generally speaking, the critics of naval administration say that there have been very great changes, of which the object has never been fully explained to the country, and of which the effect is uncertain. Examples of this are, firstly, that the recent distribution of fleets is felt to bear very little relation to possible exigencies of war. (Hear, hear.) You will say that is a matter of opinion. Some people may think one way, some another, but explanations are wanted in order to allay anxiety. (Hear, hear.)

Secondly, it is urged that we have not been maintaining the Two-Power Standard, or keeping pace with our national rivals in the matter of construction. (Hear, hear.)

Thirdly, a very important technical point is that there has been a reduction in the number of moderate sized and small cruisers (Hear, hear), while at the same time a new policy of building very large and costly cruisers has been adopted; and what the critics say is that, since, so far as they are able to judge, these large cruisers are unsuited for any specific function in war, it would have been better to spend the money on moderate-sized vessels and torpedo craft. (Hear, hear.)

I am sure you will appreciate the fact that to explain the reasons for these opinions would mean a very long technical dissertation, and I can only remind you once more that I am merely stating the facts of the criticism.

The fourth contention is that the new type of battleship, the *Dreadnought* type, has been adopted without sufficient consideration; that the type was framed in accordance with theories which were said to have been evolved from events in the Russo-Japanese War, that those theories have not been fully substantiated, and that subsequent consideration has rather tended to disprove them. (Hear, hear.)

Another point is that economies have been undertaken which are considered dangerous. They have been in the nature of depleting stores and delaying repairs, of abandoning naval stations in distant parts of the Empire (Hear, hear), and, what is most important of all, of dispensing with combined fleet training. (Cheers.)

Again, a further point is that there is no evidence—at least there is none accessible to the public—that the new systems of nucleus crews and of the training of officers have received sufficient consideration, or that they are working satisfactorily.

Yet, again, it is said with some show of evidence that there is serious discontent in the Navy (hear, hear), and, finally, it is pointed out—and I do not think it can be controverted—that the Government are keeping the nation in the dark in regard to Naval affairs. (Cheers.) One writer¹ has described the attitude of the Government as one of “professed secrecy tempered by periodic advertisement,” and those of you who have been following naval affairs will, I think, see the point of that criticism.

Reforms described as perfect when they were first introduced have, to the great surprise of those who watch these matters, been very speedily changed, and the changes have in their turn been described as improvements. I must once more beg you to note

¹ “Civis,” in *Spectator*, 1907 (quoted in *Standard*, April 23, 1909, p. 9, col. 2).

that, not being a naval expert, I am not endorsing those criticisms. I am not telling you that they are correct, and I am not taking sides with the critics; I am only stating to you, reminding you, of what has been said by men who are in a position to judge, if any men are; and I am asking you to consider whether these facts afford sufficient grounds for asking for an investigation. (Hear, hear.) Surely the nation ought to know whether these things are true or not; I will go further, and say, surely the Government ought to wish to take steps to allay anxiety, and to silence criticism of this kind, if it can be silenced. (Hear, hear.)

Well, there is only one way, only one possible way, and that is by an impartial investigation by a commission or a committee. We cannot, however much we may personally trust Ministers, accept their assurances in a matter of this kind, because they are necessarily judges in their own cause. They must think that that which they are doing, with every intention and every belief that it is for the best, is right; but the point is that they may be wrong, and therefore you want impartial outsiders, men of experience and weight and authority, to inquire into the matter and to judge. (Hear, hear.) You all know that the Government will not listen to any demand for an inquiry of this kind,¹ and it follows as a natural consequence that their refusal only increases alarm and discontent. (Hear, hear.)

It is very difficult even to guess at the reason. If all is well with the Navy, the Government have everything to gain and nothing to lose by an inquiry (Hear, hear); but if, on the other hand, anything is amiss, the Government also stand to gain, for they will naturally receive the support of the nation in incurring any expenditure that may be required to put things right—(hear, hear)—for, as you all know, when things are wrong it is purely a matter of expense to put them right. In either case, therefore, the Government can only rise in the public estimation if they take the nation into their confidence and tell the people of this country as much about naval affairs as they used to be told formerly. (Cheers.)

You must have noticed, by the way, the nature of answers in Parliament; those are accessible to everybody. You have seen that there is a great reluctance on the part of the Government to give a straight answer to a plain question; and also that many of the answers which are given prove, a few days or a few weeks later, to have been inaccurate. That is not quite as it should be. The only reason that has been given for refusal to grant an Inquiry is that the Board of Admiralty would resign. I must say that

¹ Cp. above, pp. 253, 314, 343, 420, 484, etc.; and Index, s.v. "Inquiry."

seems to me the most extraordinary reason ever given to a similar demand. (Cheers.) There have been other Inquiries into the state, not only of the Navy, but of the Army, and they have not led to the resignation of any prominent officials. On the contrary, they have in most cases led to results satisfactory to all parties concerned. History has a way of repeating itself, and I daresay that some of you will recollect that the Hartington Commission of 1888 arose out of a state of affairs very similar to that which exists in the present circumstances (Hear, hear), and it also led to very satisfactory results. There was criticism, there was anxiety, there was discontent: the Commission allayed all that. It transpired on inquiry that certain changes which had been introduced experimentally were not as satisfactory as it was hoped they would be. Those changes were accordingly discontinued, and for some time afterwards everything went on peacefully.

Well, that may be the case now. It may or it may not; and I cannot understand any reasonable man not taking the attitude, "Why not find out?" (Hear, hear.) To business men I need only say that stock-taking is an ordinary process of business, and does not imply any distrust of those whom you employ.

That, then, is the case for Inquiry. I have dealt only with facts: the fact that criticism exists; the fact that the criticism has produced anxiety; and the fact that the Government have hitherto been unwilling to grant an Inquiry which would allay that discontent; and I would ask you, "Are those facts by themselves not quite enough to justify the demand which we are asking the meeting to endorse?" (Hear, hear.)

The second part of our case relates to preparedness for war, and on this we are confronted with the statement, most satisfactory in itself, on the part of the Prime Minister, that the Government will maintain the Two-Power Standard. But I venture, with all deference, to suggest that there are a great many people in this country who are apt to make a shibboleth of the term "Two-Power Standard" (Hear, hear), to place in it a faith very similar to the faith of the pious and well-known lady who found spiritual comfort in that blessed word "Mesopotamia." (Laughter.) The real question is, are we prepared to fight any other nation which might conceivably attack us? Are we, for instance—I only say "for instance"—certain of being able to resist successfully a surprise attack on the part of Germany? There are a great many people who think that it is wrong and mistaken, and even wicked, to allude to Germany in connection with the question of national defence, and their attitude, I must say, reminds me of that of children who are afraid to mention the word "bogey man," lest

that evil spirit should appear. (Laughter.) Surely the reasonable attitude is that, if we keep fleets and armies at all, it is because there is some possibility that we might some day have to use them, and, that being so, we must take into account any possible enemy, including Germany. (Hear, hear.)

How do we stand, then, at the present moment as regards Germany? Here, again, I can only give you the barest summary of the facts, as it also involves a long technical dissertation.

I learn from what is written by naval experts that to resist such an attack, supposing it to be possible, we have the Channel Fleet and the Nore Division of the Home Fleet, and that if the actual strength of those fleets were what it is on paper it would be just sufficient for us to feel fairly certain of success, but that with the notable exception of torpedo craft, in which our numbers are very strikingly deficient. But we also know—it is a fact which is public property—that a short time ago the Channel Fleet, instead of having the 13 or 14 ships which it ought to have on paper, had only 6 or 7; and as for readiness, Mr. Arnold Forster elicited in Parliament only a few days ago the very disquieting information that there has been no combined training of the fleets, and that, moreover, the Admiralty have abandoned two principles of the greatest importance which they had laid down for their own guidance.¹ Those principles were that the fleets which are intended for the actual defence of these shores, the Channel, Atlantic, and Home Fleets, should carry out peace exercises in combination,¹ and, secondly, that not more than two ships should ever be absent for repairs at the same time.¹ Those two principles have been abandoned¹ for reasons which have not been explained, and I think you will say that in those circumstances we cannot feel absolutely certain that everything possible has been done to ensure our national security. (Hear, hear.)

That is the second part of our case, and our reason for suggesting that you should urge the Government to frame supplementary estimates to supply deficiencies, not only in ships, but deficiencies in the matter of training and other things which are necessary for readiness for battle.

Now, we are told that we must not criticise anything to do with the Navy, for fear of dragging the Navy into the arena of party politics. I venture to say, if you will forgive me for a colloquial expression, that a great deal of rot is talked upon that subject. (Laughter and cheers.) The Navy is already in the arena of party politics, so that there can be no possible question of dragging it in. When 144 members of the Liberal Party have

¹ Cp. above, p. 467.

petitioned the Prime Minister to reduce the Naval Estimates, it is perfectly obvious that the maintenance of our naval supremacy has become a party question, and must be treated as such by all who desire to preserve it. (Cheers.)

But those who use the phrase that the Navy must not be dragged into the arena of party politics do so, I think, with very little appreciation or understanding of its effect. Our system of Government depends on the contentions, and the counterbalancing effect of those contentions, between rival political parties. If you remove the Navy from the arena of party politics, you put that which is more important to the nation than anything else—that upon which the very existence of our country depends—outside the system of government.

Of course, what people mean—but unfortunately they do not say it or explain it, and hence the misunderstanding—is that there shall be fair play in the arena of party politics (Hear, hear); and all I have to say upon that point is that, if we cannot trust our Members of Parliament, the representatives of the people, the guardians of everything which we hold dear, to keep to fair play in the arena of party politics when the Navy is concerned, then we had better shut up shop altogether. (Cheers.) In this country no political object can be attained, no political institution can be maintained, except by the agency of one or other of the great political parties; therefore I say do not let us be afraid of criticising when we think that criticism is necessary, and if it be necessary to enforce that criticism, let us use all those means which are legitimate and fair for the purpose. (Hear, hear.)

The defence of this country, as I said before, is the business of the people themselves; and in putting our case before you I have confined myself to a recitation, which I fear may have been dry (cries of "No"), of bare facts. I have studiously refrained from appealing to you in any other way than to your reason, and I have done so for a purpose which I am sure you will appreciate.

The question, then, which I have to put to you is this. Will you, or will you not, ask the Government to do justice to themselves, in order that they may not be misunderstood; to do justice to the greatest and most important Department of State, in order that it may not be mistrusted; to do justice, if they will, to the critics, in order that the purity and the patriotism of their intentions may not be mistaken; and, above all, to do justice to the nation—the nation for which the Navy exists, to which the Navy belongs, and which pays the bill for our national security and peace? (Loud cheers.)

THE RIGHT HON. SIR JOHN COLOMB, K.C.M.G.¹:—Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, the Resolution committed to my hands to propose to this meeting is as follows:—

THE RESOLUTION

“That this meeting, while fully appreciating the recent declaration of the Prime Minister in regard to the maintenance of the Two-Power Standard, respectfully urges His Majesty’s Government to institute an Inquiry into the scope and effect of recent changes in the Navy, in order that the uncertainty and anxiety caused by the great volume of recent criticism may be allayed, and that the nation may be better informed as to Naval Policy so far as it may be in the public interest to afford explanation.

“That this meeting begs to remind His Majesty’s Government that such an Inquiry has been advocated by two former First Sea Lords, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Frederick Richards and Admiral Sir Richard Vesey-Hamilton.

“And further that this meeting considers it a matter of urgent necessity that Supplementary Estimates should be framed to make good recognised deficiencies in the Navy, more particularly in respect of medium cruisers, ocean-going destroyers, and dock accommodation.”

Now, my Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen, after the statesmanlike speech of the noble Chairman, it only remains for me to attempt to dot the “i’s” and cross the “t’s” of what he has declared to you. The breadth and width, and the fairness of his speech, I think even the most hostile critics must admit.

Before I deal with the Resolution itself, I wish to mention a matter which, although it really underlies the Resolution, is not apparent on the face of it. I will not enlarge upon the point for many reasons, but I will simply state the fact as it appears to me, that in the Navy now there is a feeling of great unrest threatening that solidarity of brotherhood, which for 150 years has been the best and noblest characteristic of that Service. (Cheers.) I state this on my own personal responsibility. During my observation of the Service, extending over fifty years, I have not known anything approaching this state of things, and, so far as I can

¹ Sir John Colomb—(the author of “Imperial Strategy,” 1868; “The Defence of Great and Greater Britain,” 1879; “Imperial Federation Naval and Military,” 1886; “British Dangers; Our Ships, Colonies, and Commerce in War,” 1902; etc., etc.)—is the man “to whom all those in Great Britain who take an interest in national defence look up as the pioneer who first led English thought on that subject in the right direction.”—*Morning Post*, November 20, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, col. 4.

see, the authorities ignore it. As its effects must be pernicious, I think it should be seriously inquired into. (Cheers.)

As the noble Chairman has explained, the state of the Navy concerns all parties. It is the personal concern of every individual, every citizen of the widespread Empire of ours; and I think students of history and also of politics must observe that, being the guarantee of the peace of the world, the supremacy of the Navy is something dear also to foreigners who value the peace of the world. (Cheers.) In relation to commercial stability its claims are paramount; and in the City of London, the cradle of British commerce and the fountain head of commercial effort, surely it is right to know what is the true state of the Navy upon which security depends. (Cheers.)

Now, allusion is made to the Prime Minister's statement on the Two-Power Standard. It is a proper thing to allude to, but do let us remember that the security of the waters of the world, necessary to British commerce, cannot be guaranteed by words. (Cheers.)

There are three things—not words—by which alone it can be secured. Sufficiency and efficiency of force, the perfection of training of the force, and the completeness of arrangements for its scientific application. (Cheers.) Lord Amphill has told you the points, and therefore I need not refer to them further, but I would like to emphasise what he has said with regard to the objections of the Government to Inquiry, by calling your attention to the words used by the First Lord of the Admiralty on the 9th of July last. He said, "So long as the Members of the Board remain Members of the Board they were not willing to accept Inquiry into their work." Well, Lord Amphill has anticipated me, and therefore I will only make this remark, that the Inquiry is not into the acts of persons; it is into the system under which those persons work, producing these extraordinary results that perplex and alarm the whole public. (Cheers.) The doctrine which is laid down, that the persons concerned will resign if the system is inquired into has been fully dealt with by Lord Amphill; but I call your attention to this fact, that there was a triumvirate Inquiry into the War Office, and into the administration of the War Office, and neither the Commander-in-Chief nor anybody else thought of resigning. (Cheers.)

As the Chairman has said, we want that Inquiry to close controversy or to point out the defects. As to the quantity of force, as to the quality of force, as to the organisation and training of the fleets, and the organisation of the Admiralty in respect of carrying on those great strategical operations that war demands—it is under those three heads, as the Chairman has pointed out, that controversy has raged.

Now, take the quantity of force. The Admiralty in 1905 said

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it was necessary, for the safety of the State and to maintain the Two-Power Standard, that four armoured warships should be laid down each year.¹ Well now, on the verge of 1909 where are they? Where are those ships? We know that what the Admiralty four years ago declared to be necessary for the safety of the State is now, apparently, thought to be wholly unnecessary; because if that statement be not true, we ask them, "Show us the ships. Have you carried out that programme?" We know they have not. (Cheers.) Well, the country has a right to know why. (Loud cheers.) And more particularly because in those forty-eight months since that declaration was made certain foreign nations have enormously increased their shipbuilding programmes. (Hear, hear.)

Now a capital ship, as you know, is a ship "fit to lie in the line of battle." A cruiser may or may not be a capital ship; it depends upon her capacity and many other things; and the development of the armoured cruiser does present to experts some very nice and difficult problems as to their place. But if such vessels are to be reckoned, vessels like the *Invincible*, as capital ships, they cannot be reckoned as cruisers. You cannot have it both ways; and a great deal of official dust has been thrown into the eyes of the man in the street by attributing to these *Invincibles*, these new powerful armoured cruisers, the attribute of being able to fill two places at once. (Laughter.) We want to know definitely whether they are not reckoning them in the general scale twice over.² They are too big and too powerful and too costly to use for search and intelligence purposes in narrow waters or in-shore; they are the high-sea scouts *par excellence*—and some people think, taking the cost into consideration, they are too much *par excellence*. (Laughter.) However, there they are. And there were differences of opinion among experts as to their qualifications, but there is no difference among experts, or really among all sorts of students of naval warfare, in this, that the more you increase the individual fighting capacity of your capital ships, the more essential it is to make provision for the subsidiary services necessary to make the line of battle composed of those ships efficient. (Cheers.)

I am not going to enlarge upon it, for I wish to conclude in a minute or two; but I want to point out this, that a battle fleet, however powerful the individual capacity of the ships composing it and in its corporate capacity, without a sufficiency of subsidiary service vessels, medium cruisers, and long-ranged destroyers, is simply an octopus deprived of its tentacles. The all-important matter is to find out your enemy, and you cannot go meandering about without information; so the battle fleet takes up its position, and its ten-

¹ See above, pp. 1, 4 *sq.*, 72, etc.

² Cf. above p. 469.

tacles, being spread over a large area, tell it where to close down upon its prey and produce the result to be desired.

But there is another thing that this increased power of ships brings before us, and it is alluded to in the Resolution, and that is dock accommodation. (Hear, hear.) It was foreseen by the last Admiralty, and therefore we had the acquirement of Rosyth. What have we been doing since? Nothing. We have been building more big ships without any regard to the fact that if you have big ships you must have big docks.

I fear, myself, that these great, powerful vessels have been too much used to delude the man in the street. It is said, "Look what magnificent ships we have; look at the *Dreadnought*; look at the *Invincible*; have you ever had anything like them before?" Well, the man in the street thinks that must be all right; but the Navy is one great harmonious whole, composed of several elements and demanding several things (Hear, hear), and you must be prepared to fill all the obligations the increase of size of ships has thrown upon you. It is we, by building these large ships, have made the Naval bed that we and other nations have to lie in at enormous cost, but having done it we have got to go through with it, and follow up and provide for all the necessities that those great ships create.

It is really natural that the British public should be deluded into thinking all is well because they are told how big the ships are and how powerful they are. Two hundred and seventy years ago the nation was lulled into security by the launching of the *Sovereign of the Seas*, described as "carrying murdering pieces" and "to be the most magnificent ship in the world." But we know that the idea that she provided for British security was a pure and simple delusion, and nothing more. It is by sacrifice, by effort, and, above all, by continuous policy that we have risen to the position in the world that we occupy, and it remains for the British public to-day to follow the example of their fathers to make the same sacrifices—and they must be greater—and above all things to religiously insist upon continuity of policy and of effort. (Hear, hear.)

And we want to know, and we want you to affirm a Resolution that demands to know, whether we are making that effort, whether the system under which we work is the cause of the want of continuity of policy that everybody sees; and if we do not do it our outlook is gloomy indeed. It is to continuity of policy, to sacrifice and effort, that we owe our present position; and if it had not been for that continuity of policy, carried on from generation to generation, and the development of Naval Power, where would have been the British hen-roosts for the Chancellor of the Exchequer of to-day to rob? (Cheers.) I beg to move the Resolution.

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ADMIRAL HALLIDAY CAVE, C.B.¹:—I am not going to inflict upon you a speech; you have got full explanations from our Chairman and the mover of the Resolution; I simply formally second the Resolution.

THE CHAIRMAN:—I now call upon Mr. Frewen Lord, whose name must be known to many of you as an historian, and who therefore speaks with authority on the teachings of history. He will speak in support of the Resolution.

MR. W. FREWEN LORD²:—My Lord Amphill, my Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is my privilege to address you this afternoon as the author of two books, "The Lost Possessions of England" and "The Lost Empires of the Modern World," two significant titles. I beg you, if you do me the favour to look at them, to consider how much trouble we might have been saved at the present moment, and how much more profitable our situation and our career might have been, if only we had had some recognised organised Imperial spirit in the country to which we could always appeal in crises. (Cheers.) Writing those books in the year 1895-6, somewhere about there, at the time that His Lordship in the Chair was the Secretary of a very great man, Mr. Chamberlain (Loud cheers), writing in those years I almost apologised for referring to the anti-Imperial spirit which had wrought such terrible mischief in the past. I thought it was scotched once and for all under Mr. Chamberlain's heel, but it was not, and ten years later we are to-day living in such an atmosphere of anti-Imperialism that sometimes I tremble to think of what to-morrow may bring forth.

If you will kindly refer to my book—it is in all the libraries—consider what an amount of trouble we might have been saved if only we had not cleared out of Morocco. There would have been no Moroccan Question, and what a blessing that would have been. If only we had stuck to Cuba, as we ought to have done, there would have been no Spanish war; and consider what the state of the Pacific would have been to-day if we had stuck to Java and the Philippines, as we ought to have done. (Cheers and laughter.) All those great possessions, and some others, were fooled away, not because, or wholly because, we had incompetent Ministers—they mostly are—(Laughter)—not only or mostly for that reason, but because we had no instructed public opinion to put its foot down and say, "We will not have this."

¹ Admiral J. Halliday Cave, C.B., subsequently (in December, 1908) joined the Executive Committee of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE:—see *Daily Express*, December 4, 1908, p. 5, col. 2; *Morning Post*, December 4, 1908, p. 7, col. 3; *Army and Navy Chronicle*, February, 1909. (See further below, 506 n. 2.)

² Concerning Mr. W. Frewen Lord, see the interesting notes given in the *Pall Mall Gazette*, November 21, 1908, p. 6, col. 3.

I beg you only to consider, if you will pardon the vagaries of a historian, who naturally lives much in the past, how abominably we treated Warren Hastings. Have we done worse than that? We have. How abominably we treated Alfred Milner. (Cheers.) We are worse, we are far worse, than our grandfathers and our great-grandfathers, for they at least, although they persecuted Warren Hastings, had the common sense to stick to India. (Cheers.)

So far, Ladies and Gentlemen, you have borne with me with great patience, and I will now, with your kind permission, refer to the other book, "The Lost Empires of the Modern World." The Empire in which we live was not founded by a miracle; it was founded by force. I know there are a great many people who think it is very wicked, as the Chairman said, to think about killing anybody else. I do not agree with them. (Laughter and cheers.) This Empire was founded by a predominant Maritime Force, and will only be conserved by that means. (Cheers.) We are the fifth in order of the Great Empires of the Modern World. Those four preceding us were Portugal, Spain, Holland, and France. They were all founded by superior Maritime Force dominating the conditions at that time. They did not say "this is a great ship, and therefore it is going to win the sea for us," but "this is a greater ship than anybody else has got, it is better manned, and better manœuvred, and so it will beat anything else at the present moment." That is the way they argued; and, when they ceased to argue like that, they dropped their Empire; and—we took it. (Cheers and laughter.)

Now, Ladies and Gentlemen, I want you to consider this. What the City of London says to-day England says to-morrow. (Cheers.) I want you to send forth such a message from this hall this afternoon that neither I, nor any other historian, shall ever have to write a chapter of history, "The Lost Empire of England." (Loud cheers.)

THE RESOLUTION was then put to the Meeting by THE CHAIRMAN, and,

On a show of hands,

THE CHAIRMAN:—I declare the Resolution carried without a dissentient. (Loud cheers.)

MR. HAROLD F. WYATT:—My Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen, one remaining duty, that of proposing the warmest and heartiest vote of thanks to Lord Amphil for his presence in the Chair to-day, falls to my lot to discharge as one of the Joint-Founders (with my friend Mr. Horton-Smith) of the Imperial Maritime League, which

has organised this Meeting. It is no common pleasure to propose a vote of thanks to Lord Ampthill. Courage and initiative are somewhat rare qualities nowadays among our public men, and Lord Ampthill has shown both these attributes in a surprising degree when he dared, as he has dared, to endorse by his presence in the Chair to-day the demand for an Inquiry into the state of the Navy. (Cheers.)

Hitherto that demand has been met, whenever it has been uttered in the Press or by anyone on the platform, with all the forces of misrepresentation and bitter opposition, and it is likely enough that it will be so met again.

The City of London has rendered immense services to the Navy in past times—(Cheers)—but it has never rendered a greater service than it will have rendered this afternoon, and than it will continue to render, if it continues to urge with its full effective voice the need of effective steps to restore public confidence in the Fleet. The fact that public confidence in the security of our national defence has been shaken to its depths,—this audience of City men must well know,—is one powerful cause, co-operating with other causes, to drive English capital, the wage-fund of the English people, out of this land. (Cheers.) And so this afternoon you here are fighting, in demanding an Inquiry, to restore public confidence in the Navy, and are taking the most effective steps in your power to prevent that exodus of the wages of England, and therefore to prevent that volume of unemployment of which we hear so much.

We still hear much, also, of the general assurances which have been received from the Prime Minister, and—whilst, among many letters which I have here from those who sympathise with and support this Meeting, the names of many of whom have been published in the public Press, names of members of the Upper House and of the Lower House of Parliament, names of City men (I might mention Mr. Bridges-Webb, the Chairman of the Baltic Exchange), and many admirals also who have written to express their sympathy and support,—some, also, I have received of a different tenor, saying that now that Mr. Asquith has given his assurance of adhesion to the Two-Power Standard, what more do you want? We want to see it kept, certainly; but there are other considerations.

The problem of Naval construction is only part of the danger which threatens the Naval supremacy of England. It would really seem as if some portion of the Press and some individuals are unable to comprehend the fact that it is a two-fold peril with which we are face to face to-day. One is the peril which threatens our Naval supremacy in the future, owing to the terrible manner in which, for the last three years, our shipbuilding programme has been cut down. That is one peril. We have laid down in the

last three years 8 capital ships against 10 laid down by Germany. This year we have laid down 2 capital ships to 4 laid down by Germany. I do not know what we are going to do next year; perhaps we shall lay down 3, or even 4. That only relates to capital ships. But then you have the other question of fleet auxiliaries and destroyers and medium cruisers, without which it is useless to build *Dreadnoughts*. It is no use building these big capital ships unless you build also the full complement of Naval auxiliaries which all Naval men, without exception, say are required. That altogether constitutes one part of the danger; it is the danger in regard to construction.

But the other peril, quite a separate point, is the danger which threatens us at this moment owing to the arrangements which, for the sake of economy, have been made in regard to the existing fleet. That is the second point. Well, now, Mr. Asquith's assurances do not remedy existing deficiencies. His declaration of adherence to the Two-Power Standard in the future,¹ whatever interpretation he puts upon it¹—we do not know what he will do^{1a}—does not affect by one jot or tittle the existing state of the Fleet,² so I am at a loss to understand how any reasonable man can write as some men have written; that now they are perfectly happy. The assurances of Mr. Asquith do not prevent the recurrence of such an episode as actually occurred a few weeks ago, when no less than 8 battle-ships of the Channel Fleet were withdrawn at one time and sent into harbour or dock, and without being replaced by other ships taken from the Home Fleet. The assurances of Mr. Asquith do not complete the complements of half-manned ships in the Home Ports; those assurances do not complete the training of half-trained crews; those assurances do not make good neglected repairs—(Hear, hear)—and yet the country, ignoring with a sort of fatal persistency these tremendous points upon which its present safety absolutely depends, will persist in fastening its sole attention upon the question of laying down capital ships in the future. That is a point of tremendous importance; but surely the other point is of equal importance. It is of supreme importance to keep both in your minds at the same time; and therefore I hope that such an agitation will be set on foot this afternoon as shall be carried on and increased in London and elsewhere until we shall get that Inquiry into the state of the Fleet which can alone restore public confidence in the Navy. (Cheers.)

Ladies and Gentlemen, you know well that the Nations of Europe are in a state of electrical tension; you know—you must feel—that the shadow of great coming events is sweeping across Europe—and across the world; and surely, surely, British men, and British women,

¹ Cp. above, pp. 471 *seqq.*

^{1a} We know now. By the lips of his own First Lord (April 27, 1909) the Two-Power Standard has been thrown overboard (see above, p. 472 n. 8, on p. 473). And the Premier himself (May 26, 1909) has followed suit on the same lines (see above, p. 472 n. 8, on p. 473).

² Cp. below, p. 511 (text and n. 8).

too, have a right to know—not to be in doubt about it, but to know—that the Navy, upon which all depends, shall be in a fit state to discharge its gigantic duties when the hour of trial comes. (Loud cheers.)

MR. L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH:—My Lord Amptill, my Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen, it falls to me at this late hour of the afternoon to say just a few words in seconding the Resolution which has been moved by my friend Mr. Wyatt.

What I should like to point out at the outset is this, that two years ago the Admiralty issued a pamphlet in which they advertised their own doings, and it was called "The Truth about the Navy." It was sent around to every place where it could possibly be of any avail. It unfortunately failed to silence those critics who had investigated the state of the Navy, and what we are asking for this afternoon, in calling for this Inquiry, is "The *True* Truth about the Navy." (Cheers.) And, what is more, we mean to get that true truth about the Navy. (Renewed cheers.) We have heard and we have seen much of people who are prepared to go to "sleep quietly in their beds" because Mr. Asquith or Mr. Somebody else says something. Ladies and Gentlemen, words are not works; lip-service is of itself no service; and until we see actual works and actual service we will believe no words. (Cheers.)

I am not going to detain you with many observations, but there is one thing to which I should like to draw your attention, because nobody has referred to it yet. It is this:—That, although it has been stated by people who ought to have known better that Germany has no cause of friction with Great Britain, Germany has not merely cause, but essential need for friction with Great Britain. (Cheers.) Germany consists of some 60,000,000 people, occupying only some 200,000 square miles; their people are increasing at the rate of 1,000,000 a year; they are bursting for places to go to, to send their people to. In the forthcoming edition of *Cassier's Magazine* you will see an article by Count von Reventlow in which, although he carefully "veils" the whole thing, he clearly points out that Germany must have more property, and he defines property as Colonies and also as something one can defend. That is what he wants, that is what the Germans want; and, unless they fight us, and take our Colonies from us, there is no possible chance of the German Empire maintaining the position in the world which it has attained at the present moment.

Time does not permit me to deal with these matters at length, but I should like just to refer to one other fact with regard to Germany which has not been mentioned yet, and that is this:

that ten years ago the German Naval Estimates amounted to some £9,500,000 only; to-day they are £17,000,000. Why? Because in the year 1899, when the Boer War broke out, the German Emperor saw, and to do him justice he had the honesty to admit it, that if they had had a big enough Navy at that time they could have prevented Great Britain from relieving South Africa by sea, and they would have got their reward at the hands of the Boers in the partition in their own interests of the glorious British dominions in the southern part of Africa. (Cheers.)

We have heard a great deal lately about an interview by some person unknown (what we call at the Bar some person to the jurors unknown) with the German Emperor,¹ in which the German Emperor was all for love of Great Britain, and how he had prepared such a magnificent plan of campaign which Lord Roberts reproduced. (Of course, Lord Roberts—apparently—knew nothing before!) It was very fortunate; but, unfortunately, it is flatly the opposite of what the German Emperor said when the Boer War broke out. Within one week of the outbreak of that fateful war the German Emperor said: "Had my people granted to me the Estimates for the Navy which I asked for and implored during the earlier years of my reign, how much might we not now"—of course he meant when Great Britain was in a difficulty—"have been able to advance German interests and German commerce over-seas."*

And, Ladies and Gentlemen, think of one other thing. I have worked with some care at what you may call the subterranean facts that have been going on during the last eighteen months, and I have discovered that large subscriptions have gone from the Boers in South Africa to support that League in Germany which is doing its utmost to second its Emperor in producing an enormous German fleet, and that can only be so that, when next they are able to throw the mask off, they may be able to throw it off with the utmost certainty of successful support from the German Empire. (Cheers.)

There is one thing to-day which is almost more pernicious than anything else, and that is the lack of character in the Nation. We live at a time of so-called Social Reform, which is not Social Reform, but only an organised endeavour to abolish all effort at thrift—(Cheers)—in a time when the individual seems to think that the State is to do everything for him and he nothing for the State—(Cheers)—as witness the Territorial Force. (Cheers.) This is the time at which Lord Meath has spoken words which I think should

* *Note*:—The German Emperor's words were quoted from memory. The actual words were as follows:—"We" (Germans) "are in bitter need of a strong navy. If the increases demanded during the first years of my reign had not been continually refused to me in spite of my continued entreaties and warnings, how differently should we now be able to further our flourishing commerce and our interests over-sea." (Cp. above, pp. *R.F.*, 432, 463).

¹ See above, pp. 462 sq.

go to the heart of us all, and with these words I shall close:—"Nations and Empires rise and fall, as the God of Nations wills, but the study of History shows that their rise or fall is no sudden or capricious event, but follows closely upon the rise or fall of the mercury in the barometer of National Character." (Loud cheers.)

I have the greatest pleasure in seconding Mr. Wyatt's Vote of Thanks.

MR. WYATT put the Motion to the Meeting and declared it carried by acclamation.

THE CHAIRMAN:—My Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am greatly obliged to you for the kind manner in which you have received me, but there is really no occasion why you should thank me for joining with you in the cause of patriotism. One thing only need I add. I have been asked (by Mr. Dewar, of the Royal Navy) whether this Inquiry will be confidential or not. I may say at once, and in answer, that this was implied in the terms of the Resolution.* I think that concludes our business.

* Note:—The point that the proceedings of the proposed Commission of Inquiry should not be conducted in public was also made absolutely clear in Lord Amphill's public letter of the 14th November, 1908, written with reference to the City Meeting herein reported, and published in the Press on the 17th November, 1908.¹

THE MEETING THEN TERMINATED.^{2 3}

¹ See above, p. 482.

² Interesting letters, alike illustrative of the pronounced success of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE'S Great City Meeting of November 19, 1908, and unmercifully showing up the misrepresentations perpetrated by the *Observer* (November 22, 1908), and its (*Editorially*) "Valued Correspondent" "Janus," (*Observer*, November 29, 1908, and December 6, 1908, p. 6, col. 5) in their efforts to minimise the effect of the Great City Meeting on public opinion, will be found as follows:—

(a) Two letters over the signatures of Mr. W. F. Lord, Mr. Harold F. Wyatt, and Mr. L. Graham H. Horton-Smith, bearing date respectively November 23, 1908 and December 3, 1908, and respectively published in the *Observer*, November 29, 1908 and December 6, 1908, p. 6, col. 5; and:—

(b) A letter over the signature of Admiral J. Halliday Cave, C.B., bearing date Dec. 4, 1908, and published in the *Observer*, December 6, 1908, p. 6, col. 5.

(Note:—"Janus" was saved only by the kindly courtesy of the Editor from having to expose to public gaze his timorous identity!—See *Observer*, December 6, 1908, p. 6, col. 5.)

³ The IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE'S Demand for Inquiry—the City's Demand for Inquiry—was strongly endorsed by (*int. al.*):—

Daily Express, November 19, 1908 (leading article: "We Want to Know"), p. 4, cols. 4 sq.; *Modern Society*, November 28, 1908, p. 17, col. 1; *Morning Post*, November 20, 1908 (leading article: "The Management of the Navy"), p. 6, col. 4; *Outlook*, November 21, 1908; *Spectator*, November 21, 1908; *Standard*, November 19, 1908, leading article ("Mr. McKenna and the House of Commons"), p. 6, col. 6 (concluding as follows:—"We welcome the announcement that the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE is to hold a meeting in the City to-day, under the presidency of Lord Amphill, for the express purpose of publicly urging the demand for a full and an impartial investigation. The IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE is at present the only patriotic association which has had the courage to face the obloquy and the calculated misrepresentations with which such a demand has hitherto been met, and we trust that its action will help to rouse the country to a condition of affairs which is a present and an increasing menace to the national security"); and November 20, 1908 (leading article), p. 6, cols. 5-6 above referred to (p. 483 n. 5); (cp. also *Standard*, April 23, 1909; p. 9, col. 3; referred to again, below, p. 525 n. 7); etc.; etc.; etc.

By the direction of the Executive Committee of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE, the Resolution, so carried on the 19th November, 1908, was forwarded by the Honorary Secretaries of the League to the following members of the late and present Governments:—

The Present Government.

MR. H. H. ASQUITH, K.C., M.P.
Prime Minister.

THE EARL OF CREWE.
*Leader of the Government
in the House of Lords.*

MR. REGINALD MCKENNA, M.P.
*First Lord of the Ad-
miralty.*

MR. GEORGE LAMBERT, M.P.
*Civil Lord of the Ad-
miralty.*

LORD LOCHIEE OF GOWRIE.
*Late Parliamentary Secre-
tary to the Admiralty.*

MR. T. J. MACNAMARA, M.P.
*Present Parliamentary
Secretary to the Ad-
miralty.*

The Late Government.

MR. A. J. BALFOUR, M.P.
Late Prime Minister.

THE MARQUIS OF LANSDOWNE.
*Leader of the Opposition
in the House of Lords.*

THE EARL CAWDOR.
*Late First Lord of the
Admiralty.*

MR. A. H. LEE, M.P.
*Late Civil Lord of the
Admiralty.*

and

MR. E. G. PRETYMAN, M.P.
*Late Parliamentary Sec-
retary to the Admiralty.*

and also to

THE EARL SPENCER.
*First Lord of the Admiralty,
1892-95.*

LORD GEORGE HAMILTON,
*First Lord of the Admiralty,
1885-86. 1886-92.*

*For the Executive Committee of
The Imperial Maritime League,*

HAROLD F. WYATT,
L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH,
Joint Honorary Secretaries.

3rd December, 1908.

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE
AND THE NAVY

November 21, 1908.

By kind permission of Major Frank Johnson, a Drawing-room Meeting, in furtherance of the aims of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE, was held on Nov. 21, 1908, at his residence in Clapham. The Chair was taken by Mr. Briggs, and the Speakers included Mr. Harold F. Wyatt and others.

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE
AND THE NAVY

November 23, 1908.

By kind permission of Mr. and Mrs. John A. Scrimgeour a Drawing-room Meeting, in furtherance of the aims of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE, was held on Nov. 23, 1908, at their residence, Gatton, Reigate, Surrey, Mr. John A. Scrimgeour was in the Chair, and the speakers included Mr. L. Graham H. Horton-Smith and others.

AN IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE OF 50 YEARS AGO
AND ITS HON. SECRETARY

THE LATE SIR RALPH LITTLER.

MORNING POST, *Nov. 27, 1908, p. 8, col. 5*; STANDARD, *Nov. 28, 1908, p. 10, col. 2.*

To the Editor.

Athenæum Club,
Pall Mall, London, S.W.
Nov. 26, 1908.

SIR,—In the many and appreciative biographical notices which have appeared in reference to the late Sir Ralph Littler, K.C., no mention would appear to have been made of the deep interest which he always maintained in the state of the British Navy.

An interesting echo from the far-away days of the Crimean war, and a reminiscence of the state of our Navy at that time and of his own efforts in that regard, may be found in the following letter which he wrote to me in January last,¹ in response to an invitation that he should join the General Council of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE:—

“As I had the honour,” he wrote, “of acting as honorary secretary

¹ January, 1908.

of a little band who met in Hewitt Key's¹ study in Camden-street to protest against (and remedy, which our efforts subsequently accomplished) the disgraceful weakness of our Navy in frigates after the Crimean war, I very willingly consent to your adding my name to your General Council.—Wishing you all success, Yours truly, Ralph Littler."

I am, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

YET ANOTHER² LIBERAL APPEAL FOR FURTHER REDUCTION ON ARMAMENTS

Appeal³ to the Prime Minister imploring him to "grapple with" the "lavish expenditure" upon armaments, signed by nearly 150 Liberal M.P.'s;—See *Standard*, Nov. 27, 1908, p. 7, col. 6 (*s.v.* "Reduction of Armaments: Liberal Appeal to the Prime Minister"), and p. 6, col. 7, leading article ("Radicals and Armaments") wherein the fallacy of the main argument whereon such appeal was based—viz., that it is an "accepted principle that armaments depend upon policy"—is most ably exposed. The exact reverse is, of course, the accepted principle. "Policy depends upon armaments." (*Standard l.c.*)

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE AND THE NAVY

November 28, 1908.

By kind permission of Dr. and Mrs. Sidney Turner, a Drawing-room Meeting,⁴ in furtherance of the aims of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE, was held on Nov. 28, 1908, at their residence, Stanton, Anerley Road. Mr. W. Frewen Lord was in the Chair, and the speakers included (besides the Chairman) Mr. H. F. Wyatt, Dr. Sidney Turner, and others.

¹ The late Thomas Hewitt Key, Esq., M.A., Head-Master of University College School, and Professor in University College, London.

² For earlier such Appeals, see Index, *s.v.* "Appeals."

³ The text of this Appeal will be found printed in *Standard*, November 27, 1908, p. 7, col. 6.

⁴ For an account of this Meeting see *Norwood Review*, December 5, 1908; *People* (*s.v.* "For a Strong Navy"), November 29, 1908; *Standard*, November 30, 1908, p. 12, col. 3.

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE AND THE NAVY

FIRST ANNUAL BANQUET

November 30, 1908.

Nov. 30, 1908. First Annual Banquet of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE :—Held privately, in order to allow of full and unhampered expression of opinion on naval questions by recognised authorities. No reporters were allowed to be present; and the names of those present will not be published. Suffice it only to say that the result was of eminent service and value to the LEAGUE in the Naval work which it has undertaken, and which it is carrying out, in the best interests of the Country and of the Empire.

NAVAL REDUCTIONS AND THE STATE OF THE NAVY

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE

PUBLIC MEETING AT WANDSWORTH

DEMAND FOR INQUIRY

December 1, 1908.

A Public Meeting¹² was held at Glenburnie Hall, Wandsworth Common, S.W., on Dec. 1, 1908, under the auspices of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE :—"To Protest against the Destructive Naval Policy of the Present Government, and the Resulting Peril in which the Country is now placed."

In the absence (through illness) of Sir Henry Kimber, Bart., M.P. (who had kindly undertaken to preside³), the Chair was taken by Professor Radford Thomson.

The following Resolution, moved by Mr. W. Frewen Lord, seconded by Mr. Harold F. Wyatt, and supported by Mr. L. Graham H. Horton-Smith, Mr. Algernon Black, and Mr. Councillor J. O. Turnbull, was carried unanimously :—

THE RESOLUTION

"That this Meeting views with indignation and alarm the action of "the present Government in having sacrificed the safety of the nation "to their party ends by cutting down naval expenditure, and it calls "earnestly upon the Unionist Party and its Leaders to denounce this "policy throughout the country. Further, it expresses the conviction "that an Inquiry should be instituted into the state of the Navy as "recommended by two former First Sea Lords, Admiral of the Fleet "Sir Frederick Richards and Admiral Sir R. Vesey Hamilton."⁴

¹ "A great Unionist Demonstration."

² For an account of this Meeting see *Clapham Observer*, December 5, 1908; *Daily Express*, December 2, 1908, p. 5, col. 2; *Standard*, December 2, 1908; *Wandsworth Borough News*, December 5, 1908.

³ See *Standard*, November 30, 1908, p. 12, col. 3.

⁴ See above pp. 264, 265, etc.

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE.
NATIONAL DEFENCE AND THE CITY.

STANDARD, December 8, 1908, p. 5, col. 2.

To the Editor of the STANDARD.

The Imperial Maritime League,
2 Westminster Palace Gardens,
Westminster, S.W.,

December 4, 1908.

SIR,—We have seen, with keen pleasure, in your issue of the 2nd instant,¹ the suggestion contained in Mr. Jackson's² letter and in your leader³ upon that letter, that further⁴ effort should be made to awaken the City of London to the danger in which this country now stands. Of the existence of this present peril, not Lord Roberts alone, but the voices of many others who have devoted their lives to the study of national defence have given warning to the British people.

As France was warned of the coming of the catastrophe which crushed her in 1870, so, but more frequently, more publicly, and for a longer time, has Britain been warned of the approach of the appalling calamity which now overhangs this land. And, as France remained deaf and indifferent until the hour of fate was reached by the dial-hand of history, so, blind, careless, and incredulous, the British people still sleep in the paradise of fools.

Whatever assistance, therefore, the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE can render to this new⁴ attempt to rouse the City before it is too late to the imminence of the menace which all our greatest naval and military authorities have pointed out, that aid this LEAGUE is ready to give, and, to that end, it places its services unreservedly at the disposal of those who may co-operate with Mr. Jackson in the endeavour to make this proposed meeting worthy of the occasion and of the cause. Upon this point only we would insist: that the question of our actual existing national danger is distinct altogether from the question of our future naval programme, to which alone Mr. Asquith's assurances⁵ had any reference.^{6 7 8}

We are, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

W. F. LORD,

Vice-Chairman, Executive Committee,

HAROLD F. WYATT,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH.

Joint Honorary Secretaries.

¹ *Standard*, December 2, 1908.

² Mr. John J. Jackson, for whom see above, p. 31 n. 1.

³ *Standard*, December 2, 1908, p. 6, col. 6.

⁴ See above, pp. 486 *sqq.*, for the Great City Meeting held on November 19, 1908, under the auspices of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE.

⁵ See above, pp. 471 *sqq.*

⁶ Cp. above, p. 503, and below, pp. 516, 518.

⁷ And for that matter, also, Mr. Jackson's proposal for a second City Meeting, if to be read literally.

⁸ The IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE insists (as indicated in the text), and will continue to insist upon the distinction between (a) the actually existing peril of the Country on the one hand (as to which see above *passim*, and especially pp. 459 *sqq.*, 474, 493, 502 *sq.*, etc.), and (b) that which is involved on the other hand in relation to future naval programmes (as to which see text and preceding notes).

THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME CONFERENCE,

Held in London from December 4, 1908 onwards.

Dec. 4, 1908.¹ This Conference—"an outcome of the last Hague Conference²" (*Standard*, Dec. 3, 1908, p. 5, col. 2)—"was summoned at the instance of Great Britain soon after the conclusion of that Conference" (*Standard*, *ibid.*).

"By this meeting" (according to the *Standard*, *ibid.*) "it is desired to arrive at a general agreement among the great Naval Powers on the subject of blockade, contraband,³ the destruction of neutral prizes at sea,⁴ the question of the ownership of vessels, the transfer of flag in war time, and other matters of a like nature, which would have to be dealt with by an International Prize Court as proposed at the Hague Conference.⁵"

"It cannot be too widely or too clearly understood"—wrote the *Standard* in a powerful leader, entitled the "International Maritime Conference," and published Dec. 5, 1908, p. 6, cols. 6-7—"that the International Naval Conference . . . has been assembled at the invitation of H.M.'s Ministers to discuss proposals which threaten the very foundation of British sea-power."

"The consequences"—to quote the significant warning with which the leading article in question concluded—"may be very serious, unless Parliament—omitting, of course, 150 Liberal patriots⁶—and the Nation awake in time to the real meaning of the situation." *6a 6b*

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE.

FURTHER ACCESSIONS TO GENERAL COUNCIL.

December 5, 1908.

A further Additional⁷ List—dated Dec. 5, 1908, and commencing with the Earl of Kintore—was published on Dec. 7, 1908.⁸

¹ This Conference was originally to have met on Dec. 1, 1908 (see *Standard*, Nov. 3, 1908, p. 7, col. 6; *E.S. & S.J.G.*, Dec. 1, 1908, p. 10, col. 4).

² Above, pp. 252, etc.

³ See above, pp. 252, 273.

⁴ Cp. above, p. 117.

⁵ For further reference to this Conference and its work (prior to December 5, 1908), see *Standard*, November 26, 1908, leading article: "The Rights of Neutrals," p. 6, col. 7; and *Standard*, November 30, 1908, p. 10, col. 1, "Maritime Warfare: The International Conference; Delegates' Work," where it is stated (upon authority) that "the deliberations will take place in private: the Press will not be admitted, nor will any statement be issued to the newspapers during the progress of the Conference";—and *Standard*, December 4, 1908, p. 9, col. 4.

⁶ As to these, see above, p. 509.

^{6a} "The Proceedings of" this "International Naval Conference held in London, Dec. 1908 to Feb. 1909," and "Correspondence and Documents respecting the" same, were published in March, 1909, numbered Cd. 4555 and Cd. 4554 respectively.

^{6b} See now further the paper on "England's Threatened Rights at Sea," read by Mr. H. F. Wyatt before the R.U.S.I., June 9, 1909, and Mr. L. G. H. Horton-Smith's speech upon the same occasion.

"The Conference"—(to quote the *Standard*, May 29, 1909, leading article, "Declaration of London," p. 6, cols. 6 sq.)—"met, deliberated, drew up the Declaration of London (of Feb. 26, 1909), and dispersed";—but happily (to quote further the *Standard*, May 29, 1909, *ibid.*), "Sir Edward Grey, before the rising of the House of Commons, made an important statement . . . with reference to the ratification of the Prize Court Convention of 1907" (for which cp. above in the text and also p. 252 n. 2), "and of the Declaration of London of Feb. 26, 1909" (just mentioned):—"Neither instrument will be ratified until after the House has been given opportunity for discussing the matter; and the ratification of the Prize Court Convention will be postponed until June, 1910"—so that "the nation" is now "afforded" an "opportunity" (which it "probably owes to Sir Edward Grey," and of which it is to be hoped that it will avail itself) "for saner reflection and a determination to restore" to Britain "the full measure of British maritime rights."

⁷ Cp. above, pp. 314 n. 3, 362, 403; and below, pp. 519, 522 (text and n. 5).

⁸ See *Daily Express*, December 7, 1908, p. 5, col. 1; *Morning Post*, December 7, 1908, p. 8, col. 3; *Standard*, December 7, 1908, p. 10, col. 7; etc.

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE AND THE NAVY

December 7, 1908.

A Public Meeting was held at the Drummond Room, Wanstead, Essex, on Dec. 12, 1908, under the auspices of the Wanstead Conservative Association, and with Mr. D. Wintringham Stable, J.P., in the Chair;—when Mr. W. Frewen Lord and Mr. Harold F. Wyatt addressed the Meeting (on behalf of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE) upon the subject of:—"Is Our Naval Supremacy Assured?"

THE IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE AND THE STANDARD OF NAVAL STRENGTH.

December 9, 1908.

Dec. 9, 1908. A discussion on "The Standard of Naval Strength" was held under the Presidency of Lord Cawdor (late First Lord of the Admiralty) at the Royal United Service Institution on Dec. 9, 1908.¹

Mr. L. Graham H. Horton-Smith attended upon behalf of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE, and expressed the views of the LEAGUE upon the question at issue. Those views will be found generally expressed in the foregoing pages,² and Mr. Horton-Smith's speech upon the occasion (as also that of the Right Hon. Sir John Colomb, K.C.M.G.³) will be found printed at length in the *Journal of the R.U.S.I.*, Feb., 1909, pp. 179 sqq. (168 sqq.).

The significant fact to be here recorded is that Mr. Horton-Smith challenged Lord Cawdor to the effect that the Two-Power Standard accepted (in word) by Mr. Asquith, although generally stated by the Press to have been identical with, was in fact vitally less than that defined by Lord Cawdor on Nov. 3, 1906 (above pp. 308 sq., 435 sq.).⁴ Lord Cawdor made no effort to and did not deny the accuracy of the statement made (on behalf of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE) by Mr. Horton-Smith.⁵

¹ For a general account of the discussion see *Daily Express*, December 10, 1908, p. 1, col. 2, and (leading article, "The 'Two-Party' Standard"), p. 4, cols. 4 sq.; *Daily Mail*, December 10, 1908, p. 7, col. 3; *Morning Post*, December 10, 1908, p. 5, col. 2; *Standard*, December 10, 1908, p. 8, col. 6, and (leading article), p. 7, col. 1; *Times*, December 10, 1908, p. 4, col. 1, etc.

² See the Index, *passim*.

³ For whom, see above, pp. 496 sqq.

⁴ And adopted by the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE with the accepted Qualification and Proviso mentioned above, p. 309. See also next note.

⁵ What that standard involved, in addition to battleships, will be found explained above, pp. 476, 477 n. 2, and below, p. 518 sq., by Mr. Horton-Smith in his speech referred to in the text (*Journal of the R.U.S.I.*, February, 1909, p. 181), and by Lord Cawdor himself in his speech as Chairman at the R.U.S.I., December 9, 1908, reprinted in the *Journal of the R.U.S.I.*, February, 1909, pp. 159 sq. (See further, next note.)

⁶ The only reasonable (because the only logical) interpretation of that (as indeed of any) Two-Power Standard will be found emphasised below, p. 518 nn. 8, 9.

GRAVE WARNING FROM
ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET SIR GERARD NOEL

K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

December 9, 1908.

Speaking at the Royal United Service Institution on December 9, 1908,¹ Admiral of the Fleet Sir Gerard Noel, who had (up till only three weeks before) held the great post of Commander-in-Chief at the Nore, gave the British people grave warning of present peril:—

"Another very serious matter with regard to the safety of this country is," he said, "the very large reduction that has taken place in our coast defences, without any adequate defence being put in its place. All mines have been absolutely removed—I speak particularly of the East Coast, which was under my care quite recently. The Thames and Medway defences are very much reduced, and also at the more northern ports certain reductions have been made; *in fact, all seems to tend in the direction of making the North Sea more dangerous to us.* What this country has to look out for in the future is the fact that our rival in commerce, our rival as a great nation, now has its parade ground in the North Sea. It is a very serious matter. Why we should reduce our defences in the North Sea, why we should reduce our coastguard on the East Coast, I cannot understand; *in fact, we seem to be making things easy for them.*"^{2 3}

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE.
PUBLIC MEETING AT CLAPHAM.

December 9, 1908.

A Public Meeting⁴ was held at St. Anne's Hall, Venn Street, Clapham, on Dec. 9, 1908, under the auspices of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE—"To protest against the Destructive Naval Policy of the Present Government."

Major Frank Johnson was in the Chair; and the speakers included Mr. Harold F. Wyatt, Sir Edmund C. Cox, Bart. (President of the

¹ The Meeting already above referred to in the text, p. 513.

² The whole of Sir Gerard Noel's speech (from which the passage quoted in the text is but one extract) will be found printed in the *Journal of the R.U.S.I.*, February, 1909, pp. 161 *sqq.* (and see also *ibid.*, pp. 164, 165).

³ This extract will be found largely quoted in the Manifesto ("Fact;—Why?—Party;—And You?") issued by the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE on February 24, 1909 (cp. below, p. 522 n. 5); which will be found reprinted in full in the *Liverpool Courier*, March 8, 1909; *Liverpool Express*, March 8, 1909;—(in large part) in the *Cambridge Express*, March 12, 1909;—and (in part) in the *Glasgow Herald*, March 9, 1909; *Manchester Courier*, March 8, 1909; *Morning Advertiser*, March 8, 1909; *North Star*, March 9, 1909; *Notts Daily Express*, March 9, 1909; *Southern Times*, March 6, 1909; *Standard*, March 10, 1909, p. 11, col. 2; *Times of India*, April 1, 1909; *Yorkshire Herald*, March 9, 1909; *Yorkshire Post*, March 8, 1909; etc., etc.

⁴ For an account of this Meeting see *Clapham Observer*, December 12, 1908; etc.

Ealing Branch of the LEAGUE), Mr. L. Graham H. Horton-Smith, Dr. Eugene Cronin, and Mr. T. W. H. Briggs.

The following Resolution, proposed by Mr. Wyatt, seconded by Sir Edmund Cox, and supported by Mr. Horton-Smith, was carried unanimously.

THE RESOLUTION.

"That this Meeting views with indignation and alarm the action
"of the Present Government in having sacrificed the safety of the
"nation to their party ends by cutting down naval expenditure, and it
"calls earnestly upon the Unionist Party and its Leaders to denounce
"this policy throughout the country."

ILLUMINATING ADMISSION BY FIRST LORD

December 17, 1908.

On December 17, 1908, Mr. McKenna admitted, in the House of Commons, that the total sum provided by Germany for material upkeep of the German Navy in 1909-10 is £11,942,009;—a figure exceeding (by £720,475) the total sum (namely, £11,221,534), provided in 1908-9 for material upkeep of the British Navy.¹

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE OUR PASSING NAVAL SUPREMACY PUBLIC MEETING AT REDHILL DEMAND FOR INQUIRY

December 16, 1908.

A Public Meeting^{2 3} was held at The Market Hall, Redhill, Surrey, on Dec. 16, 1908, under the auspices of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE.—"To protest against the Destructive Naval Policy of the Present Government, and the Resulting Peril in which the Country is now placed."

Mr. Rowland Hunt, M.P., was in the Chair; and the speakers included (in addition to the Chairman) Mr. Harold F. Wyatt, Mr. L. Graham H. Horton-Smith, and others.

The following Resolution, moved by Mr. Wyatt and seconded by Mr. Horton-Smith, was carried by 700 to 1:—

THE RESOLUTION.

"(1)—That this Meeting draws attention to the fact that the Prime Minister's recent assurances of devotion to the Two-Power Standard

¹ See *Times*, December 18, 1908, p. 9, col. 2.

² "A Great Patriotic Demonstration."

³ For an account of this Meeting see *Daily Express*, December 17, 1908, p. 1, col. 3; *Morning Post*, December 17, 1908; *Standard*, December 17, 1908, p. 11, col. 4; *Surrey Mirror and County Post*, December 18, 1908, p. 2, cols. 5 sq.

"relate solely to the future programme of naval construction, and
"have no reference at all to the question of the present safety of the
"nation, in regard to which it has received solemn warning of danger
"from Lord Roberts and from very many naval and military experts.

"(2)—That to allay the apprehension and anxiety thus caused, this
"Meeting urges the adoption of the recommendation made by the
"two former First Sea Lords—Admiral of the Fleet Sir Frederick
"Richards and Admiral Sir Richard Vesey-Hamilton—that an Inquiry
"should be instituted into the state of the Navy.¹

"(3)—That this Meeting considers it a matter of urgent necessity
"that Supplementary Estimates² should be framed to make good
"recognised deficiencies in the state of the Navy, more particularly
"in respect of medium cruisers, ocean-going destroyers, and dock
"accommodation."

A REVIEW OF THE NAVY FOR THE YEAR 1908

Dec. 31, 1908. "Naval Review of the Year" (1908): "Government
Without a Policy: Some Unkept Pledges";—*Standard*, Dec. 31,
1908, p. 8, cols. 3-4.

¹ See above, pp. 264 *sq.*

² See above, pp. 377, 494, 496, and below, p. 516.

THE YEAR 1909

"OUR MANACLED FLEET"

January, 1909.

Jan., 1909. "Our Manacled Fleet," by "An Admiral with 51 Years' Service";—in *Blackwood's Magazine*, Jan., 1909, pp. 143-150.

"IS INVASION IMPOSSIBLE?"

Jan., 1909. "Is Invasion Impossible?"—Book by Lieut. Alfred C. Dewar, R.N. (Gold Medallist, R.U.S.I., 1903), published by J. Griffin and Co., London and Portsmouth (57 pp.), 1909.¹

"THE SHADOW OF THE GERMAN SWORD"

January, 1909.

Jan., 1909. "The Shadow of the German Sword," by Mr. Harold F. Wyatt (on behalf of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE)²;—in *The Imperialist*,³ January, 1909, pp. 114-117.

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE

PUBLIC MEETING AT CLACTON-ON-SEA

January 11, 1909.

A Public Meeting⁴ was held in The Winter Gardens, Clacton-on-Sea, on Jan. 11, 1909, under the auspices of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE:—"To Protest Against the Passing of Our Naval Supremacy."

¹ Largely quoted in the *Marine Rundschau*, extracted in *Standard*, Feb. 2, 1909, p. 5, col. 3. (See above, p. 421 n. 3, on p. 422.)

² The sub-headings of the article are:—"To the Event" and "To the Great Day"—given as "the Toasts now current in the German Navy"—"The Event" being explained by Mr. Wyatt as "War with England," and the "Great Day" as "The Day on which that War begins."

³ Of Nottingham.

⁴ "A Great Patriotic Demonstration."

⁵ For an account of this Meeting see:—*Daily Telegraph*, January 29, 1909 (s.v. "Clacton"); *East Essex Advertiser and Clacton News*, January 16, 1909, p. 8, cols. 1-4; *Essex County Standard*, January 16, 1909; *Morning Advertiser*, February 4, 1909; *Standard*, February 4, 1909. See also below, p. 518, nn. 1, 2.

The Chair was taken by Dr. W. G. Murray,¹ and amongst those announced to speak (besides the Chairman) were Sir Edmund C. Cox, Bart., Mr. Harold F. Wyatt, and Mr. G. L. Borradaile. Mr. John Smith was also among the speakers.

The following Resolution, proposed by Sir Edmund Cox and seconded by Mr. Wyatt, was carried unanimously in an audience of upwards of 1,500² :—

THE RESOLUTION

"(1)—That this Meeting draws attention to the fact that the Prime Minister's recent assurances of devotion to the Two-Power Standard "relate solely to the future programme of naval construction, and "have no reference at all to the question of the present safety of the "nation, in regard to which it has received solemn warning of danger "from Lord Roberts, and from many naval and military experts.

"(2)—That to allay the apprehension and anxiety thus created this "Meeting urges the adoption of the recommendation made by two "former First Sea Lords—Admiral of the Fleet Sir Frederick "Richards and Admiral Sir R. Vesey-Hamilton—that an Inquiry "should be instituted into the state of the Navy.³

"(3)—That this Meeting considers it a matter of urgent necessity "that Supplementary Estimates⁴ should be framed to make good "recognised deficiencies in the state of the Navy, more particularly "in respect of medium cruisers,⁵ ocean-going destroyers,⁶ and dock "accommodation."⁷ 89

¹ See next note.

² A Clacton-on-Sea Branch of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE was subsequently founded (on January 28, 1909); and Dr. W. G. Murray accepted the Presidency (as also the Chairmanship of the Executive Committee) of the Branch (the latter having met for election of officers, etc., on January 28, 1909). See *Morning Advertiser*, Feb. 4, 1909; *Morning Post*, Feb. 4, 1909; *Standard*, Feb. 4, 1909.—For further work of this Branch (of which Mr. M. Athorpe was elected Hon. Sec.), see *Dovercourt and Harwich News*, April 10, 1909, p. 8, cols. 4 sq., *East Essex Advertiser*, April 10 and 24, and May 1 and 8, 1909.

³ See above, pp. 264 sq., etc.

⁴ See above, pp. 377, 494, 496, 516.

⁵ See above, pp. 341, 496, etc.; below, n. 9; and Index, s.v. "Cruisers."

⁶ See above, pp. 61, 76 sq., 115 sq., 140, 202, 340, etc., and below n. 9.

⁷ In regard further (e.g.) to replacement of stores, see above, pp. 373, 377, 382, 389, 391, 395, 399, 491; and Index, s.v. "Stores."

⁸ The LEAGUE'S views in regard to the number of capital ships necessary to be laid down in 1909-10, "if any attempt is to be made to save our vanishing Two-Power Standard,"—(assuming the correctness of "The Dreadnought theory of the Two-Power Standard," to which "the Opposition committed themselves in the course of the debates on the Navy Estimates," 1908: see *Standard*, January 19, 1909, leading article, p. 6, col. 7, and cp. above, p. 471, n. 3)—will be found above, p. 479 (and cp. in connection herewith, above, s.v., December 9, 1908, p. 513).

But—Numbers of ships alone will not suffice. We have to "think" not in *Ships*, but in *Fleets*. "The great main point is that the Two-Power Standard, if it is to have any relevance to war, must be considered in terms of *Fleets*, not in terms of *Ships* of a particular class" (Mr. H. F. Wyatt in the interview, March 13, 1909, published in *Daily Express*, March 15, 1909, p. 1, col. 2;—and cp. also the *Standard*, March 15, 1909, leading article: "Naval Policy," p. 6, col. 6: "There is one, and only one, reasonable interpretation of the Two-Power Standard: that is, to reckon in *Fleets*."—and *Standard*, March 17, 1909, leading article, p. 6, col. 7, pointing out that in reckoning the Two-Power Standard it is necessary to speak in "terms of fleets: the only logical method," and concluding, "No assurance the Government may give can be regarded as the redemption of the Prime Minister's Pledge which does not provide for the institution and maintenance of two complete sea-going fleets, each of which is superior respectively to the fleets of" [each of] "the two Powers next in order of strength.")

"Dreadnoughts" alone will not suffice (see above, pp. 435, n. 3; 471, n. 3; 513, n. 5; and also next note:—).

⁹ "Our Inadequate Auxiliaries" was the title of the following interview published in the *P.M.G.*, February 25, 1909 ("Extra Late" edition), p. 1, col. 2:—

"At the Head-Quarters of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE it was pointed out how

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE AND THE NAVY

January 16, 1909.

By kind permission of Mr. Walter Reynolds (L.C.C.) and Mrs. Reynolds, a Drawing-room Meeting, in furtherance of the aims of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE, was held on Jan. 16, 1909, at their Residence, Sefton Lodge, Netherhall Gardens, N.W. Sir Edmund C. Cox, Bart., was in the Chair, and an address was given by Mr. H. F. Wyatt.

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE FURTHER ACCESSIONS TO GENERAL COUNCIL

January 16, 1909.

A further Additional¹ List—dated Jan. 16, 1909, and commencing with the Duke of Sutherland, K.G.—was published on Jan. 18, 1909.²

persistently the Government and their supporters in the Press evade the real issue by talking only of *Dreadnoughts*, whereas the necessity for their auxiliaries is just as vital and pressing. In the event of war to-morrow, it was pointed out to our representative, 'our battle-fleet would be crippled owing to the inadequate provision of auxiliaries. What we want to be laid down immediately, besides *Dreadnoughts*, it was stated, 'are 60 ocean-going destroyers and "at the very least "30 medium cruisers, and they ought to be pushed forward with the utmost rapidity."

"*Prepared for Two Naval Wars*" was the title of the following interview published in the *Daily Mirror*, February 27, 1909:—

"The IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE has adopted the Standard of naval strength stated by Lord Cawdor on November 3, 1906:—"Strength adequate to defeat any combination of any two Powers, and, over and above the superiority of force necessary to ensure such defeat, a further 10 per cent. margin for contingencies." Even this Standard, in the League's opinion, should be exceeded as regards cruisers, in which Britain should possess a much greater superiority.—"We believe unreservedly in the maintenance, or rather the creation, of a Two-Power Standard, with the requisite margin," said Mr. Wyatt and Mr. Horton-Smith to the *Daily Mirror* yesterday. "We must be prepared, if the British Empire is to be preserved, to meet a first-class Power in the Pacific, and another simultaneously at home.—It is not merely a matter of *Dreadnoughts*. We want more battleships. But the most urgent need now is to repair the weakness due to the economies of the last three years. With a thoroughly efficient Navy raised to the only Two-Power Standard we recognise Britain may regard herself as safe. We want fleet auxiliaries; docking accommodation on the East Coast; 60 more sea-going destroyers, and "at the very least "30 medium cruisers are absolutely necessary."—Special construction expenditure of £30,000,000, immediately, to be met by a Navy loan, seems the only possible solution. Since 144 Liberal M.P.'s have petitioned Mr. Asquith to keep down the naval estimates, it is not possible to hope that anything but a small part of the necessary outlay can be included in the estimates.—But regarded as a special insurance premium, we believe the nation would realize the necessity for this £30,000,000 expenditure if it were properly instructed, and the loan would unquestionably be taken up readily."

With regard to medium cruisers:—*Thirty* is the very least number to be demanded (see above, in this note). As many as *fifty* are, in fact, needed; and yet the Navy Estimates for 1909-10, issued March 12, 1909, provide for less than an eighth of this number, namely, *six*. (Cp. Mr. H. F. Wyatt in *Daily Express*, March 15, 1909, p. 1, col. 2, and in *Daily Mirror*, March 15, 1909.)

¹ Cp. above, pp. 314, n. 3, 362, 403, 466, 512, and below, p. 522 (text and n. 5).

² See *Cambridge Express*, Jan. 23, 1909; *Daily Express*, Jan. 18, 1909, p. 5, col. 1; *Morning Post*, Jan. 18, 1909, p. 6, col. 7; *Naval and Military Record*, Jan. 25, 1909; *Oxford Times*, Jan. 23, 1909; *Standard*, Jan. 1909; *Times*, Jan. 18, 1909, p. 14, col. 3.

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE AND THE NAVY

January 17, 1909.

Mr. H. F. Wyatt, on behalf of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE, gave an address at Toynbee Hall, on Jan. 17, 1909, upon the subject of :—" *Duty and Patriotism.*"

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE FOURTH LONDON BRANCH¹ FOUNDED AT LEYTONSTONE

January 18, 1909.

A Meeting² was held at the Salisbury Club, Leytonstone, Essex, on Jan. 18, 1908, when, on behalf of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE, Sir Edmund C. Cox, Bart., and Mr. L. Graham H. Horton-Smith addressed the members (by invitation of the Club) on the subject of "*The Navy and the Empire.*"

The Chair was taken by Mr. L. Stanley Johnson, Prospective Unionist Candidate for the Walthamstow Division of Essex, and the speakers included also Mr. C. L. Troup, M.I.M.E., Capt. Knight, and Mr. R. H. Hurley.

A vote of thanks having been accorded to the speakers for the LEAGUE, it was proposed by Capt. Knight and seconded by Mr. R. H. Hurley that a Branch of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE be at once formed in Leytonstone. The Resolution was unanimously carried, and the Leytonstone and District Branch thereupon founded.^{3 4}

¹ For the First and Second London Branches see above, p. 357. The Third London (the North-East London) Branch of the LEAGUE was formed in June, 1908, with Mr. Frank McMurtrie as its Hon. Secretary.

² For an account of this Meeting see *Leyton Express and Independent and Essex County Record*, January 23, 1909, p. 8, col. 1; *Leytonstone and District Times*, January 23, 1909 (and see also next note).

³ See *Morning Post*, January 20, 1909; *Standard*, January 20, 1909, p. 6, col. 6.

⁴ A Second Meeting was held at the Salisbury Club, Leytonstone, Essex, (under the auspices of the Leytonstone and District Branch of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE on Jan. 29, 1909, when (by request of the Club) Mr. L. Graham H. Horton-Smith, F.S.A. Scot., gave an address on:—" *The necessity of the Imperial Maritime League and the Work which it is carrying out.*" Mr. C. L. Troup, M.I.M.E., was in the Chair, and the speakers included also Mr. H. Curtis, Mr. R. J. Elmhirst, Mr. J. Humphries, Mr. R. H. Hurley, Mr. H. Johnson, and Mr. J. R. Shelley. At this Meeting (for an account of which see *Eastern Mercury*, Feb. 9, 1909, p. 3, col. 3 and *Leytonstone and District Times*, Feb. 5, 1909, p. 11, col. 4) Mr. C. L. Troup, Mr. R. H. Hurley and Mr. J. R. Shelley were elected Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and Hon. Secretary, respectively of the Executive Committee of the Leytonstone Branch of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE (see *Leytonstone and District Times*, *ibid.*).

BRITISH AERIAL LEAGUE FOUNDED

January, 1909.

Jan., 1909. "Aerial League of the British Empire" Founded.—See *Standard*, Jan. 21, 1909, p. 3, col. 6.¹ 2

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE
AND THE NAVY*January 18, 1909.*

A Meeting³ 4 was held at the Conservative Club, Gravesend, Kent, under the Chairmanship of Alderman T. G. Sandford, J.P., on Jan. 18, 1909, when Mr. Harold F. Wyatt, on behalf of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE, gave an address on the subject of:—"The Navy and Our Colonies."⁵ 6

THE IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE AND
THE IMPERIAL COLONIAL CLUB
"OUR PASSING NAVAL SUPREMACY"*January 20, 1909.*

A Meeting⁷ was held at the Imperial Colonial Club, Piccadilly, London, W., on Jan. 20, 1909—under the presidency of Sir Edmund C. Cox, Bart., Member of the Executive Committee (as also President of the Ealing Branch) of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE—when Mr. W. Frewen Lord, the historian, Vice-Chairman of the LEAGUE, and (by special invitation as guests of the Club) Mr. Harold F. Wyatt and Mr. L. Graham H. Horton-Smith, Joint-

¹ Cp. above, p. 441, n. 11 (on p. 442).

² For the views of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE in regard to the "Command of the Air," see above, p. 427, n. 3. Until the "Command of the Air" surpasses and supersedes the "Command of the Sea," the latter remains, and must remain, the first and most immediate concern of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE. But (as already stated above, p. 427, n. 3):—"To win and hold Command of the Air may be in coming time perforce" its "substituted aim."

³ For an account of this Meeting see *Gravesend and Dartford Reporter*, January 23, 1909, p. 5, col. 1, and *Gravesend and Northfleet Standard*, January 22, 1909, p. 5, col. 4.

⁴ The LEAGUE thus holding Meetings on the subject of the Navy in two different localities on one and the same night.

⁵ By request of the Club, Mr. Wyatt addressed the members again on January 27, 1909. See below, p. 524.

⁶ See further below, p. 524, n. 2.

⁷ For an account of this Meeting see *Daily Express*, January 21, 1909, p. 5, col. 1; *E.S. and S.J.G.*, January 21, 1909; *Manchester Courier*, January 21, 1909; *Morning Advertiser*, January 21, 1909; *Morning Post*, January 21, 1909, p. 5, col. 3; *Naval and Military Record*, January 28, 1909, p. 61, cols. 3 sq.; *Standard*, January 21, 1909, p. 8, col. 1.

Founders and Joint Honorary Secretaries of the LEAGUE, addressed the Meeting upon the subject of:—"Our Passing Naval Supremacy."

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE
BRANCH FOUNDED IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA.

January 21, 1909.

A Branch of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE has been founded at Adelaide (S. Australia) on Jan. 21, 1909;—C. Reissmann, Esq. M.D. (Cantab.), being appointed Hon. Secretary.¹

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE
AND THE NAVY

January 23, 1909.

By kind permission of Mr. and Mrs. Boyd Browning, a Drawing-room Meeting in furtherance of the aims of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE, was held on Jan. 23, 1909, at their Residence in Norwood, the speakers including Mr. H. F. Wyatt and others.

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE
FURTHER ACCESSIONS TO GENERAL COUNCIL
"LEAGUE OF ADMIRALS" 2

January 23, 1909.

A further Additional³ List—dated Jan. 23, 1909, and commencing with Admiral C. C. Penrose Fitzgerald⁴ (and showing no less than **23 Admirals**⁵ upon the General Council of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE)—was published on Jan. 25, 1909.⁶

¹ See *Morning Post*, March 3, 1909; *Pall Mall Gazette*, March 3, 1909; *Standard*, March 5, 1909.

² See also above, pp. 349, n. 1, 362, n. 5, and below, nn. 5, 6.

³ Cp. above, pp. 314 (n. 3), 362, 403, 466, 512, 519, and below, n. 5, and p. 523 (n. 11, on p. 524).

⁴ For whom see above, pp. 335, 362, 428, 459, 488.

⁵ This was increased to:—**24 Admirals** by February 22, 1909.—(See:—(a) *E. S. & S. J. G.*, Feb. 22, 1909; below, p. 523, n. 11 (and *cp.* p. 525); (b) the Manifesto of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE ("*Fact* ;—*Why* ?—*Party* ;—*And You* ?"), dated Feb. 24, 1909, referred to above, p. 514, n. 3; and (c) the Additional List, commencing with the Earl of Dundonald and Rear-Admiral C. D. Lucas, V.C., published in *Daily Express*, March 6, 1909; *Northern Whig*, March 6, 1909; *Standard*, March 6, 1909; *Weekly Budget*, March 13, 1909.)

⁶ See *Daily Express* (s.v. "League of Admirals"), January 26, 1909; *Daily Telegraph*, January 25, 1909; *Hampshire Telegraph*, January 30, 1909; *Morning Post*, January 25, 1909, p. 7, col. 1; *Naval and Military Record*, January 28, 1909, p. 53, col. 4; *Nottingham Guardian*, January 25, 1909; *Scotsman*, January 25, 1909; *Weekly Budget*, February 6, 1909; etc.

FOREIGN SAILORS IN BRITISH SHIPS

Jan. 27, 1909. "Foreign Sailors in British Ships";—Letter (dated Jan. 26, 1909), by Mr. A. J. de Havilland Bushnell (Member of the General Council of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE), in *Morning Post*, Jan. 28, 1909, p. 3, col. 5, and *Standard*, Jan. 28, 1909, p. 11, col. 3;—pointing out that "in December last" (1908) "the startling fact was published that in the last 15 years out of 29,000 men added to our ships only 512 were white British subjects; of the rest about half were of the Lascar type, and the remainder, about 14,000, were foreigners":—and suggesting remedies, whereby to increase the proportion of *British* (as opposed to "*foreigners*") in the British Mercantile Marine.¹ *la*

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE AND THE NAVY
FOUNDATION OF JUNIOR BRANCH OF THE LEAGUE

January 27, 1909.

The IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE has to thank Mrs. W. Frewen Lord, wife of the well-known Historian,² and herself a well-known authoress,³ for the foundation (on its First Anniversary⁴) of a Junior Branch of the LEAGUE,⁵ which already comprises a very large number of adherents,⁶—the *First Hundred* of whom have been granted special privileges at the hands of the LEAGUE'S Executive Committee.⁷ *8 9 10 11*

¹ An interesting article on the same topic, entitled "Britannia's Bulwarks," from the pen of Mr. A. G. Cowie (author of "The Sea Services of the Empire as Fields for Employment") will be found in *The Englishman*, Jan. 20, 1909, pp. 293 *sq.*

^{1a} The LEAGUE'S principles on this subject will be found above, pp. 310 *sq.*

² Mr. W. Frewen Lord, for whom see above, pp. 442, 443, 459, 469, 470, 488, 500 *sq.*, 509, 510, 513, 521, and below, p. 526.

³ And a member of the Ladies' Council of the LEAGUE (for which see below, n. 11).

⁴ Jan. 27, 1909. See below, p. 527. (The Kaiser's 50th Birthday, *cf.* above, p. 305, n. 1.)

⁵ "A far-reaching measure":—to cite the appreciation of its foundation and its work, as given by the *Standard* and *E.S. & S.J.G.* on April 15, 1909.

⁶ See *Morning Post*, Feb. 2, 1909; *People*, Feb. 7, 1909; *Standard*, Feb. 2, 1909; and *cf.* also *E.S. & S.J.G.*, Feb. 25, 1909, p. 15, cols. 2 *sq.*; *P.M.G.*, March 2, 1909; etc.

⁷ The Letterpress (from the pen of Mrs. Lord), endorsed on the back of the subscription cards of membership of this Branch, well merits perusal. The cards themselves (a description of which will be found in the *E.S. & S.J.G.*, February 25, 1909, p. 15, cols. 2 *sq.* and *P.M.G.*, March 2, 1909) have been "entered at Stationers' Hall";—and the Letterpress (wherein to quote the *E.S. & S.J.G.*, *l.c.*, "each member can read in simple language the meaning of patriotism, and the practical methods in which he or she can help") will be found reprinted in part in *Morning Advertiser*, April 16, 1909.

⁸ "Many of the Public School Headmasters are taking up the idea, and there is no reason why the Headmistresses of Private Schools, as well as of High Schools, should not put the subjects of national importance in a much more prominent position in a girl's education than they occupy at present." *E.S. & S.J.G.*, Feb. 25, 1909, p. 15, col. 3.

⁹ For later reference to the Junior Branch and its work, see:—*Daily Express*, April 15, 1909, p. 5, col. 4; *E.S. & S.J.G.*, April 15, 1909 (above, n. 5); *Manchester Courier*, April 16, 1909; *Morning Advertiser*, April 16, 1909 (above, n. 7); *Morning Post*, April 15, 1909, p. 4, col. 5; *Naval and Military Record*, April 22, 1909; *Queen*, April 24, 1909; *Standard*, April 15, 1909 (above, n. 5); *Unionist and Tariff Reformer*, April 24, 1909; *Yorkshire Herald*, April, 16, 1909; etc.; etc.

¹⁰ The First Number of the Publications of this Branch of the LEAGUE appeared in March, 1909;—the subject being "Lord Rodney." The Second, in April, 1909:—"Lord Exmouth." The Third, in May, 1909:—"Empire Day."

¹¹ The "enormous interest" aroused by "the appeal, over the signature of Lady St,

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE AND THE NAVY.

January 27, 1909.

By request of the Conservative Club, Gravesend, Kent,—and to signalise the close of the first year of the action and activity of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE—Mr. Harold F. Wyatt (on behalf of the LEAGUE) gave a second¹ address to the members, the subject chosen being :—"The State of the British Navy."²

TRIBUTE TO THE IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE

BY A PROMINENT MEMBER OF THE OLD NAVY LEAGUE.

January, 1909.

Jan., 1909. "Canada and the British Navy";—by Capt. Clive Phillipps-Wolley, President of the Victoria and Esquimalt Branch of the Old Navy League, *National Review*, Feb., 1909, pp. 961-9; commencing as follows :—

"The pamphlet which has recently reached this Pacific Coast, from the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE,³ contains either a statement of facts, which would almost warrant a revolution against the present Government of Great Britain, or a tissue of falsehoods, so grave as to justify

Continuation of note on p. 523.

Helier, on behalf of the Ladies' Council of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE" (referred to above, p. 523, n. 3), is well described in the issue of the *E.S. & S.J.G.*, Feb. 25, 1909 (mentioned above, p. 523, nn. 6, 7, 8), p. 15, cols. 1-5.

The letter in question ("Women and the Navy: An Appeal to Patriotism"), signed by Lady St. Helier as "President of the Ladies' Council" of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE, and bearing date Feb. 19, 1909, will be found published in the :—*Bedford Standard*, Feb. 27, 1909; *Belfast News Letter*, Feb. 22, 1909; *Bolton Evening Chronicle*, Feb. 22, 1909; *Broad Arrow*, Feb. 27, 1909; *Civil Service Gazette*, March 6, 1909; *Daily Express*, Feb. 22, 1909, p. 4, col. 5; *E.S. & S.J.G.*, Feb. 22, 1909 (the latter containing further an interview with Mr. H. F. Wyatt, incidentally showing that the LEAGUE "now has 24 Admirals on its Council," *cp.* above, p. 522, n. 5); *Glasgow Herald*, Feb. 22, 1909; *Gosport Journal*, March 4, 1909; *Hearth and Home*, March 4, 1909; *Liverpool Courier*, Feb. 22, 1909; *Midland Daily Telegraph*, Feb. 20, 1909; *Morning Post*, Feb. 22, 1909; *Naval and Military Record*, Feb. 25, 1909; *Northern Whig*, Feb. 22, 1909; *Portsmouth Times*, Feb. 27, 1909; *Sheffield Telegraph*, Feb. 22, 1909; *Standard*, Feb. 22, 1909, p. 7, col. 5; *Times of India*, March 18, 1909; *Western Morning News*, Feb. 22, 1909; etc.; etc.

It was published also (in part) in *Daily Graphic*, Feb. 23, 1909; *Daily Telegraph*, Feb. 23, 1909; and *cp.* also *Newcastle Daily Chronicle*, Feb. 24, 1909; *Pall Mall Gazette*, Feb., 1909.

Lady St. Helier had already—at a Meeting of the Ladies' Council of the LEAGUE, held on February 12, 1909—been elected to and had accepted the Presidency (and Miss G. E. Wyatt the Hon. Secretaryship) of the Ladies' Council. See *Lady's Pictorial*, February 18, 1909; *Morning Post*, February 13, 1909, p. 6, col. 7; *Standard*, February 13, 1909; *Times*, February 13, 1909, p. 12, col. 4.

¹ For the earlier address see above p. 521.

² Under the auspices of the Imperial South African Association, a Public Meeting was subsequently held at Gravesend, on February 3, 1909 (with Mr. Robson in the Chair), when Mr. Wyatt gave yet another address (from the point of view of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE) upon the subject of :—"The Navy and the Colonies."

³ *I.e.*—The pamphlet dated November 14, 1908, and reprinted above, pp. 473-481.

any punishment which could be inflicted upon its authors. The man at a distance cannot be expected to appreciate the alleged facts, but the names on the roll of the LEAGUE, which issues the pamphlet, are such, that the *statement must, until disproved, be accepted as the finding of sane and loyal men, after full and careful consideration.*¹ The Empire of Great Britain, all and every part of it, rests, in the last event, upon the maintenance of her Sea-power, and this pamphlet states that by false economy on the part of the present Government, *Britain has almost been reduced to a position of Naval and Military impotence.*¹ That at least is the way which men, 6,000 miles away from the heart of Empire, will read the message, and *Lord Roberts's recent speech adds weight to it.*¹

"The unfortunate split in the Navy League² may perhaps introduce some element of doubt into their decision, but so far, those who are most loyal to the old League, in the hope of a reconciliation at no distant date, cannot blind themselves to the fact that *the younger body "becomes stronger every day."*¹³ Surely if both parties . . . really have their great object at heart,⁴ it should be possible for them to heal the breach, . . . even though the price of such a reconciliation be *an Admission of Error on the part of the Older Body.*^{15 67}

¹ The italics are ours.

² The split may or may not have been unfortunate ;—Opinions may differ. But in any case the split was one for which the Old Navy League was, itself alone, to blame (see above *passim*, and below, Index, *s.v.* "Old N.L.").

³ For instance, no less than **24 Admirals** have already joined its Council. (See above, pp. 522, n. 5, 523, n. 11). And see this Book, *passim* ;—especially pp. 314, n. 3, 362, 403, 466, 512, 519, 522 (text and nn. 5, 6). Cp. also above, pp. 487 *sq.*

⁴ "If"—and the Old Navy League!—Adequate comment may be found above *passim*. And cp. further, below, n. 7.

⁵ The emphasis of the type is ours.

⁶ If the Empire is to be saved and the Old Navy League to have any hand in its salvation, the price must be fully that which Capt. Philipps-Wolley himself would seem to suggest. In the interests of the Empire that price alone can heal the breach. *But ;—The Old Navy League still refuses the price.*

⁷ Together with a strong tribute to the work which the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE had accomplished, the position of the Old Navy League was appropriately and accurately summed up by the *Standard*, April 23, 1909, p. 9, col. 3 (already referred to above, p. 506 n. 3), as follows :—"Those responsible for the direction of the policy of that Organisation" (the Old N.L.) had been and "were far too ready to accept the patronage of the Admiralty and to find excuses for Admiralty action."

The subservience of the Old N.L. is strikingly referred to again, by *John Bull*, May 8, 1909, p. 1. In its consideration of what it terms "The 'Inquiry' Commission" (to which reference is made in the succeeding note)—and after offering Lord Charles Beresford its "*particular*" congratulations on "his success in keeping Lord Esher off it," for the reason that :—"Lord Esher has already earned a reputation for uncompromising support of Sir John Fisher" [see Index, *s.v.* "Esher"], "and for him to have occupied the chair of the Committee would have been to turn the whole thing into a whitewashing concern"—*John Bull* (*l.c.*) concludes as follows :—

"We are not at all sure that it may not turn out to be something of the kind" (*i.e.*, a whitewashing concern), "as it is, *The First Sea Lord already has too many emissaries in high places. Nothing but their most careful cultivation could have kept the* [Old] *Navy League, for instance, so docile as it has been for the last two years.* In January, "1907," [in consequence of the insistence of Messrs. Wyatt and Horton-Smith, who were still at the time members of the Old N.L.'s Executive Committee : cp. above, p. 484], "they demanded an Inquiry into Admiralty policy ; but they *dropped it suddenly like a hot brick*" [on finding that they would meet with opposition from Sir John Fisher, see above, p. 484], "and Sir John Fisher's representatives on the Committee have served him very faithfully ever since. By means of this description, and by the constant refusal of information in the House of Common

"THE LOST EMPIRE OF ENGLAND—(?)"

January, 1909.

Jan., 1909. "The Lost Empire of England (?)":—A brilliant article by Mr. W. Frewen Lord (Jan., 1909), in the *Nineteenth Century and After*, Feb., 1909, pp. 230-240; in the course of which we read:—

"On the other side of the account what is there? This much "discernible:—(1) That the Tariff Reform League grows daily stronger; "(2) *That the Imperial Maritime League has arisen, and "is doing vital work in regard to the Navy which No "Other Organisation is attempting*¹; and (3) That the efforts "of the National Service League (over which Lord Roberts presides) "are visibly producing great effect. Also that, wherever we go, we "find a rising tide of anger and alarm at the danger to which our "country is exposed by the maladministration of the present "Government."

the nation has been kept in ignorance of the state of the Fleet upon which it depends and for which it pays. We hope" (*John Bull's* italics) "it will get the truth at last—but we are not sanguine."

Indeed, from the fateful day in November, 1906 (Nov. 22, 1906, to be exact), when Mr. Seymour Trower, Chairman of the Old N.L.'s Executive Committee, permitted himself to repair to the Admiralty and there to fall completely under the dominating influence of Admiralty ideas and the Admiralty Board, the doom of the Old Navy League was sealed. The Great Split of 1907 followed (see above, pp. 52 *sqg.* and *passim*); and the blood of the Old N.L. lies in chief on the head of Mr. Trower himself (see above, pp. 52, 191). We resigned in May 1907, as a protest against the Old N.L.'s inactivity in face of its own official admissions (see above, pp. 52 *sqg.*). From that time onward the Committee of the Old N.L. has completely lost its head in the pride of Admiralty patronage, which it has not had the wits to resist. Its representatives have held frequent conference with the Admiralty itself, whereby all criticism was judiciously disarmed and all effective public usefulness of the Old N.L. extinguished. Has not the Old N.L. been rightly termed "Sir John Fisher's Navy League"? (see above, pp. 286, 289, 296).

No wonder, now, the Great Split of 1907. No wonder, now, the Old N.L.'s continued and egregious failure in its most sacred duty. No wonder its loss of membership in consequence, and its "piteous appeal for help" in its distress (Jan. 1908, above p. 295). No wonder the foundation of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE (above, pp. 305 *sqg.*), to do the duty which the Old League thus had tossed aside. No wonder the Old N.L. has since—and ever more and more—lost caste. No wonder it has had to sell out all its bonds (see its *Annual Report* for 1908, p. 8). No wonder that by the end of 1908 its available balance was but £27 os. 3d. (*ibid.*, p. 9). No wonder the thinking public trusts it no longer, and has transferred its allegiance to the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE, a League which exists but to subserve the cause of the British Navy and therewith of the British Empire—a vital and a fighting Organisation whose single motto is "God and my Country," and whose single service is devoted to its single master, "Duty." The Old has had to give place almost entirely to the New. And in the New alone is there hope of the Country's salvation.

¹ Cp. further, *Standard*, April 23, 1909, p. 9, col. 3:—"This new body" (the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE) "has increased in strength and influence every day," and "has rendered most valuable service to the nation in exposing the weakness of the Fleet and the faults of Admiralty policy, and in pressing for the Inquiry which has, at last, been granted." (Cp. also *Standard*, April 23, 1909, leading article, "The Naval Inquiry," p. 8, col. 6.)

The Inquiry so referred to by the *Standard* was granted by Mr. Asquith on April 22, 1909. Tentative only and incomplete though it be,—and though in the hands of men who by the nature of the case are "judges in their own cause"—it yet concedes, by its very grant, the entire principle for which the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE has in this regard been fighting from the day of its inception (above, pp. 313 *sq.*); and now that the Government have placed their foot upon the lowest rung of the Ladder of Inquiry, they must be forced to mount that Ladder to its top.

FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF
THE IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE.
AUGURY FOR THE FUTURE.

January 27, 1909.

Jan. 27, 1909. A date signalling the close of the first year of the work of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE—a year significant of the LEAGUE's success, despite all obloquy and all opposition :—a year, moreover, of splendid augury for the future of the LEAGUE in the best interests of that for which alone it exists, the maintenance of the Sea-Supremacy of the British Empire, and therewith the maintenance of the British Empire itself.

**May the LEAGUE be yet in Time
To Save the Empire!**



Lord God of Hosts! Be with us yet!

★ ★ ★

Judge of the Nations! Spare us yet!

★ ★

Lest we Forget!—

Lest we—

Forget!



The Imperial Maritime League

What it stands for and the Old Navy League does not

May, 1909.

As there has been recent allusion in the Press to the possibility of the amalgamation of the Old Navy League with the Imperial Maritime League, it becomes necessary to point out (though assuredly in no factious spirit) the actual points of difference between our policy and theirs.

1. The Imperial Maritime League strongly advocates the institution of an immediate, impartial, independent, and searching Inquiry into the present state of the whole Navy.

The Old Navy League does *not*.

2. The Imperial Maritime League urges the establishment of a Department of Strategy within the Admiralty.

The Old Navy League does *not*.

3. The Imperial Maritime League lays stress upon the necessity of a great increase in the number of fleet auxiliaries—e.g., of medium cruisers, ocean-going destroyers, &c., to the battle fleets.*

The Old Navy League does *not*. It has even declared its entire contentment, in an official letter to the Press (dated the 15th March), with the miserably inadequate provision shown in the present Estimates:—"With the cruiser and destroyer programme the Navy League has no fault to find."

4. The Imperial Maritime League holds that the Two-Power Standard, if it is to have any relevance to war, must be construed in terms, not of ships, but of fleets; and that this Standard therefore involves the institution and maintenance of two complete sea-going fleets, which are respectively superior to the fleet of each of the two Powers, next in order of strength, against which they are respectively matched.

The Old Navy League does *not*.

5. The Imperial Maritime League deems the reorganisation of the Board of Admiralty, with a change in its present *personnel*, an imperative national need—a need which, unless satisfied, will render nugatory all other efforts to restore to Britain her almost lost naval supremacy.

The Old Navy League does *not*.

We would point out that during two years past the Old Navy League has consistently supported and defended the policy of Sir John Fisher, whom the Imperial Maritime League believes to be the evil genius of the Navy. The published words of the Old Navy League are, "We back Sir John Fisher"; "We accept Sir John Fisher's assurance without demur"; and, again, they have declared that "The assurance of the Admiralty must be accepted."

The Imperial Maritime League, to sum up the matter, considers that the present Government is dominated by ideas incompatible with national existence, and the League accordingly appeals to the House of Lords to throw out the Budget, as the best practical means of saving the country.

The Old Navy League has *no* such thought, and *no* such wish.

It will be seen that these are vital differences, involving points on which the safety of the country depends.

HAROLD F. WYATT,

L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH,

Joint Honorary Secretaries.

* The number of our medium and small cruisers actually available for service in home waters is *thirty*, as against *forty* German vessels capable of such service.

The number of our ocean-going destroyers with sufficient steaming capacity for work in the North Sea off the German coast does not exceed *forty*, as against *seventy-eight* German destroyers specially built for work in that sea.

Enrolment and Bankers' Order Forms will be found overleaf.

Telephone:—
2810 Victoria.

Telegrams:—
"Maritimers, London."

THE IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE

Founded to secure the maintenance of
British Sea-Power

27 January
1908

To:— 190.....

Messrs. WYATT and HORTON-SMITH,

HON. SECRETARIES,

Imperial Maritime League,

2 Westminster Palace Gardens,

Westminster, London, S.W.

Please enrol me as a..

*

.....
of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE,
for which I enclose.....

value *£ : s. d., being the amount of my
first annual subscription to the League.

Name.....

Address.....

.....
*See over.

IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE

The objects of the League may be shortly summarised as follows, namely:—

To secure that the primary object of the National Policy shall be to win and hold Command of the Sea.

The creation of a Strategy Department within the Admiralty with authority in matters strategical.

The maintenance of a Navy fully up to the "Two-Power" Standard, as defined by Lord Cawdor (late First Lord of the Admiralty) on the 3rd November, 1906, and fulfilling the additional needs of the Empire in regard to cruisers;—and, further, the maintenance of such Navy in an indubitably efficient state.

To carry to fulfilment the "general aims" of the old Navy League in their widest application.

The consideration by Parliament of the best means of reducing, so far as may be reasonable and practicable, the foreign element in the British Mercantile Marine, and of improving the position and prospects of the mercantile officer and man, without casting any additional burden upon the British shipowner.

Advocacy of all means which shall tend to unite and simplify the action of Great Britain and of the kindred Nations throughout the Empire in all matters of defence, sea-borne trade, and commerce.

Rates of Subscription

HON. VICE-PRESIDENTS (Ladies and Gentlemen)	{ £25 0 0 life payment
	{ £5 5 0 annual "
MEMBERS	{ £10 10 0 life "
	{ £1 1 0 annual "
ASSOCIATE-MEMBERS	10 6 annual "
ASSOCIATES	5 0 annual "
SUPPORTERS (Working Men and Women)	1 0 annual "

DONATIONS:—OF ANY AMOUNT.

All those who sympathise with these great ends are asked to **HELP** towards their attainment **BY JOINING** the Imperial Maritime League.

£₀*

*I request you to pay to Lloyds Bank, Limited,
222 Strand, London, W.C., for the credit of the
IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE, the Sum of £ : :
now and on the corresponding day in each succeeding year
until further notice.*

£ : s. : d.

(Signature)

*N.B.—If a Branch of a Bank, kindly specify the address of the Branch.

FORM OF LEGACY

TO THE IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE

"I bequeath to the Treasurer or Honorary Treasurer for the time being (as the case may be) of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE, upon trust for the general purposes of such LEAGUE, and to be used according as the Executive Committee of such LEAGUE shall from time to time direct, the sum of £ , and I direct and declare that the receipt of the Treasurer or Honorary Treasurer for the time being (as the case may be) of the IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE shall be a sufficient discharge to my Executors for the same."

THE IMPERIAL MARITIME LEAGUE

Founded for the Maintenance of
British Sea-Power

27 January
1908

Telephone:—
2810 Victoria.

Telegrams:—
"Maritimers, London."

Offices:—
2, Westminster Palace Gardens,
Westminster,
London, S.W.

Amongst those who have already joined either the Council or the Committee (or both) of the Imperial Maritime League are the following¹:—

Mr. H. M. Adler.

Mr. W. H. Allen.

Mr. Henry Allhusen, late M.P.

The Earl of Altamont.

Lord Ampthill, G.C.I.E., G.C.S.I.

Lord Auckland.

Capt. Sir Alfred T. Bagge, Bart., R.N.

The Rev. G. C. Bell, late Head-Master of
Marlborough.

Sir Arthur Bignold, M.P.

Mr. John G. G. Birkett.

Mr. Ralph D. Blumenfeld.

The Rev. Canon Bonney, F.R.S.

Mr. H. E. M. Bourke, R.N.

Col. Sir Charles G. Boxall, K.C.B., V.D.

Mr. W. B. Boyd-Carpenter, F.R.G.S.

The Hon. Charles Brand, M.F.H.

Sir Frederick Bridge, M.V.O.

Major-General T. F. Dunscomb Bridge, R.M.,
A.D.C.

Mr. W. Clive Bridgeman, M.P.

Rear-Admiral R. F. Britten.

¹ The names of *all* members of the League's Council and Committee will be found in the Index. See Preliminary Note 4 thereto.

Sir Eric Buchanan, Bart.

The Rev. R. D. Budworth, Head-Master of
Durham.

Capt. C. Percy Bushe, R.N.

Viscount Castlereagh, M.V.O., M.P.

Admiral J. Halliday Cave, C.B.

The Rev. Canon Chappel, Head-Master King's
School, Worcester.

Mr. H. W. Chatterton.

Vice-Admiral A. C. Clarke, C.M.G.

Mr. H. T. Clarke, L.C.C.

Vice-Admiral Basil E. Cochrane.

Lt.-Col. the Hon. Francis L. L. Colborne.

Mr. G. L. Courthope, M.P.

Sir Edmund C. Cox, Bart.

Admiral Sir St. G. C. D'Arcy Irvine, K.C.B.

General Davidson.

The Duc de Lousada, Commr. R.N.

The Earl of Denbigh, C.V.O.

Sir Albert de Rutzen (Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate).

General Denis de Vitré, R.A.

The Rev. S. A. Donaldson, Master of Magda-
lene, Cambridge.

Admiral Sholto Douglas, C.B.

Admiral Sir William M. Dowell, G.C.B.

Mr. Arthur Du Cros, M.P.

Mr. W. Harvey Du Cros, late M.P.

Lord Dunboyne.

Col. the Hon. Hubert E. V. Duncombe, D.S.O.,
late M.P.

Lt.-Gen. The Earl of Dundonald, C.B., K.C.V.O.

Lord Ebury.

Sir Whittaker Ellis, Bart., late M.P., and late
Lord Mayor of London.

Mr. John E. Elmslie, M.I.N.A.

Capt. A. J. Errington, R.N.

Major Sir William E. Evans-Gordon, late M.P.

Lt.-Col. H. Everitt, R.M.A.

Capt. Walter V. Faber, M.P.

Sir Leslie E. P. R. Falkiner, Bart.

Rear-Admiral Sir Adolphus A. F. FitzGeorge,
K.C.V.O.

Admiral C. C. Penrose FitzGerald.

Mr. Patrick J. Ford.

Col. N. P. Fowell, R.A.
Mr. P. C. Gates, K.C.
Mr. H. Martin Gibbs.
Mr. C. Tyrrell Giles, K.C.
Lt.-Col. A. Gilmore.
Col. A. H. Gleadowe-Newcomen, C.I.E., V.D.,
A.D.C.
Maj.-Gen. R. Temple Godman.
Mr. H. C. Gooch, M.P.
Gen. Sir James Graham, K.C.B., R.M.L.I.
Maj.-Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.C.B.
Capt. Ernest Gray, L.C.C., late M.P.
Mr. C. E. Groves, F.R.S.
Mr. E. N. Gulick.
Mr. H. A. Gwynne.
Mr. Rupert Gwynne.
His Honour Judge H. B. Hans Hamilton.
Viscount Hardinge.
The Hon. Claude G. D. Hay, M.P.
Col. James Hay, C.B.
Bt.-Col. Alfred Heathcote, R.E.
Mr. H. S. Hele-Shaw, F.R.S., LL.D.,
M.I.Mech.E.
Sir John R. Heron-Maxwell, Bart.
Lt.-Col. W. Heron-Maxwell.
Capt. The Hon. Archibald R. Hewitt, R.N.
Mr. A. J. L. Hill.
Mr. Eric Hoffgaard.
Rear-Admiral Henry L. Holder.
Mr. G. W. Holtzapffel.
Sir Joseph D. Hooker, O.M., G.C.S.I.
The Rev. J. J. Hornby, D.D., D.C.L., C.V.O.,
Provost of Eton.
Mr. L. Graham H. Horton-Smith, F.S.A.Scot.
Mr. R. H. Horton-Smith, K.C.
Maj.-Gen. Wm. Howey.
Mr. George Hubbard.
Mr. Rowland Hunt, M.P.
Admiral Sir Walter J. Hunt-Grubbe, G.C.B.
Capt. J. E. Hunter, R.N.
Sir John Jackson, F.R.S., LL.D.
Mr. Ernest Jardine.
Major F. Johnson.
Sir Walter Johnson.
Rear-Admiral J. P. Jones-Parry.

Capt. Sir John Keane, Bart.
Col. W. Keays.
Capt. M. L. Kelham, R.N.
Lord Kesteven.
Sir Henry Kimber, Bart., M.P.
Mr. S. King-Farlow.
The Earl of Kinnoull.
The Earl of Kintore, P.C., G.C.M.G.
Mr. G. R. Lane-Fox, M.P.
Mr. P. Ogden Lawrence, K.C.
Rear-Admiral Robert O. Leach.
Lord Leconfield.
The Rev. Chancellor Lias, D.D.
Lt.-Col. Lt. W. Longstaff, F.R.G.S.
Rear-Admiral Sir Lambton Loraine, Bart.
The Earl of Lovelace.
Sir Francis W. Lowe, M.P.
Rear-Admiral C. D. Lucas, V.C.
Col. James M. McCalmont, M.P.
The Hon. Ronald Macdonald.
Capt. Charles McLaughlin, R.N.
Macpherson of Cluny.
Professor Mahaffy, C.V.O.
The Earl of Malmesbury.
The Earl of Mar.
Mr. J. E. Marr, F.R.S.
Mr. E. Marshall-Hall, K.C., late M.P.
Sir Spencer Maryon-Wilson, Bt., of Eastborne.
Sir Kenneth J. Matheson, Bart.
Col. F. N. Maude, C.B.
Mr. E. G. B. Maxse, C.M.G., F.R.G.S.
Mr. John T. Middlemore, M.P.
Sir Charles S. Milburn, Bart.
Sir Lewis Molesworth, Bart., F.R.G.S., late M.P.
Major-General Wm. E. Montgomery.
Mr. T. W. Moore, F.R.G.S.
Mr. Walter Morrison, late M.P.
Lord Mostyn.
Lord Muskerry, late R.N.
Sir W. Lennox Napier, Bart.
The Duke of Newcastle.
Admiral Sir Henry F. Nicholson, K.C.B.
The Earl of Norbury.
The Marquis of Ormonde, K.P., P.C.
Gen. Sir John F. Owen, K.C.B.

Sir J. Balfour Paul, LL.D.
The Hon. William R. L. Peel, M.P.
The Earl of Pembroke, P.C., G.C.V.O.
Rear-Admiral John L. Perry.
Vice-Admiral James A. Poland.
Rear-Admiral G. N. A. Pollard.
Dr. Pollock, M.V.O., Master of Wellington, and
a V.-P. Old Navy League.
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Col. A. S. Pratt, C.B.
General Sir Harry N. D. Prendergast, G.C.B.,
V.C.
Capt. Henry T. Price, R.N.
Mr. J. F. P. Rawlinson, K.C., M.P.
Dr. Cecil Reddie.
Mr. Walter C. Renshaw, K.C.
Mr. Walter Reynolds, L.C.C.
Mr. H. A. Rigg, K.C.
Col. Sir Howland Roberts, Bart., V.D.
The Earl of Romney.
Mr. P. Rose-Innes.
The Earl of Rosslyn.
Mr. J. A. Scrimgeour.
The Earl of Seafield.
Sir Henry Seton-Karr, C.M.G., late M.P.
Mr. Frederic Shelford, M.Inst.C.E.
Lord Sherborne.
Viscount Sidmouth, late R.N.
Mr. H. F. Morland Simpson, Rector of Aberdeen
Grammar School.
Lord Sinclair.
The Ven. Wm. Sinclair, D.D., Archdeacon of
London.
Rear-Admiral U. C. Singleton, C.B.
The Marquis of Sligo.
Mr. Thomas H. Sloan, M.P.
Col. W. G. Small, C.B.
Mr. F. E. Smith, K.C., M.P.
Mr. H. S. Staveley-Hill, M.P.
Mr. Pembroke S. Stephens, K.C.
The Duke of Sutherland, K.G.
Sir Frank A. Swettenham, K.C.M.G.
Lord Teynham.
Mr. G. W. Thomson, of the African Banking
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Mr. B. D. Turner, Head-Master of Loughboro'.
 Dr. Sidney Turner.
 Admiral F. S. Vander-Meulen.
 Col. W. Hall Walker, M.P.
 Vice-Admiral J. B. Warren.
 Mr. T. H. Warren, Vice-Chancellor of Oxford.
 The Rev. R. Waterfield, Principal of Cheltenham.
 The Marquis of Waterford, K.P.
 Sir Philip H. Waterlow, Bart.
 Mr. Robert Weatherburn, M.I.Mech.E.
 Lt.-Gen. Thos. E. Webster.
 Major Cecil Wedgwood, D.S.O.
 Sir George White, Bart. (Past-President Bristol
 Stock Exchange).
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 Mr. J. W. Wilson, M.Inst.C.E., M.I.Mech.E.
 The Earl Winterton, M.P.
 Mr. Maurice Woods.
 Admiral H. T. Wratislaw.
 Mr. Harold F. Wyatt.
 Sir Charles Wyndham.
 The Rt. Hon. George Wyndham, M.P.
 Col. Charles E. Yate, C.S.I., C.M.G.;

And many other distinguished men,—including
 well-known writers such as : —

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 Professor Edward Dowden.
 Sir Arthur Conan Doyle.
 Mr. Percival A. Hislam.
 Mr. F. T. Jane.
 Mr. Rudyard Kipling.
 Mr. Jas. Stanley Little.
 Mr. W. J. Locke.
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 Mr. F. W. Lucas.
 Mr. W. E. Norris.
 Mr. J. Holt Schooling.
 Professor Walter W. Skeat.
 Mr. R. Bosworth Smith.
 Mr. G. S. Street.
 Mr. Charles Whibley.
 Mr. H. W. Wilson;

And representatives, generally, of most spheres of thought and action.

It will be observed that this list comprises no less than ***Twenty-Three*** Naval Officers of Flag Rank.¹

HAROLD F. WYATT, •
L. GRAHAM H. HORTON-SMITH,

*Founders
and Joint Honorary Secretaries.*

4 June, 1909.

¹ The late Admiral Sir Charles G. Fane, K.C.B., was also a Member of the League's Council up till the time of his death.

INDEX

PRELIMINARY NOTES

(1) *This Index has been arranged under upwards of 2,000 main headings, each in alphabetical order; but in view of the rapid and kaleidoscopic changes not only in regard to the British Navy but also in regard to those of other Powers, it has been thought more useful to arrange the matters mentioned under such main headings, in an order approximately of date.*

(2) *In order to curtail length, this Index draws no distinction between the Authors' statements and statements quoted from others. The responsibility for all and any of the latter statements is that of their own authors.*

(3) *Abbreviations will be found explained, each in its own alphabetical order.*

(4) *The letters "C.," "G.C.," and "L.C.," after a name indicate Membership of the "Committee," the "General Council," and the "Ladies Council," respectively, of the Imperial Maritime League. (Cp. also above pp. 529 sqq.)*

(5) *The letters "R.F." succeeding any item, indicate a reference to the pages of the "Sequence" which follows the "Preface" at the commencement of the Book, as also to other preliminary pages similarly numbered with Roman Figures.*

(6) *Wherever the letters "q.v." appear in this Index, they indicate a reference to a heading entitled as of the word or words which immediately precedes or precede such letters.*

(7) *Any "Addenda" to this Index will be found at its close.*

(8) *For the authorship of this Index see below s.v. "This Index."*

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	—		—

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